Statutory Compilation Regarding Child Homicide Statutes

March 2013

Scope
This document is a comprehensive compilation of child homicide statutes from U.S. state, territorial, and the federal jurisdictions. It is up-to-date as of March 2013.

For further assistance, consult the National District Attorneys Association’s National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse at 703.549.9222, or via the free online prosecution assistance service http://www.ndaa.org/ta_form.php.

*The statutes in this compilation are current as of March 2013. Please be advised that these statutes are subject to change in forthcoming legislation and Shepardizing is recommended.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alaska</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arkansas</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>California</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Colorado</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## ALABAMA

- ALA. Code § 13A-6-1 (2013). Definitions. ................................................................. 15
- ALA. Code § 13A-6-29 (2013). Administration of medication by owner, operator, or employee of licensed or statutorily exempt child care facility. .................................................. 16

## ALASKA

- Alaska Stat. § 11.41.100 (2013). Murder in the first degree. ................................... 17
- Alaska Stat. § 11.56.765 (2013). Failure to report a violent crime committed against a child. 19

## ARIZONA


## ARKANSAS


## CALIFORNIA

- Cal. Penal Code § 190.2 (2012). Death penalty or life imprisonment without parole; special circumstances. ................................................................. 40
- Cal. Penal Code § 273Ab (2012). Assault resulting in death, comatose state, or paralysis of child under §; imprisonment. ................................................ 43
- Cal. Penal Code § 12022.95 (2013). Willful harm or injury resulting in death of child; sentence enhancement; procedural requirements. .................. 43

## COLORADO


## CONNECTICUT

- Connecticut. ...................................................................................................................... 48

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
Iowa Code § 707.2 (2013). Murder in the First Degree. ................................................. 95
Iowa Code § 707.7 (2013). Feticide. ................................................................. 95

KANSAS

KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5402 (2012). Murder in the first degree. ........................................ 97

KENTUCKY

KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.040 (2012). Manslaughter in the second degree. .................. 100
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.020 (2012). Fetal homicide in the first degree ................. 100
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.030 (2012). Fetal homicide in the second degree .......... 100
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.040 (2012). Fetal homicide in the third degree .......... 101
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.050 (2012). Fetal homicide in the fourth degree ......... 101
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.060 (2012). Death sentence prohibited. .................... 101
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.030 (2012). Concealing birth of infant ......................... 101

LOUISIANA

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2012). First degree murder. ........................................ 101
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31 (2012). Manslaughter ............................................... 104
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32 (2012). Negligent homicide ..................................... 104
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5 (2012). Feticide defined; exceptions ..................... 106
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.6 (2012). First degree feticide ................................ 106
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.7 (2012). Second degree feticide ............................. 107
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.8 (2012). Third degree feticide ............................... 107

MARYLAND

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-303 (2012). First degree murder -- sentencing procedure -- death penalty ........................................ 109
MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-601 (2012). Child abuse ..................................... 115

MASSACHUSETTS

ASS. ANN. LAW CH. 272, § 22 (2013). Concealment of death of child born out of wedlock 119
ASS. ANN. LAW CH. 279, § 69 (2013). Aggravating and mitigating circumstances in death penalty cases ........................................ 120

MICHIGAN

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750-135A (2012). Leaving child unattended in vehicle posing unreasonable risk of harm or injury to child. ........................................ 121
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600-2922A (2012). Issue; concealment of death by mother ............ 122
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750-150 (2012). Issue; concealment of death by unmarried woman .... 123
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750-316 (2012). First degree murder; definitions ........................ 123
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.322 (2012). Manslaughter; wilful killing of unborn quick child ... 124
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750.323 (2012). Manslaughter; death of quick child or mother from use of medicine or instrument .......................... 124

MINNESOTA

Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (2013). Murder in the first degree ........................................ 124
Minn. Stat. § 609.20 (2013). Manslaughter in the first degree ............................. 125
Minn. Stat. § 609.205 (2013). Manslaughter in the second degree .................... 126
MISSISSIPPI

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-4 (2012). ALLOWING CHILD DELIVERED IN FAILED ABORTION TO DIE; PENALTIES. ................................................................. 129
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21 (2012). MURDER AND CAPITAL MURDER, PUNISHMENT. .................................................. 130
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-25 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER, PUNISHMENT. ................................................................. 130
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-27 (2012). FELONY MANSLAUGHTER DEFINED. ............................................................ 131
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-29 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER AS KILLING DURING OTHER CRIME OR MISDEMEANOR. ................................................................. 131
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-31 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER, RESISTING UNLAWFUL ACT. .................................................. 131
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-33 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER, INVOLUNTARY KILLING DURING TRESPASS. .................................................. 131
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-35 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER, HEAT OF PASSION. ................................................................. 131
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (2012). INJURY TO PREGNANT WOMAN RESULTING IN MISCARRIAGE OR STILLBIRTH; “HUMAN BEING” DEFINED; CRIMES; EXCEPTIONS. .................................................. 131
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-47 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER, GENERAL. ................................................................. 132

MISSOURI

MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2012). LIFE BEGINS AT CONCEPTION—UNBORN CHILD, DEFINED—FAILURE TO PROVIDE PRENATAL CARE, NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR ........................................................................................................ 132
MO. REV. STAT. § 188.035 (2012). DEATH OF CHILD ABORTED ALIVE DEEMED MURDER IN SECOND DEGREE, WHEN. ................................................................. 133
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2012). FIRST DEGREE MURDER, PENALTY—PERSON UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE NOT TO RECEIVE DEATH PENALTY. ................................................................. 133
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.021 (2012). SECOND DEGREE MURDER, PENALTY. ................................................................. 133
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.023 (2012). VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, PENALTY—UNDER INFLUENCE OF SUDDEN PASSION, DEFENDANT’S BURDEN TO INJECT. ................................................................. 134
MO. REV. STAT. § 565.024 (2012). INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, PENALTY. ................................................................. 134
MO. REV. STAT. § 568.060 (2012). ABUSE OR NEGLECT OF A CHILD, PENALTY. ................................................................. 136

MONTANA

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (2013). DELIBERATE HOMICIDE. ................................................................. 138
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103 (2013). MITIGATED DELIBERATE HOMICIDE. ................................................................. 138
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-104 (2013). NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. ................................................................. 138
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-106 (2013). VEHICULAR HOMICIDE WHILE UNDER INFLUENCE. ................................................................. 139
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-627 (2013). RITUAL ABUSE OF MINOR—EXCEPTIONS—PENALTY. ................................................................. 139

NEBRASKA

NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-390 (2012). APPLICABILITY OF SECTIONS. ................................................................. 140
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-391 (2012). MURDER OF AN UNBORN CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE; PENALTY. ................................................................. 141
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-392 (2012). MURDER OF AN UNBORN CHILD IN THE SECOND DEGREE; PENALTY. ................................................................. 141
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-393 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER OF AN UNBORN CHILD; PENALTY. ................................................................. 141
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-394 (2012). MOTOR VEHICLE HOMICIDE OF AN UNBORN CHILD; PENALTY. ................................................................. 141

NEVADA

MURN. STAT. § 609.2662 (2013). MURDER OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE SECOND DEGREE. ................................................................. 127
MURN. STAT. § 609.2663 (2013). MURDER OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE THIRD DEGREE. ................................................................. 127
MURN. STAT. § 609.2664 (2013). MANSLAUGHTER OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE. ................................................................. 127
MURN. STAT. § 609.2665 (2013). MANSLAUGHTER OF UNBORN CHILD IN SECOND DEGREE. ................................................................. 128
MURN. STAT. § 609.268 (2013). INJURY OR DEATH OF UNBORN CHILD IN COMMISSION OF CRIME. ................................................................. 128
MURN. STAT. § 617.22 (2013). CONCEALING BIRTH. ................................................................. 128

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.033 (2011). CIRCUMSTANCES AGGRAVATING FIRST DEGREE MURDER. ................................................................. 144
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.050 (2011). "VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER" DEFINED. ........ 146
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.080 (2011). PUNISHMENT FOR VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER ................................................................. 147
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.090 (2011). PUNISHMENT FOR INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER ................................................................. 147
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.220 (2011). TAKING DRUGS TO TERMINATE PREGNANCY; PENALTY. ........ 147
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.150 (2011). CONCEALING BIRTH; PENALTY. ..................... 148

NEW HAMPSHIRE .............................................................................................................. 148
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630: 3 (2013). NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE. ................................. 152

NEW JERSEY ...................................................................................................................... 161
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-3 (2013). MURDER ................................................................. 162
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5.1 (2013). LEAVING THE SCENE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT ........................................................................ 166

NEW MEXICO .................................................................................................................... 167
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-22 (2012). REPORTS OF SPONTANEOUS FETAL DEATH. .......... 167
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (2012). MURDER. ............................................................... 167
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER. .................................................... 168
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-3 (2012). CRIMINAL ABORTION .............................................. 168
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5A-3 (2012). PROHIBITION OF PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS. .... 168
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-18-15 (2012). SENTENCING AUTHORITY; NONCAPITAL FELONIES; BASIC SENTENCES AND FINES; PAROLE AUTHORITY; MERITORIOUS DEDUCTIONS. .............................................. 169
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-101 (2012). HOMICIDE BY VEHICLE; GREAT BODILY HARM BY VEHICLE. ................................................................. 171
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-207.1 (2012). MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS INVOLVING A SCHOOL BUS; INVESTIGATION BY A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER CERTIFIED AS AN ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTIONIST. .............................. 172

NEW YORK ..................................................................................................................... 172
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (2013). HOMICIDE DEFINED. ............................................... 172
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (2013). HOMICIDE, ABORTION AND RELATED OFFENSES; DEFINITIONS OF TERMS. ............................................ 172
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.10 (2013). CRIMINALLY NEGLECTFUL HOMICIDE. ................................. 173
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.11 (2013). AGGRAVATED CRIMINALLY NEGLECTFUL HOMICIDE. ............... 173
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.12 (2013). VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE. ............. 173
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.13 (2013). VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER IN THE FIRST DEGREE. ................. 174
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.14 (2013). AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE. ........................................ 175
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.15 (2013). MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE. .......................... 176
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.20 (2013). MANSLAUGHTER IN THE FIRST DEGREE. .................................. 176
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.21 (2013). AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE. .............. 176
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.22 (2013). AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER IN THE FIRST DEGREE. ............... 176
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (2013). MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE. ........................................... 177
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.26 (2013). AGGRAVATED MURDER. ............................................................. 178
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (2013). MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE. .............................................. 179
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.40 (2013). ABORTION IN THE SECOND DEGREE. ......................................... 181
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.45 (2013). ABORTION IN THE FIRST DEGREE. ............................................ 181
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.50 (2013). SELF-ABORTION IN THE SECOND DEGREE. ............................. 181
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.55 (2013). SELF-ABORTION IN THE FIRST DEGREE. .............................. 181

NORTH CAROLINA .................................................................................................................. 182
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-301. (2013). DUTY TO REPORT ABUSE, NEGLECT, DEPENDENCY, OR DEATH DUE TO MALTREATMENT. .............................................. 182
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2902 (2013). DISCLOSURE IN CHILD FATALITY OR NEAR FATALITY CASES. .... 182
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-17 (2013). MURDER IN THE FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE DEFINED; PUNISHMENT. 184
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-18 (2013). PUNISHMENT FOR MANSLAUGHTER. ........................................ 184
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-23.1 (2013). DEFINITION. ............................................................................. 185
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-13.2 (2013). MURDER OF AN UNBORN CHILD; PENALTY. .................................. 185
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-23.3 (2013). VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER OF AN UNBORN CHILD; PENALTY. ... 185
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-23.4 (2013). IN VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER OF AN UNBORN CHILD; PENALTY. 185
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-23.7 (2013). EXCEPTIONS. .............................................................................. 185
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-23.8 (2013). KNOWLEDGE NOT REQUIRED. ............................................... 186
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-46. (2013). CONCEALING BIRTH OF CHILD. ................................................. 186
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141.4 (2013). FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR DEATH BY VEHICLE; FELONY SERIOUS INJURY BY VEHICLE; AGGRAVATED OFFENSES; REPEAT FELONY DEATH BY VEHICLE. .......... 186

NORTH DAKOTA ....................................................................................................................... 188
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-01 (2011). MURDER ............................................................................ 188
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-02 (2011). MANSLAUGHTER .................................................................. 189
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-1-01 (2011). DEFINITIONS. ................................................................. 189
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-1-02 (2011). MURDER OF AN UNBORN CHILD. ................................. 190
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-1-03 (2011). MANSLAUGHTER OF AN UNBORN CHILD ....................... 190
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17-1-04 (2011). NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE OF AN UNBORN CHILD ............... 190
N.D. CENT. CODE § 39.4-08-04 (2011). ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DEATH OR PERSONAL INJURIES—PENALTY. .................................................. 191

OHIO ........................................................................................................................................... 191
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.114 (2012). LIMITATION OF ACTION FOR PARTIAL BIRTH FETICIDE. ... 191
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.53 (2012). CIVIL ACTION FOR PARTIAL BIRTH FETICIDE. ............... 191
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.01 (2012). AGGRAVATED MURDER. .............................................. 192
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.02 (2012). MURDER. ................................................................. 192
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.03 (2012). VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. .................................... 193
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04 (2012). INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER. ............................ 193

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.41 (2012). RECKLESS HOMICIDE. ............................................................ 194
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.05 (2012). NEGLECTED HOMICIDE. .................................................. 194
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.06 (2012). AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE; VEHICULAR HOMICIDE; VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER; EFFECT OF PRIOR CONVICTIONS; PENALTIES ................................................................. 194
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.15 (2012). PERMITTING CHILD ABUSE ............................................................................. 199
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.13 (2012). ABORTION MANSLAUGHTER ......................................................... 199
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151 (2012). PARTIAL BIRTH FETICIDE ........................................................................ 199
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17 (2012). TERMINATING OR ATTEMPTING TO TERMINATE A HUMAN PREGNANCY AFTER VIABILITY ........................................................................................................... 200
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.225 (2012). FAILURE OF CERTAIN FAMILY DAY-CARE HOMES TO DISCLOSE DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY OF CHILD ........................................................................................................... 202
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.227 (2012). FAILURE OF CHILD CARE CENTER TO DISCLOSE DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY OF CHILD ........................................................................................................... 204
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.02 (2012). PENALTIES FOR MURDER ............................................................ 205
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (2012). IMPOSING SENTENCE FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE; PROOF OF RELEVANT FACTORS; ALTERNATIVE SENTENCES .................................................................................. 206
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (2012). CRITERIA FOR IMPOSING DEATH OR IMPRISONMENT FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE ........................................................................................................................................... 211

OKLAHOMA ........................................................................................................................................... 213

OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 53 (2012). ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL DEATH OF CHILD—FELONY ON SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION ......................................................................................................................... 213
OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 652 (2012). SHOOTING OR DISCHARGING FIREARM WITH INTENT TO KILL—USE OF VEHICLE TO FACILITATE DISCHARGE OF WEAPON IN CONSCIOUS DISREGARD OF SAFETY OF OTHERS—ASSAULT AND BATTERY WITH DEADLY WEAPON ........................................................................................................ 213
OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 691 (2012). HOMICIDE DEFINED ............................................................................... 214
OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 701.7 (2012). MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE ...................................................... 214
OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 701.8 (2012). MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE .................................................. 216
OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 701.9 (2012). PUNISHMENT FOR MURDER ............................................................ 216
OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 716 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE ..................................... 217
OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 861 (2012). PROCURING AN ABORTION .............................................................. 217
OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 863 (2012). CONCEALING STILLBIRTH OR DEATH OF CHILD .......................... 217
OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 47, § 11-903 (2012). NEGLECTED HOMICIDE ............................................................. 218

OREGON .................................................................................................................................................. 218

OR. REV. STAT. § 163.005 (2012). CRIMINAL HOMICIDE .............................................................................. 218
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095 (2012). AGGRAVATED MURDER .......................................................................... 218
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.105 (2012). SENTENCING FOR AGGRAVATED MURDER .............................................. 219
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (2012). MURDER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES; FELONY MURDER; SENTENCE .................. 220
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118 (2012). FIRST DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER ........................................................... 223
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125 (2012). SECOND DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER .......................................................... 224
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.145 (2012). CRIMINALLY NEGLECTED HOMICIDE .......................................................... 224
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.147 (2012). CLASSIFICATIONS OF MANSLAUGHTER AND CRIMINALLY NEGLECT HOMICIDE ................................................................. 224
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.149 (2012). AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE; DEFENSE ...................................... 225
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (2012). SENTENCING; AGGRAVATED MURDER ............................................... 225
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.155 (2012). MURDER CONVICTION OF PREGNANT VICTIM; SENTENCING ............. 228
OR. REV. STAT. § 163.820 (2012). CONCEALING BIRTH OF AN INFANT .......................................................... 229

PENNSYLVANIA ........................................................................................................................................ 229
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (2012). Sentence for murder, murder of unborn child and murder of law enforcement officer. ........................................... 229
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102.1 (2012). Sentence of persons under the age of 18 for murder, murder of an unborn child and murder of a law enforcement officer. .................. 230
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2501 (2012). Criminal homicide. ............................................. 231
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (2012). Involuntary manslaughter. .............................. 233
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2604 (2012). Murder of unborn child. ................................. 233
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3212 (2012). Infanticide. ...................................................... 234
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (2012). Homicide by vehicle. ....................................... 234
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3735 (2012). Homicide by vehicle while driving under influence. 235
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5502.2 (2012). Homicide by watercraft. .......................... 235

RHODE ISLAND .................................................................................................................. 240
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-3-17. (2012). Fetal death registration. ............................................. 242
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-1. (2012). Driving so as to endanger, resulting in death. .......... 243

SOUTH CAROLINA ............................................................................................................. 243
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (2012). “Murder” defined .................................................. 243
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2012). Punishment for murder; separate sentencing proceeding when death penalty sought. ....................................................... 243
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-29 (2012). Attempted murder .................................................... 247
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-60 (2012). Involuntary manslaughter; “criminal negligence” defined. 247
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-85 (2012). Homicide by child abuse; definitions; penalty; sentencing. 247
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1083 (2012). Death or injury of child in utero due to commission of violent crime. ............................................................... 248
S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-80 (2012). Performing or soliciting unlawful abortion; testimony of woman may be compelled. .............................................................. 249
S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-21-115 (2012). Reckless homicide by operation of boat; penalty; person convicted of certain offenses prohibited from operation boat. ........................................... 249
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2910 (2012). Reckless vehicular homicide; penalties; revocation of driver’s license; reinstatement of license; conditions; consequences for subsequent violations... 250

SOUTH DAKOTA .................................................................................................................... 250
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-1 (2012). HOMICIDE DEFINED.......................................................... 250
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-7 (2012). HOMICIDE AS MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE ............... 252
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-12 (2012). CLASSIFICATION OF MURDER ........................................ 252
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-41 (2012). VEHICULAR HOMICIDE .................................................. 252

TENNESSEE .......................................................................................................................................... 254

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-201 (2012). CRIMINAL ABORTION AND ATTEMPT TO PRODUCE MISCARRIAGE; LAWFUL ABORTION; DISTINGUISHED ............................................................................................. 261

TEXAS ..................................................................................................................................................... 262

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01 (2011). TYPES OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE ........................................ 262
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (2011). MURDER ................................................................................ 262
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (2011). CAPITAL MURDER ............................................................... 263
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (2011). CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE ................................. 264
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (2011). APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN CONDUCT .......................... 264
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08 (2011). INTOXICATION MANSLAUGHTER ........................................ 265

UTAH ..................................................................................................................................................... 265

Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-301 (2012). OFFENSES FOR WHICH PROSECUTION MAY BE COMMENCED AT ANY TIME ........................................................................................................................................ 265
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203.10 (2012). VIOLENT OFFENSE COMMITTED IN PRESENCE OF A CHILD—PENALTIES ................................................................................................................................. 266
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207 (2012). CAPITAL FELONY—SENTENCING PROCEEDING ........................... 266
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7 (2012). FIRST DEGREE FELONY AGGRAVATED MURDER—NONCAPITAL FELONY—Penalties—sentence by court ........................................................................................................ 269
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-204 (2012). DEATH OF OTHER THAN INTENDED VICTIM NO DEFENSE .......... 276
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207.5 (2012). AUTOMOBILE HOMICIDE INVOLVING USING A HANDHELD WIRELESS COMMUNICATION DEVISE WHILE DRIVING ......................................................... 278
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-208 (2012). CHILD ABUSE HOMICIDE ............................................................ 279

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association 10
Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-314.5 (2012). Killing an unborn child. .......................................................... 280

Vermont .............................................................................................................................................. 280

WYOMING

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (2012). FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE MURDER DEFINED; ALLEGATION IN INDICTMENT FOR HOMICIDE. ................................................................. 293
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-4 (2012). VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER; PENALTY .................................................... 294
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-5a (2012). CONCEALMENT OF DECEASED HUMAN BODY; PENALTY ...................... 294
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-6 (2012). HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE WITHIN STATE IF INJURY OCCURS WITHIN AND DEATH WITHOUT, OR VICE VERSA ........................................................................................................ 294
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-BD-2 (2012). MURDER OF A CHILD BY A PARENT, GUARDIAN OR CUSTODIAN OR OTHER PERSON BY REFUSAL OR FAILURE TO SUPPLY NECESSITIES, OR BY DELIVERY, ADMINISTRATION OR INGESTION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE; PENALTIES .............................................................. 295
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-BD-2A (2012). DEATH OF A CHILD BY A PARENT, GUARDIAN OR CUSTODIAN OR OTHER PERSON BY CHILD ABUSE; CRIMINAL PENALTIES ........................................................................... 295
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-BD-4A (2012). CHILD NEGLECT RESULTING IN DEATH; CRIMINAL PENALTIES. 296

WISCONSIN.................................................................................................................................................. 296

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.75 (2011). DEATH OR HARM TO AN UNBORN CHILD ................................................................. 296
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.01 (2011). FIRST-DEGREE INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE ......................................................... 297
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.02 (2011). FIRST-DEGREE RECKLESS HOMICIDE .............................................................. 298
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.03 (2011). FELONY MURDER ................................................................................................. 299
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.04 (2011). ABORTION ........................................................................................................... 299
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.05 (2011). SECOND-DEGREE INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE ..................................................... 299
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.06 (2011). SECOND-DEGREE RECKLESS HOMICIDE ......................................................... 300
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.07 (2011). HOMICIDE RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENT CONTROL OF Vicious ANIMAL. ......................................................................................................................... 300
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.08 (2011). HOMICIDE BY NEGLIGENT HANDLING OF DANGEROUS WEAPON, EXPLOSIVES OR FIRE .............................................................................................................. 300
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.09 (2011). HOMICIDE BY INTOXICATED USE OF VEHICLE OR FIREARM ......................... 300
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.10 (2011). HOMICIDE BY NEGLIGENT OPERATION OF VEHICLE ..................................... 300
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.13 (2011). ABORTION EXCEPTION ............................................................................................ 303
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.15 (2011). ABORTION ............................................................................................................. 303
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.16 (2011). PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION ................................................................................... 303
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.23 (2011). CONCEALING DEATH OF CHILD ........................................................................... 304

ANY PERSON WHO CONCEALS THE CORPSE OF ANY ISSUE OF A WOMANS BODY WITH INTENT TO PREVENT A DETERMINATION OF WHETHER IT WAS BORN DEAD OR ALIVE IS GUILTY OF A CLASS I FELONY. ....................................................................................................................... 304

WYOMING.................................................................................................................................................. 304

WYOM. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102 (2012). PRESENTENCE HEARING FOR MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE; MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES; EFFECT OF ERROR IN HEARING ............................................................................... 304
WYOM. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-104 (2012). MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE; PENALTY ................................................ 307
WYOM. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-105 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER; PENALTY ................................................................. 307
WYOM. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-106 (2012). HOMICIDE BY VEHICLE; AGGRAVATED HOMICIDE BY VEHICLE; PENALTIES. ...................................................................................................................... 308
WYOM. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-107 (2012). CRIMINALLY NEGLECTIVE MURDER .............................................................. 308
WYOM. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (2012). DRUG INDUCED HOMICIDE; PENALTY ........................................................ 308
WYOM. STAT. ANN. § 14-3-204 (2012). DUTIES OF LOCAL CHILD PROTECTIVE AGENCY ................................... 309

FEDERAL LEGISLATION....................................................................................................................................... 310

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
12
AMERICAN SAMOA

AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §22.0708 (2011). CAUSING DEATH OR BODILY INJURY WHILE DRIVING UNDER THE
INFLUENCE - PENALTY ....................................................... 314
AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §22.0502 (2011). ACCIDENT INVOLVING DEATH OR PERSONAL INJURIES ............ 314
AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §46.3501 (2011). DEFINITIONS ................................................................. 314
AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §46.3502 (2011). MURDER IN THE 1ST DEGREE .............................................. 314
AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §46.3503 (2011). MURDER IN THE 2ND DEGREE .............................................. 315
AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §46.3504 (2011). MANSLAUGHTER .............................................................. 315
AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §46.3902 (2011). UNLAWFUL ABORTION ...................................................... 316
AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §47.0401 (2011). CRIME INVOLVING DOMESTIC OR FAMILY VIOLENCE DEFINED 316

GUAM

GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 9, § 16.20 (2012). CRIMINAL HOMICIDE DEFINED .............................................. 317
GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 9, § 16.30 (2012). AGGRAVATED MURDER DEFINED .......................................... 317
GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 9, § 16.40 (2012). MURDER DEFINED ............................................................... 318
GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 9, § 16.50 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER DEFINED AND CLASSIFIED .......................... 318
GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 9, § 16.60 (2012). NEGLECTFUL HOMICIDE DEFINED AND CLASSIFIED ............ 319
GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 10, § 69210 (2012). MOTORBOAT OR VESSEL HOMICIDE; CLASSIFIED .............. 319
FINDINGS AND INTENT ...................................................... 319
................................................................. 320
GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 10, § 91A105 (2012). PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS PUNISHMENT ............................ 320
GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 16, § 18111 (2012). VEHICULAR HOMICIDE; CLASSIFIED .................................. 320

PUERTO RICO

P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 1051 (2010). ABORTION PROHIBITED ......................................................... 320
P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 1052 (2010). ABORTION PROHIBITED - PENALTIES ........................................ 320
P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4655 (2010). STATE OF NECESSITY .......................................................... 321
P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4733 (2010). MURDER ................................................................. 321
P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4734 (2010). DEGREES OF MURDER .......................................................... 321
P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4735 (2010). PENALTIES FOR MURDER ....................................................... 321
P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4736 (2010). MANSLAUGHTER .............................................................. 322
P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4737 (2010). NEGLECTFUL HOMICIDE ....................................................... 322
P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4740 (2010). COMMITTED OR CONSENTED BY THE WOMAN ...................... 322

VIRGIN ISLANDS

V.I. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, § 923 (2012). PUNISHMENT FOR MURDER ...................................................... 323
V.I. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, § 924 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER DEFINED AND CLASSIFIED ............................. 323
V.I. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, § 925 (2012). PUNISHMENT FOR MANSLAUGHTER ......................................... 323

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
13
ALABAMA


(a) The following are capital offenses:

(1) Murder by the defendant during a kidnapping in the first degree or an attempt thereof committed by the defendant.

(2) Murder by the defendant during a robbery in the first degree or an attempt thereof committed by the defendant.

(3) Murder by the defendant during a rape in the first or second degree or an attempt thereof committed by the defendant; or murder by the defendant during sodomy in the first or second degree or an attempt thereof committed by the defendant.

(4) Murder by the defendant during a burglary in the first or second degree or an attempt thereof committed by the defendant.

(5) Murder of any police officer, sheriff, deputy, state trooper, federal law enforcement officer, or any other state or federal peace officer of any kind, or prison or jail guard, while such officer or guard is on duty, regardless of whether the defendant knew or should have known the victim was an officer or guard on duty, or because of some official or job-related act or performance of such officer or guard.

(6) Murder committed while the defendant is under sentence of life imprisonment.

(7) Murder done for a pecuniary or other valuable consideration or pursuant to a contract or for hire.

(8) Murder by the defendant during sexual abuse in the first or second degree or an attempt thereof committed by the defendant.

(9) Murder by the defendant during arson in the first or second degree committed by the defendant; or murder by the defendant by means of explosives or explosion.

(10) Murder wherein two or more persons are murdered by the defendant by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.

(11) Murder by the defendant when the victim is a state or federal public official or former public official and the murder stems from or is caused by or is related to his official position, act, or capacity.

(12) Murder by the defendant during the act of unlawfully assuming control of any aircraft by use of threats or force with intent to obtain any valuable consideration for the release of said aircraft or any passenger or crewmen thereon or to direct the route or movement of said aircraft, or otherwise exert control over said aircraft.

(13) Murder by a defendant who has been convicted of any other murder in the 20 years preceding the crime; provided that the murder which constitutes the capital crime shall be murder as defined in subsection (b) of this section; and provided further that the prior murder conviction referred to shall include murder in any degree as defined at the time and place of the prior conviction.
(14) Murder when the victim is subpoenaed, or has been subpoenaed, to testify, or the victim had testified, in any preliminary hearing, grand jury proceeding, criminal trial or criminal proceeding of whatever nature, or civil trial or civil proceeding of whatever nature, in any municipal, state, or federal court, when the murder stems from, is caused by, or is related to the capacity or role of the victim as a witness.

(15) Murder when the victim is less than fourteen years of age.

(16) Murder committed by or through the use of a deadly weapon fired or otherwise used from outside a dwelling while the victim is in a dwelling.

(17) Murder committed by or through the use of a deadly weapon while the victim is in a vehicle.

(18) Murder committed by or through the use of a deadly weapon fired or otherwise used within or from a vehicle.

(b) Except as specifically provided to the contrary in the last part of subdivision (a)(13) of this section, the terms “murder” and “murder by the defendant” as used in this section to define capital offenses mean murder as defined in Section 13A-6-2(a)(1), but not as defined in Section 13A-6-2(a)(2) and (3). Subject to the provisions of Section 13A-5-41, murder as defined in Section 13A-6-2(a)(2) and (3), as well as murder as defined in Section 13A-6-2(a)(1), may be a lesser included offense of the capital offenses defined in subsection (a) of this section.

(c) A defendant who does not personally commit the act of killing which constitutes the murder is not guilty of a capital offense defined in subsection (a) of this section unless that defendant is legally accountable for the murder because of complicity in the murder itself under the provisions of Section 13A-2-23, in addition to being guilty of the other elements of the capital offense as defined in subsection (a) of this section.

(d) To the extent that a crime other than murder is an element of a capital offense defined in subsection (a) of this section, a defendant's guilt of that other crime may also be established under Section 13A-2-23. When the defendant's guilt of that other crime is established under Section 13A-2-23, that crime shall be deemed to have been “committed by the defendant” within the meaning of that phrase as it is used in subsection (a) of this section.

**ALA. Code § 13A-6-1 (2013). Definitions.**

(a) As used in Article 1 and Article 2, the following terms shall have the meanings ascribed to them by this section:

(1) CRIMINAL HOMICIDE. Murder, manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide.

(2) HOMICIDE. A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence causes the death of another person.

(3) PERSON. The term, when referring to the victim of a criminal homicide or assault, means a human being, including an unborn child in utero at any stage of development, regardless of viability.
(b) Article 1 or Article 2 shall not apply to the death or injury to an unborn child alleged to be caused by medication or medical care or treatment provided to a pregnant woman when performed by a physician or other licensed health care provider.

Mistake, or unintentional error on the part of a licensed physician or other licensed health care provider or his or her employee or agent or any person acting on behalf of the patient shall not subject the licensed physician or other licensed health care provider or person acting on behalf of the patient to any criminal liability under this section.

Medical care or treatment includes, but is not limited to, ordering, dispensation or administration of prescribed medications and medical procedures.

(c) A victim of domestic violence or sexual assault may not be charged under Article 1 or Article 2 for the injury or death of an unborn child caused by a crime of domestic violence or rape perpetrated upon her.

(d) Nothing in Article 1 or Article 2 shall permit the prosecution of (1) any person for conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman or a person authorized by law to act on her behalf has been obtained or for which consent is implied by law or (2) any woman with respect to her unborn child.

(e) Nothing in this section shall make it a crime to perform or obtain an abortion that is otherwise legal. Nothing in this section shall be construed to make an abortion legal which is not otherwise authorized by law.

**ALA. CODE § 13A-6-29 (2013). ADMINISTRATION OF MEDICATION BY OWNER, OPERATOR, OR EMPLOYEE OF LICENSED OR STATUTORILY EXEMPT CHILD CARE FACILITY.**

(a) As used in this section, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

(1) MEDICALLY PRESCRIBED. In accordance with a physician's prescription or in accordance with age-appropriate directions for the over-the-counter medication.

(2) NEAR FATALITY. An act that, as certified by a physician, places the child in serious or critical condition.

(b) There is established the crime of administration of medication by the owner, operator, or employee of a licensed or statutorily exempt child care facility with the intent to drug the child or alter the child's behavior beyond what is medically prescribed or with the reckless disregard for the health, safety, and welfare of the child.

(c) A violation of subsection (b) is punishable as follows:

(1) A violation which does not cause or contributes to the death, near fatality, dismemberment, or permanent disability of a child is a Class C felony.

(2) A violation which causes a near fatality, dismemberment, or permanent disability of a child is a Class B felony.

(3) A violation which causes the death of a child is a Class A felony.
ALASKA

ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.100 (2013). MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.

