U.S. Supreme Court

Out of State Arraignment of Detainee Results in Dismissed Charges

Alabama v. Michael Herman Bozeman, 121 S.Ct. 2079; 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4310 (2001). Defendant, incarcerated in a federal prison in Florida, was transported to Alabama for arraignment on a firearms charge and returned to his original place of imprisonment. This process took one day. One month later, he was returned to Florida to stand trial at which time his counsel moved that the charges be dismissed on the basis of an Article IV (e) violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD).

The IAD established a uniform procedure for lodging and executing a detainer, thus requiring a state to hold an in-state imprisoned individual after he has concluded serving a sentence so that he may be transported to another jurisdiction to face different charges. In its application to defendant, the agreement stipulates that when a state obtains a prisoner for trial purposes, it must try him within 120 days of his arrival in that jurisdiction. The agreement further states that if the borrowing jurisdiction returns him to his original place of confinement prior to trial, that charges “shall” be dismissed with prejudice.

The trial court denied defendant’s request and defendant was tried and convicted. On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court’s authority to try the defendant. The Alabama Supreme Court reversed this ruling and applying the literal language of the agreement, required dismissal of the firearms charges against the defendant.

The United States Supreme Court, in further review, held that the plain meaning of the agreement’s language, coupled with defendant’s pretrial return to his original place of confinement, barred further criminal proceeding on these charges by the receiving state. Alabama argued that the short time defendant appeared for arraignment and appointment of counsel amounted to a de minimus violation of the agreement that was merely technical and harmless. Further, the state argued, defendant’s appearance for pretrial purposes was helpful, not harmful.

The United States Supreme Court failed to accept the state’s position and ruled the agreement’s use of the word “shall” indicated the ordinary language of a command and was absolute. Further, in affirming the Alabama Supreme Court’s ruling, the United States Supreme Court held any pretrial benefit to the defendant resulting from his Alabama appearance was a policy argument best addressed by the individual state legislatures.

Arresting Officer’s Subjective Intentions Irrelevant in Ordinary, Probable-Cause Fourth Amendment Analysis

Arkansas v. Kenneth A. Sullivan, 121 S.Ct. 1876; 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4118 (2001). Defendant was stopped for a traffic violation. After requesting routine documentation from the defendant, the officer realized he had professional knowledge regarding defendant’s drug activities. When defendant opened his car door in an attempt to locate additional identification information, the officer noticed a rusted hatchet on the car floorboard. Defendant was arrested for several violations and placed in a second officer’s squad car.

During an inventory search of defendant’s vehicle, officers located a bag of suspected methamphetamine as well as several items of suspected drug paraphernalia. Defendant claimed his arrest was merely a pretext and violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. The trial court granted defendant’s motion and suppressed the evidence seized. The state filed an interlocutory appeal and the Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed. The state petitioned for a rehearing arguing the court erred by assessing the arresting officer’s subjective motivation and failed to follow the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in Whren v. U.S., 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996) which held officers’ ulterior motives to be irrelevant as long as a probable cause for the traffic stop exists. The state’s request for rehearing was denied with the court calling the arrest pretextural and made for the purpose of searching the defendant’s car. Alternatively, the Arkansas Supreme Court ruling indicated an interpretation of the U.S. Constitution that provided greater protection than that afforded by the United States Supreme Court’s federal constitutional precedents in violation of Oregon v. Hass, 95 S.Ct. 1215 (1975).

The United States Supreme Court ruled the Arkansas holding to be “flatly contrary” to the Court’s well-settled ruling in Whren. In noting the Arkansas Supreme Court failed to question the arresting officer’s authority to make the arrest for the initial traffic violation, the United States Supreme Court reiterated its position in Whren stating that an arresting officer’s subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis. Reversed and remanded.

Unconstitutionality of Jury Instruction Not Applied Retroactively

Melvin Tyler v. Burl Cain, Warden, 121 S.Ct. 2478; 2001 U.S. LEXIS 4909 (2001). Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder for killing his 20-day-old daughter during an argument with his girlfriend. His conviction was affirmed on appeal and he unsuccessfully filed five post-conviction relief petitions. His federal habeas petition was also denied. After the Unites States Supreme Court’s decision in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) (per curiam) holding that a jury instruction is unconstitutional if there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury understood the instruction to allow conviction without proof beyond a reasonable doubt, petitioner renewed his efforts believing the jury instruction used in his trial was substantially similar to that found unconstitutional in Cage. He filed a sixth petition raising a Cage claim. This petition was denied by the state district court and the Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed this ruling. He continued his efforts before the Fifth Circuit by filing a second habeas corpus application that granted his petition allowing him to file a habeas petition in district court.

