Swift & Certain - Volume II, Number 4, 2004

Recent Firearms Related Supreme Court Rulings

In prosecuting gun violence-related arrests, prosecutors are often confronted with complex and lengthy defense motions designed to weaken the state’s case. If the arrest includes charges of illegal drug possession or indicia of gang involvement, defense counsel normally files a motion to suppress to preview portions of the state’s case and exclude compelling or prejudicial evidence against the defendant. A key challenge in many motions to suppress stems from claims involving the defendant’s Miranda rights and whether they were properly administered. If successful on Miranda challenges, a defendant may keep critical evidence from the jury or move to have the case dismissed in its entirety. Other defense challenges often focus on allegations of unlawful search and seizure practices. The U.S. Supreme Court recently handed down several decisions involving firearms that clarify the application of Miranda and the scope of searches incident to arrest.

Miranda Warnings

U.S. v. Samuel Patane, 124 S.Ct. 2620 (June 2004): During the investigation of a temporary restraining order violation, officers learned that Patane possessed a pistol, and further that he was a convicted felon. Officers went to Patane’s home to arrest him on the restraining order violation. While officers were advising him of his Miranda rights, Patane interrupted and informed them that he understood his rights. After this interruption, the officers did not attempt to complete the Miranda warning. Officers then asked about the alleged pistol. When Patane initially was reluctant to discuss the pistol for fear it would be taken from him, the officers persisted and were informed that the pistol was in his bedroom. Patane directed officers to its location, and they found and seized a .40 Glock pistol. Patane was later indicted in federal court as a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. He filed a motion to suppress the firearm evidence, arguing that the officers lacked probable cause to arrest him, or in the alternative, that the firearm should be suppressed as the fruit of an unwarned statement.

The district court granted his motion on the sole theory that the officers lacked probable cause to make the arrest. The Tenth Circuit reversed this decision but affirmed the suppression motion on Patane’s theory that the firearm was indeed the fruit of an unwarned statement. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to hear arguments regarding whether the failure to give a suspect the full warnings outlined in Miranda requires the suppression of the physical fruits of an unwarned but voluntary statement.

In June, the Supreme Court reiterated that the Miranda rule is used to protect against violations of the Self-Incrimination Clause; however, self-incrimination is not implicated by admitting into evidence the fruit of a voluntary statement. Therefore, Patane’s interrupting the officers’ attempt to articulate Miranda, and subsequently making an unwarned confession regarding the location of the pistol, did not trigger Miranda’s constitutional warning requirement. The Court held that the firearm was rightfully admitted into evidence.

Yarborough v. Alvarado, 124 S.Ct. 2140 (June 2004): Alvarado, a minor, participated with another individual in attempting to steal a truck. This attempt resulted in the death of the truck’s owner. Alvarado was brought by his parents to the local police station where he was interviewed outside the presence of his parents by law enforcement. The interview lasted almost two hours, during which Alvarado changed his story several times. He was not advised of his Miranda rights at any time during the interview. Ultimately, he stated that he helped try to steal a truck but that another male shot the owner. Alvarado then hid the gun. Alvarado was given the opportunity to take breaks during the interview and at its conclusion went home with his parents. Later, he was indicted for murder and attempted robbery. He filed a motion to suppress his interview statements because he had not been apprised of his Miranda rights. The lower court denied his motion, holding that he was not in custody for Miranda purposes during his station interview. He was convicted. He appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which reversed this denial.

Upon a writ of certiorari, Warden Michael Yarborough appealed the Ninth Circuit’s decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. After hearing arguments, the Court determined that, while it was arguable whether minor Alvarado was in custody at the time of his interview, the state court’s determination that he was not in custody was based on a proper application of Supreme Court precedent. The general test to determine whether an individual is in custody for purposes of pre-interrogation advisement of rights involves the objective circumstances of the interview. However, the lower court’s failure to weigh Alvarado’s age and inexperience was not an unreasonable omission of the clearly established Miranda requirement. The Ninth Circuit’s ruling was reversed.

Search and Seizure

Thornton v. U.S. 124 S.Ct 2127 (2004): A uniformed law enforcement officer driving an unmarked police car observed Thornton, who was driving a Lincoln Town Car, slow down to avoid driving next to him. The officer suspected that Thornton recognized he was an officer and was trying to avoid contact with him. The officer pulled to the side of the road and, as Thornton passed, ran a check on the Lincoln’s tags, which indicated they had been issued to a Chevy two-door. Before the officer was able to pull Thornton over, Thornton drove into a parking lot, parked and got out of the Lincoln. The officer asked Thornton for his driver’s license, and informed him the displayed tags did not match his vehicle.

During contact with the uniformed officer, Thornton appeared to be nervous, rambled and licked his lips. The officer asked Thornton if there were any narcotics or firearms in the Lincoln, and Thornton replied that there were none. For safety purposes, the officer asked if he could pat Thornton down, to which Thornton agreed. During the pat-down, the officer felt a bulge in Thornton’s left front pocket and inquired whether Thornton had any drugs on his person. Thornton replied that he did and, reaching into his pocket, removed two individual bags. The first bag contained three smaller baggies of marijuana and the other bag contained a large amount of crack cocaine.

The officer secured and arrested Thornton and, during an inventory search of the Lincoln, located a handgun stuffed under the driver’s seat. Thornton was indicted on three charges stemming from this incident, and defense counsel tried to suppress the firearm as fruit of an unconstitutional search. Thornton’s motion was denied. He was later convicted on all three counts and sentenced to 180 months in federal prison with eight years of supervised release.

After the defendant had exhausted the federal appellate process, the Supreme Court agreed to hear Thornton’s argument that the recovered firearm was the result of an unlawful search of the Lincoln after his detention and arrest outside his vehicle, in violation of the Court’s previous rulings in New York v. Belton, 101 S.Ct. 2860 (1981). In Belton, the Court ruled that when a police officer makes a lawful custodial arrest of an automobile’s occupant, the Fourth Amendment permits the officer to search the vehicle’s passenger compartment as a contemporaneous incident of arrest. Thornton contended that Belton was limited to those incidents in which the officer initiated contact with a suspect – later arrestee – while the suspect was still in the vehicle. Since Thornton voluntarily exited the Lincoln, he asserted that the search of his vehicle and discovery of the handgun were illegal.

The Court disagreed with Thornton, ruling that Belton includes those instances where the officer does not make contact until the person who is subsequently arrested has exited the vehicle. Thus, whether an arrestee exits a vehicle at the officer’s direction or whether the officer initiates contact while the arrestee is still in the vehicle, a post-arrest search is valid and evidence seized can be admitted into evidence.