(a) A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if

(1) with intent to cause the death of another person, the person

(A) causes the death of any person; or

(B) compels or induces any person to commit suicide through duress or deception;

(2) the person knowingly engages in conduct directed toward a child under the age of 16 and the person with criminal negligence inflicts serious physical injury on the child by at least two separate acts, and one of the acts results in the death of the child;

(3) acting alone or with one or more persons, the person commits or attempts to commit a sexual offense against or kidnapping of a child under 16 years of age and, in the course of or in furtherance of the offense or in immediate flight from that offense, any person causes the death of the child; in this paragraph, “sexual offense” means an offense defined in AS 11.41.410--11.41.470;

(4) acting alone or with one or more persons, the person commits or attempts to commit criminal mischief in the first degree under AS 11.46.475 and, in the course of or in furtherance of the offense or in immediate flight from that offense, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; or

(5) acting alone or with one or more persons, the person commits terroristic threatening in the first degree under AS 11.56.807 and, in the course of or in furtherance of the offense or in immediate flight from that offense, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants.

(b) Murder in the first degree is an unclassified felony and is punishable as provided in AS 12.55.

ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110 (2013). MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.

(a) A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if

(1) with intent to cause serious physical injury to another person or knowing that the conduct is substantially certain to cause death or serious physical injury to another person, the person causes the death of any person;

(2) the person knowingly engages in conduct that results in the death of another person under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life;

(3) under circumstances not amounting to murder in the first degree under AS 11.41.100(a)(3), while acting either alone or with one or more persons, the person commits or attempts to commit arson in the first degree, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the second degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, burglary in the first
degree, escape in the first or second degree, robbery in any degree, or misconduct involving a controlled substance under AS 11.71.010(a), 11.71.020(a), 11.71.030(a)(1) or (2), or 11.71.040(a)(1) or (2) and, in the course of or in furtherance of that crime or in immediate flight from that crime, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants;

(4) acting with a criminal street gang, the person commits or attempts to commit a crime that is a felony and, in the course of or in furtherance of that crime or in immediate flight from that crime, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; or

(5) the person with criminal negligence causes the death of a child under the age of 16, and the person has been previously convicted of a crime involving a child under the age of 16 that was

(A) a felony violation of AS 11.41;

(B) in violation of a law or ordinance in another jurisdiction with elements similar to a felony under AS 11.41; or

(C) an attempt, a solicitation, or a conspiracy to commit a crime listed in (A) or (B) of this paragraph.

(b) Murder in the second degree is an unclassified felony and is punishable as provided in AS 12.55.

ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.150 (2010). MURDER OF AN UNBORN CHILD.

(a) A person commits the crime of murder of an unborn child if the person

(1) with intent to cause the death of an unborn child or of another person, causes the death of an unborn child;

(2) with intent to cause serious physical injury to an unborn child or to another person or knowing that the conduct is substantially certain to cause death or serious physical injury to an unborn child or to another person, causes the death of an unborn child;

(3) while acting alone or with one or more persons, commits or attempts to commit arson in the first degree, kidnapping, sexual assault in the first degree, sexual assault in the second degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, burglary in the first degree, escape in the first or second degree, robbery in any degree, or misconduct involving a controlled substance under AS 11.71.010(a), 11.71.020(a), 11.71.030(a)(1) or (2), or 11.71.040(a)(1) or (2), and, in the course of or in furtherance of that crime or in immediate flight from that crime, any person causes the death of an unborn child;

(4) knowingly engages in conduct that results in the death of an unborn child under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life; for purposes of this paragraph, a pregnant woman's decision to remain in a relationship in which domestic violence, as defined in AS 18.66.990, has occurred does not constitute conduct manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life.

(b) A person may not be convicted under (a)(3) of this section if the only underlying crime is burglary, the sole purpose of the burglary is a criminal homicide, and the unborn child killed is the intended victim of
the defendant. However, if the defendant causes the death of another unborn child, the defendant may be convicted under (a)(3) of this section. Nothing in this subsection precludes a prosecution for or conviction of murder in the first degree or murder in the second degree, murder of an unborn child under AS 11.41.150(a)(1), (2), or (4), or any other crime.

(c) Murder of an unborn child is an unclassified felony.


(a) A person commits the crime of manslaughter of an unborn child if, under circumstances not amounting to murder of an unborn child, the person intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes the death of an unborn child.

(b) Manslaughter of an unborn child is a class A felony.


(a) A person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide of an unborn child if, with criminal negligence, the person causes the death of an unborn child.

(b) Criminally negligent homicide of an unborn child is a class B felony.


AS 11.41.150--11.41.170 do not apply to acts that

(1) cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during a legal abortion to which the pregnant woman consented or a person authorized by law to act on her behalf consented, or for which such consent is implied by law;

(2) are committed under usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing, therapeutic treatment, or to assist a pregnancy; or

(3) are committed by a pregnant woman against herself and her own unborn child.


(a) A person, other than the victim, commits the crime of failure to report a violent crime committed against a child if the person

(1) witnesses what the person knows or reasonably should know is

(A) the murder or attempted murder of a child by another;
(B) the kidnapping or attempted kidnapping of a child by another;

(C) the sexual penetration or attempted sexual penetration by another

(i) of a child without consent of the child;

(ii) of a child that is mentally incapable;

(iii) of a child that is incapacitated; or

(iv) of a child that is unaware that a sexual act is being committed; or

(D) the assault of a child by another causing serious physical injury to the child;

(2) knows or reasonably should know that the child is under 16 years of age; and

(3) does not in a timely manner report that crime to a peace officer or law enforcement agency.

(b) In a prosecution under this section, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant

(1) did not report in a timely manner because the defendant reasonably believed that doing so would have exposed the defendant or others to a substantial risk of physical injury; or

(2) acted to stop the commission of the crime and stopped

(A) the commission of the crime; or

(B) the completion of the crime being attempted.

(c) In this section,

(1) “incapacitated” has the meaning given in AS 11.41.470;

(2) “mentally incapable” has the meaning given in AS 11.41.470;

(3) “sexual act” has the meaning given in AS 11.41.470;

(4) “without consent” has the meaning given in AS 11.41.470.

(d) Failure to report a violent crime committed against a child is a class A misdemeanor.

ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.250 (2013). CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSES.

(a) For purposes of sentencing under AS 12.55, all offenses defined in this title, except murder in the first and second degree, attempted murder in the first degree, solicitation to commit murder in the first degree, conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree, murder of an unborn child, sexual assault in the first degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, misconduct involving a controlled substance in the first degree, sex trafficking in the first degree under AS 11.66.110(a)(2), and kidnapping, are classified on
the basis of their seriousness, according to the type of injury characteristically caused or risked by commission of the offense and the culpability of the offender. Except for murder in the first and second degree, attempted murder in the first degree, solicitation to commit murder in the first degree, conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree, murder of an unborn child, sexual assault in the first degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, misconduct involving a controlled substance in the first degree, sex trafficking in the first degree under AS 11.66.110(a)(2), and kidnapping, the offenses in this title are classified into the following categories:

(1) class A felonies, which characteristically involve conduct resulting in serious physical injury or a substantial risk of serious physical injury to a person;

(2) class B felonies, which characteristically involve conduct resulting in less severe violence against a person than class A felonies, aggravated offenses against property interests, or aggravated offenses against public administration or order;

(3) class C felonies, which characteristically involve conduct serious enough to deserve felony classification but not serious enough to be classified as A or B felonies;

(4) class A misdemeanors, which characteristically involve less severe violence against a person, less serious offenses against property interests, less serious offenses against public administration or order, or less serious offenses against public health and decency than felonies;

(5) class B misdemeanors, which characteristically involve a minor risk of physical injury to a person, minor offenses against property interests, minor offenses against public administration or order, or minor offenses against public health and decency;

(6) violations, which characteristically involve conduct inappropriate to an orderly society but which do not denote criminality in their commission.

(b) The classification of each felony defined in this title, except murder in the first and second degree, attempted murder in the first degree, solicitation to commit murder in the first degree, conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree, murder of an unborn child, sexual assault in the first degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, misconduct involving a controlled substance in the first degree, sex trafficking in the first degree under AS 11.66.110(a)(2), and kidnapping, is designated in the section defining it. A felony under the law of this state defined outside this title for which no penalty is specifically provided is a class C felony.

(c) The classification of each misdemeanor defined in this title is designated in the section defining it. A misdemeanor under Alaska law defined outside this title for which no penalty is provided is a class A misdemeanor.

**ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.125 (2013). SENTENCES OF IMPRISONMENT FOR FELONIES.**

(a) A defendant convicted of murder in the first degree or murder of an unborn child under AS 11.41.150(a)(1) shall be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of at least 20 years but not more than 99 years. A defendant convicted of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to a mandatory term of imprisonment of 99 years when
(1) the defendant is convicted of the murder of a uniformed or otherwise clearly identified peace officer, firefighter, or correctional employee who was engaged in the performance of official duties at the time of the murder;

(2) the defendant has been previously convicted of

(A) murder in the first degree under AS 11.41.100 or former AS 11.15.010 or 11.15.020;

(B) murder in the second degree under AS 11.41.110 or former AS 11.15.030; or

(C) homicide under the laws of another jurisdiction when the offense of which the defendant was convicted contains elements similar to first degree murder under AS 11.41.100 or second degree murder under AS 11.41.110;

(3) the defendant subjected the murder victim to substantial physical torture;

(4) the defendant is convicted of the murder of and personally caused the death of a person, other than a participant, during a robbery; or

(5) the defendant is a peace officer who used the officer's authority as a peace officer to facilitate the murder.

(b) A defendant convicted of attempted murder in the first degree, solicitation to commit murder in the first degree, conspiracy to commit murder in the first degree, kidnapping, or misconduct involving a controlled substance in the first degree shall be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of at least five years but not more than 99 years. A defendant convicted of murder in the second degree or murder of an unborn child under AS 11.41.150(a)(2)--(4) shall be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of at least 10 years but not more than 99 years. A defendant convicted of murder in the second degree shall be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of at least 20 years but not more than 99 years when the defendant is convicted of the murder of a child under 16 years of age and the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant (1) was a natural parent, a stepparent, an adoptive parent, a legal guardian, or a person occupying a position of authority in relation to the child; or (2) caused the death of the child by committing a crime against a person under AS 11.41.200--11.41.530. In this subsection, “legal guardian” and “position of authority” have the meanings given in AS 11.41.470.

(c) Except as provided in (i) of this section, a defendant convicted of a class A felony may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 20 years, and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155--12.55.175:

(1) if the offense is a first felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (2) of this subsection, five to eight years;

(2) if the offense is a first felony conviction

(A) and the defendant possessed a firearm, used a dangerous instrument, or caused serious physical injury or death during the commission of the offense, or knowingly directed the conduct constituting the offense at a uniformed or otherwise clearly identified peace officer, firefighter, correctional employee, emergency medical technician, paramedic, ambulance attendant, or other emergency responder who was engaged in the performance of official duties at the time of the offense, seven to 11 years;
(B) and the conviction is for manufacturing related to methamphetamine under AS 11.71.020(a)(2)(A) or (B), seven to 11 years, if

(i) the manufacturing occurred in a building with reckless disregard that the building was used as a permanent or temporary home or place of lodging for one or more children under 18 years of age or the building was a place frequented by children; or

(ii) in the course of manufacturing or in preparation for manufacturing, the defendant obtained the assistance of one or more children under 18 years of age or one or more children were present;

(3) if the offense is a second felony conviction, 10 to 14 years;

(4) if the offense is a third felony conviction and the defendant is not subject to sentencing under (l) of this section, 15 to 20 years.

(d) Except as provided in (i) of this section, a defendant convicted of a class B felony may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 10 years, and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155--12.55.175:

(1) if the offense is a first felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (2) of this subsection, one to three years; a defendant sentenced under this paragraph may, if the court finds it appropriate, be granted a suspended imposition of sentence under AS 12.55.085 if, as a condition of probation under AS 12.55.086, the defendant is required to serve an active term of imprisonment within the range specified in this paragraph, unless the court finds that a mitigation factor under AS 12.55.155 applies;

(2) if the offense is a first felony conviction,

(A) the defendant violated AS 11.41.130, and the victim was a child under 16 years of age, two to four years;

(B) two to four years if the conviction is for an attempt, solicitation, or conspiracy to manufacture related to methamphetamine under AS 11.31 and AS 11.71.020(a)(2)(A) or (B), and

(i) the attempted manufacturing occurred, or the solicited or conspired offense was to have occurred, in a building with reckless disregard that the building was used as a permanent or temporary home or place of lodging for one or more children under 18 years of age or the building was a place frequented by children; or

(ii) in the course of an attempt to manufacture, the defendant obtained the assistance of one or more children under 18 years of age or one or more children were present;

(3) if the offense is a second felony conviction, four to seven years;

(4) if the offense is a third felony conviction, six to 10 years.

(e) Except as provided in (i) of this section, a defendant convicted of a class C felony may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than five years, and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155--12.55.175:
(1) if the offense is a first felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (4) of this subsection, zero to two years; a defendant sentenced under this paragraph may, if the court finds it appropriate, be granted a suspended imposition of sentence under AS 12.55.085, and the court may, as a condition of probation under AS 12.55.086, require the defendant to serve an active term of imprisonment within the range specified in this paragraph;

(2) if the offense is a second felony conviction, two to four years;

(3) if the offense is a third felony conviction, three to five years;

(4) if the offense is a first felony conviction, and the defendant violated AS 08.54.720(a)(15), one to two years.

(f) If a defendant is sentenced under (a) or (b) of this section,

(1) imprisonment for the prescribed minimum or mandatory term may not be suspended under AS 12.55.080;

(2) imposition of sentence may not be suspended under AS 12.55.085;

(3) imprisonment for the prescribed minimum or mandatory term may not be reduced, except as provided in (j) of this section.

(g) If a defendant is sentenced under (c), (d), (e), or (i) of this section, except to the extent permitted under AS 12.55.155--12.55.175,

(1) imprisonment may not be suspended under AS 12.55.080 below the low end of the presumptive range;

(2) and except as provided in (d)(1) or (e)(1) of this section, imposition of sentence may not be suspended under AS 12.55.085;

(3) terms of imprisonment may not be otherwise reduced.

(h) Nothing in this section or AS 12.55.135 limits the discretion of the sentencing judge except as specifically provided. Nothing in (a) of this section limits the court's discretion to impose a sentence of 99 years imprisonment, or to limit parole eligibility, for a person convicted of murder in the first or second degree in circumstances other than those enumerated in (a).

(i) A defendant convicted of

(1) sexual assault in the first degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the first degree, or sex trafficking in the first degree under AS 11.66.110(a)(2) may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 99 years and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155--12.55.175:

(A) if the offense is a first felony conviction, the offense does not involve circumstances described in (B) of this paragraph, and the victim was

(i) less than 13 years of age, 25 to 35 years;
(ii) 13 years of age or older, 20 to 30 years;

(B) if the offense is a first felony conviction and the defendant possessed a firearm, used a
dangerous instrument, or caused serious physical injury during the commission of the offense, 25 to 35
years;

(C) if the offense is a second felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (D)
of this paragraph, 30 to 40 years;

(D) if the offense is a second felony conviction and the defendant has a prior conviction for a sexual
felony, 35 to 45 years;

(E) if the offense is a third felony conviction and the defendant is not subject to sentencing under
(F) of this paragraph or (l) of this section, 40 to 60 years;

(F) if the offense is a third felony conviction, the defendant is not subject to sentencing under (l)
of this section, and the defendant has two prior convictions for sexual felonies, 99 years;

(2) unlawful exploitation of a minor under AS 11.41.455(c)(2), online enticement of a minor under AS
11.41.452(e), or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit sexual assault in the first degree, sexual
abuse of a minor in the first degree, or sex trafficking in the first degree under AS 11.66.110(a)(2) may be
sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 99 years and shall be sentenced to a
definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155 -
12.55.175:

(A) if the offense is a first felony conviction, the offense does not involve circumstances described
in (B) of this paragraph, and the victim was

(i) under 13 years of age, 20 to 30 years;

(ii) 13 years of age or older, 15 to 30 years;

(B) if the offense is a first felony conviction and the defendant possessed a firearm, used a
dangerous instrument, or caused serious physical injury during the commission of the offense, 25 to 35
years;

(C) if the offense is a second felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in
(D) of this paragraph, 25 to 35 years;

(D) if the offense is a second felony conviction and the defendant has a prior conviction for a sexual
felony, 30 to 40 years;

(E) if the offense is a third felony conviction, the offense does not involve circumstances described
in (F) of this paragraph, and the defendant is not subject to sentencing under (l) of this section, 35 to 50
years;

(F) if the offense is a third felony conviction, the defendant is not subject to sentencing under (l)
of this section, and the defendant has two prior convictions for sexual felonies, 99 years;
(3) sexual assault in the second degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, online enticement of a minor under AS 11.41.452(d), unlawful exploitation of a minor under AS 11.41.455(c)(1), or distribution of child pornography under AS 11.61.125(e)(2) may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 99 years and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155--12.55.175:

(A) if the offense is a first felony conviction, five to 15 years;

(B) if the offense is a second felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (C) of this paragraph, 10 to 25 years;

(C) if the offense is a second felony conviction and the defendant has a prior conviction for a sexual felony, 15 to 30 years;

(D) if the offense is a third felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (E) of this paragraph, 20 to 35 years;

(E) if the offense is a third felony conviction and the defendant has two prior convictions for sexual felonies, 99 years;

(4) sexual assault in the third degree, incest, indecent exposure in the first degree, possession of child pornography, distribution of child pornography under AS 11.61.125(e)(1), or attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation to commit sexual assault in the second degree, sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, unlawful exploitation of a minor, or distribution of child pornography, may be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of not more than 99 years and shall be sentenced to a definite term within the following presumptive ranges, subject to adjustment as provided in AS 12.55.155--12.55.175:

(A) if the offense is a first felony conviction, two to 12 years;

(B) if the offense is a second felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (C) of this paragraph, eight to 15 years;

(C) if the offense is a second felony conviction and the defendant has a prior conviction for a sexual felony, 12 to 20 years;

(D) if the offense is a third felony conviction and does not involve circumstances described in (E) of this paragraph, 15 to 25 years;

(E) if the offense is a third felony conviction and the defendant has two prior convictions for sexual felonies, 99 years.

(j) A defendant sentenced to a (1) mandatory term of imprisonment of 99 years under (a) of this section may apply once for a modification or reduction of sentence under the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure after serving one-half of the mandatory term without consideration of good time earned under AS 33.20.010, or (2) definite term of imprisonment under (l) of this section may apply once for a modification or reduction of sentence under the Alaska Rules of Criminal Procedure after serving one-half of the definite term. A defendant may not file and a court may not entertain more than one motion for modification or reduction of a sentence subject to this subsection, regardless of whether or not the court granted or denied a previous motion.

(l) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a defendant convicted of an unclassified or class A felony offense, and not subject to a mandatory 99-year sentence under (a) of this section, shall be sentenced to a definite term of imprisonment of 99 years when the defendant has been previously convicted of two or more most serious felonies. If a defendant is sentenced to a definite term under this subsection,

(1) imprisonment for the prescribed definite term may not be suspended under AS 12.55.080;

(2) imposition of sentence may not be suspended under AS 12.55.085;

(3) imprisonment for the prescribed definite term may not be reduced, except as provided in (j) of this section.

(m) Notwithstanding (a)(4) and (f) of this section, if a court finds that imposition of a mandatory term of imprisonment of 99 years on a defendant subject to sentencing under (a)(4) of this section would be manifestly unjust, the court may sentence the defendant to a definite term of imprisonment otherwise permissible under (a) of this section.

(n) In imposing a sentence within a presumptive range under (c), (d), (e), or (i) of this section, the total term, made up of the active term of imprisonment plus any suspended term of imprisonment, must fall within the presumptive range, and the active term of imprisonment may not fall below the lower end of the presumptive range.

(o) Other than for convictions subject to a mandatory 99-year sentence, the court shall impose, in addition to an active term of imprisonment imposed under (i) of this section, a minimum period of (1) suspended imprisonment of five years and a minimum period of probation supervision of 15 years for conviction of an unclassified felony, (2) suspended imprisonment of three years and a minimum period of probation supervision of 10 years for conviction of a class A or class B felony, or (3) suspended imprisonment of two years and a minimum period of probation supervision of five years for conviction of a class C felony. The period of probation is in addition to any sentence received under (i) of this section and may not be suspended or reduced. Upon a defendant’s release from confinement in a correctional facility, the defendant is subject to this probation requirement and shall submit and comply with the terms and requirements of the probation.

(p) If the state seeks either (1) the imposition of a sentence under (a) of this section that would preclude the defendant from being awarded a good time deduction under AS 33.20.010(a) based on a fact other than a prior conviction; or (2) to establish a fact that would increase the presumptive sentencing range under (c)(2), (d)(2), (e)(4), (i)(1)(A) or (B), or (i)(2)(A) or (B) of this section, the factual question required to be decided shall be presented to a trial jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt under procedures set by the court, unless the defendant waives trial by jury and either stipulates to the existence of the fact or consents to have the fact proven to the court sitting without a jury. Written notice of the intent to establish a fact under this subsection must be served on the defendant and filed with the court as provided for notice under AS 12.55.155(f)(2).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-751 (2012). SENTENCE OF DEATH OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT; AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES; DEFINITION.

A. If the state has filed a notice of intent to seek the death penalty and the defendant is:

1. Convicted of first degree murder pursuant to § 13-1105, subsection A, paragraph 1 or 3 and was at least eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, the defendant shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment in the custody of the state department of corrections for natural life as determined and in accordance with the procedures provided in § 13-752. A defendant who is sentenced to natural life is not eligible for commutation, parole, work furlough, work release or release from confinement on any basis.

2. Convicted of first degree murder pursuant to § 13-1105 and was under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment in the custody of the state department of corrections for life or natural life, as determined and in accordance with the procedures provided in § 13-752. A defendant who is sentenced to natural life is not eligible for commutation, parole, work furlough, work release or release from confinement on any basis. If the defendant is sentenced to life, the defendant shall not be released on any basis until the completion of the service of twenty-five calendar years if the murdered person was fifteen or more years of age and thirty-five years if the murdered person was under fifteen years of age or was an unborn child.

3. Convicted of first degree murder pursuant to § 13-1105, subsection A, paragraph 2, the defendant shall be sentenced to death or imprisonment in the custody of the state department of corrections for life or natural life as determined and in accordance with the procedures provided in § 13-752. A defendant who is sentenced to natural life is not eligible for commutation, parole, work furlough, work release or release from confinement on any basis. If the defendant is sentenced to life, the defendant shall not be released on any basis until the completion of the service of twenty-five calendar years if the murdered person was fifteen or more years of age and thirty-five years if the murdered person was under fifteen years of age or was an unborn child.

B. At the aggravation phase of the sentencing proceeding that is held pursuant to § 13-752, the admissibility of information relevant to any of the aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection F of this section shall be governed by the rules of evidence applicable to criminal trials. The burden of establishing the existence of any of the aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection F of this section is on the prosecution. The prosecution must prove the existence of the aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

C. At the penalty phase of the sentencing proceeding that is held pursuant to § 13-752, the prosecution or the defendant may present any information that is relevant to any of the mitigating circumstances included in subsection G of this section, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials. The burden of establishing the existence of the mitigating circumstances included in subsection G of this section is on the defendant. The defendant must prove the existence of the mitigating circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. If the trier of fact is a jury, the jurors do not have to agree unanimously that a mitigating circumstance has been proven to exist. Each juror may consider any mitigating circumstance found by that juror in determining the appropriate penalty.
D. Evidence that is admitted at the trial and that relates to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances shall be deemed admitted as evidence at a sentencing proceeding if the trier of fact considering that evidence is the same trier of fact that determined the defendant's guilt. The prosecution and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the aggravation or penalty phase of the sentencing proceeding and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to whether the information is sufficient to establish the existence of any of the circumstances included in subsections F and G of this section.

E. In determining whether to impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment, the trier of fact shall take into account the aggravating and mitigating circumstances that have been proven. The trier of fact shall impose a sentence of death if the trier of fact finds one or more of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection F of this section and then determines that there are no mitigating circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency.

F. The trier of fact shall consider the following aggravating circumstances in determining whether to impose a sentence of death:

1. The defendant has been convicted of another offense in the United States for which under Arizona law a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable.

2. The defendant has been or was previously convicted of a serious offense, whether preparatory or completed. Convictions for serious offenses committed on the same occasion as the homicide, or not committed on the same occasion but consolidated for trial with the homicide, shall be treated as a serious offense under this paragraph.

3. In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person or persons in addition to the person murdered during the commission of the offense.

4. The defendant procured the commission of the offense by payment, or promise of payment, of anything of pecuniary value.

5. The defendant committed the offense as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value.

6. The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.

7. The defendant committed the offense while:

   (a) In the custody of or on authorized or unauthorized release from the state department of corrections, a law enforcement agency or a county or city jail.

   (b) On probation for a felony offense.

8. The defendant has been convicted of one or more other homicides, as defined in § 13-1101, that were committed during the commission of the offense.

9. The defendant was an adult at the time the offense was committed or was tried as an adult and the murdered person was under fifteen years of age, was an unborn child in the womb at any stage of its development or was seventy years of age or older.
10. The murdered person was an on duty peace officer who was killed in the course of performing the officer's official duties and the defendant knew, or should have known, that the murdered person was a peace officer.

11. The defendant committed the offense with the intent to promote, further or assist the objectives of a criminal street gang or criminal syndicate or to join a criminal street gang or criminal syndicate.

12. The defendant committed the offense to prevent a person's cooperation with an official law enforcement investigation, to prevent a person's testimony in a court proceeding, in retaliation for a person's cooperation with an official law enforcement investigation or in retaliation for a person's testimony in a court proceeding.

13. The offense was committed in a cold, calculated manner without pretense of moral or legal justification.

14. The defendant used a remote stun gun or an authorized remote stun gun in the commission of the offense. For the purposes of this paragraph:

   (a) “Authorized remote stun gun” means a remote stun gun that has all of the following:

      (i) An electrical discharge that is less than one hundred thousand volts and less than nine joules of energy per pulse.

      (ii) A serial or identification number on all projectiles that are discharged from the remote stun gun.

      (iii) An identification and tracking system that, on deployment of remote electrodes, disperses coded material that is traceable to the purchaser through records that are kept by the manufacturer on all remote stun guns and all individual cartridges sold.

      (iv) A training program that is offered by the manufacturer.

   (b) “Remote stun gun” means an electronic device that emits an electrical charge and that is designed and primarily employed to incapacitate a person or animal either through contact with electrodes on the device itself or remotely through wired probes that are attached to the device or through a spark, plasma, ionization or other conductive means emitting from the device.

G. The trier of fact shall consider as mitigating circumstances any factors proffered by the defendant or the state that are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death, including any aspect of the defendant's character, propensities or record and any of the circumstances of the offense, including but not limited to the following:

1. The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, but not so impaired as to constitute a defense to prosecution.

2. The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution.
3. The defendant was legally accountable for the conduct of another under § 13-303, but his participation was relatively minor, although not so minor as to constitute a defense to prosecution.

4. The defendant could not reasonably have foreseen that his conduct in the course of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was convicted would cause, or would create a grave risk of causing, death to another person.

5. The defendant's age.

H. For the purposes of determining whether a conviction of any dangerous crime against children is a serious offense pursuant to this section, an unborn child shall be treated like a minor who is under twelve years of age.

I. In this section, for purposes of punishment an unborn child shall be treated like a minor who is under twelve years of age.

J. For the purposes of this section, “serious offense” means any of the following offenses if committed in this state or any offense committed outside this state that if committed in this state would constitute one of the following offenses:

1. First degree murder.

2. Second degree murder.

3. Manslaughter.

4. Aggravated assault resulting in serious physical injury or committed by the use, threatened use or exhibition of a deadly weapon or dangerous instrument.

5. Sexual assault.

6. Any dangerous crime against children.

7. Arson of an occupied structure.

8. Robbery.


11. Sexual conduct with a minor under fifteen years of age.

12. Burglary in the second degree.

13. Terrorism.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1102 (2012). NEGLIGENCE HOMICIDE; CLASSIFICATION.

A. A person commits negligent homicide if with criminal negligence the person causes the death of another person, including an unborn child.

B. An offense under this section applies to an unborn child in the womb at any stage of its development. A person may not be prosecuted under this section if any of the following applies:

1. The person was performing an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by law to act on the pregnant woman's behalf, has been obtained or for which the consent was implied or authorized by law.

2. The person was performing medical treatment on the pregnant woman or the pregnant woman's unborn child.

3. The person was the unborn child's mother.

C. Negligent homicide is a class 4 felony.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1103 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER; CLASSIFICATION.

A. A person commits manslaughter by:

1. Recklessly causing the death of another person; or

2. Committing second degree murder as defined in § 13-1104, subsection A upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion resulting from adequate provocation by the victim; or

3. Intentionally aiding another to commit suicide; or

4. Committing second degree murder as defined in § 13-1104, subsection A, paragraph 3, while being coerced to do so by the use or threatened immediate use of unlawful deadly physical force upon such person or a third person which a reasonable person in his situation would have been unable to resist; or

5. Knowingly or recklessly causing the death of an unborn child by any physical injury to the mother.

B. An offense under subsection A, paragraph 5 of this section applies to an unborn child in the womb at any stage of its development. A person shall not be prosecuted under subsection A, paragraph 5 of this section if any of the following applies:

1. The person was performing an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by law to act on the pregnant woman's behalf, has been obtained or for which the consent was implied or authorized by law.

2. The person was performing medical treatment on the pregnant woman or the pregnant woman's unborn child.

3. The person was the unborn child's mother.
C. Manslaughter is a class 2 felony.

**ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1104 (2012). SECOND DEGREE MURDER; CLASSIFICATION.**

A. A person commits second degree murder if without premeditation:

1. The person intentionally causes the death of another person, including an unborn child or, as a result of intentionally causing the death of another person, causes the death of an unborn child; or

2. Knowing that the person's conduct will cause death or serious physical injury, the person causes the death of another person, including an unborn child or, as a result of knowingly causing the death of another person, causes the death of an unborn child; or

3. Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, the person recklessly engages in conduct that creates a grave risk of death and thereby causes the death of another person, including an unborn child or, as a result of recklessly causing the death of another person, causes the death of an unborn child.

B. An offense under this section applies to an unborn child in the womb at any stage of its development. A person may not be prosecuted under this section if any of the following applies:

1. The person was performing an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by law to act on the pregnant woman's behalf, has been obtained or for which the consent was implied or authorized by law.

2. The person was performing medical treatment on the pregnant woman or the pregnant woman's unborn child.

3. The person was the unborn child's mother.

C. Second degree murder is a class 1 felony and is punishable as provided by § 13-705 if the victim is under fifteen years of age or is an unborn child, § 13-706, subsection A or § 13-710.

**ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1101 (2012). DEFINITIONS.**

In this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:

1. “Premeditation” means that the defendant acts with either the intention or the knowledge that he will kill another human being, when such intention or knowledge precedes the killing by any length of time to permit reflection. Proof of actual reflection is not required, but an act is not done with premeditation if it is the instant effect of a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

2. “Homicide” means first degree murder, second degree murder, manslaughter or negligent homicide.

3. “Person” means a human being.
4. “Adequate provocation” means conduct or circumstances sufficient to deprive a reasonable person of self-control.

**ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-1105 (2012). FIRST DEGREE MURDER; CLASSIFICATION.**

A. A person commits first degree murder if:

1. Intending or knowing that the person's conduct will cause death, the person causes the death of another person, including an unborn child, with premeditation or, as a result of causing the death of another person with premeditation, causes the death of an unborn child.

2. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons the person commits or attempts to commit sexual conduct with a minor under § 13-1405, sexual assault under § 13-1406, molestation of a child under § 13-1410, terrorism under § 13-2308.01, marijuana offenses under § 13-3405, subsection A, paragraph 4, dangerous drug offenses under § 13-3407, subsection A, paragraphs 4 and 7, narcotics offenses under § 13-3408, subsection A, paragraph 7 that equal or exceed the statutory threshold amount for each offense or combination of offenses, involving or using minors in drug offenses under § 13-3409, drive by shooting under § 13-1209, kidnapping under § 13-1304, burglary under § 13-1506, 13-1507 or 13-1508, arson under § 13-1703 or 13-1704, robbery under § 13-1902, 13-1903 or 13-1904, escape under § 13-2503 or 13-2504, child abuse under § 13-3623, subsection A, paragraph 1 or unlawful flight from a pursuing law enforcement vehicle under § 28-622.01 and, in the course of and in furtherance of the offense or immediate flight from the offense, the person or another person causes the death of any person.

3. Intending or knowing that the person's conduct will cause death to a law enforcement officer, the person causes the death of a law enforcement officer who is in the line of duty.

B. Homicide, as prescribed in subsection A, paragraph 2 of this section, requires no specific mental state other than what is required for the commission of any of the enumerated felonies.

C. An offense under subsection A, paragraph 1 of this section applies to an unborn child in the womb at any stage of its development. A person shall not be prosecuted under subsection A, paragraph 1 of this section if any of the following applies:

1. The person was performing an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by law to act on the pregnant woman's behalf, has been obtained or for which the consent was implied or authorized by law.

2. The person was performing medical treatment on the pregnant woman or the pregnant woman's unborn child.

3. The person was the unborn child's mother.

D. First degree murder is a class 1 felony and is punishable by death or life imprisonment as provided by §§ 13-751 and 13-752.
ARKANSAS

ARK. CODE ANN. §5-4-604 (2012). AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.