The district court held that while Cage could be applied retroactively, in this case petitioner was not entitled to collateral relief, having failed to make a showing that the state court’s decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the United States Supreme Court.” The court of appeals, while affirming this ruling, noted the district court erred by failing to determine whether petitioner “satisfied AEDPA’s (Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996) successive habeas standard.” AEDPA allows a federal court to award relief to second or successive habeas corpus applications if the claim is predicated on newly discovered facts which raise a question as to the validity of the guilty verdict or relies on new rules of constitutional law. Petitioner relied on this later exception which required a prerequisite showing that the claim arose from a new rule of constitutional law, the rule must have been made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the United States Supreme Court, and the claim must have been previously unavailable.

Petitioner argued the term “made” indicated the retroactive application of a new rule of constitutional law should occur whenever the principles of the United States Supreme Court’s decisions, as interpreted at the appellate level, were believed to be appropriate. The United States Supreme Court, however, determined the plain meaning of “made” to be “held” and thus reasoned that the retroactive application to cases on collateral review could be accomplished only when it explicitly so held. The Court declined to apply Cage retroactively to cases on collateral review through this case.

State Cases

Failure to Respond to On-Going Discovery Demands Results in Reversal

Barry Hoffman v. State of Florida, No. SC94072; 2001 Fla. LEXIS 1360 (2001). Petitioner pled guilty to two counts of first-degree murder and entered into a plea agreement with the state regarding his sentencing in exchange for his truthful testimony at the trial of a co-defendant for the contract killing organized by a high level drug dealer. The evidence implicating defendant in the murders included his fingerprints found on a package of cigarettes found in the victims’ hotel room and his confession. At the trial of his co-defendant, Hoffman denied killing either victim. The state withdrew from the plea agreement and at trial, Hoffman was convicted on one count each of first and second degree murder and one count of conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree.

Defendant’s conviction was affirmed by the Florida Supreme Court. Defendant filed a motion to vacate raising claims of Brady violations. This motion was denied by the trial court. He sought post conviction relief which was denied. On appeal from this denial, defendant raised a Brady claim alleging the trial court erred on several grounds including the state’s withholding exculpatory evidence. Defendant claimed that had he known of this evidence, there would have been a reasonable probability the result of the trial would have been different. The evidence defendant claimed was withheld included an exculpatory hair analysis of hair found on the female victim’s hands. This analysis excluded the defendant, his co-defendant and the male victim.

In response, state contended that it disclosed the existence of the analysis to defense counsel and that such disclosure should have placed defendant on notice of any other evidence flowing therefrom. The record indicates defendant filed a demand discovery motion to which the state promptly responded that there were scientific reports available concerning the autopsy, fingerprinting, blood and hair analysis. The report that indicated the hair analysis of the evidence found in the victim’s hands did not match the defendant was not available until sometime after the state’s discovery response. The state essentially argued that defense counsel should have inquired further once told of the existence of other hair analyses.

Whether defendant was present in the hotel room during the murder was an important issue for the jury to resolve. Thus, the Florida Supreme Court concluded, any evidence which tended to prove or disprove this fact would have been highly probative, and given the other evidence presented, could have changed the outcome of the trial. The court concluded in part, this Brady violation severely compromised defendant’s right to a fair trial and required reversal thus rendering the court’s determination of his other claims moot. Reversed and conviction set aside.

Victim-Witness Advocate’s Notes Protected as Work Product

Commonwealth v. Bing Sial Liang. 747 N.E. 2nd 112 (2001). The defendant was charged with counts of assault and threatening to commit a crime and violating an abuse protection order. Prior to trial, the defendant filed a motion for production of the notes of the victim-witness advocate who spoke with the complaining witnesses. The motion judge ordered the commonwealth to produce the notes to defense counsel and the commonwealth appealed with a written request for a stay of compliance pending appeal. Additionally the commonwealth requested two different judges issue a stay. However, no action was taken by these judges. Ultimately, the commonwealth filed a petition to the Massachusetts Supreme Court requesting the motion be vacated.

The defendant argued that victim-witness advocates do not perform a legal function and therefore their notes are not likely to contain legal research, opinions, theories or conclusions which might qualify them as legitimate work product. The court, however, found the advocates to be with the governing statute’s definition of “prosecutor” and concluded such advocates are generally employees of the prosecution. Further, the court stated the information contained in the advocates’ notes would have been protected as work product had the prosecutor gathered it. Therefore, unless the advocates’ notes contain exculpatory evidence or witness statements, such notes are protected as work product. The commonwealth has an affirmative duty to review these notes and inquire regarding conversations with victims. Case remanded with an order to vacate the discovery order.

Federal Cases

Media Statements and False Crime Report Deemed Prosecutorial Misconduct

Leonard Milstein v. Stephen Cooley, Robert Foltz, County of Los Angeles, U.S. Court of Appeals 257 F. 3rd 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16082 (2001). Defendant, defense attorney, successfully represented a client in two counts of murder. Consequently, he alleged prosecutors conspired to deny him due process and subjected him to malicious prosecution by soliciting false testimony against him on a charge of subornation of perjury, offering false documents and solicitation of bribery. The lower court ruled the prosecutors were entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for the acts of fabricating evidence, filing a false crime report, investigating the purported crime and making statements to the media.