An aggravating circumstance is limited to the following:

(1) The capital murder was committed by a person imprisoned as a result of a felony conviction;

(2) The capital murder was committed by a person unlawfully at liberty after being sentenced to imprisonment as a result of a felony conviction;

(3) The person previously committed another felony, an element of which was the use or threat of violence to another person or the creation of a substantial risk of death or serious physical injury to another person;

(4) The person in the commission of the capital murder knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim or caused the death of more than one (1) person in the same criminal episode;

(5) The capital murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest or effecting an escape from custody;

(6) The capital murder was committed for pecuniary gain;

(7) The capital murder was committed for the purpose of disrupting or hindering the lawful exercise of any government or political function;

(8)(A) The capital murder was committed in an especially cruel or depraved manner.

    (B)(i) For purposes of subdivision (8)(A) of this section, a capital murder is committed in an especially cruel manner when, as part of a course of conduct intended to inflict mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death, mental anguish, serious physical abuse, or torture is inflicted.

    (ii)(a) “Mental anguish” means the victim's uncertainty as to his or her ultimate fate.

    (b) “Serious physical abuse” means physical abuse that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes protracted impairment of health, or loss or protracted impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

    (c) “Torture” means the infliction of extreme physical pain for a prolonged period of time prior to the victim's death.

    (C) For purposes of subdivision (8)(A) of this section, a capital murder is committed in an especially depraved manner when the person relishes the murder, evidencing debasement or perversion, or shows an indifference to the suffering of the victim and evidences a sense of pleasure in committing the murder;

(9) The capital murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, explosive, or similar device that the person planted, hid, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or structure, or
mailed or delivered, or caused to be planted, hidden, concealed, mailed, or delivered, and the person knew
that his or her act would create a great risk of death to human life; or

(10) The capital murder was committed against a person whom the defendant knew or reasonably should
have known was especially vulnerable to the attack because:

(A) Of either a temporary or permanent severe physical or mental disability which would interfere
with the victim's ability to flee or to defend himself or herself; or

(B) The person was twelve (12) years of age or younger.

**ARK. CODE ANN. §5-10-101 (2012). CAPITAL MURDER.**

(a) A person commits capital murder if:

(1) Acting alone or with one (1) or more other persons:

(A) The person commits or attempts to commit:

(i) Terrorism, as defined in § 5-54-205;

(ii) Rape, § 5-14-103;

(iii) Kidnapping, § 5-11-102;

(iv) Vehicular piracy, § 5-11-105;

(v) Robbery, § 5-12-102;

(vi) Aggravated robbery, § 5-12-103;

(vii) Residential burglary, § 5-39-201(a);

(viii) Commercial burglary, § 5-39-201(b);

(ix) Aggravated residential burglary, § 5-39-204;

(x) A felony violation of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, §§ 5-64-101 -- 5-64-508, 
    involving an actual delivery of a controlled substance; or

(xi) First degree escape, § 5-54-110; and

(B) In the course of and in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony, the
    person or an accomplice causes the death of a person under circumstances manifesting extreme
    indifference to the value of human life;

(2) Acting alone or with one (1) or more other persons:
(A) The person commits or attempts to commit arson, § 5-38-301; and

(B) In the course of and in furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony, the person or an accomplice causes the death of any person;

(3) With the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of any law enforcement officer, jailer, prison official, firefighter, judge or other court official, probation officer, parole officer, any military personnel, or teacher or school employee, when such person is acting in the line of duty, the person causes the death of any person;

(4) With the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of another person, the person causes the death of any person;

(5) With the premeditated and deliberated purpose of causing the death of the holder of any public office filled by election or appointment or a candidate for public office, the person causes the death of any person;

(6) While incarcerated in the Department of Correction or the Department of Community Correction, the person purposely causes the death of another person after premeditation and deliberation;

(7) Pursuant to an agreement that the person cause the death of another person in return for anything of value, he or she causes the death of any person;

(8) The person enters into an agreement in which a person is to cause the death of another person in return for anything of value, and a person hired pursuant to the agreement causes the death of any person;

(9)(A) Under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, the person knowingly causes the death of a person fourteen (14) years of age or younger at the time the murder was committed if the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older at the time the murder was committed.

(B) It is an affirmative defense to any prosecution under this subdivision (a)(9) arising from the failure of the parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis to provide specified medical or surgical treatment, that the parent, guardian, or person standing in loco parentis relied solely on spiritual treatment through prayer in accordance with the tenets and practices of an established church or religious denomination of which he or she is a member; or

(10) The person:

(A) Purposely discharges a firearm from a vehicle at a person or at a vehicle, conveyance, or a residential or commercial occupiable structure that he or she knows or has good reason to believe to be occupied by a person; and

(B) Thereby causes the death of another person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

(b) It is an affirmative defense to any prosecution under subdivision (a)(1) of this section for an offense in which the defendant was not the only participant that the defendant did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, command, induce, procure, counsel, or aid in the homicidal act's commission.
(c)(1) Capital murder is punishable by death or life imprisonment without parole under §§ 5-4-601 -- 5-4-605, 5-4-607, and 5-4-608.

(2) For any purpose other than disposition under §§ 5-4-101 -- 5-4-104, 5-4-201 -- 5-4-204, 5-4-301 -- 5-4-307, 5-4-401 -- 5-4-404, 5-4-501 -- 5-4-504, 5-4-601 -- 5-4-605, 5-4-607, 5-4-608, 16-93-307, 16-93-313, and 16-93-314, capital murder is a Class Y felony.

**ARK. CODE ANN. §5-10-102 (2012). MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.**

(a) A person commits murder in the first degree if:

(1) Acting alone or with one (1) or more other persons:

   (A) The person commits or attempts to commit a felony; and

   (B) In the course of and in the furtherance of the felony or in immediate flight from the felony, the person or an accomplice causes the death of any person under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life;

(2) With a purpose of causing the death of another person, the person causes the death of another person; or

(3) The person knowingly causes the death of a person fourteen (14) years of age or younger at the time the murder was committed.

(b) It is an affirmative defense to any prosecution under subdivision (a)(1) of this section for an offense in which the defendant was not the only participant that the defendant:

(1) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, command, induce, procure, counsel, or aid the homicidal act's commission;

(2) Was not armed with a deadly weapon;

(3) Reasonably believed that no other participant was armed with a deadly weapon; and

(4) Reasonably believed that no other participant intended to engage in conduct that could result in death or serious physical injury.

(c) Murder in the first degree is a Class Y felony.

**ARK. CODE ANN. §5-26-203 (2012). CONCEALING BIRTH.**

(a) A person commits the offense of concealing birth if he or she hides the corpse of a newborn child with purpose to conceal the fact of the child's birth or to prevent a determination of whether the child was born alive.

(b) Concealing birth is a Class D felony.

(a) It is unlawful for any person to induce another person to have an abortion or to willfully terminate the pregnancy of a woman known to be pregnant with the intent to cause fetal death unless the person is licensed to practice medicine in the State of Arkansas.

(b) Violation of subsection (a) of this section is a Class D felony.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow the charging or conviction of a woman with any criminal offense in the death of her own unborn child in utero.


(a) It is unlawful for any person to administer or prescribe any medicine or drug to any woman with child with the intent to produce an abortion or premature delivery of any fetus before or after the period of quickening or to produce or attempt to produce the abortion by any other means.

(b) Any person violating a provision of this section is guilty of a Class D felony.

(c) Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow the charging or conviction of a woman with any criminal offense in the death of her own unborn child in utero.


(a) No abortion of a viable fetus shall be performed unless necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman.

(b) Before a physician may perform an abortion upon a pregnant woman after such time as her fetus has become viable, the physician shall first certify in writing that the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman and shall further certify in writing the medical indications for the abortion and the probable health consequences.

(c) This subchapter shall not prohibit the abortion of a viable fetus if the pregnancy is the result of rape or incest perpetrated on a minor.


(a)(1) Any person who knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus is guilty of a Class D felony.

(2) This subsection (a) does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.
(b) A female upon whom a partial-birth abortion is performed shall not be prosecuted under this subchapter.

CALIFORNIA

CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (2012). MURDER DEFINED.

(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus, with malice aforethought.

(b) This section shall not apply to any person who commits an act that results in the death of a fetus if any of the following apply:

(1) The act complied with the Therapeutic Abortion Act, Article 2 (commencing with Section 123400) of Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division 106 of the Health and Safety Code.

(2) The act was committed by a holder of a physician's and surgeon's certificate, as defined in the Business and Professions Code, in a case where, to a medical certainty, the result of childbirth would be death of the mother of the fetus or where her death from childbirth, although not medically certain, would be substantially certain or more likely than not.

(3) The act was solicited, aided, abetted, or consented to by the mother of the fetus.

(c) Subdivision (b) shall not be construed to prohibit the prosecution of any person under any other provision of law.

CAL. PENAL CODE §190.2 (2012). DEATH PENALTY OR LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE; SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.

(a) The penalty for a defendant who is found guilty of murder in the first degree is death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the following special circumstances has been found under Section 190.4 to be true:

(1) The murder was intentional and carried out for financial gain.

(2) The defendant was convicted previously of murder in the first or second degree. For the purpose of this paragraph, an offense committed in another jurisdiction, which if committed in California would be punishable as first or second degree murder, shall be deemed murder in the first or second degree.

(3) The defendant, in this proceeding, has been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree.

(4) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or explosive planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or structure, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death to one or more human beings.
(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest, or perfecting or attempting to perfect, an escape from lawful custody.

(6) The murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or explosive that the defendant mailed or delivered, attempted to mail or deliver, or caused to be mailed or delivered, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that his or her act or acts would create a great risk of death to one or more human beings.

(7) The victim was a peace officer, as defined in Section 830.1, 830.2, 830.3, 830.31, 830.32, 830.33, 830.34, 830.35, 830.36, 830.37, 830.4, 830.5, 830.6, 830.10, 830.11, or 830.12, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a peace officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a peace officer, as defined in the above-enumerated sections, or a former peace officer under any of those sections, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.

(8) The victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent engaged in the performance of his or her duties; or the victim was a federal law enforcement officer or agent, and was intentionally killed in retaliation for the performance of his or her official duties.

(9) The victim was a firefighter, as defined in Section 245.1, who, while engaged in the course of the performance of his or her duties, was intentionally killed, and the defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim was a firefighter engaged in the performance of his or her duties.

(10) The victim was a witness to a crime who was intentionally killed for the purpose of preventing his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding, and the killing was not committed during the commission or attempted commission, of the crime to which he or she was a witness; or the victim was a witness to a crime and was intentionally killed in retaliation for his or her testimony in any criminal or juvenile proceeding. As used in this paragraph, “juvenile proceeding” means a proceeding brought pursuant to Section 602 or 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.

(11) The victim was a prosecutor or assistant prosecutor or a former prosecutor or assistant prosecutor of any local or state prosecutor's office in this or any other state, or of a federal prosecutor's office, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.

(12) The victim was a judge or former judge of any court of record in the local, state, or federal system in this or any other state, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.

(13) The victim was an elected or appointed official or former official of the federal government, or of any local or state government of this or any other state, and the killing was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.

(14) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity. As used in this section, the phrase “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity” means a conscienceless or pitiless crime that is unnecessarily torturous to the victim.
(15) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by means of lying in wait.

(16) The victim was intentionally killed because of his or her race, color, religion, nationality, or country of origin.

(17) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in, or was an accomplice in, the commission of, attempted commission of, or the immediate flight after committing, or attempting to commit, the following felonies:

(A) Robbery in violation of Section 211 or 212.5.

(B) Kidnapping in violation of Section 207, 209, or 209.5.

(C) Rape in violation of Section 261.

(D) Sodomy in violation of Section 286.

(E) The performance of a lewd or lascivious act upon the person of a child under the age of 14 years in violation of Section 288.

(F) Oral copulation in violation of Section 288a.

(G) Burglary in the first or second degree in violation of Section 460.

(H) Arson in violation of subdivision (b) of Section 451.

(I) Train wrecking in violation of Section 219.

(J) Mayhem in violation of Section 203.

(K) Rape by instrument in violation of Section 289.

(L) Carjacking, as defined in Section 215.

(M) To prove the special circumstances of kidnapping in subparagraph (B), or arson in subparagraph (H), if there is specific intent to kill, it is only required that there be proof of the elements of those felonies. If so established, those two special circumstances are proven even if the felony of kidnapping or arson is committed primarily or solely for the purpose of facilitating the murder.

(18) The murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture.

(19) The defendant intentionally killed the victim by the administration of poison.

(20) The victim was a juror in any court of record in the local, state, or federal system in this or any other state, and the murder was intentionally carried out in retaliation for, or to prevent the performance of, the victim's official duties.

(21) The murder was intentional and perpetrated by means of discharging a firearm from a motor vehicle, intentionally at another person or persons outside the vehicle with the intent to inflict death. For
purposes of this paragraph, “motor vehicle” means any vehicle as defined in Section 415 of the Vehicle Code.

(22) The defendant intentionally killed the victim while the defendant was an active participant in a criminal street gang, as defined in subdivision (f) of Section 186.22, and the murder was carried out to further the activities of the criminal street gang.

(b) Unless an intent to kill is specifically required under subdivision (a) for a special circumstance enumerated therein, an actual killer, as to whom the special circumstance has been found to be true under Section 190.4, need not have had any intent to kill at the time of the commission of the offense which is the basis of the special circumstance in order to suffer death or confinement in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole.

(c) Every person, not the actual killer, who, with the intent to kill, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists any actor in the commission of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if one or more of the special circumstances enumerated in subdivision (a) has been found to be true under Section 190.4.

(d) Notwithstanding subdivision (c), every person, not the actual killer, who, with reckless indifference to human life and as a major participant, aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, solicits, requests, or assists in the commission of a felony enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) which results in the death of some person or persons, and who is found guilty of murder in the first degree thereof, shall be punished by death or imprisonment in the state prison for life without the possibility of parole if a special circumstance enumerated in paragraph (17) of subdivision (a) has been found to be true under Section 190.4.

The penalty shall be determined as provided in this section and Sections 190.1, 190.3, 190.4, and 190.5.

**CAL. PENAL CODE § 273AB (2012). ASSAULT RESULTING IN DEATH, COMATOSE STATE, OR PARALYSIS OF CHILD UNDER 8; IMPRISONMENT.**

(a) Any person, having the care or custody of a child who is under eight years of age, who assaults the child by means of force that to a reasonable person would be likely to produce great bodily injury, resulting in the child's death, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for 25 years to life. Nothing in this section shall be construed as affecting the applicability of subdivision (a) of Section 187 or Section 189.

(b) Any person, having the care or custody of a child who is under eight years of age, who assaults the child by means of force that to a reasonable person would be likely to produce great bodily injury, resulting in the child becoming comatose due to brain injury or suffering paralysis of a permanent nature, shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for life with the possibility of parole. As used in this subdivision, “paralysis” means a major or complete loss of motor function resulting from injury to the nervous system or to a muscular mechanism.

**CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.95 (2013). WILLFUL HARM OR INJURY RESULTING IN DEATH OF CHILD; SENTENCE ENHANCEMENT; PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS.**
Any person convicted of a violation of Section 273a, who under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or injury that results in death, or having the care or custody of any child, under circumstances likely to produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits that child to be injured or harmed, and that injury or harm results in death, shall receive a four-year enhancement for each violation, in addition to the sentence provided for that conviction. Nothing in this paragraph shall be construed as affecting the applicability of subdivision (a) of Section 187 or Section 192. This section shall not apply unless the allegation is included within an accusatory pleading and admitted by the defendant or found to be true by the trier of fact.

COLORADO

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-102 (2013). MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.

(1) A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if:

(a) After deliberation and with the intent to cause the death of a person other than himself, he causes the death of that person or of another person; or

(b) Acting either alone or with one or more persons, he or she commits or attempts to commit arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, sexual assault as prohibited by section 18-3-402, sexual assault in the first or second degree as prohibited by section 18-3-402 or 18-3-403 as those sections existed prior to July 1, 2000, or a class 3 felony for sexual assault on a child as provided in section 18-3-405(2), or the crime of escape as provided in section 18-8-208, and, in the course of or in furtherance of the crime that he or she is committing or attempting to commit, or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of the participants, is caused by anyone; or

(c) By perjury or subornation of perjury he procures the conviction and execution of any innocent person; or

(d) Under circumstances evidencing an attitude of universal malice manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life generally, he knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to a person, or persons, other than himself, and thereby causes the death of another; or

(e) He or she commits unlawful distribution, dispensation, or sale of a controlled substance to a person under the age of eighteen years on school grounds as provided in section 18-18-407(2), and the death of such person is caused by the use of such controlled substance; or

(f) The person knowingly causes the death of a child who has not yet attained twelve years of age and the person committing the offense is one in a position of trust with respect to the victim.

(2) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of violating subsection (1)(b) of this section that the defendant:

(a) Was not the only participant in the underlying crime; and

(b) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and
(c) Was not armed with a deadly weapon; and

(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and

(e) Did not engage himself in or intend to engage in and had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily injury; and

(f) Endeavored to disengage himself from the commission of the underlying crime or flight therefrom immediately upon having reasonable grounds to believe that another participant is armed with a deadly weapon, instrument, article, or substance, or intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily injury.

(3) Murder in the first degree is a class 1 felony.

(4) The statutory privilege between patient and physician and between husband and wife shall not be available for excluding or refusing testimony in any prosecution for the crime of murder in the first degree as described in paragraph (f) of subsection (1) of this section.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-102 (2013). CRIMINAL ABORTION.

(1) Any person who intentionally ends or causes to be ended the pregnancy of a woman by any means other than justified medical termination or birth commits criminal abortion.

(2) Criminal abortion is a class 4 felony, but if the woman dies as a result of the criminal abortion, it is a class 2 felony.


(1)(a) A person commits child abuse if such person causes an injury to a child's life or health, or permits a child to be unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of injury to the child's life or health, or engages in a continued pattern of conduct that results in malnourishment, lack of proper medical care, cruel punishment, mistreatment, or an accumulation of injuries that ultimately results in the death of a child or serious bodily injury to a child.

(b)(I) Except as otherwise provided in subparagraph (III) of this paragraph (b), a person commits child abuse if such person excises or infibulates, in whole or in part, the labia majora, labia minora, vulva, or clitoris of a female child. A parent, guardian, or other person legally responsible for a female child or charged with the care or custody of a female child commits child abuse if he or she allows the excision or infibulation, in whole or in part, of such child's labia majora, labia minora, vulva, or clitoris.

(II) Belief that the conduct described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) is required as a matter of custom, ritual, or standard practice or consent to the conduct by the child on whom it is performed or by the child's parent or legal guardian shall not be an affirmative defense to a charge of child abuse under this paragraph (b).
(III) A surgical procedure as described in subparagraph (I) of this paragraph (b) is not a crime if the procedure:

(A) Is necessary to preserve the health of the child on whom it is performed and is performed by a person licensed to practice medicine under article 36 of title 12, C.R.S.; or

(B) Is performed on a child who is in labor or who has just given birth and is performed for medical purposes connected with that labor or birth by a person licensed to practice medicine under article 36 of title 12, C.R.S.

(IV) If the district attorney having jurisdiction over a case arising under this paragraph (b) has a reasonable belief that any person arrested or charged pursuant to this paragraph (b) is not a citizen or national of the United States, the district attorney shall report such information to the immigration and naturalization service, or any successor agency, in an expeditious manner.

(c)(I) A person commits child abuse if, in the presence of a child, or on the premises where a child is found, or where a child resides, or in a vehicle containing a child, the person knowingly engages in the manufacture or attempted manufacture of a controlled substance, as defined by section 18-18-102(5), or knowingly possesses ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine, or their salts, isomers, or salts of isomers, with the intent to use the product as an immediate precursor in the manufacture of a controlled substance. It shall be no defense to the crime of child abuse, as described in this subparagraph (I), that the defendant did not know a child was present, a child could be found, a child resided on the premises, or that a vehicle contained a child.

(II) A parent or lawful guardian of a child or a person having the care or custody of a child who knowingly allows the child to be present at or reside at a premises or to be in a vehicle where the parent, guardian, or person having care or custody of the child knows or reasonably should know another person is engaged in the manufacture or attempted manufacture of methamphetamine commits child abuse.

(III) A parent or lawful guardian of a child or a person having the care or custody of a child who knowingly allows the child to be present at or reside at a premises or to be in a vehicle where the parent, guardian, or person having care or custody of the child knows or reasonably should know another person possesses ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine, or their salts, isomers, or salts of isomers, with the intent to use the product as an immediate precursor in the manufacture of methamphetamine commits child abuse.

(2) In this section, “child” means a person under the age of sixteen years.

(3) The statutory privilege between patient and physician and between husband and wife shall not be available for excluding or refusing testimony in any prosecution for a violation of this section.

(4) No person, other than the perpetrator, complicitor, coconspirator, or accessory, who reports an instance of child abuse to law enforcement officials shall be subjected to criminal or civil liability for any consequence of making such report unless he knows at the time of making it that it is untrue.

(5) Deferred prosecution is authorized for a first offense under this section unless the provisions of subsection (7.5) of this section or section 18-6-401.2 apply.

Where death or injury results, the following shall apply:

(I) When a person acts knowingly or recklessly and the child abuse results in death to the child, it is a class 2 felony except as provided in paragraph (c) of this subsection (7).

(II) When a person acts with criminal negligence and the child abuse results in death to the child, it is a class 3 felony.

(III) When a person acts knowingly or recklessly and the child abuse results in serious bodily injury to the child, it is a class 3 felony.

(IV) When a person acts with criminal negligence and the child abuse results in serious bodily injury to the child, it is a class 4 felony.

(V) When a person acts knowingly or recklessly and the child abuse results in any injury other than serious bodily injury, it is a class 1 misdemeanor; except that, if it is committed under the circumstances described in paragraph (e) of this subsection (7), then it is a class 5 felony.

(VI) When a person acts with criminal negligence and the child abuse results in any injury other than serious bodily injury to the child, it is a class 2 misdemeanor; except that, if it is committed under the circumstances described in paragraph (e) of this subsection (7), then it is a class 5 felony.

Where no death or injury results, the following shall apply:

(I) An act of child abuse when a person acts knowingly or recklessly is a class 2 misdemeanor; except that, if it is committed under the circumstances described in paragraph (e) of this subsection (7), then it is a class 5 felony.

(II) An act of child abuse when a person acts with criminal negligence is a class 3 misdemeanor; except that, if it is committed under the circumstances described in paragraph (e) of this subsection (7), then it is a class 5 felony.

(c) When a person knowingly causes the death of a child who has not yet attained twelve years of age and the person committing the offense is one in a position of trust with respect to the child, such person commits the crime of murder in the first degree as described in section 18-3-102(1)(f).

(d) When a person commits child abuse as described in paragraph (c) of subsection (1) of this section, it is a class 3 felony.

(e) A person who has previously been convicted of a violation of this section or of an offense in any other state, the United States, or any territory subject to the jurisdiction of the United States that would constitute child abuse if committed in this state and who commits child abuse as provided in subparagraph (V) or (VI) of paragraph (a) of this subsection (7) or as provided in subparagraph (I) or (II) of paragraph (b) of this subsection (7) commits a class 5 felony if the trier of fact finds that the new offense involved any of the following acts:

(I) The defendant, who was in a position of trust, as described in section 18-3-401(3.5), in relation to the child, participated in a continued pattern of conduct that resulted in the child's malnourishment or failed to ensure the child's access to proper medical care;
(II) The defendant participated in a continued pattern of cruel punishment or unreasonable isolation or confinement of the child;

(III) The defendant made repeated threats of harm or death to the child or to a significant person in the child's life, which threats were made in the presence of the child;

(IV) The defendant committed a continued pattern of acts of domestic violence, as that term is defined in section 18-6-800.3, in the presence of the child; or

(V) The defendant participated in a continued pattern of extreme deprivation of hygienic or sanitary conditions in the child's daily living environment.

(7.3) Felony child abuse is an extraordinary risk crime that is subject to the modified presumptive sentencing range specified in section 18-1.3-401(10). Misdemeanor child abuse is an extraordinary risk crime that is subject to the modified sentencing range specified in section 18-1.3-501(3).

(7.5) If a defendant is convicted of the class 2 or class 3 felony of child abuse under subparagraph (I) or (III) of paragraph (a) of subsection (7) of this section, the court shall sentence the defendant in accordance with section 18-1.3-401(8)(d).


(9) If a parent is charged with permitting a child to be unreasonably placed in a situation that poses a threat of injury to the child's life or health, pursuant to paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section, and the child was seventy-two hours old or younger at the time of the alleged offense, it shall be an affirmative defense to such charge that the parent safely, reasonably, and knowingly handed the child over to a firefighter, as defined in section 18-3-201(1), or to a hospital staff member who engages in the admission, care, or treatment of patients, when such firefighter is at a fire station or such hospital staff member is at a hospital.

**CONNECTICUT**


(a) A person is guilty of concealment of delivery who intentionally conceals the delivery of any child, whether such child was delivered alive or dead.

(b) Concealment of delivery is a class A misdemeanor.

**CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53A-54B (2013). MURDER WITH SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES.**

A person is guilty of murder with special circumstances who is convicted of any of the following:

(1) Murder of a member of the Division of State Police within the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection or of any local police department, a chief inspector or inspector in the Division of Criminal Justice, a state marshal who is exercising authority granted under any provision of the general statutes, a judicial marshal in performance of the duties of a judicial marshal, a constable who performs...
criminal law enforcement duties, a special policeman appointed under section 29-18, a conservation
officer or special conservation officer appointed by the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental
Protection under the provisions of section 26-5, an employee of the Department of Correction or a person
providing services on behalf of said department when such employee or person is acting within the scope
of such employee's or person's employment or duties in a correctional institution or facility and the actor
is confined in such institution or facility, or any firefighter, while such victim was acting within the scope
of such victim's duties;

(2) murder committed by a defendant who is hired to commit the same for pecuniary gain or murder
committed by one who is hired by the defendant to commit the same for pecuniary gain;

(3) murder committed by one who has previously been convicted of intentional murder or of murder
committed in the course of commission of a felony;

(4) murder committed by one who was, at the time of commission of the murder, under sentence of life
imprisonment;

(5) murder by a kidnapper of a kidnapped person during the course of the kidnapping or before such
person is able to return or be returned to safety;

(6) murder committed in the course of the commission of sexual assault in the first degree;

(7) murder of two or more persons at the same time or in the course of a single transaction; or

(8) murder of a person under sixteen years of age.

DELWARE

DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 11, § 633 (2013). MURDER BY ABUSE OR NEGLECT IN THE SECOND DEGREE;
CLASS B FELONY.

(a) A person is guilty of murder by abuse or neglect in the second degree when, with criminal negligence,
the person causes the death of a child:

(1) Through an act of abuse and/or neglect of such child; or

(2) When the person has engaged in a previous pattern of abuse and/or neglect of such child.

(b) For the purpose of this section:

(1) “Abuse” and “neglect” shall have the same meaning as set forth in § 1100 of this title.

(2) “Child” shall refer to any person who has not yet reached that person's 14th birthday.

(3) “Previous pattern” of abuse and/or neglect shall mean 2 or more incidents of conduct:

a. That constitute an act of abuse and/or neglect; and
b. Are not so closely related to each other or connected in point of time and place that they constitute a single event.

(c) A conviction is not required for an act of abuse or neglect to be used in prosecution of a matter under this section, including an act used as proof of a previous pattern as defined in paragraph (b)(3) of this section. A conviction for any act of abuse or neglect, including one which may be relied upon to establish a previous pattern of abuse and/or neglect does not preclude prosecution under this section. Prosecution under this section does not preclude prosecution under any other section of the Code.

(d) Murder by abuse or neglect in the second degree is a class B felony. Notwithstanding any provision of this title to the contrary, the minimum sentence for a person convicted of murder by abuse or neglect in the second degree in violation of this section shall be 10 years at Level V.

DELAWARE CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 634 (2013). MURDER BY ABUSE OR NEGLECT IN THE FIRST DEGREE; CLASS A FELONY.

(a) A person is guilty of murder by abuse or neglect in the first degree when the person recklessly causes the death of a child:

(1) Through an act of abuse and/or neglect of such child; or

(2) When the person has engaged in a previous pattern of abuse and/or neglect of such child.

(b) For the purpose of this section:

(1) “Abuse” and “neglect” shall have the same meaning as set forth in § 1100 of this title.

(2) “Child” shall refer to any person who has not yet reached that person's 14th birthday.

(3) “Previous pattern” of abuse and/or neglect shall mean 2 or more incidents of conduct:

a. That constitute an act of abuse and/or neglect; and

b. Are not so closely related to each other or connected in point of time and place that they constitute a single event.

(c) A conviction is not required for an act of abuse or neglect to be used in prosecution of a matter under this section including an act used as proof of the previous pattern as defined in paragraph (b)(3) of this section. A conviction for any act of abuse or neglect including one which may be relied upon to establish the previous pattern of abuse and/or neglect does not preclude prosecution under this section. Prosecution under this section does not preclude prosecution under any other section of the Code.

(d) Murder by abuse or neglect in the first degree is a class A felony.

DELAWARE CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (2013). PUNISHMENT, PROCEDURE FOR DETERMINING PUNISHMENT, REVIEW OF PUNISHMENT AND METHOD OF PUNISHMENT FOR FIRST-DEGREE MURDER.
(a) Punishment for first-degree murder.--Any person who is convicted of first-degree murder shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for the remainder of the person's natural life without benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction, said penalty to be determined in accordance with this section.

(b) Separate hearing on issue of punishment for first-degree murder.—

(1) Upon a conviction of guilt of a defendant of first-degree murder, the Superior Court shall conduct a separate hearing to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death or to life imprisonment without benefit of probation or parole as authorized by subsection (a) of this section. If the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury, this hearing shall be conducted by the trial judge before that jury as soon as practicable after the return of the verdict of guilty. Alternate jurors shall not be excused from the case prior to submission of the issue of guilt to the trial jury and may, but need not be, separately sequestered until a verdict on guilt is entered. If the verdict of the trial jury is guilty of first-degree murder said alternates shall sit as alternate jurors on the issue of punishment. If, for any reason satisfactory to the Court, any member of the trial jury is excused from participation in the hearing on punishment, the trial judge shall replace such juror or jurors with alternate juror or jurors. If a jury of 12 jurors cannot participate in the hearing a separate and new jury, plus alternates, shall be selected for the hearing in accordance with the applicable rules of the Superior Court and laws of Delaware, unless the defendant or defendants and the State stipulate to the use of a lesser number of jurors.

(2) If the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder by the Court, after a trial and waiver of a jury trial or after a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, the hearing shall be conducted by the trial judge before a jury, plus alternates, empaneled for that purpose and selected in accordance with the applicable rules of the Superior Court and laws of Delaware, unless said jury is waived by the State and the defendant in which case the hearing shall be conducted, if possible, by and before the trial judge who entered the finding of guilty or accepted the plea of guilty or nolo contendere.

(c) Procedure at punishment hearing.—

(1) The sole determination for the jury or judge at the hearing provided for by this section shall be the penalty to be imposed upon the defendant for the conviction of first-degree murder. At the hearing, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the Court deems relevant and admissible to the penalty to be imposed. The evidence shall include matters relating to any mitigating circumstance and to any aggravating circumstance, including, but not limited to, those aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (e) of this section. Notice in writing of any aggravating circumstances and any mitigating circumstances shall be given to the other side by the party seeking to introduce evidence of such circumstances prior to the punishment hearing, and after the verdict on guilt, unless in the discretion of the Court such advance notice is dispensed with as impracticable. The record of any prior criminal convictions and pleas of guilty or pleas of nolo contendere of the defendant or the absence of any such prior criminal convictions and pleas shall also be admissible in evidence.

(2) At the hearing the Court shall permit argument by the State, the defendant and/or the defendant's counsel, on the punishment to be imposed. Such argument shall consist of opening statements by each, unless waived, opening summation by the State, rebuttal summation by the defendant and/or the defendant's counsel and closing summation by the State.

(3) a. Upon the conclusion of the evidence and arguments the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions and the jury shall retire to deliberate and report to the Court an answer to the following questions:
1. Whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least 1 aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection (e) of this section; and

2. Whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, after weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which bear upon the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender, the aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist.

b. 1. The jury shall report to the Court its finding on the question of the existence of statutory aggravating circumstances as enumerated in subsection (e) of this section. In order to find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection (e) of this section beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury must be unanimous as to the existence of that statutory aggravating circumstance. As to any statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (e) of this section which were alleged but for which the jury is not unanimous, the jury shall report the number of the affirmative and negative votes on each such circumstance.

2. The jury shall report to the Court by the number of the affirmative and negative votes its recommendation on the question as to whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, after weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which bear upon the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender, the aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist.

(4) In the instructions to the jury the Court shall include instructions for it to weigh and consider any mitigating circumstances or aggravating circumstances and any of the statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection (e) of this section which may be raised by the evidence. The jury shall be instructed to weigh any mitigating factors against the aggravating factors.

(d) Determination of sentence.--

(1) If a jury is impaneled, the Court shall discharge that jury after it has reported its findings and recommendation to the Court. A sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the jury, if a jury is impaneled, first finds unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least 1 statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection (e) of this section. If a jury is not impaneled, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least 1 statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection (e) of this section. If a jury has been impaneled and if the existence of at least 1 statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection (e) of this section has been found beyond a reasonable doubt by the jury, the Court, after considering the findings and recommendation of the jury and without hearing or reviewing any additional evidence, shall impose a sentence of death if the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence, after weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which bear upon the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender, that the aggravating circumstances found by the Court to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found by the Court to exist. The jury's recommendation concerning whether the aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist shall be given such consideration as deemed appropriate by the Court in light of the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender as found to exist by the Court. The jury's recommendation shall not be binding upon the Court. If a jury has not been impaneled and if the existence of at least 1 statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection (e) of this section has been found beyond a reasonable doubt by the Court, it shall impose a sentence of death if the Court finds by a preponderance of the evidence, after weighing all relevant evidence in aggravation or mitigation which
bears upon the particular circumstances or details of the commission of the offense and the character and
propensities of the offender, that the aggravating circumstances found by the Court to exist outweigh the
mitigating circumstances found by the Court to exist.

(2) Otherwise, the Court shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's
natural life without benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction.

(3) a. Not later than 90 days before trial the defendant may file a motion with the Court alleging that
the defendant had a serious intellectual developmental disorder at the time the crime was committed.
Upon the filing of the motion, the Court shall order an evaluation of the defendant for the purpose of
providing evidence of the following:

1. Whether the defendant has a significantly subaverage level of intellectual functioning;

2. Whether the defendant's adaptive behavior is substantially impaired; and

3. Whether the conditions described in paragraphs (d)(1) and (d)(2) of this section existed before
the defendant became 18 years of age.

b. During the hearing authorized by subsections (b) and (c) of this section, the defendant and the
State may present relevant and admissible evidence on the issue of the defendant's alleged serious
intellectual developmental disorder, or in rebuttal thereof. The defendant shall have the burden of proof to
demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had a serious intellectual developmental
disorder at the time of the offense. Evidence presented during the hearing shall be considered by the jury
in making its recommendation to the Court pursuant to paragraph (c)(3) of this section as to whether the
aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist. The jury
shall not make any recommendation to the Court on the question of whether the defendant had a serious
intellectual developmental disorder at the time the crime was committed.

c. If the defendant files a motion pursuant to this paragraph claiming he or she had a serious
intellectual developmental disorder at the time the crime was committed, the Court, in determining the
sentence to be imposed, shall make specific findings as to the existence of a serious intellectual
developmental disorder at the time the crime was committed. If the Court finds that the defendant has
established by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had a serious intellectual developmental
disorder at the time the crime was committed, notwithstanding any other provision of this section to the
contrary, the Court shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for the remainder of the defendant's natural
life without benefit of probation or parole or any other reduction. If the Court determines that the
defendant has failed to establish by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant had a serious
intellectual developmental disorder at the time the crime was committed, the Court shall proceed to
determine the sentence to be imposed pursuant to the provisions of this subsection. Evidence on the
question of the defendant's alleged serious intellectual developmental disorder presented during the
hearing shall be considered by the Court in its determination pursuant to this section as to whether the
aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist.

d. When used in this paragraph:

1. “Adaptive behavior” means the effectiveness or degree to which the individual meets the
standards of personal independence expected of the individual’s age group, sociocultural background and
community setting, as evidenced by significant limitations in not less than 2 of the following adaptive
skill areas: communication, self-care, home living, social skills, use of community resources, self-
direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, health or safety;

2. “Serious intellectual developmental disorder” means that an individual has significantly
subaverage intellectual functioning that exists concurrently with substantial deficits in adaptive behavior
and both the significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and the deficits in adaptive behavior were
manifested before the individual became 18 years of age; and

3. “Significantly subaverage intellectual functioning” means an intelligent quotient of 70 or
below obtained by assessment with 1 or more of the standardized, individually administered general
intelligence tests developed for the purpose of assessing intellectual functioning.

(4) After the Court determines the sentence to be imposed, it shall set forth in writing the findings
upon which its sentence is based. If a jury is impaneled, and if the Court's decision as to whether the
aggravating circumstances found to exist outweigh the mitigating circumstances found to exist differs
from the jury's recommended finding, the Court shall also state with specificity the reasons for its
decision not to accept the jury's recommendation.

(e) Aggravating circumstances.--

(1) In order for a sentence of death to be imposed, the jury, unanimously, or the judge where
applicable, must find that the evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least 1 of
the following aggravating circumstances which shall apply with equal force to accomplices convicted of
such murder:

   a. The murder was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the custody of a law-
enforcement officer or place of confinement.

   b. The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest or for the purpose
   of effecting an escape from custody.

   c. The murder was committed against any law-enforcement officer, corrections employee,
   firefighter, paramedic, emergency medical technician, fire marshal or fire police officer while such victim
   was engaged in the performance of official duties.

   d. The murder was committed against a judicial officer, a former judicial officer, Attorney General,
   former Attorney General, Assistant or Deputy Attorney General or former Assistant or Deputy Attorney
   General, State Detective or former State Detective, Special Investigator or former Special Investigator,
   during, or because of, the exercise of an official duty.

   e. The murder was committed against a person who was held or otherwise detained as a shield or
   hostage.

   f. The murder was committed against a person who was held or detained by the defendant for
   ransom or reward.

   g. The murder was committed against a person who was a witness to a crime and who was killed
   for the purpose of preventing the witness's appearance or testimony in any grand jury, criminal or civil
   proceeding involving such crime, or in retaliation for the witness's appearance or testimony in any grand
   jury, criminal or civil proceeding involving such crime.
h. The defendant paid or was paid by another person or had agreed to pay or be paid by another
classmate or had conspired to pay or be paid by another person for the killing of the victim.

i. The defendant was previously convicted of another murder or manslaughter or of a felony
involving the use of, or threat of, force or violence upon another person.

j. The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or attempt to
commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit any degree of rape, unlawful sexual
intercourse, arson, kidnapping, robbery, sodomy, burglary, or home invasion.

k. The defendant's course of conduct resulted in the deaths of 2 or more persons where the deaths
are a probable consequence of the defendant's conduct.

l. The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture,
depravity of mind, use of an explosive device or poison or the defendant used such means on the victim
prior to murdering the victim.

m. The defendant caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or
employee of another person.

n. The defendant was under a sentence of life imprisonment, whether for natural life or otherwise,
at the time of the commission of the murder.

o. The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.

p. The victim was pregnant.

q. The victim was particularly vulnerable due to a severe intellectual, mental or physical disability.

r. The victim was 62 years of age or older.

s. The victim was a child 14 years of age or younger, and the murder was committed by an
individual who is at least 4 years older than the victim.

t. At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been a nongovernmental informant or had
otherwise provided any investigative, law enforcement or police agency with information concerning
criminal activity, and the killing was in retaliation for the victim's activities as a nongovernmental
informant or in providing information concerning criminal activity to an investigative, law enforcement or
police agency.

u. The murder was premeditated and the result of substantial planning. Such planning must be as to
the commission of the murder itself and not simply as to the commission or attempted commission of any
underlying felony.

v. The murder was committed for the purpose of interfering with the victim's free exercise or
enjoyment of any right, privilege or immunity protected by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution, or because the victim has exercised or enjoyed said rights, or because of the victim's race,
religion, color, disability, national origin or ancestry.

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
55
(2) In any case where the defendant has been convicted of murder in the first degree in violation of any provision of § 636(a)(2)-(6) of this title, that conviction shall establish the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance and the jury, or judge where appropriate, shall be so instructed. This provision shall not preclude the jury, or judge where applicable, from considering and finding the statutory aggravating circumstances listed in this subsection and any other aggravating circumstances established by the evidence.

(f) Method and imposition of sentence of death.--The imposition of a sentence of death shall be upon such terms and conditions as the trial court may impose in its sentence, including the place, the number of witnesses which shall not exceed 10, and conditions of privacy, and shall occur between the hours of 12:01 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on the date set by the trial court. The trial court shall permit one adult member of the immediate family of the victim, as defined in § 4350(e) of this title, or the victim's designee, to witness the execution of a sentence of death pursuant to the rules of the court, if the family provides reasonable notice of its desire to be so represented. Punishment of death shall, in all cases, be inflicted by intravenous injection of a substance or substances in a lethal quantity sufficient to cause death and until such person sentenced to death is dead, and such execution procedure shall be determined and supervised by the Commissioner of the Department of Correction. The administration of the required lethal substance or substances required by this section shall not be construed to be the practice of medicine and any pharmacist or pharmaceutical supplier is authorized to dispense drugs to the Commissioner or the Commissioner's designee, without prescription, for carrying out the provisions of this section, notwithstanding any other provision of law. Such sentence may not be carried out until final review thereof is had by the Delaware Supreme Court as provided for in subsection (g) of this section. The Court or the Governor may suspend the execution of the sentence until a later date to be specified, solely to permit completion of the process of judicial review of the conviction.

If the execution of the sentence of death as provided above is held unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction, then punishment of death shall, in all cases, be inflicted by hanging by the neck. The imposition of a sentence of death shall be upon such terms and conditions as the trial court may impose in its sentence, including the place, the number of witnesses and conditions of privacy. Such sentence may not be carried out until final review thereof is had by the Delaware Supreme Court as provided in subsection (g) of this section. The Court or the Governor may suspend the execution of the sentence until a later date to be specified, solely to permit completion of the process of judicial review of the conviction.

(g) Automatic review of death penalty by Delaware Supreme Court.--

(1) Whenever the death penalty is imposed, and upon the judgment becoming final in the trial court, the recommendation on and imposition of that penalty shall be reviewed on the record by the Delaware Supreme Court. Absent an appeal having been taken by the defendant upon the expiration of 30 days after the sentence of death has been imposed, the Clerk of the Superior Court shall require a complete transcript of the punishment hearing to be prepared promptly and within 10 days after receipt of that transcript the clerk shall transmit the transcript, together with a notice prepared by the clerk, to the Delaware Supreme Court. The notice shall set forth the title and docket number of the case, the name of the defendant, the name and address of any attorney and a narrative statement of the judgment, the offense and the punishment prescribed. The Court shall, if necessary, appoint counsel to respond to the State's positions in the review proceedings.

(2) The Supreme Court shall limit its review under this section to the recommendation on and imposition of the penalty of death and shall determine:
a. Whether, considering the totality of evidence in aggravation and mitigation which bears upon the particular circumstances or details of the offense and the character and propensities of the offender, the death penalty was either arbitrarily or capriciously imposed or recommended, or disproportionate to the penalty recommended or imposed in similar cases arising under this section.

b. Whether the evidence supports the jury's or the judge's finding of a statutory aggravating circumstance as enumerated in subsection (e) of this section and, where applicable, § 636(a)(2)-(6) of this title.

(3) The Supreme Court shall permit the defendant and the State to submit briefs within the time provided by the Court, and permit them to present oral argument to the Court.

(4) With regard to review of the sentence in accordance with this subsection, the Court shall:

a. Affirm the sentence of death.

b. Set aside the sentence of death and remand for correction of any errors occurring during the hearing and for imposition of the appropriate penalty. Such errors shall not affect the determination of guilt and shall not preclude the reimposition of death where appropriately determined after a new hearing on punishment.

c. Set forth its findings as to the reasons for its actions.

(h) Ordinary review not affected by section.--Any error in the guilt phase of the trial may be raised as provided by law and rules of court and shall be in addition to the review of punishment provided by this section.

This act shall apply to all defendants tried, retried, sentenced or re-sentenced after July 15, 2003.

**DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA**

**D.C. CODE § 22-2101 (2012). MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE -- PURPOSEFUL KILLING; KILLING WHILE PERPETRATING CERTAIN CRIMES.**

Whoever, being of sound memory and discretion, kills another purposely, either of deliberate and premeditated malice or by means of poison, or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate an offense punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, or without purpose to do so kills another in perpetrating or in attempting to perpetrate any arson, as defined in § 22-301 or § 22-302, first degree sexual abuse, first degree child sexual abuse, first degree cruelty to children, mayhem, robbery, or kidnaping, or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate any housebreaking while armed with or using a dangerous weapon, or in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate a felony involving a controlled substance, is guilty of murder in the first degree. For purposes of imprisonment following revocation of release authorized by § 24-403.01(b)(7), murder in the first degree is a Class A felony.

**FLORIDA**

OFFENDERS; DEFINITIONS; PROCEDURE; ENHANCED PENALTIES OR MANDATORY MINIMUM PRISON TERMS.

(1) As used in this act:

(a) “Habitual felony offender” means a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in paragraph (4)(a), if it finds that:

1. The defendant has previously been convicted of any combination of two or more felonies in this state or other qualified offenses.

2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed:

a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense; or

b. Within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the defendant's last prior felony or other qualified offense, or within 5 years of the defendant's release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, control release, conditional release, parole or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision or other sentence that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for a felony or other qualified offense, whichever is later.

3. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced, and one of the two prior felony convictions, is not a violation of s. 893.13 relating to the purchase or the possession of a controlled substance.

4. The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or other qualified offense that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph.

5. A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.

(b) “Habitual violent felony offender” means a defendant for whom the court may impose an extended term of imprisonment, as provided in paragraph (4)(b), if it finds that:

1. The defendant has previously been convicted of a felony or an attempt or conspiracy to commit a felony and one or more of such convictions was for:

a. Arson;

b. Sexual battery;

c. Robbery;

d. Kidnapping;

e. Aggravated child abuse;
f. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult;

g. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon;

h. Murder;

i. Manslaughter;

j. Aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult;

k. Aggravated manslaughter of a child;

l. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;

m. Armed burglary;

n. Aggravated battery; or

o. Aggravated stalking.

2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced was committed:

   a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony; or

   b. Within 5 years of the date of the conviction of the last prior enumerated felony, or within 5 years of the defendant’s release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, control release, conditional release, parole, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision or other sentence that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony, whichever is later.

3. The defendant has not received a pardon on the ground of innocence for any crime that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph.

4. A conviction of a crime necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.

(c) “Three-time violent felony offender” means a defendant for whom the court must impose a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, as provided in paragraph (4)(c), if it finds that:

1. The defendant has previously been convicted as an adult two or more times of a felony, or an attempt to commit a felony, and two or more of such convictions were for committing, or attempting to commit, any of the following offenses or combination thereof:

   a. Arson;

   b. Sexual battery;

   c. Robbery;

   d. Kidnapping;
e. Aggravated child abuse;

f. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult;

g. Aggravated assault with a deadly weapon;

h. Murder;

i. Manslaughter;

j. Aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult;

k. Aggravated manslaughter of a child;

l. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;

m. Armed burglary;

n. Aggravated battery;

o. Aggravated stalking;

p. Home invasion/robbery;

q. Carjacking; or

r. An offense which is in violation of a law of any other jurisdiction if the elements of the offense are substantially similar to the elements of any felony offense enumerated in sub-subparagraphs a.-q., or an attempt to commit any such felony offense.

2. The felony for which the defendant is to be sentenced is one of the felonies enumerated in sub-subparagraphs 1.a.-q. and was committed:

a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence imposed as a result of a prior conviction for any offense enumerated in sub-subparagraphs 1.a.-r.; or

b. Within 5 years after the date of the conviction of the last prior offense enumerated in sub-subparagraphs 1.a.-r., or within 5 years after the defendant's release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, or other sentence imposed as a result of a prior conviction for any offense enumerated in sub-subparagraphs 1.a.-r., whichever is later.

3. The defendant has not received a pardon on the ground of innocence for any crime that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph.

4. A conviction of a crime necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.

(d) “Violent career criminal” means a defendant for whom the court must impose imprisonment pursuant to paragraph (4)(d), if it finds that:
1. The defendant has previously been convicted as an adult three or more times for an offense in this state or other qualified offense that is:

   a. Any forcible felony, as described in s. 776.08;
   b. Aggravated stalking, as described in s. 784.048(3) and (4);
   c. Aggravated child abuse, as described in s. 827.03(2)(a);
   d. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult, as described in s. 825.102(2);
   e. Lewd or lascivious battery, lewd or lascivious molestation, lewd or lascivious conduct, or lewd or lascivious exhibition, as described in s. 800.04 or s. 847.0135(5);
   f. Escape, as described in s. 944.40; or
   g. A felony violation of chapter 790 involving the use or possession of a firearm.

2. The defendant has been incarcerated in a state prison or a federal prison.

3. The primary felony offense for which the defendant is to be sentenced is a felony enumerated in subparagraph 1. and was committed on or after October 1, 1995, and:

   a. While the defendant was serving a prison sentence or other sentence, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony; or
   b. Within 5 years after the conviction of the last prior enumerated felony, or within 5 years after the defendant's release from a prison sentence, probation, community control, control release, conditional release, parole, or court-ordered or lawfully imposed supervision or other sentence that is imposed as a result of a prior conviction for an enumerated felony, whichever is later.

4. The defendant has not received a pardon for any felony or other qualified offense that is necessary for the operation of this paragraph.

5. A conviction of a felony or other qualified offense necessary to the operation of this paragraph has not been set aside in any postconviction proceeding.

(e) “Qualified offense” means any offense, substantially similar in elements and penalties to an offense in this state, which is in violation of a law of any other jurisdiction, whether that of another state, the District of Columbia, the United States or any possession or territory thereof, or any foreign jurisdiction, that was punishable under the law of such jurisdiction at the time of its commission by the defendant by death or imprisonment exceeding 1 year.

(2) For the purposes of this section, the placing of a person on probation or community control without an adjudication of guilt shall be treated as a prior conviction.

(3)(a) In a separate proceeding, the court shall determine if the defendant is a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender. The procedure shall be as follows:
1. The court shall obtain and consider a presentence investigation prior to the imposition of a sentence as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender.

2. Written notice shall be served on the defendant and the defendant's attorney a sufficient time prior to the entry of a plea or prior to the imposition of sentence in order to allow the preparation of a submission on behalf of the defendant.

3. Except as provided in subparagraph 1., all evidence presented shall be presented in open court with full rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.

4. Each of the findings required as the basis for such sentence shall be found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence and shall be appealable to the extent normally applicable to similar findings.

5. For the purpose of identification of a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender, the court shall fingerprint the defendant pursuant to s. 921.241.

6. For an offense committed on or after October 1, 1995, if the state attorney pursues a habitual felony offender sanction or a habitual violent felony offender sanction against the defendant and the court, in a separate proceeding pursuant to this paragraph, determines that the defendant meets the criteria under subsection (1) for imposing such sanction, the court must sentence the defendant as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender, subject to imprisonment pursuant to this section unless the court finds that such sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public. If the court finds that it is not necessary for the protection of the public to sentence the defendant as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender, the court shall provide written reasons; a written transcript of orally stated reasons is permissible, if filed by the court within 7 days after the date of sentencing. Each month, the court shall submit to the Office of Economic and Demographic Research of the Legislature the written reasons or transcripts in each case in which the court determines not to sentence a defendant as a habitual felony offender or a habitual violent felony offender as provided in this subparagraph.

(b) In a separate proceeding, the court shall determine if the defendant is a three-time violent felony offender. The procedure shall be as follows:

1. The court shall obtain and consider a presentence investigation prior to the imposition of a sentence as a three-time violent felony offender.

2. Written notice shall be served on the defendant and the defendant's attorney a sufficient time prior to the entry of a plea or prior to the imposition of sentence in order to allow the preparation of a submission on behalf of the defendant.

3. Except as provided in subparagraph 1., all evidence presented shall be presented in open court with full rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.

4. Each of the findings required as the basis for such sentence shall be found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence and shall be appealable to the extent normally applicable to similar findings.

5. For the purpose of identification of a three-time violent felony offender, the court shall fingerprint the defendant pursuant to s. 921.241.
6. For an offense committed on or after the effective date of this act, if the state attorney pursues a three-time violent felony offender sanction against the defendant and the court, in a separate proceeding pursuant to this paragraph, determines that the defendant meets the criteria under subsection (1) for imposing such sanction, the court must sentence the defendant as a three-time violent felony offender, subject to imprisonment pursuant to this section as provided in paragraph (4)(c).

(c) In a separate proceeding, the court shall determine whether the defendant is a violent career criminal with respect to a primary offense committed on or after October 1, 1995. The procedure shall be as follows:

1. Written notice shall be served on the defendant and the defendant's attorney a sufficient time prior to the entry of a plea or prior to the imposition of sentence in order to allow the preparation of a submission on behalf of the defendant.

2. All evidence presented shall be presented in open court with full rights of confrontation, cross-examination, and representation by counsel.

3. Each of the findings required as the basis for such sentence shall be found to exist by a preponderance of the evidence and shall be appealable only as provided in paragraph (d).

4. For the purpose of identification, the court shall fingerprint the defendant pursuant to s. 921.241.

5. For an offense committed on or after October 1, 1995, if the state attorney pursues a violent career criminal sanction against the defendant and the court, in a separate proceeding pursuant to this paragraph, determines that the defendant meets the criteria under subsection (1) for imposing such sanction, the court must sentence the defendant as a violent career criminal, subject to imprisonment pursuant to this section unless the court finds that such sentence is not necessary for the protection of the public. If the court finds that it is not necessary for the protection of the public to sentence the defendant as a violent career criminal, the court shall provide written reasons; a written transcript of orally stated reasons is permissible, if filed by the court within 7 days after the date of sentencing. Each month, the court shall submit to the Office of Economic and Demographic Research of the Legislature the written reasons or transcripts in each case in which the court determines not to sentence a defendant as a violent career criminal as provided in this subparagraph.

(d) 1. A person sentenced under paragraph (4)(d) as a violent career criminal has the right of direct appeal, and either the state or the defendant may petition the trial court to vacate an illegal sentence at any time. However, the determination of the trial court to impose or not to impose a violent career criminal sentence is presumed appropriate and no petition or motion for collateral or other postconviction relief may be considered based on an allegation either by the state or the defendant that such sentence is inappropriate, inadequate, or excessive.

2. It is the intent of the Legislature that, with respect to both direct appeal and collateral review of violent career criminal sentences, all claims of error or illegality be raised at the first opportunity and that no claim should be filed more than 2 years after the judgment and sentence became final, unless it is established that the basis for the claim could not have been ascertained at the time by the exercise of due diligence. Technical violations and mistakes at trials and sentencing proceedings involving violent career criminals that do not affect due process or fundamental fairness are not appealable by either the state or the defendant.
3. It is the intent of the Legislature that no funds, resources, or employees of the state or its political subdivisions be used, directly or indirectly, in appellate or collateral proceedings based on violent career criminal sentencing, except when such use is constitutionally or statutorily mandated.

(4)(a) The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph (3)(a), may sentence the habitual felony offender as follows:

1. In the case of a life felony or a felony of the first degree, for life.

2. In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of years not exceeding 30.

3. In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term of years not exceeding 10.

(b) The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph (3)(a), may sentence the habitual violent felony offender as follows:

1. In the case of a life felony or a felony of the first degree, for life, and such offender shall not be eligible for release for 15 years.

2. In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of years not exceeding 30, and such offender shall not be eligible for release for 10 years.

3. In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term of years not exceeding 10, and such offender shall not be eligible for release for 5 years.

(c) 1. The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph (3)(b), must sentence the three-time violent felony offender to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, as follows:

   a. In the case of a felony punishable by life, to a term of imprisonment for life;

   b. In the case of a felony of the first degree, to a term of imprisonment of 30 years;

   c. In the case of a felony of the second degree, to a term of imprisonment of 15 years; or

   d. In the case of a felony of the third degree, to a term of imprisonment of 5 years.

   2. Nothing in this subsection shall prevent a court from imposing a greater sentence of incarceration as authorized by law.

(d) The court, in conformity with the procedure established in paragraph (3)(c), shall sentence the violent career criminal as follows:

1. In the case of a life felony or a felony of the first degree, for life.

2. In the case of a felony of the second degree, for a term of years not exceeding 40, with a mandatory minimum term of 30 years' imprisonment.

3. In the case of a felony of the third degree, for a term of years not exceeding 15, with a mandatory minimum term of 10 years' imprisonment.
(e) If the court finds, pursuant to paragraph (3)(a) or paragraph (3)(c), that it is not necessary for the protection of the public to sentence a defendant who meets the criteria for sentencing as a habitual felony offender, a habitual violent felony offender, or a violent career criminal, with respect to an offense committed on or after October 1, 1995, sentence shall be imposed without regard to this section.

(f) At any time when it appears to the court that the defendant is eligible for sentencing under this section, the court shall make that determination as provided in paragraph (3)(a), paragraph (3)(b), or paragraph (3)(c).

(g) A sentence imposed under this section shall not be increased after such imposition.

(h) A sentence imposed under this section is not subject to s. 921.002.

(i) The provisions of this section do not apply to capital felonies, and a sentence authorized under this section does not preclude the imposition of the death penalty for a capital felony.

(j) The provisions of s. 947.1405 shall apply to persons sentenced as habitual felony offenders and persons sentenced as habitual violent felony offenders.

(k) 1. A defendant sentenced under this section as a habitual felony offender, a habitual violent felony offender, or a violent career criminal is eligible for gain-time granted by the Department of Corrections as provided in s. 944.275(4)(b).

2. For an offense committed on or after October 1, 1995, a defendant sentenced under this section as a violent career criminal is not eligible for any form of discretionary early release, other than pardon or executive clemency, or conditional medical release granted pursuant to s. 947.149.

3. For an offense committed on or after July 1, 1999, a defendant sentenced under this section as a three-time violent felony offender shall be released only by expiration of sentence and shall not be eligible for parole, control release, or any form of early release.

(5) In order to be counted as a prior felony for purposes of sentencing under this section, the felony must have resulted in a conviction sentenced separately prior to the current offense and sentenced separately from any other felony conviction that is to be counted as a prior felony.

(6) The purpose of this section is to provide uniform punishment for those crimes made punishable under this section, and to this end, a reference to this section constitutes a general reference under the doctrine of incorporation by reference.


(1)(a) The unlawful killing of a human being:

1. When perpetrated from a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or any human being;

2. When committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any:
a. Trafficking offense prohibited by s. 893.135(1),
b. Arson,
c. Sexual battery,
d. Robbery,
e. Burglary,
f. Kidnapping,
g. Escape,
h. Aggravated child abuse,
i. Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult,
j. Aircraft piracy,
k. Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb,
l. Carjacking,
m. Home-invasion robbery,
n. Aggravated stalking,
o. Murder of another human being,
p. Resisting an officer with violence to his or her person,
q. Aggravated fleeing or eluding with serious bodily injury or death,
r. Felony that is an act of terrorism or is in furtherance of an act of terrorism; or

3. Which resulted from the unlawful distribution of any substance controlled under s. 893.03(1), cocaine as described in s. 893.03(2)(a) 4., opium or any synthetic or natural salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of opium, or methadone by a person 18 years of age or older, when such drug is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user, is murder in the first degree and constitutes a capital felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082.

(b) In all cases under this section, the procedure set forth in s. 921.141 shall be followed in order to determine sentence of death or life imprisonment.

(2) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to another and evincing a depraved mind regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual, is murder in the second degree and constitutes a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.
(3) When a human being is killed during the perpetration of, or during the attempt to perpetrate, any:

(a) Trafficking offense prohibited by s. 893.135(1),

(b) Arson,

(c) Sexual battery,

(d) Robbery,

(e) Burglary,

(f) Kidnapping,

(g) Escape,

(h) Aggravated child abuse,

(i) Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult,

(j) Aircraft piracy,

(k) Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb,

(l) Carjacking,

(m) Home-invasion robbery,

(n) Aggravated stalking,

(o) Murder of another human being,

(p) Aggravated fleeing or eluding with serious bodily injury or death,

(q) Resisting an officer with violence to his or her person, or

(r) Felony that is an act of terrorism or is in furtherance of an act of terrorism, by a person other than the person engaged in the perpetration of or in the attempt to perpetrate such felony, the person perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate such felony commits murder in the second degree, which constitutes a felony of the first degree, punishable by imprisonment for a term of years not exceeding life or as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(4) The unlawful killing of a human being, when perpetrated without any design to effect death, by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or in the attempt to perpetrate, any felony other than any:

(a) Trafficking offense prohibited by s. 893.135(1),

(b) Arson,
(c) Sexual battery,
(d) Robbery,
(e) Burglary,
(f) Kidnapping,
(g) Escape,
(h) Aggravated child abuse,
(i) Aggravated abuse of an elderly person or disabled adult,
(j) Aircraft piracy,
(k) Unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or bomb,
(l) Unlawful distribution of any substance controlled under s. 893.03(1), cocaine as described in s. 893.03(2)(a) 4., or opium or any synthetic or natural salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of opium by a person 18 years of age or older, when such drug is proven to be the proximate cause of the death of the user,
(m) Carjacking,
(n) Home-invasion robbery,
(o) Aggravated stalking,
(p) Murder of another human being,
(q) Aggravated fleeing or eluding with serious bodily injury or death,
(r) Resisting an officer with violence to his or her person, or
(s) Felony that is an act of terrorism or is in furtherance of an act of terrorism, is murder in the third degree and constitutes a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(5) As used in this section, the term “terrorism” means an activity that:

(a) 1. Involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life which is a violation of the criminal laws of this state or of the United States; or 2. Involves a violation of s. 815.06; and
(b) Is intended to:

1. Intimidate, injure, or coerce a civilian population;

2. Influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or
3. Affect the conduct of government through destruction of property, assassination, murder, kidnapping, or aircraft piracy.

**Fla. Stat. Ann. § 782.07 (2012). Manslaughter; Aggravated Manslaughter of an Elderly Person or Disabled Adult; Aggravated Manslaughter of a Child; Aggravated Manslaughter of an Officer, a Firefighter, an Emergency Medical Technician, or a Paramedic.**

(1) The killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, without lawful justification according to the provisions of chapter 776 and in cases in which such killing shall not be excusable homicide or murder, according to the provisions of this chapter, is manslaughter, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(2) A person who causes the death of any elderly person or disabled adult by culpable negligence under s. 825.102(3) commits aggravated manslaughter of an elderly person or disabled adult, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(3) A person who causes the death of any person under the age of 18 by culpable negligence under s. 827.03(2)(b) commits aggravated manslaughter of a child, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(4) A person who causes the death, through culpable negligence, of an officer as defined in s. 943.10(14), a firefighter as defined in s. 112.191, an emergency medical technician as defined in s. 401.23, or a paramedic as defined in s. 401.23, while the officer, firefighter, emergency medical technician, or paramedic is performing duties that are within the course of his or her employment, commits aggravated manslaughter of an officer, a firefighter, an emergency medical technician, or a paramedic, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.


“Vehicular homicide” is the killing of a human being, or the killing of a viable fetus by any injury to the mother, caused by the operation of a motor vehicle by another in a reckless manner likely to cause the death of, or great bodily harm to, another.

(1) Vehicular homicide is:

   a. A felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

   b. A felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084, if:

      1. At the time of the accident, the person knew, or should have known, that the accident occurred; and

      2. The person failed to give information and render aid as required by s. 316.062.

This paragraph does not require that the person knew that the accident resulted in injury or death.

(2) For purposes of this section, a fetus is viable when it becomes capable of meaningful life outside the womb through standard medical measures.
(3) A right of action for civil damages shall exist under s. 768.19, under all circumstances, for all deaths described in this section.

(4) In addition to any other punishment, the court may order the person to serve 120 community service hours in a trauma center or hospital that regularly receives victims of vehicle accidents, under the supervision of a registered nurse, an emergency room physician, or an emergency medical technician pursuant to a voluntary community service program operated by the trauma center or hospital.


(1) The unlawful killing of an unborn quick child, by any injury to the mother of such child which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be deemed murder in the same degree as that which would have been committed against the mother. Any person, other than the mother, who unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother:

   (a) Which would be murder in the first degree constituting a capital felony if it resulted in the mother's death commits murder in the first degree constituting a capital felony, punishable as provided in s. 775.082.

   (b) Which would be murder in the second degree if it resulted in the mother's death commits murder in the second degree, a felony of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

   (c) Which would be murder in the third degree if it resulted in the mother's death commits murder in the third degree, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(2) The unlawful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother of such child which would be manslaughter if it resulted in the death of such mother shall be deemed manslaughter. A person who unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother which would be manslaughter if it resulted in the mother's death commits manslaughter, a felony of the second degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084.

(3) The death of the mother resulting from the same act or criminal episode that caused the death of the unborn quick child does not bar prosecution under this section.

(4) This section does not authorize the prosecution of any person in connection with a termination of pregnancy pursuant to chapter 390.

(5) For purposes of this section, the definition of the term “unborn quick child” shall be determined in accordance with the definition of viable fetus as set forth in s. 782.071.

**Fla. Stat. Ann. § 823.07 (2012). Iceboxes, Refrigerators, Deep-Freeze Lockers, Clothes Washers, Clothes Dryers, or Airtight Units; Abandonment, Discard.**

(1) The purpose of ss. 823.07-823.09 is to prevent deaths due to suffocation of children locked in abandoned or discarded iceboxes, refrigerators, deep-freeze lockers, clothes washers, clothes dryers, or similar airtight units from which the doors have not been removed.
(2) It is unlawful for any person knowingly to abandon or discard or to permit to be abandoned or
discarded on premises under his or her control any icebox, refrigerator, deep-freeze locker, clothes
washer, clothes dryer, or similar airtight unit having an interior storage capacity of 1 ½ cubic feet or more
from which the door has not been removed.

(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to an icebox, refrigerator, deep-freeze locker, clothes
washer, clothes dryer, or similar airtight unit which is crated or is securely locked from the outside or is in
the normal use on the premises of a home, or rental unit, or is held for sale or use in a place of business;
provided, however, that “place of business” as used herein shall not be deemed to include a junkyard or
other similar establishment dealing in secondhand merchandise for sale on open unprotected premises.

(4) It shall be unlawful for any junkyard dealer or secondhand furniture dealer with unenclosed premises
used for display of secondhand iceboxes, refrigerators, deep-freeze lockers, clothes washers, clothes
dryers, or similar airtight units to fail to remove the doors on such secondhand units having an interior
storage capacity of 1 ½ cubic feet or more from which the door has not been removed. This section will
not apply to any dealer who has fenced and locked his or her premises.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 823.09 (2012). VIOLATION OF S. 823.07; PENALTY.