The defense attorney claimed assistant district attorneys approached an incarcerated defense witness after trial to induce him to agree to testify falsely against counsel and the witness agreed. The assistants then filed a crime report listing themselves as the complaining witnesses or crime victims. An investigator working for the assistants then investigated the alleged crime and a grand jury indictment was obtained. Plaintiff claimed the assistants acted as advisors to the grand jury instead of complaining witnesses and in so doing mislead, misadvised and mischaracterized the evidence against the plaintiff to the grand jury. This indictment was dismissed.

Defense counsel then alleges the assistants brought a criminal complaint signed by a third party in order to avoid appearing before a grand jury again. This complaint resulted in an arrest warrant and reprosecution via an information. At a re-arraignment, both assistants argued to oppose the re-appointment of Milstein’s prior counsel who had successfully argued for the dismissal of the previous grand jury indictment. At trial, Milstein was convicted. Following the trial, assistant Foltz commented to the press “That’s what you get when you step over the line.”

Milstein’s appeal was dismissed with prejudice on the ground of absolute prosecutorial immunity and he sought relief through a Ninth Circuit appeal, alleging in addition to the earlier charges, claims that the assistants acted as advisors to the grand jury, their opposition to reappointment of his original counsel and making false statements to the press.

The U.S. district court responded to Milstein’s claim regarding the assistants’ grand jury conduct that a prosecutor has the duel role for both pressing for an indictment and being a grand jury advisor, with the later role taking precedence in the case of conflict. If the assistants had been acting as advisors rather than advocating, they would not be entitled to absolute immunity. Here, however, Milstein did not argue the assistants were acting as advisors instead of advocates.

On the claim of opposing the reappointment of Milstein’s original counsel, the court stated that the assistances’ appearance in court to argue a motion was the quintessential act of advocacy and therefore Milstein’s allegations regarding the assistants’ motives was irrelevant.

Finally, on the issue of statements made to the media, the court concluded that “(a)bsolute immunity does not protect prosecutors from comments they made to the media,” however, in this case, the court did not express an opinion as to whether the alleged comments gave rise to a valid claim.

The district court’s dismissal was affirmed regarding absolute prosecutorial immunity in securing the grand jury indictment, securing both the information and arrest warrant and opposing the re–appointment of counsel. The court’s ruling was reversed and remanded regarding the claims of fabricating evidence, making a false crime report, investigating the purported crime and making statements to the press.

Forced Medically Appropriate Treatment Does Not Violate Liberty Interest

U.S. of America v. Russell Eugene Weston, Jr., 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001); 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16851 (2001). On July 24, 1998, an allegedly armed Weston forced his way past security checkpoints at the U.S. Capitol where he shot and killed two U.S. Capitol Police Officers and seriously wounded another. A district court accepted the findings of the court-appointed forensic psychiatrist and found defendant incompetent to stand trial. Weston was thereafter incarcerated “for treatment” at a federal correctional institute. However, Weston was not given treatment for his diagnosed conditions, but kept in solitary confinement and kept under constant observation. Through administrative and district court hearings, the government obtained an order authorizing it to administer antipsychotic medication to Weston against his will determining such medication was “medically appropriate” and essential for his safety or the safety of others.

A court panel found that the district court had failed to make a finding supported by the record regarding Weston’s dangerousness. Further the panel reversed the district court’s determination that his Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial was not ripe stating that “because antipsychotic medication may affect the defendant’s ability to assist in his defense, postmedication may affect the defendant’s ability to assist in his defense, postmedication review may come too late to prevent impairment of his Sixth Amendment rights.” Additionally, the district court was directed to consider whether medical ethics precluded forcibly medicating a defendant to make them competent for trial in a potential capital case.

On remand, the district court again found the Bureau of Prisons was entitled to forcibly medicate Weston, determining the medication was medically appropriate and essential to control and treat his dangerousness to others.

On appeal, the defendant claimed a Fifth Amendment violation of his due process liberty interest in administering the drugs against his will and causing unwanted bodily intrusion. Further, he claimed such forced medication implicated his right to a fair trial.

In reaching its ruling, the court reiterated the holding in Kansas v. Hendricks 117 S.Ct. 2072 (1997) which concluded that such liberty interest in avoiding unwanted antipsychotic medication may be “significant,” however, it is not absolute, and further, that when “medically appropriate” the government may forcibly administer such medication to a prisoner or criminal defendant.

The court concluded that while there was no basis to believe defendant’s worsening condition would render him more dangerous, the government had a valid interest in administering antipsychotic drugs to make Weston competent for trial and that this interest overrode Weston’s liberty interest. Further, it ruled that restoring his competence through medication did not violate his right to a fair trial. Affirmed.