Any person violating any provision of s. 823.07, is guilty of a misdemeanor of the second degree,
punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or s. 775.083; provided, however, that in the event death of a minor
child or permanent physical or mental injury to a minor child results from willful and wanton misconduct
amounting to culpable negligence on the part of the person committing such violation, then such person
shall be guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s.
775.084.

GEORGIA

GA. CODE ANN. §16-5-72 (2012). RECKLESS ABANDONMENT.

(a) A parent, guardian, or other person supervising the welfare of or having immediate charge or custody
of a child under the age of one year commits the offense of reckless abandonment of a child when the
person willfully and voluntarily physically abandons such child with the intention of severing all parental
or custodial duties and responsibilities to such child and leaving such child in a condition which results in
the death of said child.

(b) Any person who violates subsection (a) of this Code section shall be guilty of a felony and shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punished by imprisonment for not less than ten nor more than 25 years.

GA. CODE ANN. §16-5-80 (2012). FETICIDE.

(a) For the purposes of this Code section, the term “unborn child” means a member of the species homo
sapiens at any stage of development who is carried in the womb.

(b) A person commits the offense of feticide if he or she willfully and without legal justification causes
the death of an unborn child by any injury to the mother of such child, which would be murder if it
resulted in the death of such mother, or if he or she, when in the commission of a felony, causes the death of an unborn child.

(c) A person convicted of the offense of feticide shall be punished by imprisonment for life.

(d) A person commits the offense of voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child when such person causes the death of an unborn child under circumstances which would otherwise be feticide and if such person acts solely as the result of a sudden, violent, and irresistible passion resulting from serious provocation sufficient to excite such passion in a reasonable person; provided, however, that, if there should have been an interval between the provocation and the killing sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, of which the jury in all cases shall be the judge, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge and be punished as feticide.

(e) A person convicted of the offense of voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child shall be guilty of a felony and shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years.

(f) Nothing in this Code section shall be construed to permit the prosecution of:

1. Any person for conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman, or person authorized by law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or for which such consent is implied by law;
2. Any person for any medical treatment of the pregnant woman or her unborn child; or
3. Any woman with respect to her unborn child.

GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-140 (2012). CRIMINAL ABORTION.

(a) A person commits the offense of criminal abortion when, in violation of Code Section 16-12-141, he or she administers any medicine, drugs, or other substance whatever to any woman or when he or she uses any instrument or other means whatever upon any woman with intent to produce a miscarriage or abortion.

(b) A person convicted of the offense of criminal abortion shall be punished by imprisonment for not less than one nor more than ten years.

GA. CODE ANN. § 51-4-4 (2012). HOMICIDE OF A CHILD.

The right to recover for the homicide of a child shall be as provided in Code Section 19-7-1.

HAWAII

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 706-620 (2012). AUTHORITY TO WITHHOLD SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT.
A defendant who has been convicted of a crime may be sentenced to a term of probation unless:

(1) The crime is first or second degree murder or attempted first or second degree murder;

(2) The crime is a class A felony, except class A felonies defined in chapter 712, part IV, and by section 707-702;

(3) The defendant is a repeat offender under section 706-606.5;

(4) The defendant is a felony firearm offender as defined in section 706-660.1(2); or

(5) The crime involved the death of or the infliction of serious or substantial bodily injury upon a child, an elder person, or a handicapped person under section 706-660.2.

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §706-660.2 (2012). SENTENCE OF IMPRISONMENT FOR OFFENSES AGAINST CHILDREN, ELDER PERSONS, OR HANDICAPPED PERSONS.

Notwithstanding section 706-669, a person who, in the course of committing or attempting to commit a felony, causes the death or inflicts serious or substantial bodily injury upon a person who is:

(1) Sixty years of age or older;

(2) Blind, a paraplegic, or a quadriplegic; or

(3) Eight years of age or younger;

and such disability is known or reasonably should be known to the defendant, shall, if not subjected to an extended term of imprisonment pursuant to section 706-662, be sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment without possibility of parole as follows:

(1) For murder in the second degree--fifteen years;

(2) For a class A felony--six years, eight months;

(3) For a class B felony--three years, four months;

(4) For a class C felony--one year, eight months.

HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 709-901 (2012). CONCEALING THE CORPSE OF AN INFANT.

(1) A person commits the offense of concealing the corpse of an infant if the person conceals the corpse of a new-born child with intent to conceal the fact of its birth or to prevent a determination of whether it was born dead or alive.

(2) Concealing the corpse of an infant is a misdemeanor.
**IDAHO**

**IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4001. (2013). MURDER DEFINED.**

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being including, but not limited to, a human embryo or fetus, with malice aforethought or the intentional application of torture to a human being, which results in the death of a human being. Torture is the intentional infliction of extreme and prolonged pain with the intent to cause suffering. It shall also be torture to inflict on a human being extreme and prolonged acts of brutality irrespective of proof of intent to cause suffering. The death of a human being caused by such torture is murder irrespective of proof of specific intent to kill; torture causing death shall be deemed the equivalent of intent to kill.

**IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4003 (2013). DEGREES OF MURDER.**

(a) All murder which is perpetrated by means of poison, or lying in wait, or torture, when torture is inflicted with the intent to cause suffering, to execute vengeance, to extort something from the victim, or to satisfy some sadistic inclination, or which is perpetrated by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing is murder of the first degree.

(b) Any murder of any peace officer, executive officer, officer of the court, fireman, judicial officer or prosecuting attorney who was acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty, and was known or should have been known by the perpetrator of the murder to be an officer so acting, shall be murder of the first degree.

(c) Any murder committed by a person under a sentence for murder of the first or second degree, including such persons on parole or probation from such sentence, shall be murder of the first degree.

(d) Any murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, aggravated battery on a child under twelve (12) years of age, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or mayhem, or an act of terrorism, as defined in section 18-8102, Idaho Code, or the use of a weapon of mass destruction, biological weapon or chemical weapon, is murder of the first degree.

(e) Any murder committed by a person incarcerated in a penal institution upon a person employed by the penal institution, another inmate of the penal institution or a visitor to the penal institution shall be murder of the first degree.

(f) Any murder committed by a person while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal institution is murder of the first degree.

(g) All other kinds of murder are of the second degree.

**IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4006 (2013). MANSLAUGHTER DEFINED.**

Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being including, but not limited to, a human embryo or fetus, without malice. It is of three (3) kinds:
(1) Voluntary--upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion.

(2) Involuntary--in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any unlawful act, other than those acts specified in section 18-4003(d), Idaho Code; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection; or in the operation of any firearm or deadly weapon in a reckless, careless or negligent manner which produces death.

(3) Vehicular--in which the operation of a motor vehicle is a significant cause contributing to the death because of:

   (a) The commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, with gross negligence; or

   (b) The commission of a violation of section 18-8004 or 18-8006, Idaho Code; or

   (c) The commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony, without gross negligence.

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, any evidence of conviction under subsection (3)(b) of this section shall be admissible in any civil action for damages resulting from the occurrence. A conviction for the purposes of subsection (3)(b) of this section means that the person has pled guilty or has been found guilty, notwithstanding the form of the judgment(s) or withheld judgment(s).

IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-4007 (2013). PUNISHMENT FOR MANSLAUGHTER.

Manslaughter is punishable as follows:

(1) Voluntary--by a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or by a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction not exceeding fifteen (15) years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(2) Involuntary--by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction not exceeding ten (10) years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(3) Vehicular--in the operation of a motor vehicle:

   (a) For a violation of section 18-4006(3)(a), Idaho Code, by a fine of not more than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), or by a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction not exceeding ten (10) years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

   (b) For a violation of section 18-4006(3)(b), Idaho Code, by a fine of not more than fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000), or by a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction not exceeding fifteen (15) years, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

   (c) For a violation of section 18-4006(3)(c), Idaho Code, by a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000), or by a jail sentence not exceeding one (1) year, or by both such fine and jail sentence.

   (d) In addition to the foregoing, any person convicted of a violation of section 18-4006(3), Idaho Code, which resulted in the death of the parent or parents of minor children may be ordered by the court to pay support for each such minor child until the child reaches the age of eighteen (18) years. In setting
the amount of support, the court shall consider all relevant factors. The nonpayment of such support shall be subject to enforcement and collection by the surviving parent or guardian of the child in the same manner that other child support orders are enforced as provided by law. In no event shall the child support judgment or order imposed by the court under this section be paid or indemnified by the proceeds of any liability insurance policy.

(e) In addition to the foregoing, the driver's license of any person convicted of a violation of section 18-4006(3), Idaho Code, may be suspended for a time determined by the court.

**Idaho Code Ann. § 19-2515 (2013). Sentence in capital cases -- Special sentencing proceeding -- Statutory aggravating circumstances -- Special verdict or written findings.**

(1) Except as provided in section 19-2515A, Idaho Code, a person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be liable for the imposition of the penalty of death if such person killed, intended a killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human life, irrespective of whether such person directly committed the acts that caused death.

(2) Where a person is sentenced to serve a term in the penitentiary, after conviction of a crime which falls within the provisions of section 20-223, Idaho Code, except in cases where the court retains jurisdiction, the comments and arguments of the counsel for the state and the defendant relative to the sentencing and the comments of the judge relative to the sentencing shall be recorded. If the comments are recorded electronically, they need not be transcribed. Otherwise, they shall be transcribed by the court reporter.

(3) Where a person is convicted of an offense which may be punishable by death, a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless:

(a) A notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed and served as provided in section 18-4004A, Idaho Code; and

(b) The jury, or the court if a jury is waived, finds beyond a reasonable doubt at least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance. Where a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant shall be sentenced to death unless mitigating circumstances which may be presented are found to be sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust. The jury shall not direct imposition of a sentence of death unless it unanimously finds at least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance and unanimously determines that the penalty of death should be imposed.

(4) Notwithstanding any court rule to the contrary, when a defendant is adjudicated guilty of murder in the first degree, whether by acceptance of a plea of guilty, by verdict of a jury, or by decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, no presentence investigation shall be conducted; provided however, that if a special sentencing proceeding is not held or if a special sentencing proceeding is held but no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the court may order that a presentence investigation be conducted.

(5) (a) If a person is adjudicated guilty of murder in the first degree, whether by acceptance of a plea of guilty, by verdict of a jury, or by decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, and a notice of intent to seek the death penalty was filed and served as provided in section 18-4004A, Idaho Code, a special sentencing proceeding shall be held promptly for the purpose of hearing all relevant evidence and
arguments of counsel in aggravation and mitigation of the offense. Information concerning the victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the victim's family is relevant and admissible. Such information shall be designed to demonstrate the victim's uniqueness as an individual human being and the resultant loss to the community by the victim's death. Characterizations and opinions about the crime, the defendant and the appropriate sentence shall not be permitted as part of any victim impact information. The special sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury unless a jury is waived by the defendant with the consent of the prosecuting attorney.

(b) If the defendant's guilt was determined by a jury verdict, the same jury shall hear the special sentencing proceeding; provided however, that if it is impracticable to reconvene the same jury to hear the special sentencing proceeding due to an insufficient number of jurors, the trial court may dismiss that jury and convene a new jury of twelve (12) persons, plus alternate jurors as the trial court deems necessary pursuant to section 19-1904, Idaho Code.

(c) If the defendant's guilt was determined by a plea of guilty or by a decision of the trial court sitting without a jury, or if a retrial of the special sentencing proceeding is necessary for any reason including, but not limited to, a mistrial in a previous special sentencing proceeding or as a consequence of a remand from an appellate court, the trial court shall impanel a jury of twelve (12) persons, plus alternate jurors as the trial court deems necessary pursuant to section 19-1904, Idaho Code, unless such jury is waived.

(d) If a special sentencing proceeding is conducted before a newly impaneled jury pursuant to the provisions of subsection (5)(b) or (5)(c) of this section, the state and the defense may present evidence to inform the jury of the nature and circumstances of the murder for which the defendant was convicted. The newly impaneled jury shall be instructed that the defendant has previously been found guilty of first-degree murder and that the jury's purpose is limited to making findings relevant for sentencing.

(6) At the special sentencing proceeding, the state and the defendant shall be entitled to present all relevant evidence in aggravation and mitigation. Disclosure of evidence to be relied on in the sentencing proceeding shall be made in accordance with Idaho criminal rule 16. Evidence admitted at trial shall be considered and need not be repeated at the sentencing hearing.

(7) The jury shall be informed as follows:

(a) If the jury finds that a statutory aggravating circumstance exists and no mitigating circumstances exist which would make the imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant will be sentenced to death by the court.

(b) If the jury finds the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance but finds that the existence of mitigating circumstances makes the imposition of the death penalty unjust or the jury cannot unanimously agree on whether the existence of mitigating circumstances makes the imposition of the death penalty unjust, the defendant will be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole; and

(c) If the jury does not find the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance or if the jury cannot unanimously agree on the existence of a statutory aggravating circumstance, the defendant will be sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment with a fixed term of not less than ten (10) years.

(8) Upon the conclusion of the evidence and arguments in mitigation and aggravation:
(a) With regard to each statutory aggravating circumstance alleged by the state, the jury shall return a special verdict stating:

(i) Whether the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt; and

(ii) If the statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whether all mitigating circumstances, when weighed against the aggravating circumstance, are sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust.

(b) If a jury has been waived, the court shall:

(i) Make written findings setting forth any statutory aggravating circumstance found beyond a reasonable doubt;

(ii) Set forth in writing any mitigating circumstances considered; and

(iii) Upon weighing all mitigating circumstances against each statutory aggravating circumstance separately, determine whether mitigating circumstances are found to be sufficiently compelling that the death penalty would be unjust and detail in writing its reasons for so finding.

(9) The following are statutory aggravating circumstances, at least one (1) of which must be found to exist beyond a reasonable doubt before a sentence of death can be imposed:

(a) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder.

(b) At the time the murder was committed the defendant also committed another murder.

(c) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to many persons.

(d) The murder was committed for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or the defendant employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration.

(e) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or cruel, manifesting exceptional depravity.

(f) By the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter disregard for human life.

(g) The murder was committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or mayhem and the defendant killed, intended a killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human life.

(h) The murder was committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, an infamous crime against nature, lewd and lascivious conduct with a minor, sexual abuse of a child under sixteen (16) years of age, ritualized abuse of a child, sexual exploitation of a child, sexual battery of a minor child sixteen (16) or seventeen (17) years of age, or forcible sexual penetration by use of a foreign object, and the defendant killed, intended a killing, or acted with reckless indifference to human life.
(i) The defendant, by his conduct, whether such conduct was before, during or after the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society.

(j) The murder was committed against a former or present peace officer, executive officer, officer of the court, judicial officer or prosecuting attorney because of the exercise of official duty or because of the victim's former or present official status.

(k) The murder was committed against a witness or potential witness in a criminal or civil legal proceeding because of such proceeding.

ILLINOIS


(a) A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits first degree murder if, in performing the acts which cause the death:

(1) he either intends to kill or do great bodily harm to that individual or another, or knows that such acts will cause death to that individual or another; or

(2) he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another; or

(3) he is attempting or committing a forcible felony other than second degree murder.

(b) Aggravating Factors. A defendant who at the time of the commission of the offense has attained the age of 18 or more and who has been found guilty of first degree murder may be sentenced to death if:

(1) the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a peace officer or fireman; or

(2) the murdered individual was an employee of an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections, or any similar local correctional agency, killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, or the murdered individual was an inmate at such institution or facility and was killed on the grounds thereof, or the murdered individual was otherwise present in such institution or facility with the knowledge and approval of the chief administrative officer thereof; or

(3) the defendant has been convicted of murdering two or more individuals under subsection (a) of this Section or under any law of the United States or of any state which is substantially similar to subsection (a) of this Section regardless of whether the deaths occurred as the result of the same act or of several related or unrelated acts so long as the deaths were the result of either an intent to kill more than one person or of separate acts which the defendant knew would cause death or create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; or
(4) the murdered individual was killed as a result of the hijacking of an airplane, train, ship, bus or other public conveyance; or

(5) the defendant committed the murder pursuant to a contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder or procured another to commit the murder for money or anything of value; or

(6) the murdered individual was killed in the course of another felony if:

   (a) the murdered individual:

   (i) was actually killed by the defendant, or

   (ii) received physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant substantially contemporaneously with physical injuries caused by one or more persons for whose conduct the defendant is legally accountable under Section 5-2 of this Code, and the physical injuries inflicted by either the defendant or the other person or persons for whose conduct he is legally accountable caused the death of the murdered individual; and

   (b) in performing the acts which caused the death of the murdered individual or which resulted in physical injuries personally inflicted by the defendant on the murdered individual under the circumstances of subdivision (ii) of subparagraph (a) of paragraph (6) of subsection (b) of this Section, the defendant acted with the intent to kill the murdered individual or with the knowledge that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the murdered individual or another; and

   (c) the other felony was an inherently violent crime or the attempt to commit an inherently violent crime. In this subparagraph (c), “inherently violent crime” includes, but is not limited to, armed robbery, robbery, predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, aggravated vehicular hijacking, aggravated arson, aggravated stalking, residential burglary, and home invasion; or

(7) the murdered individual was under 12 years of age and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or

(8) the defendant committed the murder with intent to prevent the murdered individual from testifying or participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution or giving material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; or the defendant committed the murder because the murdered individual was a witness in any prosecution or gave material assistance to the State in any investigation or prosecution, either against the defendant or another; for purposes of this paragraph (8), “participating in any criminal investigation or prosecution” is intended to include those appearing in the proceedings in any capacity such as trial judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, investigators, witnesses, or jurors; or

(9) the defendant, while committing an offense punishable under Sections 401, 401.1, 401.2, 405, 405.2, 407 or 407.1 or subsection (b) of Section 404 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act,1 or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual; or
(10) the defendant was incarcerated in an institution or facility of the Department of Corrections at the time of the murder, and while committing an offense punishable as a felony under Illinois law, or while engaged in a conspiracy or solicitation to commit such offense, intentionally killed an individual or counseled, commanded, induced, procured or caused the intentional killing of the murdered individual; or

(11) the murder was committed in a cold, calculated and premeditated manner pursuant to a preconceived plan, scheme or design to take a human life by unlawful means, and the conduct of the defendant created a reasonable expectation that the death of a human being would result therefrom; or

(12) the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician--ambulance, emergency medical technician--intermediate, emergency medical technician--paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid personnel, employed by a municipality or other governmental unit, killed in the course of performing his official duties, to prevent the performance of his official duties, or in retaliation for performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was an emergency medical technician--ambulance, emergency medical technician--intermediate, emergency medical technician--paramedic, ambulance driver, or other medical assistance or first aid personnel; or

(13) the defendant was a principal administrator, organizer, or leader of a calculated criminal drug conspiracy consisting of a hierarchical position of authority superior to that of all other members of the conspiracy, and the defendant counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or caused the intentional killing of the murdered person; or

(14) the murder was intentional and involved the infliction of torture. For the purpose of this Section torture means the infliction of or subjection to extreme physical pain, motivated by an intent to increase or prolong the pain, suffering or agony of the victim; or

(15) the murder was committed as a result of the intentional discharge of a firearm by the defendant from a motor vehicle and the victim was not present within the motor vehicle; or

(16) the murdered individual was 60 years of age or older and the death resulted from exceptionally brutal or heinous behavior indicative of wanton cruelty; or

(17) the murdered individual was a disabled person and the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was disabled. For purposes of this paragraph (17), “disabled person” means a person who suffers from a permanent physical or mental impairment resulting from disease, an injury, a functional disorder, or a congenital condition that renders the person incapable of adequately providing for his or her own health or personal care; or

(18) the murder was committed by reason of any person's activity as a community policing volunteer or to prevent any person from engaging in activity as a community policing volunteer; or

(19) the murdered individual was subject to an order of protection and the murder was committed by a person against whom the same order of protection was issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986; or

(20) the murdered individual was known by the defendant to be a teacher or other person employed in any school and the teacher or other employee is upon the grounds of a school or grounds adjacent to a school, or is in any part of a building used for school purposes; or
(21) the murder was committed by the defendant in connection with or as a result of the offense of terrorism as defined in Section 29D-14.9 of this Code.

(b-5) Aggravating Factor; Natural Life Imprisonment. A defendant who has been found guilty of first degree murder and who at the time of the commission of the offense had attained the age of 18 years or more may be sentenced to natural life imprisonment if (i) the murdered individual was a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice nurse, (ii) the defendant knew or should have known that the murdered individual was a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice nurse, and (iii) the murdered individual was killed in the course of acting in his or her capacity as a physician, physician assistant, psychologist, nurse, or advanced practice nurse, or to prevent him or her from acting in that capacity, or in retaliation for his or her acting in that capacity.

(c) Consideration of factors in Aggravation and Mitigation. The court shall consider, or shall instruct the jury to consider any aggravating and any mitigating factors which are relevant to the imposition of the death penalty. Aggravating factors may include but need not be limited to those factors set forth in subsection (b). Mitigating factors may include but need not be limited to the following:

(1) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;

(2) the murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, although not such as to constitute a defense to prosecution;

(3) the murdered individual was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal act;

(4) the defendant acted under the compulsion of threat or menace of the imminent infliction of death or great bodily harm;

(5) the defendant was not personally present during commission of the act or acts causing death;

(6) the defendant's background includes a history of extreme emotional or physical abuse;

(7) the defendant suffers from a reduced mental capacity.

(d) Separate sentencing hearing. Where requested by the State, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine the existence of factors set forth in subsection (b) and to consider any aggravating or mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c). The proceeding shall be conducted:

(1) before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or

(2) before a jury impanelled for the purpose of the proceeding if:

A. the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; or

B. the defendant was convicted after a trial before the court sitting without a jury; or

C. the court for good cause shown discharges the jury that determined the defendant's guilt; or
(3) before the court alone if the defendant waives a jury for the separate proceeding.

(e) Evidence and Argument.
During the proceeding any information relevant to any of the factors set forth in subsection (b) may be presented by either the State or the defendant under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. Any information relevant to any additional aggravating factors or any mitigating factors indicated in subsection (c) may be presented by the State or defendant regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence at criminal trials. The State and the defendant shall be given fair opportunity to rebut any information received at the hearing.

(f) Proof.
The burden of proof of establishing the existence of any of the factors set forth in subsection (b) is on the State and shall not be satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable doubt.

(g) Procedure--Jury.
If at the separate sentencing proceeding the jury finds that none of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections. If there is a unanimous finding by the jury that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exist, the jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors as instructed by the court and shall determine whether the sentence of death shall be imposed. If the jury determines unanimously, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. If the court does not concur with the jury determination that death is the appropriate sentence, the court shall set forth reasons in writing including what facts or circumstances the court relied upon, along with any relevant documents, that compelled the court to non-concur with the sentence. This document and any attachments shall be part of the record for appellate review. The court shall be bound by the jury's sentencing determination.

If after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, one or more jurors determines that death is not the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(h) Procedure--No Jury.
In a proceeding before the court alone, if the court finds that none of the factors found in subsection (b) exists, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.

If the Court determines that one or more of the factors set forth in subsection (b) exists, the Court shall consider any aggravating and mitigating factors as indicated in subsection (c). If the Court determines, after weighing the factors in aggravation and mitigation, that death is the appropriate sentence, the Court shall sentence the defendant to death.

If the court finds that death is not the appropriate sentence, the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(h-5) Decertification as a capital case.
In a case in which the defendant has been found guilty of first degree murder by a judge or jury, or a case on remand for resentencing, and the State seeks the death penalty as an appropriate sentence, on the court's own motion or the written motion of the defendant, the court may decertify the case as a death penalty case if the court finds that the only evidence supporting the defendant's conviction is the uncorroborated testimony of an informant witness, as defined in Section 115-21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1963, concerning the confession or admission of the defendant or that the sole evidence against the defendant is a single eyewitness or single accomplice without any other corroborating evidence. If the court decertifies the case as a capital case under either of the grounds set forth above, the court shall issue a written finding. The State may pursue its right to appeal the decertification pursuant to
Supreme Court Rule 604(a)(1). If the court does not decertify the case as a capital case, the matter shall proceed to the eligibility phase of the sentencing hearing.

(i) Appellate Procedure.
The conviction and sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court. Such review shall be in accordance with rules promulgated by the Supreme Court. The Illinois Supreme Court may overturn the death sentence, and order the imposition of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections if the court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case. If the Illinois Supreme Court finds that the death sentence is fundamentally unjust as applied to the particular case, independent of any procedural grounds for relief, the Illinois Supreme Court shall issue a written opinion explaining this finding.

(j) Disposition of reversed death sentence.
In the event that the death penalty in this Act is held to be unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, any person convicted of first degree murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.
In the event that any death sentence pursuant to the sentencing provisions of this Section is declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the United States or of the State of Illinois, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death shall cause the defendant to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence the defendant to a term of imprisonment under Chapter V of the Unified Code of Corrections.

(k) Guidelines for seeking the death penalty.
The Attorney General and State's Attorneys Association shall consult on voluntary guidelines for procedures governing whether or not to seek the death penalty. The guidelines do not have the force of law and are only advisory in nature.

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1.2 (2013). INTENTIONAL HOMICIDE OF AN UNBORN CHILD.

(a) A person commits the offense of intentional homicide of an unborn child if, in performing acts which cause the death of an unborn child, he without lawful justification:

(1) either intended to cause the death of or do great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child or knew that such acts would cause death or great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child; or

(2) knew that his acts created a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to the pregnant woman or her unborn child; and

(3) knew that the woman was pregnant.

(b) For purposes of this Section, (1) “unborn child” shall mean any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth, and (2) “person” shall not include the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed.

(c) This Section shall not apply to acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion, as defined in Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended,1 to which the pregnant woman has consented. This Section shall not apply to acts which were

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
84
committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.

(d) Penalty. The sentence for intentional homicide of an unborn child shall be the same as for first degree murder, except that:

(1) the death penalty may not be imposed;

(2) if the person committed the offense while armed with a firearm, 15 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(3) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm, 20 years shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court;

(4) if, during the commission of the offense, the person personally discharged a firearm that proximately caused great bodily harm, permanent disability, permanent disfigurement, or death to another person, 25 years or up to a term of natural life shall be added to the term of imprisonment imposed by the court.

(e) The provisions of this Act shall not be construed to prohibit the prosecution of any person under any other provision of law.

720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-2.1 (2013). VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER OF AN UNBORN CHILD.


(a) A person who kills an unborn child without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by another whom the offender endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the unborn child. Serious provocation is conduct sufficient to excite an intense passion in a reasonable person.

(b) A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an unborn child commits voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify or exonerate the killing under the principles stated in Article 7 of this Code, but his belief is unreasonable.

(c) Sentence. Voluntary Manslaughter of an unborn child is a Class 1 felony.

(d) For purposes of this Section, (1) “unborn child” shall mean any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth, and (2) “person” shall not include the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed.

(e) This Section shall not apply to acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion, as defined in Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended,1 to which the pregnant woman has consented. This Section shall not apply to acts which were committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.
§ 9-3.2. Involuntary Manslaughter and Reckless Homicide of an Unborn Child.

(a) A person who unintentionally kills an unborn child without lawful justification commits involuntary manslaughter of an unborn child if his acts whether lawful or unlawful which cause the death are such as are likely to cause death or great bodily harm to some individual, and he performs them recklessly, except in cases in which the cause of death consists of the driving of a motor vehicle, in which case the person commits reckless homicide of an unborn child.

(b) Sentence.

(1) Involuntary manslaughter of an unborn child is a Class 3 felony.

(2) Reckless homicide of an unborn child is a Class 3 felony.

(c) For purposes of this Section, (1) “unborn child” shall mean any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth, and (2) “person” shall not include the pregnant woman whose unborn child is killed.

(d) This Section shall not apply to acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion, as defined in Section 2 of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975, as amended, to which the pregnant woman has consented. This Section shall not apply to acts which were committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.

(e) The provisions of this Section shall not be construed to prohibit the prosecution of any person under any other provision of law, nor shall it be construed to preclude any civil cause of action.

INDIANA

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-38-1-7-1 (2012). CONSIDERATIONS IN IMPOSING SENTENCE.

Sec. 7.1. (a) In determining what sentence to impose for a crime, the court may consider the following aggravating circumstances:

(1) The harm, injury, loss, or damage suffered by the victim of an offense was:

(A) significant; and

(B) greater than the elements necessary to prove the commission of the offense.

(2) The person has a history of criminal or delinquent behavior.
(3) The victim of the offense was less than twelve (12) years of age or at least sixty-five (65) years of age at the time the person committed the offense.

(4) The person:

   (A) committed a crime of violence (IC 35-50-1-2); and

   (B) knowingly committed the offense in the presence or within hearing of an individual who:

       (i) was less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time the person committed the offense; and

       (ii) is not the victim of the offense.

(5) The person violated a protective order issued against the person under IC 34-26-5 (or IC 31-1-11.5, IC 34-26-2, or IC 34-4-5.1 before their repeal), a workplace violence restraining order issued against the person under IC 34-26-6, or a no contact order issued against the person.

(6) The person has recently violated the conditions of any probation, parole, pardon, community corrections placement, or pretrial release granted to the person.

(7) The victim of the offense was:

   (A) a person with a disability (as defined in IC 27-7-6-12), and the defendant knew or should have known that the victim was a person with a disability; or

   (B) mentally or physically infirm.

(8) The person was in a position having care, custody, or control of the victim of the offense.

(9) The injury to or death of the victim of the offense was the result of shaken baby syndrome (as defined in IC 16-41-40-2).

(10) The person threatened to harm the victim of the offense or a witness if the victim or witness told anyone about the offense.

(11) The person:

   (A) committed trafficking with an inmate under IC 35-44.1-3-5; and

   (B) is an employee of the penal facility.

(b) The court may consider the following factors as mitigating circumstances or as favoring suspending the sentence and imposing probation:

   (1) The crime neither caused nor threatened serious harm to persons or property, or the person did not contemplate that it would do so.

   (2) The crime was the result of circumstances unlikely to recur.
(3) The victim of the crime induced or facilitated the offense.

(4) There are substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the crime, though failing to establish a defense.

(5) The person acted under strong provocation.

(6) The person has no history of delinquency or criminal activity, or the person has led a law-abiding life for a substantial period before commission of the crime.

(7) The person is likely to respond affirmatively to probation or short term imprisonment.

(8) The character and attitudes of the person indicate that the person is unlikely to commit another crime.

(9) The person has made or will make restitution to the victim of the crime for the injury, damage, or loss sustained.

(10) Imprisonment of the person will result in undue hardship to the person or the dependents of the person.

(11) The person was convicted of a crime involving the use of force against a person who had repeatedly inflicted physical or sexual abuse upon the convicted person and evidence shows that the convicted person suffered from the effects of battery as a result of the past course of conduct of the individual who is the victim of the crime for which the person was convicted.

(c) The criteria listed in subsections (a) and (b) do not limit the matters that the court may consider in determining the sentence.

(d) A court may impose any sentence that is:

(1) authorized by statute; and

(2) permissible under the Constitution of the State of Indiana; regardless of the presence or absence of aggravating circumstances or mitigating circumstances.


Sec. 1. A person who:

(1) knowingly or intentionally kills another human being;

(2) kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit arson, burglary, child molesting, consumer product tampering, criminal deviate conduct, kidnapping, rape, robbery, human trafficking, promotion of human trafficking, sexual trafficking of a minor, or carjacking;

(3) kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit:
(A) dealing in or manufacturing cocaine or a narcotic drug (IC 35-48-4-1);
(B) dealing in or manufacturing methamphetamine (IC 35-48-4-1.1);
(C) dealing in a schedule I, II, or III controlled substance (IC 35-48-4-2);
(D) dealing in a schedule IV controlled substance (IC 35-48-4-3); or
(E) dealing in a schedule V controlled substance; or

(4) knowingly or intentionally kills a fetus that has attained viability (as defined in IC 16-18-2-365);

commits murder, a felony.

**IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-3 (2012). VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.**

Sec. 3. (a) A person who knowingly or intentionally:

(1) kills another human being; or

(2) kills a fetus that has attained viability (as defined in IC 16-18-2-365);

while acting under sudden heat commits voluntary manslaughter, a Class B felony. However, the offense is a Class A felony if it is committed by means of a deadly weapon.

(b) The existence of sudden heat is a mitigating factor that reduces what otherwise would be murder under section 1(1) of this chapter to voluntary manslaughter.


Sec. 4. (a) As used in this section, “child care provider” means a person who provides child care in or on behalf of:

(1) a child care center (as defined in IC 12-7-2-28.4); or

(2) a child care home (as defined in IC 12-7-2-28.6);

regardless of whether the child care center or child care home is licensed.

(b) As used in this section, “fetus” means a fetus that has attained viability (as defined in IC 16-18-2-365).

(c) A person who kills another human being while committing or attempting to commit:

(1) a Class C or Class D felony that inherently poses a risk of serious bodily injury;

(2) a Class A misdemeanor that inherently poses a risk of serious bodily injury; or

(3) battery;
commits involuntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. However, if the killing results from the operation of a vehicle, the offense is a Class D felony.

(d) A person who kills a fetus while committing or attempting to commit:

(1) a Class C or Class D felony that inherently poses a risk of serious bodily injury;

(2) a Class A misdemeanor that inherently poses a risk of serious bodily injury;

(3) battery; or

(4) a violation of IC 9-30-5-1 through IC 9-30-5-5 (operating a vehicle while intoxicated);

commits involuntary manslaughter, a Class C felony. However, if the killing results from the operation of a vehicle, the offense is a Class D felony.

(e) If:

(1) a child care provider recklessly supervises a child; and

(2) the child dies as a result of the child care provider's reckless supervision;

the child care provider commits involuntary manslaughter, a Class D felony.

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-42-1-6 (2012). FETICIDE.

Sec. 6. A person who knowingly or intentionally terminates a human pregnancy with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead fetus commits feticide, a Class B felony. This section does not apply to an abortion performed in compliance with:

(1) IC 16-34; or

(2) IC 35-1-58.5 (before its repeal).

IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9 (2012). DEATH SENTENCES; LIFE IMPRISONMENT WITHOUT PAROLE.

Sec. 9. (a) The state may seek either a death sentence or a sentence of life imprisonment without parole for murder by alleging, on a page separate from the rest of the charging instrument, the existence of at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b). In the sentencing hearing after a person is convicted of murder, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances alleged. However, the state may not proceed against a defendant under this section if a court determines at a pretrial hearing under IC 35-36-9 that the defendant is an individual with mental retardation.

(b) The aggravating circumstances are as follows:

(1) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally killing the victim while committing or attempting to commit any of the following:
(A) Arson (IC 35-43-1-1).

(B) Burglary (IC 35-43-2-1).

(C) Child molesting (IC 35-42-4-3).

(D) Criminal deviate conduct (IC 35-42-4-2).

(E) Kidnapping (IC 35-42-3-2).

(F) Rape (IC 35-42-4-1).

(G) Robbery (IC 35-42-5-1).

(H) Carjacking (IC 35-42-5-2).

(I) Criminal gang activity (IC 35-45-9-3).

(J) Dealing in cocaine or a narcotic drug (IC 35-48-4-1).

(2) The defendant committed the murder by the unlawful detonation of an explosive with intent to injure person or damage property.

(3) The defendant committed the murder by lying in wait.

(4) The defendant who committed the murder was hired to kill.

(5) The defendant committed the murder by hiring another person to kill.

(6) The victim of the murder was a corrections employee, probation officer, parole officer, community corrections worker, home detention officer, fireman, judge, or law enforcement officer, and either:

(A) the victim was acting in the course of duty; or

(B) the murder was motivated by an act the victim performed while acting in the course of duty.

(7) The defendant has been convicted of another murder.

(8) The defendant has committed another murder, at any time, regardless of whether the defendant has been convicted of that other murder.

(9) The defendant was:

(A) under the custody of the department of correction;

(B) under the custody of a county sheriff;
(C) on probation after receiving a sentence for the commission of a felony; or

(D) on parole;

at the time the murder was committed.

(10) The defendant dismembered the victim.

(11) The defendant burned, mutilated, or tortured the victim while the victim was alive.

(12) The victim of the murder was less than twelve (12) years of age.

(13) The victim was a victim of any of the following offenses for which the defendant was convicted:

(A) Battery as a Class D felony or as a Class C felony under IC 35-42-2-1.

(B) Kidnapping (IC 35-42-3-2).

(C) Criminal confinement (IC 35-42-3-3).

(D) A sex crime under IC 35-42-4.

(14) The victim of the murder was listed by the state or known by the defendant to be a witness against the defendant and the defendant committed the murder with the intent to prevent the person from testifying.

(15) The defendant committed the murder by intentionally discharging a firearm (as defined in IC 35-47-1-5):

(A) into an inhabited dwelling; or

(B) from a vehicle.

(16) The victim of the murder was pregnant and the murder resulted in the intentional killing of a fetus that has attained viability (as defined in IC 16-18-2-365).

(c) The mitigating circumstances that may be considered under this section are as follows:

(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conduct.

(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance when the murder was committed.

(3) The victim was a participant in or consented to the defendant's conduct.

(4) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person, and the defendant's participation was relatively minor.

(5) The defendant acted under the substantial domination of another person.
(6) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or of intoxication.

(7) The defendant was less than eighteen (18) years of age at the time the murder was committed.

(8) Any other circumstances appropriate for consideration.

(d) If the defendant was convicted of murder in a jury trial, the jury shall reconvene for the sentencing hearing. If the trial was to the court, or the judgment was entered on a guilty plea, the court alone shall conduct the sentencing hearing. The jury or the court may consider all the evidence introduced at the trial stage of the proceedings, together with new evidence presented at the sentencing hearing. The court shall instruct the jury concerning the statutory penalties for murder and any other offenses for which the defendant was convicted, the potential for consecutive or concurrent sentencing, and the availability of good time credit and clemency. The court shall instruct the jury that, in order for the jury to recommend to the court that the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole should be imposed, the jury must find at least one (1) aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt as described in subsection (l) and shall provide a special verdict form for each aggravating circumstance alleged. The defendant may present any additional evidence relevant to:

(1) the aggravating circumstances alleged; or

(2) any of the mitigating circumstances listed in subsection (c).

(e) For a defendant sentenced after June 30, 2002, except as provided by IC 35-36-9, if the hearing is by jury, the jury shall recommend to the court whether the death penalty or life imprisonment without parole, or neither, should be imposed. The jury may recommend:

(1) the death penalty; or

(2) life imprisonment without parole; only if it makes the findings described in subsection (l). If the jury reaches a sentencing recommendation, the court shall sentence the defendant accordingly. After a court pronounces sentence, a representative of the victim’s family and friends may present a statement regarding the impact of the crime on family and friends. The impact statement may be submitted in writing or given orally by the representative. The statement shall be given in the presence of the defendant.

(f) If a jury is unable to agree on a sentence recommendation after reasonable deliberations, the court shall discharge the jury and proceed as if the hearing had been to the court alone.

(g) If the hearing is to the court alone, except as provided by IC 35-36-9, the court shall:

(1) sentence the defendant to death; or

(2) impose a term of life imprisonment without parole; only if it makes the findings described in subsection (l).

(h) If a court sentences a defendant to death, the court shall order the defendant’s execution to be carried out not later than one (1) year and one (1) day after the date the defendant was convicted. The supreme
court has exclusive jurisdiction to stay the execution of a death sentence. If the supreme court stays the execution of a death sentence, the supreme court shall order a new date for the defendant's execution.

(i) If a person sentenced to death by a court files a petition for post-conviction relief, the court, not later than ninety (90) days after the date the petition is filed, shall set a date to hold a hearing to consider the petition. If a court does not, within the ninety (90) day period, set the date to hold the hearing to consider the petition, the court's failure to set the hearing date is not a basis for additional post-conviction relief. The attorney general shall answer the petition for post-conviction relief on behalf of the state. At the request of the attorney general, a prosecuting attorney shall assist the attorney general. The court shall enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law concerning the petition not later than ninety (90) days after the hearing concludes. However, if the court determines that the petition is without merit, the court may dismiss the petition within ninety (90) days without conducting a hearing under this subsection.

(j) A death sentence is subject to automatic review by the supreme court. The review, which shall be heard under rules adopted by the supreme court, shall be given priority over all other cases. The supreme court's review must take into consideration all claims that the:

1. conviction or sentence was in violation of the:
   - Constitution of the State of Indiana; or
   - Constitution of the United States;

2. sentencing court was without jurisdiction to impose a sentence; and

3. sentence:
   - (A) exceeds the maximum sentence authorized by law; or
   - (B) is otherwise erroneous.

If the supreme court cannot complete its review by the date set by the sentencing court for the defendant's execution under subsection (h), the supreme court shall stay the execution of the death sentence and set a new date to carry out the defendant's execution.

(k) A person who has been sentenced to death and who has completed state post-conviction review proceedings may file a written petition with the supreme court seeking to present new evidence challenging the person's guilt or the appropriateness of the death sentence if the person serves notice on the attorney general. The supreme court shall determine, with or without a hearing, whether the person has presented previously undiscovered evidence that undermines confidence in the conviction or the death sentence. If necessary, the supreme court may remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing to consider the new evidence and its effect on the person's conviction and death sentence. The supreme court may not make a determination in the person's favor nor make a decision to remand the case to the trial court for an evidentiary hearing without first providing the attorney general with an opportunity to be heard on the matter.

(l) Before a sentence may be imposed under this section, the jury, in a proceeding under subsection (e), or the court, in a proceeding under subsection (g), must find that:

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
94
(1) the state has proved beyond a reasonable doubt that at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances listed in subsection (b) exists; and

(2) any mitigating circumstances that exist are outweighed by the aggravating circumstance or circumstances.

**IOWA**

**IOWA CODE § 707.2 (2013). MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.**

A person commits murder in the first degree when the person commits murder under any of the following circumstances:

1. The person willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation kills another person.

2. The person kills another person while participating in a forcible felony.

3. The person kills another person while escaping or attempting to escape from lawful custody.

4. The person intentionally kills a peace officer, correctional officer, public employee, or hostage while the person is imprisoned in a correctional institution under the jurisdiction of the Iowa department of corrections, or in a city or county jail.

5. The person kills a child while committing child endangerment under section 726.6, subsection 1, paragraph “b”, or while committing assault under section 708.1 upon the child, and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.

6. The person kills another person while participating in an act of terrorism as defined in section 708A.1.

Murder in the first degree is a class “A” felony.

For purposes of determining whether a person should register as a sex offender pursuant to the provisions of chapter 692A, the fact finder shall make a determination as provided in section 692A.126.

**IOWA CODE § 707.7 (2013). FETICIDE.**

1. Any person who intentionally terminates a human pregnancy, with the knowledge and voluntary consent of the pregnant person, after the end of the second trimester of the pregnancy where death of the fetus results commits feticide. Feticide is a class “C” felony.

2. Any person who attempts to intentionally terminate a human pregnancy, with the knowledge and voluntary consent of the pregnant person, after the end of the second trimester of the pregnancy where death of the fetus does not result commits attempted feticide. Attempted feticide is a class “D” felony.

3. Any person who terminates a human pregnancy, with the knowledge and voluntary consent of the pregnant person, who is not a person licensed to practice medicine and surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery under the provisions of chapter 148, commits a class “C” felony.
4. This section shall not apply to the termination of a human pregnancy performed by a physician licensed in this state to practice medicine or surgery or osteopathic medicine or surgery when in the best clinical judgment of the physician the termination is performed to preserve the life or health of the pregnant person or of the fetus and every reasonable medical effort not inconsistent with preserving the life of the pregnant person is made to preserve the life of a viable fetus.

IOWA CODE § 707.8 (2013). NONCONSENSUAL TERMINATION -- SERIOUS INJURY TO A HUMAN PREGNANCY.

1. A person who terminates a human pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant person during the commission of a forcible felony is guilty of a class “B” felony.

2. A person who terminates a human pregnancy without the consent of the pregnant person during the commission of a felony or felonious assault is guilty of a class “C” felony.

3. A person who intentionally terminates a human pregnancy without the knowledge and voluntary consent of the pregnant person is guilty of a class “C” felony.

4. A person who unintentionally terminates a human pregnancy by any of the means provided pursuant to section 707.6A, subsection 1, is guilty of a class “C” felony.

5. A person who by force or intimidation procures the consent of the pregnant person to a termination of a human pregnancy is guilty of a class “C” felony.

6. A person who unintentionally terminates a human pregnancy while drag racing in violation of section 321.278 is guilty of a class “D” felony.

7. A person who unintentionally terminates a human pregnancy without the knowledge and voluntary consent of the pregnant person by the commission of an act in a manner likely to cause the termination of or serious injury to a human pregnancy is guilty of an aggravated misdemeanor.

8. A person commits an aggravated misdemeanor when the person intentionally causes serious injury to a human pregnancy by the commission of an act in a manner likely to cause the termination of or serious injury to a human pregnancy.

9. A person commits an aggravated misdemeanor when the person unintentionally causes serious injury to a human pregnancy by any of the means described in section 707.6A, subsection 1.

10. A person commits a serious misdemeanor when the person unintentionally causes serious injury to a human pregnancy by the commission of an act in a manner likely to cause the termination of or serious injury to the human pregnancy.

11. For the purposes of this section “serious injury to a human pregnancy” means, relative to the human pregnancy, disabling mental illness, or bodily injury which creates a substantial risk of death or which causes serious permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, and includes but is not limited to skull fractures, rib fractures, and metaphyseal fractures of the long bones.
12. As used in this section, actions which cause the termination of or serious injury to a pregnancy do not apply to any of the following:

   a. An act or omission of the pregnant person.

   b. A termination of or a serious injury to a pregnancy which is caused by the performance of an approved medical procedure performed by a person licensed in this state to practice medicine and surgery or osteopathic medicine and surgery, irrespective of the duration of the pregnancy and with or without the voluntary consent of the pregnant person when circumstances preclude the pregnant person from providing consent.

   c. An act committed in self-defense or in defense of another person or any other act committed if legally justified or excused.

**KANSAS**

**KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5402 (2012). MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.**

(a) Murder in the first degree is the killing of a human being committed:

   (1) Intentionally, and with premeditation; or

   (2) in the commission of, attempt to commit, or flight from any inherently dangerous felony.

(b) Murder in the first degree is an off-grid person felony.

(c) As used in this section, an “inherently dangerous felony” means:

   (1) Any of the following felonies, whether such felony is so distinct from the homicide alleged to be a violation of subsection (a)(2) as not to be an ingredient of the homicide alleged to be a violation of subsection (a)(2):

      (A) Kidnapping, as defined in subsection (a) of K.S.A. 21-5408, and amendments thereto;

      (B) aggravated kidnapping, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5408, and amendments thereto;

      (C) robbery, as defined in subsection (a) of K.S.A. 21-5420, and amendments thereto;

      (D) aggravated robbery, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5420, and amendments thereto;

      (E) rape, as defined in K.S.A. 21-5503, and amendments thereto;

      (F) aggravated criminal sodomy, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5504, and amendments thereto;

      (G) abuse of a child, as defined in K.S.A. 21-5602, and amendments thereto;
(H) felony theft of property as defined in subsection (a)(1) or (a)(3) of K.S.A. 21-5801, and amendments thereto;

(I) burglary, as defined in subsection (a) of K.S.A. 21-5807, and amendments thereto;

(J) aggravated burglary, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5807, and amendments thereto;

(K) arson, as defined in subsection (a) of K.S.A. 21-5812, and amendments thereto;

(L) aggravated arson, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5812, and amendments thereto;

(M) treason, as defined in K.S.A. 21-5901, and amendments thereto;

(N) any felony offense as provided in K.S.A. 21-5703, 21-5705 or 21-5706, and amendments thereto;

(O) any felony offense as provided in subsection (a) or (b) of K.S.A. 21-6308, and amendments thereto;

(P) endangering the food supply, as defined in subsection (a) of K.S.A. 21-6317, and amendments thereto;

(Q) aggravated endangering the food supply, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-6317, and amendments thereto;

(R) fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 8-1568, and amendments thereto;

(S) aggravated endangering a child, as defined in subsection (b)(1) of K.S.A. 21-5601, and amendments thereto;

(T) abandonment of a child, as defined in subsection (a) of K.S.A. 21-5605, and amendments thereto; or

(U) aggravated abandonment of a child, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5605, and amendments thereto; and

(2) any of the following felonies, only when such felony is so distinct from the homicide alleged to be a violation of subsection (a)(2) as to not be an ingredient of the homicide alleged to be a violation of subsection (a)(2):

(A) Murder in the first degree, as defined in subsection (a)(1);

(B) murder in the second degree, as defined in subsection (a)(1) of K.S.A. 21-5403, and amendments thereto;

(C) voluntary manslaughter, as defined in subsection (a)(1) of K.S.A. 21-5404, and amendments thereto;

(D) aggravated assault, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5412, and amendments thereto;
(E) aggravated assault of a law enforcement officer, as defined in subsection (d) of K.S.A. 21-5412, and amendments thereto;

(F) aggravated battery, as defined in subsection (b)(1) of K.S.A. 21-5413, and amendments thereto; or

(G) aggravated battery against a law enforcement officer, as defined in subsection (d) of K.S.A. 21-5413, and amendments thereto.

**KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3439 (2012). CAPITAL MURDER.**

(a) Capital murder is the:

(1) Intentional and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of kidnapping, as defined in subsection (a) of K.S.A. 21-5408, and amendments thereto, or aggravated kidnapping, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5408, and amendments thereto, when the kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping was committed with the intent to hold such person for ransom;

(2) intentional and premeditated killing of any person pursuant to a contract or agreement to kill such person or being a party to the contract or agreement pursuant to which such person is killed;

(3) intentional and premeditated killing of any person by an inmate or prisoner confined in a state correctional institution, community correctional institution or jail or while in the custody of an officer or employee of a state correctional institution, community correctional institution or jail;

(4) intentional and premeditated killing of the victim of one of the following crimes in the commission of, or subsequent to, such crime: Rape, as defined in K.S.A. 21-5503, and amendments thereto, criminal sodomy, as defined in subsections (a)(3) or (a)(4) of K.S.A. 21-5504, and amendments thereto, or aggravated criminal sodomy, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5504, and amendments thereto, or any attempt thereof, as defined in K.S.A. 21-5301, and amendments thereto;

(5) intentional and premeditated killing of a law enforcement officer;

(6) intentional and premeditated killing of more than one person as a part of the same act or transaction or in two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or course of conduct; or

(7) intentional and premeditated killing of a child under the age of 14 in the commission of kidnapping, as defined in subsection (a) of K.S.A. 21-5408, and amendments thereto, or aggravated kidnapping, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5408, and amendments thereto, when the kidnapping or aggravated kidnapping was committed with intent to commit a sex offense upon or with the child or with intent that the child commit or submit to a sex offense.

(b) For purposes of this section, “sex offense” means rape, as defined in K.S.A. 21-5503, and amendments thereto, aggravated indecent liberties with a child, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5506, and amendments thereto, aggravated criminal sodomy, as defined in subsection (b) of K.S.A. 21-5504, and amendments thereto, prostitution, as defined in K.S.A. 21-6419, and amendments thereto,
promoting prostitution, as defined in K.S.A. 21-6420, and amendments thereto, or sexual exploitation of a child, as defined in K.S.A. 21-5510, and amendments thereto.

(c) Capital murder is an off-grid person felony.

**KENTUCKY**

**KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.040 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.**

(1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when he wantonly causes the death of another person, including, but not limited to, situations where the death results from the person's:

   (a) Operation of a motor vehicle; or

   (b) Leaving a child under the age of eight (8) years in a motor vehicle under circumstances which manifest an extreme indifference to human life and which create a grave risk of death to the child, thereby causing the death of the child.

(2) Manslaughter in the second degree is a Class C felony.

**KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.020 (2012). FETAL HOMICIDE IN THE FIRST DEGREE.**

(1) A person is guilty of fetal homicide in the first degree when:

   (a) With intent to cause the death of an unborn child or with the intent necessary to commit an offense under KRS 507.020(1)(a), he causes the death of an unborn child; except that in any prosecution, a person shall not be guilty under this subsection if he acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. However, nothing contained in this section shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for or preclude a conviction of fetal homicide in the second degree or any other crime; or

   (b) Including but not limited to the operation of a motor vehicle under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he wantonly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to an unborn child and thereby causes the death of an unborn child.

(2) Fetal homicide in the first degree is a capital offense.

**KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.030 (2012). FETAL HOMICIDE IN THE SECOND DEGREE.**

(1) A person is guilty of fetal homicide in the second degree when:
(a) With intent to cause serious physical injury to an unborn child or with the intent necessary to commit an offense under KRS 507.030(1)(a), he causes the death of an unborn child; or

(b) With intent to cause the death of an unborn child or with the intent necessary to commit an offense under KRS 507.030(1)(b), he causes the death of an unborn child under circumstances which do not constitute fetal homicide in the first degree because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in KRS 507A.020(1)(a).

(2) Fetal homicide in the second degree is a Class B felony.

**KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.040 (2012). FETAL HOMICIDE IN THE THIRD DEGREE.**

(1) A person is guilty of fetal homicide in the third degree when he wantonly causes the death of an unborn child, including but not limited to situations where the death results from the person's operation of a motor vehicle.

(2) Fetal homicide in the third degree is a Class C felony.

**KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.050 (2012). FETAL HOMICIDE IN THE FOURTH DEGREE.**

(1) A person is guilty of fetal homicide in the fourth degree when, with recklessness, he causes the death of an unborn child.

(2) Fetal homicide in the fourth degree is a Class D felony.

**KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507A.060 (2012). DEATH SENTENCE PROHIBITED.**

The death of an unborn child shall not result in the imposition of a sentence of death, either as a result of the violation of KRS 507A.020 or as a result of the aggravation of another capital offense under KRS 532.025(2).

**KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 530.030 (2012). CONCEALING BIRTH OF INFANT.**

(1) A person is guilty of concealing the birth of an infant when he conceals the corpse of a newborn child with intent to conceal the fact of its birth or to prevent a determination of whether it was born dead or alive.

(2) Concealing the birth of an infant is a Class A misdemeanor.

**LOUISIANA**

**LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30 (2012). FIRST DEGREE MURDER.**
A. First degree murder is the killing of a human being:

(1) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, aggravated arson, aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated burglary, armed robbery, assault by drive-by shooting, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, terrorism, cruelty to juveniles, or second degree cruelty to juveniles.

(2) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a fireman, peace officer, or civilian employee of the Louisiana State Police Crime Laboratory or any other forensic laboratory engaged in the performance of his lawful duties, or when the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm is directly related to the victim's status as a fireman, peace officer, or civilian employee.

(3) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon more than one person.

(4) When the offender has specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and has offered, has given, or has received anything of value for the killing.

(5) When the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim who is under the age of twelve or sixty-five years of age or older.

(6) When the offender has the specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm while engaged in the distribution, exchange, sale, or purchase, or any attempt thereof, of a controlled dangerous substance listed in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law.

(7) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and is engaged in the activities prohibited by R.S. 14:107.1(C)(1).

(8) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm and there has been issued by a judge or magistrate any lawful order prohibiting contact between the offender and the victim in response to threats of physical violence or harm which was served on the offender and is in effect at the time of the homicide.

(9) When the offender has specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a victim who was a witness to a crime or was a member of the immediate family of a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and:

(a) The killing was committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether or not such action or proceeding had been commenced; or

(b) The killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for the victim's prior testimony.

(10) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm upon a taxicab driver who is in the course and scope of his employment. For purposes of this Paragraph, “taxicab” means a motor vehicle for hire, carrying six passengers or less, including the driver thereof, that is subject to call from a garage, office, taxi stand, or otherwise.
(11) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm and the offender has previously acted with a specific intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm that resulted in the killing of one or more persons.

B. 
(1) For the purposes of Paragraph (A)(2) of this Section, the term “peace officer” means any peace officer, as defined in R.S. 40:2402, and includes any constable, marshal, deputy marshal, sheriff, deputy sheriff, local or state policeman, commissioned wildlife enforcement agent, federal law enforcement officer, jail or prison guard, parole officer, probation officer, judge, attorney general, assistant attorney general, attorney general's investigator, district attorney, assistant district attorney, or district attorney's investigator.

(2) For the purposes of Paragraph (A)(9) of this Section, the term “member of the immediate family” means a husband, wife, father, mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent, grandparent, stepchild, or grandchild.

(3) For the purposes of Paragraph (A)(9) of this Section, the term “witness” means any person who has testified or is expected to testify for the prosecution, or who, by reason of having relevant information, is subject to call or likely to be called as a witness for the prosecution, whether or not any action or proceeding has yet commenced.

C. Penalty provisions.
(1) If the district attorney seeks a capital verdict, the offender shall be punished by death or life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence, in accordance with the determination of the jury. The provisions of C.Cr.P. Art 782 relative to cases in which punishment may be capital shall apply.

(2) If the district attorney does not seek a capital verdict, the offender shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation or suspension of sentence. The provisions of C. Cr.P. Art 782 relative to cases in which punishment is necessarily confinement at hard labor shall apply.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:30.1 (2012). SECOND DEGREE MURDER.

A. Second degree murder is the killing of a human being:
(1) When the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm; or

(2) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, aggravated escape, assault by drive-by shooting, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, simple robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, or terrorism, even though he has no intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

(3) When the offender unlawfully distributes or dispenses a controlled dangerous substance listed in Schedules I through V of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law, or any combination
thereof, which is the direct cause of the death of the recipient who ingested or consumed the controlled
dangerous substance.

(4) When the offender unlawfully distributes or dispenses a controlled dangerous substance listed in
Schedules I through V of the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Law, or any combination
thereof, to another who subsequently distributes or dispenses such controlled dangerous substance which
is the direct cause of the death of the person who ingested or consumed the controlled dangerous
substance.

B. Whoever commits the crime of second degree murder shall be punished by life imprisonment at hard
labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:31 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER.

A. Manslaughter is:

(1) A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1
(second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately
caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection.
Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had
actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was
committed; or

(2) A homicide committed, without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm.

   (a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony not
   enumerated in Article 30 or 30.1, or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person; or

   (b) When the offender is resisting lawful arrest by means, or in a manner, not inherently
dangerous, and the circumstances are such that the killing would not be murder under Article 30 or 30.1.

B. Whoever commits manslaughter shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than forty years.
However, if the victim killed was under the age of ten years, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard
labor, without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, for not less than ten years nor more than
forty years.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32 (2012). NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.

A. Negligent homicide is either of the following:

   (1) The killing of a human being by criminal negligence.

   (2) The killing of a human being by a dog or other animal when the owner is reckless and
   criminally negligent in confining or restraining the dog or other animal.

B. The violation of a statute or ordinance shall be considered only as presumptive evidence of such
negligence.
C. (1) Except as provided for in Paragraph (2) of this Subsection, whoever commits the crime of negligent homicide shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than five years, fined not more than five thousand dollars, or both.

(2)(a) If the victim killed was under the age of ten years, the offender shall be imprisoned at hard labor, without benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, for not less than two nor more than five years.

(b) If the court does not order the offender to a term of imprisonment when the following two factors are established, the court shall state, both orally and in writing at the time of sentencing, the reasons for not sentencing the offender to a term of imprisonment:

(i) The fatality was caused by a person engaged in the operation of, or in actual physical control of, any motor vehicle, aircraft, watercraft, or other means of conveyance; and

(ii) The offender's blood alcohol concentration contributed to the fatality.

(3) If the victim was killed by a dog or other animal, the owner of the dog or other animal shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than five years or fined not more than five thousand dollars, or both.

D. The provisions of this Section shall not apply to:

(1) Any dog which is owned, or the service of which is employed, by any state or local law enforcement agency for the principal purpose of aiding in the detection of criminal activity, enforcement of laws, or apprehension of offenders.

(2) Any dog trained in accordance with the standards of a national or regional search and rescue association to respond to instructions from its handler in the search and rescue of lost or missing individuals and which dog, together with its handler, is prepared to render search and rescue services at the request of law enforcement.

(3) Any guide or service dog trained at a qualified dog guide or service school who is accompanying any blind person, visually handicapped person, deaf person, hearing impaired person, or otherwise physically disabled person who is using the dog as a guide or for service.

(4) Any attack made by a dog lawfully inside a dwelling, a place of business, or a motor vehicle as defined in R.S. 32:1(40), against a person who is attempting to make an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, or who has made an unlawful entry into the dwelling, place of business, or motor vehicle, and the dog is protecting that property.

(5) Any attack made by livestock as defined in this Section.

E. For the purposes of this Section:

(1) “Harboring or keeping” means feeding, sheltering, or having custody over the animal for three or more consecutive days.
(2) “Livestock” means any animal except dogs and cats, bred, kept, maintained, raised, or used for profit, that is used in agriculture, aquaculture, agritourism, competition, recreation, or silvaculture, or for other related purposes or used in the production of crops, animals, or plant or animal products for market. This definition includes but is not limited to cattle, buffalo, bison, oxen, and other bovine; horses, mules, donkeys, and other equine; goats; sheep; swine; chickens, turkeys, and other poultry; domestic rabbits; imported exotic deer and antelope, elk, farm-raised white-tailed deer, farm-raised ratites, and other farm-raised exotic animals; fish, pet turtles, and other animals identified with aquaculture which are located in artificial reservoirs or enclosures that are both on privately owned property and constructed so as to prevent, at all times, the ingress and egress of fish life from public waters; any commercial crawfish from any crawfish pond; and any hybrid, mixture, or mutation of any such animal.

(3) “Owner” means any person, partnership, corporation, or other legal entity owning, harboring, or keeping any animal.

**LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.5 (2012). FETICIDE DEFINED; EXCEPTIONS.**

A. Feticide is the killing of an unborn child by the act, procurement, or culpable omission of a person other than the mother of the unborn child. The offense of feticide shall not include acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion to which the pregnant woman or her legal guardian has consented or which was performed in an emergency as defined in R.S. 40:1299.35.12. Nor shall the offense of feticide include acts which are committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.

B. Criminal feticide is of three grades:

(1) First degree feticide.

(2) Second degree feticide.

(3) Third degree feticide.

**LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.6 (2012). FIRST DEGREE FETICIDE.**

A. First degree feticide is:

(1) The killing of an unborn child when the offender has a specific intent to kill or to inflict great bodily harm.

(2) The killing of an unborn child when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of aggravated rape, forcible rape, aggravated arson, aggravated burglary, aggravated kidnapping, second degree kidnapping, assault by drive-by shooting, aggravated escape, armed robbery, first degree robbery, second degree robbery, cruelty to juveniles, second degree cruelty to juveniles, terrorism, or simple robbery, even though he has no intent to kill or inflict great bodily harm.

B. Whoever commits the crime of first degree feticide shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than fifteen years.
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.7 (2012). SECOND DEGREE FETICIDE.

A. Second degree feticide is:

(1) The killing of an unborn child which would be first degree feticide, but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation of the mother of the unborn child sufficient to deprive an average person of his self control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a first degree feticide to second degree feticide if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed.

(2) A feticide committed without any intent to cause death or great bodily harm:

   (a) When the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any felony not enumerated in Article 32.6 (first degree feticide), or of any intentional misdemeanor directly affecting the person; or

   (b) When the offender is resisting lawful arrest by means, or in a manner, not inherently dangerous, and the circumstances are such that the killing would not be first degree feticide under Article 32.6.

B. Whoever commits the crime of second degree feticide shall be imprisoned at hard labor for not more than ten years.

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.8 (2012). THIRD DEGREE FETICIDE.

A. Third degree feticide is:

(1) The killing of an unborn child by criminal negligence. The violation of a statute or ordinance shall be considered only as presumptive evidence of such negligence.

(2) The killing of an unborn child caused proximately or caused directly by an offender engaged in the operation of, or in actual physical control of, any motor vehicle, aircraft, vessel, or other means of conveyance whether or not the offender had the intent to cause death or great bodily harm whenever any of the following conditions exist and such condition was a contributing factor to the killing:

   (a) The offender is under the influence of alcoholic beverages as determined by chemical tests administered under the provisions of R.S. 32:662.

   (b) The offender's blood alcohol concentration is 0.08 percent or more by weight based upon grams of alcohol per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.

   (c) The offender is under the influence of any controlled dangerous substance listed in Schedule I, II, III, IV, or V as set forth in R.S. 40:964.

   (d) The offender is under the influence of alcoholic beverages.
(e)(i) The offender is under the influence of a combination of alcohol and one or more drugs which are not controlled dangerous substances and which are legally obtainable with or without a prescription.

(ii) It shall be an affirmative defense to any charge under this Subparagraph that the label on the container of the prescription drug or the manufacturer’s package of the drug does not contain a warning against combining the medication with alcohol.

(f) The offender is under the influence of one or more drugs which are not controlled dangerous substances and which are legally obtainable with or without a prescription and the influence is caused by the offender's knowingly consuming quantities of the drug or drugs which substantially exceed the dosage prescribed by the physician or the dosage recommended by the manufacturer of the drug.

(g) The operator's blood has any detectable amount of any controlled dangerous substance listed in Schedule I, II, III, or IV as set forth in R.S. 40:964, or a metabolite of such controlled dangerous substance, that has not been medically ordered or prescribed for the individual.

B. Whoever commits the crime of third degree feticide shall be fined not less than two thousand dollars and shall be imprisoned with or without hard labor for not more than five years.

MAINE

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 17-A, §1251 (2012). IMPRISONMENT FOR MURDER.

A person convicted of the crime of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life or for any term of years that is not less than 25. The sentence of the court shall specify the length of the sentence to be served and shall commit the person to the Department of Corrections.

In setting the length of imprisonment, if the victim is a child who had not in fact attained the age of 6 years at the time the crime was committed or if the victim is a woman that the convicted person knew or had reasonable cause to believe to be in fact pregnant at the time the crime was committed, a court shall assign special weight to this objective fact in determining the basic sentence in the first step of the sentencing process. The court shall assign special weight to any subjective victim impact in determining the final sentence in the 2nd and final step in the sentencing process. Nothing in this paragraph may be construed to restrict a court in setting the length of imprisonment from considering the age of the victim in other circumstances when relevant.

MARYLAND

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 2-103 (2012). VIABLE FETUSES.

“Viable” defined
(a) For purposes of a prosecution under this title, “viable” has the meaning stated in § 20-209 of the Health--General Article.
Murder or manslaughter of viable fetus
Except as provided in subsections (d) through (f) of this section, a prosecution may be instituted for murder or manslaughter of a viable fetus.

Intent
(c) A person prosecuted for murder or manslaughter as provided in subsection (b) of this section must have:

(1) intended to cause the death of the viable fetus;

(2) intended to cause serious physical injury to the viable fetus; or

(3) wantonly or recklessly disregarded the likelihood that the person's actions would cause the death of or serious physical injury to the viable fetus.

Right to terminate pregnancy
(d) Nothing in this section applies to or infringes on a woman's right to terminate a pregnancy as stated in § 20-209 of the Health--General Article.

Liability of medical professionals
(e) Nothing in this section subjects a physician or other licensed medical professional to liability for fetal death that occurs in the course of administering lawful medical care.

Act or failure to act of pregnant woman
(f) Nothing in this section applies to an act or failure to act of a pregnant woman with regard to her own fetus.

Personhood or rights of fetus
(g) Nothing in this section shall be construed to confer personhood or any rights on the fetus.

Death penalty
(h) The commission of first degree murder of a viable fetus under this section, in conjunction with the commission of another first degree murder arising out of the same incident, does not constitute an aggravating circumstance subjecting a defendant to the death penalty under § 2-303(g)(ix) of this title.


Definitions
(a)(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.

(2)(i) “Correctional facility” has the meaning stated in § 1-101 of this article.

(ii) “Correctional facility” includes:

1. an institution for the confinement or detention of juveniles charged with or adjudicated as being delinquent; and
2. a hospital in which a person is confined under an order of a court exercising criminal jurisdiction.

(3)(i) “Law enforcement officer” means a law enforcement officer as defined under the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights,1 § 3-101 of the Public Safety Article.

(ii) “Law enforcement officer” includes:

1. a law enforcement officer of a jurisdiction outside of the State;

2. an officer serving in a probationary status;

3. a parole and probation officer; and

4. a law enforcement officer while privately employed as a security officer or special police officer under Title 3, Subtitle 3 of the Public Safety Article if the law enforcement officer is wearing the uniform worn while acting in an official capacity or is displaying prominently the officer's official badge or other insignia of office.

Imposition of death penalty--Sentencing proceeding
(b) If the State gave notice under § 2-202(a)(1) of this title, a separate sentencing proceeding shall be held as soon as practicable after a defendant is found guilty of murder in the first degree to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death.

Imposition of death penalty--Determination by court or jury
(c) The sentencing proceeding under subsection (b) of this section shall be conducted:

(1) before the jury that determined the defendant's guilt;

(2) before a jury impaneled for purposes of the proceeding if:

(i) the defendant was convicted based on a guilty plea;

(ii) the defendant was convicted after a trial by a court sitting without a jury;

(iii) the court, for good cause, discharged the jury that convicted the defendant; or

(iv) a court of competent jurisdiction remanded the case for resentencing following a review of the original sentence of death; or

(3) before the court, if the defendant waives a jury sentencing proceeding.

Jury composition--Alternate jurors
(d)(1) A judge shall appoint at least two alternate jurors when impaneling a jury for any proceeding:

(i) in which the defendant is being tried for a crime for which the death penalty may be imposed; or

(ii) that is held under this section.
(2) The alternate jurors shall be retained throughout the proceedings under any restrictions that the judge imposes.

(3) Subject to paragraph (4) of this subsection, if a juror dies, is disqualified, becomes incapacitated, or is discharged for any other reason before the jury begins its deliberations on sentencing, an alternate juror becomes a juror in the order selected, and serves in all respects as a juror selected on the regular trial panel.

(4) An alternate juror may not replace a juror who is discharged during the actual deliberations of the jury on the guilt or innocence of the defendant or on sentencing.

Evidence; opportunity for arguments

(e)(1) The following type of evidence is admissible in a sentencing proceeding:

(i) evidence relating to a mitigating circumstance that is listed under subsection (h) of this section;

(ii) evidence relating to an aggravating circumstance:

1. that is listed under subsection (g) of this section; and

2. of which the State provided notice under § 2-202(a)(1)(ii) of this title;

(iii) evidence of a prior criminal conviction, guilty plea, plea of nolo contendere, or the absence of any prior convictions or pleas, to the same extent that the evidence would be admissible in other sentencing procedures;

(iv) subject to paragraph (2) of this subsection, any presentence investigation report; and

(v) any other evidence the court finds to have probative value and relevance to sentencing, if the defendant has a fair opportunity to rebut any statement.

(2) A recommendation in a presentence investigation report as to a sentence is not admissible in a sentencing proceeding.

(3) The State and the defendant or counsel for the defendant may present argument for or against the sentence of death.

Jury instructions

(f)(1) After the evidence is presented to the jury in the sentencing proceeding, the court shall:

(i) give any appropriate instructions allowed by law; and

(ii) instruct the jury as to:

1. the findings that the jury must make to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death, imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole, or imprisonment for life; and
2. the burden of proof applicable to the findings under subsection (g)(2) or (i)(1) and (2) of this section.

(2) The court may not instruct the jury that the jury is to assume that a sentence of life imprisonment is for the natural life of the defendant.

Consideration of aggravating circumstances

(g)(1) In determining a sentence under subsection (b) of this section, the court or jury first shall consider whether any of the following aggravating circumstances exists beyond a reasonable doubt:

(i) one or more persons committed the murder of a law enforcement officer while the officer was performing the officer's duties;
(ii) the defendant committed the murder while confined in a correctional facility;
(iii) the defendant committed the murder in furtherance of an escape from, an attempt to escape from, or an attempt to evade lawful arrest, custody, or detention by:
   1. a guard or officer of a correctional facility; or
   2. a law enforcement officer;
(iv) the victim was taken or attempted to be taken in the course of an abduction, kidnapping, or an attempt to abduct or kidnap;
(v) the victim was a child abducted in violation of § 3-503(a)(1) of this article;
(vi) the defendant committed the murder under an agreement or contract for remuneration or promise of remuneration to commit the murder;
(vii) the defendant employed or engaged another to commit the murder and the murder was committed under an agreement or contract for remuneration or promise of remuneration;
(viii) the defendant committed the murder while under a sentence of death or imprisonment for life;
(ix) the defendant committed more than one murder in the first degree arising out of the same incident; or
(x) the defendant committed the murder while committing, or attempting to commit:
   1. arson in the first degree;
   2. carjacking or armed carjacking;
   3. rape in the first degree;
   4. robbery under § 3-402 or § 3-403 of this article; or
   5. sexual offense in the first degree.
(2) If the court or jury does not find that one or more of the aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt:

(i) it shall state that conclusion in writing; and

(ii) a death sentence may not be imposed.

Consideration of mitigating circumstances
(h)(1) In this subsection, “crime of violence” means:

(i) abduction;

(ii) arson in the first degree;

(iii) carjacking or armed carjacking;

(iv) escape in the first degree;

(v) kidnapping;

(vi) mayhem;

(vii) murder;

(viii) rape in the first or second degree;

(ix) robbery under § 3-402 or § 3-403 of this article;

(x) sexual offense in the first or second degree;

(xi) manslaughter other than involuntary manslaughter;

(xii) an attempt to commit any crime listed in items (i) through (xi) of this paragraph; or

(xiii) the use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or other crime of violence.

(2) If the court or jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the aggravating circumstances under subsection (g) of this section exists, it then shall consider whether any of the following mitigating circumstances exists based on a preponderance of the evidence:

(i) the defendant previously has not:

1. been found guilty of a crime of violence;

2. entered a guilty plea or a plea of nolo contendere to a charge of a crime of violence; or

3. received probation before judgment for a crime of violence;
(ii) the victim was a participant in the conduct of the defendant or consented to the act that caused the victim's death;

(iii) the defendant acted under substantial duress, domination, or provocation of another, but not so substantial as to constitute a complete defense to the prosecution;

(iv) the murder was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of the defendant's conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired due to emotional disturbance, mental disorder, or mental incapacity;

(v) the defendant was of a youthful age at the time of the murder;

(vi) the act of the defendant was not the sole proximate cause of the victim's death;

(vii) it is unlikely that the defendant will engage in further criminal activity that would be a continuing threat to society; or

(viii) any other fact that the court or jury specifically sets forth in writing as a mitigating circumstance in the case.

Findings; documentation of decision

(1) If the court or jury finds that one or more of the mitigating circumstances under subsection (h) of this section exists, it shall determine by a preponderance of the evidence whether the aggravating circumstances under subsection (g) of this section outweigh the mitigating circumstances.

(2) If the court or jury finds that the aggravating circumstances:

(i) outweigh the mitigating circumstances, a death sentence shall be imposed; or

(ii) do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances, a death sentence may not be imposed.

(3) If the determination is by a jury, a decision to impose a death sentence must be unanimous and shall be signed by the jury foreperson.

(4) A court or jury shall put its determination in writing and shall state specifically:

(i) each aggravating circumstance found;

(ii) each mitigating circumstance found;

(iii) whether any aggravating circumstances found under subsection (g) of this section outweigh the mitigating circumstances found under subsection (h) of this section;

(iv) whether the aggravating circumstances found under subsection (g) of this section do not outweigh the mitigating circumstances found under subsection (h) of this section; and

(v) the sentence determined under subsection (g)(2) of this section or paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection.
Sentencing

(j)(1) If a jury determines that a death sentence shall be imposed under the provisions of this section, the court shall impose a death sentence.

(2) If, within a reasonable time, the jury is unable to agree as to whether a death sentence shall be imposed, the court may not impose a death sentence.

(3) If the sentencing proceeding is conducted before a court without a jury, the court shall determine whether a death sentence shall be imposed under the provisions of this section.

(4) If the court or jury determines that a death sentence may not be imposed and the State gave notice under § 2-203(1) of this title, a determination shall be made concerning imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole under § 2-304 of this subtitle.

(5) If the court or jury determines that a death sentence may not be imposed and if the State did not give notice under § 2-203(1) of this title, the court shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life.

Certification of proceedings

(k)(1) Immediately after the imposition of a death sentence:

(i) the clerk of the court in which sentence is imposed, if different from the court where the indictment or information was filed, shall certify the proceedings to the clerk of the court where the indictment or information was filed; and

(ii) the clerk of the court where the indictment or information was filed shall copy the docket entries in the inmate's case, sign the copies, and deliver them to the Governor.

(2) The docket entries shall show fully the sentence of the court and the date that the sentence was entered.

Method of imposing death sentence

(l) If the defendant is sentenced to death, the court before which the defendant is tried and convicted shall sentence the defendant to death by intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate or other similar drug in combination with a chemical paralytic agent.

MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-601 (2012). CHILD ABUSE.

Definitions

(a)(1) In this section the following words have the meanings indicated.

(2) “Abuse” means physical injury sustained by a minor as a result of cruel or inhumane treatment or as a result of a malicious act under circumstances that indicate that the minor's health or welfare is harmed or threatened by the treatment or act.

(3) “Family member” means a relative of a minor by blood, adoption, or marriage.
(4) “Household member” means a person who lives with or is a regular presence in a home of a minor at the time of the alleged abuse.

(5) “Severe physical injury” means:

(i) brain injury or bleeding within the skull;

(ii) starvation; or

(iii) physical injury that:

1. creates a substantial risk of death; or

2. causes permanent or protracted serious:

   A. disfigurement;

   B. loss of the function of any bodily member or organ; or

   C. impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ.

Child abuse in the first degree
(b)(1) A parent, family member, household member, or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor may not cause abuse to the minor that:

(i) results in the death of the minor; or

(ii) causes severe physical injury to the minor.

(2) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person who violates paragraph (1) of this subsection is guilty of the felony of child abuse in the first degree and on conviction is subject to:

(i) imprisonment not exceeding 25 years; or

(ii) if the violation results in the death of the victim, imprisonment not exceeding 40 years.

Repeat offenders
(c) A person who violates this section after being convicted of a previous violation of this section is guilty of a felony and on conviction is subject to:

(1) imprisonment not exceeding 25 years; or

(2) if the violation results in the death of the victim, imprisonment not exceeding 40 years.

Child abuse in the second degree
(d)(1)(i) A parent or other person who has permanent or temporary care or custody or responsibility for the supervision of a minor may not cause abuse to the minor.

(ii) A household member or family member may not cause abuse to a minor.
(2) Except as provided in subsection (c) of this section, a person who violates paragraph (1) of this subsection is guilty of the felony of child abuse in the second degree and on conviction is subject to imprisonment not exceeding 15 years.

Sentencing

(e) A sentence imposed under this section may be separate from and consecutive to or concurrent with a sentence for any crime based on the act establishing the violation of this section.


“Crime of violence” defined
(a) In this section, “crime of violence” means:

(1) abduction;

(2) arson in the first degree;

(3) kidnapping;

(4) manslaughter, except involuntary manslaughter;

(5) mayhem;

(6) maiming, as previously proscribed under former Article 27, §§ 385 and 386 of the Code;

(7) murder;

(8) rape;

(9) robbery under § 3-402 or § 3-403 of this article;

(10) carjacking;

(11) armed carjacking;

(12) sexual offense in the first degree;

(13) sexual offense in the second degree;

(14) use of a handgun in the commission of a felony or other crime of violence;

(15) child abuse in the first degree under § 3-601 of this article;

(16) sexual abuse of a minor under § 3-602 of this article if:

(i) the victim is under the age of 13 years and the offender is an adult at the time of the offense; and
(ii) the offense involved:

1. vaginal intercourse, as defined in § 3-301 of this article;

2. a sexual act, as defined in § 3-301 of this article;

3. an act in which a part of the offender's body penetrates, however slightly, into the victim's genital opening or anus; or

4. the intentional touching, not through the clothing, of the victim's or the offender's genital, anal, or other intimate area for sexual arousal, gratification, or abuse;

(17) an attempt to commit any of the crimes described in items (1) through (16) of this subsection;

(18) continuing course of conduct with a child under § 3-315 of this article;

(19) assault in the first degree;

(20) assault with intent to murder;

(21) assault with intent to rape;

(22) assault with intent to rob;

(23) assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in the first degree; and

(24) assault with intent to commit a sexual offense in the second degree.

Scope of section
(b) This section does not apply if a person is sentenced to death.

Fourth conviction of crime of violence
(c)(1) Except as provided in subsection (g) of this section, on conviction for a fourth time of a crime of violence, a person who has served three separate terms of confinement in a correctional facility as a result of three separate convictions of any crime of violence shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.

(2) Notwithstanding any other law, the provisions of this subsection are mandatory.

Third conviction of crime of violence
(d)(1) Except as provided in subsection (g) of this section, on conviction for a third time of a crime of violence, a person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the term allowed by law but not less than 25 years, if the person:

(i) has been convicted of a crime of violence on two prior separate occasions:

1. in which the second or succeeding crime is committed after there has been a charging document filed for the preceding occasion; and

2. for which the convictions do not arise from a single incident; and
(ii) has served at least one term of confinement in a correctional facility as a result of a conviction of a crime of violence.

(2) The court may not suspend all or part of the mandatory 25-year sentence required under this subsection.

(3) A person sentenced under this subsection is not eligible for parole except in accordance with the provisions of § 4-305 of the Correctional Services Article.

Second conviction of crime of violence

(e)(1) On conviction for a second time of a crime of violence committed on or after October 1, 1994, a person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for the term allowed by law, but not less than 10 years, if the person:

(i) has been convicted on a prior occasion of a crime of violence, including a conviction for a crime committed before October 1, 1994; and

(ii) served a term of confinement in a correctional facility for that conviction.

(2) The court may not suspend all or part of the mandatory 10-year sentence required under this subsection.

Compliance with Maryland Rules

(f) If the State intends to proceed against a person as a subsequent offender under this section, it shall comply with the procedures set forth in the Maryland Rules for the indictment and trial of a subsequent offender.

Eligibility for parole after age 65

(g)(1) A person sentenced under this section may petition for and be granted parole if the person:

(i) is at least 65 years old; and

(ii) has served at least 15 years of the sentence imposed under this section.

(2) The Maryland Parole Commission shall adopt regulations to implement this subsection.

MASSACHUSETTS

MASS. ANN. LAW CH. 272, § 22 (2013). CONCEALMENT OF DEATH OF CHILD BORN OUT OF WEDLOCK.

A parent who conceals the death of the issue of such parent, which if born alive would be a child born out of wedlock, so that it cannot be ascertained whether it was born alive or, if born alive, whether it was murdered, shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars or by imprisonment for not more than one year.
MASS. ANN. LAW CH. 279, § 69 (2013). AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES IN DEATH PENALTY CASES.

(a) In all cases in which the death penalty may be authorized, the statutory aggravating circumstances are:

(1) the murder was committed on a victim who was killed while serving in the performance of his official duties as one or more of the following: police officer, special police officer, state or federal law enforcement officer, firefighter, officer or employee of the department of correction, officer or employee of a sheriff's department, officer or employee of a jail or officer or employee of a house of correction;

(2) the murder was committed by a defendant who was at the time incarcerated in a jail, house of correction, prison, state prison or a correctional or penal institution or a facility used for the housing or treatment or housing and treatment of prisoners;

(3) the murder was committed on a victim who was killed while engaged in the performance of his official duties as a judge, prosecuting attorney, juror, or witness;

(4) the murder was committed by a defendant who had previously been convicted of murder in the first degree, or of an offense in any other federal, state or territorial jurisdiction of the United States which is the same as or necessarily includes the elements of the offense of murder in the first degree;

(5) the murder was committed by the defendant pursuant to a contract, agreement or understanding by which he was to receive money or anything of value in return for committing the murder;

(6) the murder was committed by the defendant for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest of the defendant or another, or the murder was committed by the defendant for the purpose of effectuating an escape or attempting to effectuate an escape of the defendant or another from custody in a place of lawful confinement;

(7) the murder involved torture to the victim or the intentional infliction of extreme pain prior to death demonstrating a total disregard to the suffering of the victim;

(8) the murder was committed as part of a course of conduct involving the killing of or causing serious bodily injury to or the attempted killing of or the attempted causing of serious bodily injury to more than one person by the defendant;

(9) the murder was committed by means of a destructive device, bomb, or explosive planted, hidden, mailed, delivered, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or structure by the defendant or the murder was committed by means such that the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that his act or acts would create a grave risk of death or serious bodily injury to more than one person; or

(10) the murder was committed by the defendant and occurred during the commission or attempted commission or flight after committing or flight after attempting to commit aggravated rape, rape, rape of a child, indecent assault and battery on a child under fourteen, assault with intent to rape, assault on a child under sixteen years of age with intent to rape, kidnapping for ransom, kidnapping, armed robbery, unarmed robbery, breaking and entering with intent to commit a felony, armed assault in a dwelling, arson, confining or putting in fear or otherwise harming another for the purpose of stealing from
depositories, or the murder occurred while the defendant was in possession of a sawed-off shotgun or a machine gun.

(b) In all cases in which the death penalty may be authorized, the mitigating circumstances shall be any factors proffered by the defendant or the commonwealth which are relevant in determining whether to impose a sentence less than death, including, but not limited to, any aspect of the defendant's character, propensities, or record and any of the circumstances of the murder, including but not limited to the following:

1. the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convictions;
2. the victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or had consented to it;
3. the murder was committed while the defendant was under extreme duress or under the domination or control of another;
4. the offense was committed while the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the law was impaired as a result of a mental disease or defect, organic brain damage, emotional illness brought on by stress or prescribed medication, intoxication, or legal or illegal drug use by the defendant which was insufficient to establish a defense to the murder but which substantially affected his judgment;
5. the defendant was over the age of seventy-five at the time of the murder, or any other relevant consideration regarding the age of the defendant at the time of the murder;
6. the defendant was battered or otherwise physically, sexually, or mentally abused by the victim in connection with or immediately prior to the murder for which the defendant was convicted;
7. the defendant was experiencing post-traumatic stress syndrome caused by military service during a declared or undeclared war.

**MICHIGAN**

**MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750-14 (2012). MISCARRIAGE; ADMINISTERING WITH INTENT TO PROCUERE.**

Any person who shall wilfully administer to any pregnant woman any medicine, drug, substance or thing whatever, or shall employ any instrument or other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of any such woman, unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such woman, shall be guilty of a felony, and in case the death of such pregnant woman be thereby produced, the offense shall be deemed manslaughter.

In any prosecution under this section, it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove that no such necessity existed.
MIC. COMP. LAWS § 750-135A (2012). LEAVING CHILD UNATTENDED IN VEHICLE POSING UNREASONABLE RISK OF HARM OR INJURY TO CHILD.

(1) A person who is responsible for the care or welfare of a child shall not leave that child unattended in a vehicle for a period of time that poses an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to the child or under circumstances that pose an unreasonable risk of harm or injury to the child.

(2) A person who violates this section is guilty of a crime as follows:

(a) Except as otherwise provided in subdivisions (b) to (d), the person is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 93 days or a fine of not more than $500.00, or both.

(b) If the violation results in physical harm other than serious physical harm to the child, the person is guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than 1 year or a fine of not more than $1,000.00, or both.

(c) If the violation results in serious physical harm to the child, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 10 years or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both.

(d) If the violation results in the death of the child, the person is guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than 15 years or a fine of not more than $10,000.00, or both.

(3) As used in this section:

(a) “Child” means an individual less than 6 years of age.

(b) “Physical harm” and “serious physical harm” mean those terms as defined in section 136b.

(c) “Unattended” means alone or without the supervision of an individual 13 years of age or older who is not legally incapacitated.

(d) “Vehicle” means that term as defined in section 79 of the Michigan vehicle code, 1949 PA 300, MCL 257.79.

MIC. COMP. LAWS § 600-2922A (2012). ISSUE; CONCEALMENT OF DEATH BY MOTHER.

(1) A person who commits a wrongful or negligent act against a pregnant individual is liable for damages if the act results in a miscarriage or stillbirth by that individual, or physical injury to or the death of the embryo or fetus.

(2) This section does not apply to any of the following:

(a) An act committed by the pregnant individual.
(b) A medical procedure performed by a physician or other licensed health professional within the scope of his or her practice and with the pregnant individual's consent or the consent of an individual who may lawfully provide consent on her behalf or without consent as necessitated by a medical emergency.

(c) The lawful dispensation, administration, or prescription of medication.

(3) This section does not prohibit a civil action under any other applicable law.

(4) As used in this section, “physician or other licensed health professional” means a person licensed under article 15 of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.16101 to 333.18838.

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750-150 (2012). ISSUE; CONCEALMENT OF DEATH BY UNMARRIED WOMAN.

If any unmarried woman conceals the death of any issue of her body, so that it may not be known whether such issue was born alive or not, or whether it was not murdered, she shall be punished by a fine not exceeding $1,000.00 or imprisonment for not more than 1 year.

MICH. COMP. LAWS § 750-316 (2012). FIRST DEGREE MURDER; DEFINITIONS.

(1) A person who commits any of the following is guilty of first degree murder and shall be punished by imprisonment for life:

(a) Murder perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, or any other willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.

(b) Murder committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, arson, criminal sexual conduct in the first, second, or third degree, child abuse in the first degree, a major controlled substance offense, robbery, carjacking, breaking and entering of a dwelling, home invasion in the first or second degree, larceny of any kind, extortion, kidnapping, vulnerable adult abuse in the first and second degree under section 145n, 1 torture under section 85, 2 or aggravated stalking under section 411i.3

(c) A murder of a peace officer or a corrections officer committed while the peace officer or corrections officer is lawfully engaged in the performance of any of his or her duties as a peace officer or corrections officer, knowing that the peace officer or corrections officer is a peace officer or corrections officer engaged in the performance of his or her duty as a peace officer or corrections officer.

(2) As used in this section:

(a) “Arson” means a felony violation of chapter X.4

(b) “Corrections officer” means any of the following:

(i) A prison or jail guard or other prison or jail personnel.

(ii) Any of the personnel of a boot camp, special alternative incarceration unit, or other minimum security correctional facility.
(iii) A parole or probation officer.

(c) “Major controlled substance offense” means any of the following:

(i) A violation of section 7401(2)(a)(i) to (iii) of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7401.

(ii) A violation of section 7403(2)(a)(i) to (iii) of the public health code, 1978 PA 368, MCL 333.7403.

(iii) A conspiracy to commit an offense listed in subparagraph (i) or (ii).

(d) “Peace officer” means any of the following:

(i) A police or conservation officer of this state or a political subdivision of this state.

(ii) A police or conservation officer of the United States.

(iii) A police or conservation officer of another state or a political subdivision of another state.


The willful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother of such child, which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother, shall be deemed manslaughter.

**Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.323 (2012). Manslaughter; Death of Quick Child or Mother from Use of Medicine or Instrument.**

Any person who shall administer to any woman pregnant with a quick child any medicine, drug or substance whatever, or shall use or employ any instrument or other means, with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, shall, in case the death of such child or of such mother be thereby produced, be guilty of manslaughter.

In any prosecution under this section, it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove that no such necessity existed.

**Minnesota**

**Minn. Stat. § 609.185 (2013). Murder in the First Degree.**

(a) Whoever does any of the following is guilty of murder in the first degree and shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life:
(1) causes the death of a human being with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the person or of another;

(2) causes the death of a human being while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence, either upon or affecting the person or another;

(3) causes the death of a human being with intent to effect the death of the person or another, while committing or attempting to commit burglary, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, arson in the first or second degree, a drive-by shooting, tampering with a witness in the first degree, escape from custody, or any felony violation of chapter 152 involving the unlawful sale of a controlled substance;

(4) causes the death of a peace officer or a guard employed at a Minnesota state or local correctional facility, with intent to effect the death of that person or another, while the peace officer or guard is engaged in the performance of official duties;

(5) causes the death of a minor while committing child abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of child abuse upon a child and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life;

(6) causes the death of a human being while committing domestic abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse upon the victim or upon another family or household member and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life; or

(7) causes the death of a human being while committing, conspiring to commit, or attempting to commit a felony crime to further terrorism and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.

(b) For purposes of paragraph (a), clause (5), “child abuse” means an act committed against a minor victim that constitutes a violation of the following laws of this state or any similar laws of the United States or any other state: section 609.221; 609.222; 609.223; 609.224; 609.2242; 609.342; 609.343; 609.344; 609.345; 609.377; 609.378; or 609.713.

(c) For purposes of paragraph (a), clause (6), “domestic abuse” means an act that:

(1) constitutes a violation of section 609.221, 609.222, 609.223, 609.224, 609.2242, 609.342, 609.343, 609.344, 609.345, 609.713, or any similar laws of the United States or any other state; and

(2) is committed against the victim who is a family or household member as defined in section 518B.01, subdivision 2, paragraph (b).

(d) For purposes of paragraph (a), clause (7), “further terrorism” has the meaning given in section 609.714, subdivision 1.

**MINN. STAT. § 609.20 (2013). MANSLAUGHTER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.**

Whoever does any of the following is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both:
(1) intentionally causes the death of another person in the heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of ordinary self-control under like circumstances, provided that the crying of a child does not constitute provocation;

(2) violates section 609.224 and causes the death of another or causes the death of another in committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor offense with such force and violence that death of or great bodily harm to any person was reasonably foreseeable, and murder in the first or second degree was not committed thereby;

(3) intentionally causes the death of another person because the actor is coerced by threats made by someone other than the actor's coconspirator and which cause the actor reasonably to believe that the act performed by the actor is the only means of preventing imminent death to the actor or another;

(4) proximately causes the death of another, without intent to cause death by, directly or indirectly, unlawfully selling, giving away, bartering, delivering, exchanging, distributing, or administering a controlled substance classified in Schedule III, IV, or V; or

(5) causes the death of another in committing or attempting to commit a violation of section 609.377 (malicious punishment of a child), and murder in the first, second, or third degree is not committed thereby.

As used in this section, a “person of ordinary self-control” does not include a person under the influence of intoxicants or a controlled substance.

**Minn. Stat. § 609.205 (2013). Manslaughter in the Second Degree.**

A person who causes the death of another by any of the following means is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both:

(1) by the person's culpable negligence whereby the person creates an unreasonable risk, and consciously takes chances of causing death or great bodily harm to another; or

(2) by shooting another with a firearm or other dangerous weapon as a result of negligently believing the other to be a deer or other animal; or

(3) by setting a spring gun, pit fall, deadfall, snare, or other like dangerous weapon or device; or

(4) by negligently or intentionally permitting any animal, known by the person to have vicious propensities or to have caused great or substantial bodily harm in the past, to run uncontrolled off the owner's premises, or negligently failing to keep it properly confined; or

(5) by committing or attempting to commit a violation of section 609.378 (neglect or endangerment of a child), and murder in the first, second, or third degree is not committed thereby.

If proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall be an affirmative defense to criminal liability under clause (4) that the victim provoked the animal to cause the victim's death.
MINN. STAT. § 609.2661 (2013). MURDER OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE.

Whoever does any of the following is guilty of murder of an unborn child in the first degree and must be sentenced to imprisonment for life:

   (1) causes the death of an unborn child with premeditation and with intent to effect the death of the unborn child or of another;

   (2) causes the death of an unborn child while committing or attempting to commit criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence, either upon or affecting the mother of the unborn child or another; or

   (3) causes the death of an unborn child with intent to effect the death of the unborn child or another while committing or attempting to commit burglary, aggravated robbery, kidnapping, arson in the first or second degree, tampering with a witness in the first degree, or escape from custody.

MINN. STAT. § 609.2662 (2013). MURDER OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE SECOND DEGREE.

Whoever does either of the following is guilty of murder of an unborn child in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 40 years:

   (1) causes the death of an unborn child with intent to effect the death of that unborn child or another, but without premeditation; or

   (2) causes the death of an unborn child, without intent to effect the death of any unborn child or person, while committing or attempting to commit a felony offense other than criminal sexual conduct in the first or second degree with force or violence.

MINN. STAT. § 609.2663 (2013), MURDER OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE THIRD DEGREE.

Whoever, without intent to effect the death of any unborn child or person, causes the death of an unborn child by perpetrating an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human or fetal life, is guilty of murder of an unborn child in the third degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 25 years.

MINN. STAT. § 609.2664 (2013). MANSLAUGHTER OF UNBORN CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE.

Whoever does any of the following is guilty of manslaughter of an unborn child in the first degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine of not more than $30,000, or both:

   (1) intentionally causes the death of an unborn child in the heat of passion provoked by such words or acts of another as would provoke a person of ordinary self-control under like circumstances;

   (2) causes the death of an unborn child in committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor offense with such force or violence that death of or great bodily harm to any person or
unborn child was reasonably foreseeable, and murder of an unborn child in the first or second degree was not committed thereby; or

(3) intentionally causes the death of an unborn child because the actor is coerced by threats made by someone other than the actor's coconspirator and which cause the actor to reasonably believe that the act performed by the actor is the only means of preventing imminent death to the actor or another.

MINN. STAT. § 609.2665 (2013). MANSLAUGHTER OF UNBORN CHILD IN SECOND DEGREE.

A person who causes the death of an unborn child by any of the following means is guilty of manslaughter of an unborn child in the second degree and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both:

(1) by the actor's culpable negligence whereby the actor creates an unreasonable risk and consciously takes chances of causing death or great bodily harm to an unborn child or a person;

(2) by shooting the mother of the unborn child with a firearm or other dangerous weapon as a result of negligently believing her to be a deer or other animal;

(3) by setting a spring gun, pit fall, deadfall, snare, or other like dangerous weapon or device; or

(4) by negligently or intentionally permitting any animal, known by the person to have vicious propensities or to have caused great or substantial bodily harm in the past, to run uncontrolled off the owner's premises, or negligently failing to keep it properly confined.

If proven by a preponderance of the evidence, it shall be an affirmative defense to criminal liability under clause (4) that the mother of the unborn child provoked the animal to cause the unborn child's death.

MINN. STAT. § 609.268 (2013). INJURY OR DEATH OF UNBORN CHILD IN COMMISSION OF CRIME.

Subdivision 1. Death of unborn child. Whoever, in the commission of a felony or in a violation of section 609.224, 609.2242, 609.23, 609.231, 609.2325, or 609.233, causes the death of an unborn child is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than 15 years or to payment of a fine not more than $30,000, or both. As used in this subdivision, “felony” does not include a violation of sections 609.185 to 609.21, 609.221 to 609.2231, or 609.2661 to 609.2665.

Subd. 2. Injury to unborn child. Whoever, in the commission of a felony or in a violation of section 609.23, 609.231, 609.2325 or 609.233, causes great or substantial bodily harm to an unborn child who is subsequently born alive, is guilty of a felony and may be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than ten years or to payment of a fine of not more than $20,000, or both. As used in this subdivision, “felony” does not include a violation of sections 609.21, 609.221 to 609.2231, or 609.267 to 609.2672.

MINN. STAT. § 617.22 (2013). CONCEALING BIRTH.

Every person who shall endeavor to conceal the birth of a child by any disposition of its dead body, whether the child died before or after its birth, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Every person who, having been convicted of endeavoring to conceal the stillbirth of any issue, or the death of any issue under
the age of two years, shall, subsequent to that conviction, endeavor to conceal any subsequent birth or
death, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years.

MISSISSIPPI

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-4 (2012). ALLOWING CHILD DELIVERED IN FAILED ABORTION TO DIE; PENALTIES.

(1) It shall be unlawful for any physician performing an abortion that results in the delivery of a living
child to intentionally allow or cause the child to die.

(2) If the child is viable, such child shall be immediately provided appropriate medical care and comfort
care necessary to sustain life. If the child is not viable, such child shall be provided comfort care. The
 provision of this section shall include, but not be limited to, a child born with physical or mental
handicapping conditions which, in the opinion of the parent, the physician or other persons, diminishes
the quality of the child’s life, a child born alive during the course of an attempted abortion and a child not
wanted by the parent.

(3) As used in this section the term “child” includes every infant member of the species homo sapiens
who is born alive at any stage of development.

(4) Any person who violates this section shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, be imprisoned
for not less than one (1) year nor more than ten (10) years in the State Penitentiary and fined not more
than Fifty Thousand Dollars ($50,000.00) but not less than Twenty-five Thousand Dollars ($25,000.00).

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (2012). “MURDER” AND “CAPITAL MURDER” DEFINED.

(1) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be
murder in the following cases:

   (a) When done with deliberate design to effect the death of the person killed, or of any human being;

   (b) When done in the commission of an act eminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved
   heart, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any
   particular individual;

   (c) When done without any design to effect death by any person engaged in the commission of any
felony other than rape, kidnapping, burglary, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with
any child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or felonious
abuse and/or battery of a child in violation of subsection (2) of Section 97-5-39, or in any attempt to
commit such felonies;

   (d) When done with deliberate design to effect the death of an unborn child.

(2) The killing of a human being without the authority of law by any means or in any manner shall be
capital murder in the following cases:

   (a) Murder which is perpetrated by killing a peace officer or fireman while such officer or fireman is

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
129
acting in his official capacity or by reason of an act performed in his official capacity, and with
knowledge that the victim was a peace officer or fireman. For purposes of this paragraph, the term “peace
officer” means any state or federal law enforcement officer, including, but not limited to, a federal park
ranger, the sheriff of or police officer of a city or town, a conservation officer, a parole officer, a judge,
senior status judge, special judge, district attorney, legal assistant to a district attorney, county prosecuting
attorney or any other court official, an agent of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Division of the State Tax
Commission, an agent of the Bureau of Narcotics, personnel of the Mississippi Highway Patrol, and the
employees of the Department of Corrections who are designated as peace officers by the Commissioner
of Corrections pursuant to Section 47-5-54, and the superintendent and his deputies, guards, officers and
other employees of the Mississippi State Penitentiary;

(b) Murder which is perpetrated by a person who is under sentence of life imprisonment;

(c) Murder which is perpetrated by use or detonation of a bomb or explosive device;

(d) Murder which is perpetrated by any person who has been offered or has received anything of value
for committing the murder, and all parties to such a murder, are guilty as principals;

(e) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of
the crime of rape, burglary, kidnapping, arson, robbery, sexual battery, unnatural intercourse with any
child under the age of twelve (12), or nonconsensual unnatural intercourse with mankind, or in any
attempt to commit such felonies;

(f) When done with or without any design to effect death, by any person engaged in the commission of
the crime of felonious abuse and/or battery of a child in violation of subsection (2) of Section 97-5-39, or
in any attempt to commit such felony;

(g) Murder which is perpetrated on educational property as defined in Section 97-37-17;

(h) Murder which is perpetrated by the killing of any elected official of a county, municipal, state or
federal government with knowledge that the victim was such public official.

(3) An indictment for murder or capital murder shall serve as notice to the defendant that the indictment
may include any and all lesser included offenses thereof, including, but not limited to, manslaughter.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-21 (2012). MURDER AND CAPITAL MURDER, PUNISHMENT.

Every person who shall be convicted of murder shall be sentenced by the court to imprisonment for life in
the State Penitentiary.
Every person who shall be convicted of capital murder shall be sentenced (a) to death; (b) to
imprisonment for life in the State Penitentiary without parole; or (c) to imprisonment for life in the State
Penitentiary with eligibility for parole as provided in Section 47-7-3(1)(f).

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-25 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER, PUNISHMENT.

Any person convicted of manslaughter shall be fined in a sum not less than five hundred dollars, or
imprisoned in the county jail not more than one year, or both, or in the penitentiary not less than two
years, nor more than twenty years.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-27 (2012). FELONY MANSLAUGHTER DEFINED.

The killing of a human being without malice, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, while such other is engaged in the perpetration of any felony, except those felonies enumerated in Section 97-3-19(2) (e) and (f), or while such other is attempting to commit any felony besides such as are above enumerated and excepted, shall be manslaughter.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-29 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER AS KILLING DURING OTHER CRIME OR MISDEMEANOR.

The killing of a human being without malice, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, while such other is engaged in the perpetration of any crime or misdemeanor not amounting to felony, or in the attempt to commit any crime or misdemeanor, where such killing would be murder at common law, shall be manslaughter.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-31 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER, RESISTING UNLAWFUL ACT.

Every person who shall unnecessarily kill another, either while resisting an attempt by such other person to commit any felony, or to do any unlawful act, or after such attempt shall have failed, shall be guilty of manslaughter.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-33 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER, INVOLUNTARY KILLING DURING TRESPASS.

The involuntary killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, while such human being is engaged in the commission of a trespass or other injury to private rights or property, or is engaged in an attempt to commit such injury, shall be manslaughter.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-35 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER, HEAT OF PASSION.

The killing of a human being, without malice, in the heat of passion, but in a cruel or unusual manner, or by the use of a dangerous weapon, without authority of law, and not in necessary self-defense, shall be manslaughter.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-37 (2012). INJURY TO PREGNANT WOMAN RESULTING IN MISCARRIAGE OR STILLBIRTH; “HUMAN BEING” DEFINED; CRIMES; EXCEPTIONS.

(1) For purposes of the offenses enumerated in this subsection (1), the term “human being” includes an unborn child at every stage of gestation from conception until live birth and the term “unborn child” means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb:

(a) Section 97-3-7, simple and aggravated assault and domestic violence;

(b) Section 97-3-15, justifiable homicide;

(c) Section 97-3-17, excusable homicide;

(d) Section 97-3-19, murder, capital murder;
(e) Section 97-3-27, homicide while committing a felony;
(f) Section 97-3-29, homicide while committing a misdemeanor;
(g) Section 97-3-33, killing a trespasser unnecessarily;
(h) Section 97-3-35, killing without malice in the heat of passion;
(i) Section 97-3-45, homicide by means of a dangerous animal;
(j) Section 97-3-47, all other homicides;
(k) Section 97-3-61, poisoning with intent to kill or injure.

(2) A person who intentionally injures a pregnant woman is guilty of a crime as follows:

   (a) If the conduct results in a miscarriage or stillbirth by that individual, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years or a fine of not more than Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($7,500.00), or both.

   (b) If the conduct results in serious physical injury to the embryo or fetus, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not more than twenty (20) years or a fine of not more than Five Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00), or both.

   (c) If the conduct results in minor physical injury to the embryo or fetus, a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than six (6) months or a fine of not more than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or both.

(3) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any legal medical procedure performed by a licensed physician or other licensed medical professional, including legal abortions, when done at the request of a mother of an unborn child or the mother's legal guardian, or to the lawful dispensing or administration of lawfully prescribed medication.

(4) Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prohibit prosecution of an offender pursuant to the provisions of any other applicable statute.

MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-47 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER, GENERALLY.

Every other killing of a human being, by the act, procurement, or culpable negligence of another, and without authority of law, not provided for in this title, shall be manslaughter.

MISSOURI

MO. REV. STAT. § 1.205 (2012). LIFE BEGINS AT CONCEPTION—UNBORN CHILD, DEFINED—FAILURE TO PROVIDE PREGNATAL CARE, NO CAUSE OF ACTION FOR

1. The general assembly of this state finds that:
(1) The life of each human being begins at conception;

(2) Unborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-being;

(3) The natural parents of unborn children have protectable interests in the life, health, and well-being of their unborn child.

2. Effective January 1, 1988, the laws of this state shall be interpreted and construed to acknowledge on behalf of the unborn child at every stage of development, all the rights, privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state, subject only to the Constitution of the United States, and decisional interpretations thereof by the United States Supreme Court and specific provisions to the contrary in the statutes and constitution of this state.

3. As used in this section, the term “unborn children” or “unborn child” shall include all unborn child or children or the offspring of human beings from the moment of conception until birth at every stage of biological development.

4. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted as creating a cause of action against a woman for indirectly harming her unborn child by failing to properly care for herself or by failing to follow any particular program of prenatal care.

**MO. REV. STAT. § 188.035 (2012). DEATH OF CHILD ABORTED ALIVE DEEMED MURDER IN SECOND DEGREE, WHEN.**

Whoever, with intent to do so, shall take the life of a child aborted alive, shall be guilty of murder of the second degree.

**MO. REV. STAT. § 565.020 (2012). FIRST DEGREE MURDER, PENALTY—PERSON UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS OF AGE NOT TO RECEIVE DEATH PENALTY.**

1. A person commits the crime of murder in the first degree if he knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter.

2. Murder in the first degree is a class A felony, and the punishment shall be either death or imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole, or release except by act of the governor; except that, if a person has not reached his sixteenth birthday at the time of the commission of the crime, the punishment shall be imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation or parole, or release except by act of the governor.

**MO. REV. STAT. § 565.021 (2012). SECOND DEGREE MURDER, PENALTY.**

1. A person commits the crime of murder in the second degree if he:

   (1) Knowingly causes the death of another person or, with the purpose of causing serious physical injury to another person, causes the death of another person; or

   (2) Commits or attempts to commit any felony, and, in the perpetration or the attempted perpetration of such felony or in the flight from the perpetration or attempted perpetration of such felony, another person is killed as a result of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of such felony or immediate flight from
the perpetration of such felony or attempted perpetration of such felony.

2. Murder in the second degree is a class A felony, and the punishment for second degree murder shall be in addition to the punishment for commission of a related felony or attempted felony, other than murder or manslaughter.

3. Notwithstanding section 556.046, RSMo, and section 565.025, in any charge of murder in the second degree, the jury shall be instructed on, or, in a jury-waived trial, the judge shall consider, any and all of the subdivisions in subsection 1 of this section which are supported by the evidence and requested by one of the parties or the court.

MO. REV. STAT. § 565.023 (2012). VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, PENALTY—UNDER INFLUENCE OF SUDDEN PASSION, DEFENDANT’S BURDEN TO INJECT.

1. A person commits the crime of voluntary manslaughter if he:

   (1) Causes the death of another person under circumstances that would constitute murder in the second degree under subdivision (1) of subsection 1 of section 565.021, except that he caused the death under the influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause; or

   (2) Knowingly assists another in the commission of self-murder.

2. The defendant shall have the burden of injecting the issue of influence of sudden passion arising from adequate cause under subdivision (1) of subsection 1 of this section.

3. Voluntary manslaughter is a class B felony.

MO. REV. STAT. § 565.024 (2012). INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, PENALTY.

1. A person commits the crime of involuntary manslaughter in the first degree if he or she:

   (1) Recklessly causes the death of another person; or

   (2) While in an intoxicated condition operates a motor vehicle or vessel in this state and, when so operating, acts with criminal negligence to cause the death of any person; or

   (3) While in an intoxicated condition operates a motor vehicle or vessel in this state, and, when so operating, acts with criminal negligence to:

       (a) Cause the death of any person not a passenger in the vehicle or vessel operated by the defendant, including the death of an individual that results from the defendant's vehicle leaving a highway, as defined by section 301.010, RSMo, or the highway's right-of-way; or vessel leaving the water; or

       (b) Cause the death of two or more persons; or

       (c) Cause the death of any person while he or she has a blood alcohol content of at least eighteen-hundredths of one percent by weight of alcohol in such person's blood; or
(4) Operates a motor vehicle in violation of subsection 2 of section 304.022, RSMo, and when so operating, acts with criminal negligence to cause the death of any person authorized to operate an emergency vehicle, as defined in section 304.022, RSMo, while such person is in the performance of official duties;

(5) Operates a vessel in violation of subsections 1 and 2 of section 306.132, RSMo, and when so operating acts with criminal negligence to cause the death of any person authorized to operate an emergency watercraft, as defined in section 306.132, RSMo, while such person is in the performance of official duties.

2. Involuntary manslaughter in the first degree under subdivision (1) or (2) of subsection 1 of this section is a class C felony. Involuntary manslaughter in the first degree under subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of this section is a class B felony. A second or subsequent violation of subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of this section is a class A felony. For any violation of subdivision (3) of subsection 1 of this section, the minimum prison term which the defendant must serve shall be eighty-five percent of his or her sentence. Any violation of subdivisions (4) and (5) of subsection 1 of this section is a class B felony.

3. A person commits the crime of involuntary manslaughter in the second degree if he acts with criminal negligence to cause the death of any person.

4. Involuntary manslaughter in the second degree is a class D felony.


1. This section shall be known and may be cited as the “Infant's Protection Act”.

2. As used in this section, and only in this section, the following terms shall mean:

   (1) “Born”, complete separation of an intact child from the mother regardless of whether the umbilical cord is cut or the placenta detached;

   (2) “Living infant”, a human child, born or partially born, who is alive, as determined in accordance with the usual and customary standards of medical practice and is not dead as determined pursuant to section 194.005, RSMo, relating to the determination of the occurrence of death, and has not attained the age of thirty days post birth;

   (3) “Partially born”, partial separation of a child from the mother with the child's head intact with the torso. If vaginally delivered, a child is partially separated from the mother when the head in a cephalic presentation, or any part of the torso above the navel in a breech presentation, is outside the mother's external cervical os. If delivered abdominally, a child is partially separated from the mother when the child's head in a cephalic presentation, or any part of the torso above the navel in a breech presentation, is outside the mother's external abdominal wall.

3. A person is guilty of the crime of infanticide if such person causes the death of a living infant with the purpose to cause said death by an overt act performed when the infant is partially born or born.

4. The crime of infanticide shall be a class A felony.
5. A physician using procedures consistent with the usual and customary standards of medical practice to save the life of the mother during pregnancy or birth or to save the life of any unborn or partially born child of the same pregnancy shall not be criminally responsible under this section. In no event shall the mother be criminally responsible pursuant to this section for the acts of the physician if the physician is not held criminally responsible pursuant to this section.

6. This section shall not apply to any person who performs or attempts to perform a legal abortion if the act that causes the death is performed prior to the child being partially born, even though the death of the child occurs as a result of the abortion after the child is partially born.

7. Only that person who performs the overt act required under subsection 3 of this section shall be culpable under this section, unless a person, with the purpose of committing infanticide, does any act which is a substantial step towards the commission of the offense which results in the death of the living infant. A “substantial step” is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the actor's purpose to complete the commission of the offense.

8. Nothing in this section shall be interpreted to exclude the defenses otherwise available to any person under the law including defenses provided pursuant to chapters 562 and 563, RSMo.

**MO. REV. STAT. § 568.060 (2012). ABUSE OR NEGLECT OF A CHILD, PENALTY.**

1. As used in this section, the following terms shall mean:

   (1) “Abuse”, the infliction of physical, sexual, or mental injury against a child by any person eighteen years of age or older. For purposes of this section, abuse shall not include injury inflicted on a child by accidental means by a person with care, custody, or control of the child, or discipline of a child by a person with care, custody, or control of the child, including spanking, in a reasonable manner;

   (2) “Abusive head trauma”, a serious physical injury to the head or brain caused by any means, including but not limited to shaking, jerking, pushing, pulling, slamming, hitting, or kicking;

   (3) “Mental injury”, an injury to the intellectual or psychological capacity or the emotional condition of a child as evidenced by an observable and substantial impairment of the ability of the child to function within his or her normal range of performance or behavior;

   (4) “Neglect”, the failure to provide, by those responsible for the care, custody, and control of a child under the age of eighteen years, the care reasonable and necessary to maintain the physical and mental health of the child, when such failure presents a substantial probability that death or physical injury or sexual injury would result;

   (5) “Physical injury”, physical pain, illness, or any impairment of physical condition, including but not limited to bruising, lacerations, hematomas, welts, or permanent or temporary disfigurement and impairment of any bodily function or organ;

   (6) “Serious emotional injury”, an injury that creates a substantial risk of temporary or permanent medical or psychological damage, manifested by impairment of a behavioral, cognitive, or physical condition. Serious emotional injury shall be established by testimony of qualified experts upon the reasonable expectation of probable harm to a reasonable degree of medical or psychological certainty;
“Serious physical injury”, a physical injury that creates a substantial risk of death or that causes serious disfigurement or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any part of the body.

2. A person commits the offense of abuse or neglect of a child if such person knowingly causes a child who is less than eighteen years of age:

   (1) To suffer physical or mental injury as a result of abuse or neglect; or

   (2) To be placed in a situation in which the child may suffer physical or mental injury as the result of abuse or neglect.

3. A person commits the offense of abuse or neglect of a child if such person recklessly causes a child who is less than eighteen years of age to suffer from abusive head trauma.

4. A person does not commit the offense of abuse or neglect of a child by virtue of the sole fact that the person delivers or allows the delivery of child to a provider of emergency services.

5. The offense of abuse or neglect of a child is a class C felony, without eligibility for probation or parole until the defendant has served no less than one year of such sentence, unless the person has previously been found guilty of a violation of this section or of a violation of the law of any other jurisdiction that prohibits the same or similar conduct or the injury inflicted on the child is a serious emotional injury or a serious physical injury, in which case abuse or neglect of a child is a class B felony, without eligibility for probation or parole until the defendant has served not less than five years of such sentence.

6. Notwithstanding subsection 5 of this section to the contrary, the offense of abuse or neglect of a child is a class A felony, without eligibility for probation or parole until the defendant has served not less than fifteen years of such sentence, if:

   (1) The injury is a serious emotional injury or a serious physical injury;

   (2) The child is less than fourteen years of age; and

   (3) The injury is the result of sexual abuse as defined under section 566.100 or sexual exploitation of a minor as defined under section 573.023.

7. The circuit or prosecuting attorney may refer a person who is suspected of abuse or neglect of a child to an appropriate public or private agency for treatment or counseling so long as the agency has consented to taking such referrals. Nothing in this subsection shall limit the discretion of the circuit or prosecuting attorney to prosecute a person who has been referred for treatment or counseling pursuant to this subsection.

8. Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter the requirement that every element of any crime referred to herein must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

9. Discipline, including spanking administered in a reasonable manner, shall not be construed to be abuse under this section.
MONTANA

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-102 (2013). DELIBERATE HOMICIDE.

(1) A person commits the offense of deliberate homicide if:

(a) the person purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being; or

(b) the person attempts to commit, commits, or is legally accountable for the attempt or commission of robbery, sexual intercourse without consent, arson, burglary, kidnapping, aggravated kidnapping, felonious escape, assault with a weapon, aggravated assault, or any other forcible felony and in the course of the forcible felony or flight thereafter, the person or any person legally accountable for the crime causes the death of another human being.

(2) A person convicted of the offense of deliberate homicide shall be punished by death as provided in 46-18-301 through 46-18-310, unless the person is less than 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, by life imprisonment, or by imprisonment in the state prison for a term of not less than 10 years or more than 100 years, except as provided in 46-18-219 and 46-18-222.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-103 (2013). MITIGATED DELIBERATE HOMICIDE

(1) A person commits the offense of mitigated deliberate homicide when the person purposely or knowingly causes the death of another human being but does so under the influence of extreme mental or emotional stress for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse. The reasonableness of the explanation or excuse must be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the actor's situation.

(2) Mitigated deliberate homicide is a lesser included offense of deliberate homicide as defined in 45-5-102(1)(a), but is not a lesser included offense of deliberate homicide as defined in 45-5-102(1)(b).

(3) Mitigating circumstances that reduce deliberate homicide to mitigated deliberate homicide are not an element of the reduced crime that the state is required to prove or an affirmative defense that the defendant is required to prove. Neither party has the burden of proof as to mitigating circumstances, but either party may present evidence of mitigation.

(4) A person convicted of mitigated deliberate homicide shall be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of not less than 2 years or more than 40 years and may be fined not more than $50,000, except as provided in 46-18-219 and 46-18-222.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-104 (2013). NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.

(1) A person commits the offense of negligent homicide if the person negligently causes the death of another human being.

(2) Negligent homicide is not an included offense of deliberate homicide as defined in 45-5-102(1)(b).

(3) A person convicted of negligent homicide shall be imprisoned in the state prison for any term not to exceed 20 years or be fined an amount not to exceed $50,000, or both.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-106 (2013). VEHICULAR HOMICIDE WHILE UNDER INFLUENCE.

(1) A person commits the offense of vehicular homicide while under the influence if the person negligently causes the death of another human being while the person is operating a vehicle in violation of 61-8-401 or 61-8-406.

(2) Vehicular homicide while under the influence is not an included offense of deliberate homicide as described in 45-5-102(1)(b).

(3) A person convicted of vehicular homicide while under the influence shall be imprisoned in a state prison for a term not to exceed 30 years or be fined an amount not to exceed $50,000, or both. Imposition of a sentence may not be deferred.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-5-627 (2013). RITUAL ABUSE OF MINOR—EXCEPTIONS—PENALTY.

(1) A person commits the offense of ritual abuse of a minor if the person purposely or knowingly and as part of any ceremony, rite, or ritual or of any training or practice for any ceremony, rite, or ritual:

   (a) has sexual intercourse without consent with a person less than 16 years of age; commits assault, aggravated assault, assault on a minor, or assault with a weapon against a victim less than 16 years of age; or kills a person less than 16 years of age;

   (b) actually or by simulation tortures, mutilates, or sacrifices an animal or person in the presence of the minor;

   (c) dissects, mutilates, or incinerates a human corpse or remains in the presence of the minor;

   (d) forces upon the minor or upon another person in the presence of a minor the ingestion or the external bodily application of human or animal urine, feces, flesh, blood, bone, or bodily secretions or drugs or chemical compounds;

   (e) places a living minor or another living person in the presence of a minor in a coffin or open grave that is empty or that contains a human corpse or remains; or

   (f) threatens the minor or, in the presence of the minor, threatens any person or animal with death or serious bodily harm and the minor reasonably believes that the threat will or may be carried out.

(2) This section does not apply to activities, practices, and procedures otherwise allowed by law.

(3) Except as provided in 46-18-219, a person convicted of ritual abuse of a minor shall:

   (a) for the first offense, be imprisoned in the state prison for a term of not less than 2 years or more than 20 years and may be fined not more than $50,000, or both; and

   (b) for a second or subsequent offense, be imprisoned in the state prison for any term of not less than 2 years or more than 40 years and may be fined not more than $50,000, or both.

(4) In addition to any sentence imposed under subsection (3), after determining pursuant to 46-18-242 the financial resources and future ability of the offender to pay restitution, the court shall require the offender,
if able, to pay the victim's reasonable costs of counseling that result from the offense. The amount, method, and time of payment must be determined in the same manner as provided for in 46-18-244.

**MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-303 (2013). AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES.**

Aggravating circumstances are any of the following:

1. (a) The offense was deliberate homicide and was committed:
   i. by an offender while in official detention, as defined in 45-2-101;
   ii. by an offender who had been previously convicted of another deliberate homicide;
   (iii) by means of torture;
   (iv) by an offender lying in wait or ambush;
   (v) as a part of a scheme or operation that, if completed, would result in the death of more than one person; or
   (vi) by an offender during the course of committing sexual assault, sexual intercourse without consent, deviate sexual conduct, or incest, and the victim was less than 18 years of age.

2. (b) The offense was deliberate homicide, as defined in 45-5-102(1)(a), and the victim was a peace officer killed while performing the officer's duty.

3. (2) The offense was aggravated kidnapping that resulted in the death of the victim or the death by direct action of the offender of a person who rescued or attempted to rescue the victim.

4. The offense was attempted deliberate homicide, aggravated assault, or aggravated kidnapping committed while in official detention, as defined in 45-2-101, by an offender who has been previously:
   a. convicted of the offense of deliberate homicide; or
   b. found to be a persistent felony offender pursuant to part 5 of this chapter, and one of the convictions was for an offense against the person in violation of Title 45, chapter 5, for which the minimum prison term is not less than 2 years.

4. The offense was sexual intercourse without consent, the offender has a previous conviction of sexual intercourse without consent in this state or of an offense under the laws of another state or of the United States that if committed in this state would be the offense of sexual intercourse without consent, and the offender inflicted serious bodily injury upon a person in the course of committing each offense.

**NEBRASKA**

**NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-390 (2012). APPLICABILITY OF SECTIONS.**

Sections 28-391 to 28-394 do not apply to an act or conduct causing or contributing to the death of an
unborn child when the act or conduct is:

(1) Committed or engaged in by the mother of the unborn child;

(2) Any medical procedure performed with the consent of the mother; or

(3) Dispensing a drug or device in accordance with law or administering a drug or device prescribed in accordance with law.

**NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-391 (2012). MURDER OF AN UNBORN CHILD IN THE FIRST DEGREE; PENALTY.**

(1) A person commits murder of an unborn child in the first degree if he or she in committing an act or engaging in conduct that causes the death of an unborn child, intends, with deliberate and premeditated malice, to kill the unborn child or the mother of the unborn child with knowledge of the pregnancy.

(2) Murder of an unborn child in the first degree is a Class IA felony.

**NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-392 (2012). MURDER OF AN UNBORN CHILD IN THE SECOND DEGREE; PENALTY**

(1) A person commits murder of an unborn child in the second degree if he or she, in committing an act or engaging in conduct that causes the death of an unborn child, intends, but without premeditation, to kill the unborn child or another.

(2) Murder of an unborn child in the second degree is a Class IB felony.

**NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-393 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER OF AN UNBORN CHILD; PENALTY.**

(1) A person commits manslaughter of an unborn child if he or she (a) kills an unborn child without malice upon a sudden quarrel with any person or (b) causes the death of an unborn child unintentionally while in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any criminal assault, any sexual assault, arson, robbery, kidnapping, intentional child abuse, hijacking of any public or private means of transportation, or burglary.

(2) Manslaughter of an unborn child is a Class III felony.

**NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 28-394 (2012). MOTOR VEHICLE HOMICIDE OF AN UNBORN CHILD; PENALTY.**

(1) A person who causes the death of an unborn child unintentionally while engaged in the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of the law of the State of Nebraska or in violation of any city or village ordinance commits motor vehicle homicide of an unborn child.

(2) Except as provided in subsection (3) of this section, motor vehicle homicide of an unborn child is a Class I misdemeanor.

(3)(a) If the proximate cause of the death of an unborn child is the operation of a motor vehicle in
violation of section 60-6,213 or 60-6,214, motor vehicle homicide of an unborn child is a Class IV felony.

(b) Except as provided in subdivision (3)(c) of this section, if the proximate cause of the death of an unborn child is the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of section 60-6,196 or 60-6,197.06, motor vehicle homicide of an unborn child is a Class IV felony and the court shall, as part of the judgment of conviction, order the person not to drive any motor vehicle for any purpose for a period of at least sixty days and not more than fifteen years after the date ordered by the court and shall order that the operator's license of such person be revoked for the same period. The revocation shall not run concurrently with any jail term imposed.

(c) If the proximate cause of the death of an unborn child is the operation of a motor vehicle in violation of section 60-6,196 or 60-6,197.06 and the defendant has a prior conviction for a violation of section 60-6,196 or a city or village ordinance enacted in conformance with section 60-6,196, motor vehicle homicide of an unborn child is a Class III felony and the court shall, as part of the judgment of conviction, order the person not to drive any motor vehicle for any purpose for a period of at least sixty days and not more than fifteen years after the date ordered by the court and shall order that the operator's license of such person be revoked for the same period. The revocation shall not run concurrently with any jail term imposed.

(4) The crime punishable under this section shall be treated as a separate and distinct offense from any other offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was in violation of this section.

NEVADA

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.010 (2011). "MURDER” DEFINED.

Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being:

1. With malice aforethought, either express or implied;

2. Caused by a controlled substance which was sold, given, traded or otherwise made available to a person in violation of chapter 453 of NRS; or

3. Caused by a violation of NRS 453.3325.

The unlawful killing may be effected by any of the various means by which death may be occasioned.

NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.030 (2011). DEGREE OF MURDER; PENALTIES.

1. Murder of the first degree is murder which is:

   (a) Perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait or torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing;

   (b) Committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, robbery, burglary, invasion of the home, sexual abuse of a child, sexual molestation of a child under the age of 14 years, child abuse or abuse of an older person or vulnerable person pursuant to NRS 200.5099;
(c) Committed to avoid or prevent the lawful arrest of any person by a peace officer or to effect the escape of any person from legal custody;

(d) Committed on the property of a public or private school, at an activity sponsored by a public or private school or on a school bus while the bus was engaged in its official duties by a person who intended to create a great risk of death or substantial bodily harm to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action that would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person; or

(e) Committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of an act of terrorism.

2. Murder of the second degree is all other kinds of murder.

3. The jury before whom any person indicted for murder is tried shall, if they find the person guilty thereof, designate by their verdict whether the person is guilty of murder of the first or second degree.

4. A person convicted of murder of the first degree is guilty of a category A felony and shall be punished:

   (a) By death, only if one or more aggravating circumstances are found and any mitigating circumstance or circumstances which are found do not outweigh the aggravating circumstance or circumstances, unless a court has made a finding pursuant to NRS 174.098 that the defendant is a person with mental retardation and has stricken the notice of intent to seek the death penalty; or

   (b) By imprisonment in the state prison:

      (1) For life without the possibility of parole;

      (2) For life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served; or

      (3) For a definite term of 50 years, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 20 years has been served.

   A determination of whether aggravating circumstances exist is not necessary to fix the penalty at imprisonment for life with or without the possibility of parole.

5. A person convicted of murder of the second degree is guilty of a category A felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison:

   (a) For life with the possibility of parole, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 10 years has been served; or

   (b) For a definite term of 25 years, with eligibility for parole beginning when a minimum of 10 years has been served.

6. As used in this section:

   (a) “Act of terrorism” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 202.4415;
(b) “Child abuse” means physical injury of a nonaccidental nature to a child under the age of 18 years;

(c) “School bus” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 483.160;

(d) “Sexual abuse of a child” means any of the acts described in NRS 432B.100; and

(e) “Sexual molestation” means any willful and lewd or lascivious act, other than acts constituting the crime of sexual assault, upon or with the body, or any part or member thereof, of a child under the age of 14 years, with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust, passions or sexual desires of the perpetrator or of the child.


The only circumstances by which murder of the first degree may be aggravated are:

1. The murder was committed by a person under sentence of imprisonment.

2. The murder was committed by a person who, at any time before a penalty hearing is conducted for the murder pursuant to NRS 175.552, is or has been convicted of:

   (a) Another murder and the provisions of subsection 12 do not otherwise apply to that other murder; or

   (b) A felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another and the provisions of subsection 4 do not otherwise apply to that felony.

For the purposes of this subsection, a person shall be deemed to have been convicted at the time the jury verdict of guilt is rendered or upon pronouncement of guilt by a judge or judges sitting without a jury.

3. The murder was committed by a person who knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.

4. The murder was committed while the person was engaged, alone or with others, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, arson in the first degree, burglary, invasion of the home or kidnapping in the first degree, and the person charged:

   (a) Killed or attempted to kill the person murdered; or

   (b) Knew or had reason to know that life would be taken or lethal force used.

5. The murder was committed to avoid or prevent a lawful arrest or to effect an escape from custody.

6. The murder was committed by a person, for himself or herself or another, to receive money or any other thing of monetary value.

7. The murder was committed upon a peace officer or firefighter who was killed while engaged in the performance of his or her official duty or because of an act performed in his or her official capacity, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a peace officer or firefighter.

For the purposes of this subsection, “peace officer” means:
(a) An employee of the Department of Corrections who does not exercise general control over offenders imprisoned within the institutions and facilities of the Department, but whose normal duties require the employee to come into contact with those offenders when carrying out the duties prescribed by the Director of the Department.

(b) Any person upon whom some or all of the powers of a peace officer are conferred pursuant to NRS 289.150 to 289.360, inclusive, when carrying out those powers.

8. The murder involved torture or the mutilation of the victim.

9. The murder was committed upon one or more persons at random and without apparent motive.

10. The murder was committed upon a person less than 14 years of age.

11. The murder was committed upon a person because of the actual or perceived race, color, religion, national origin, physical or mental disability or sexual orientation of that person.

12. The defendant has, in the immediate proceeding, been convicted of more than one offense of murder in the first or second degree. For the purposes of this subsection, a person shall be deemed to have been convicted of a murder at the time the jury verdict of guilt is rendered or upon pronouncement of guilt by a judge or judges sitting without a jury.

13. The person, alone or with others, subjected or attempted to subject the victim of the murder to nonconsensual sexual penetration immediately before, during or immediately after the commission of the murder. For the purposes of this subsection:

   (a) “Nonconsensual” means against the victim's will or under conditions in which the person knows or reasonably should know that the victim is mentally or physically incapable of resisting, consenting or understanding the nature of his or her conduct, including, but not limited to, conditions in which the person knows or reasonably should know that the victim is dead.

   (b) “Sexual penetration” means cunnilingus, fellatio or any intrusion, however slight, of any part of the victim's body or any object manipulated or inserted by a person, alone or with others, into the genital or anal openings of the body of the victim, whether or not the victim is alive. The term includes, but is not limited to, anal intercourse and sexual intercourse in what would be its ordinary meaning.

14. The murder was committed on the property of a public or private school, at an activity sponsored by a public or private school or on a school bus while the bus was engaged in its official duties by a person who intended to create a great risk of death or substantial bodily harm to more than one person by means of a weapon, device or course of action that would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person. For the purposes of this subsection, “school bus” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 483.160.

15. The murder was committed with the intent to commit, cause, aid, further or conceal an act of terrorism. For the purposes of this subsection, “act of terrorism” has the meaning ascribed to it in NRS 202.4415.

Murder of the first degree may be mitigated by any of the following circumstances, even though the mitigating circumstance is not sufficient to constitute a defense or reduce the degree of the crime:

1. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity.

2. The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

3. The victim was a participant in the defendant's criminal conduct or consented to the act.

4. The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and the defendant’s participation in the murder was relatively minor.

5. The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.

6. The youth of the defendant at the time of the crime.

7. Any other mitigating circumstance.

*NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.040 (2011).* "MANSLAUGHTER" DEFINED.

1. Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being, without malice express or implied, and without any mixture of deliberation.

2. Manslaughter must be voluntary, upon a sudden heat of passion, caused by a provocation apparently sufficient to make the passion irresistible, or involuntary, in the commission of an unlawful act, or a lawful act without due caution or circumspection.

3. Manslaughter does not include vehicular manslaughter as described in NRS 484B.657.

*NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.050 (2011).* "VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER" DEFINED.

1. In cases of voluntary manslaughter, there must be a serious and highly provoking injury inflicted upon the person killing, sufficient to excite an irresistible passion in a reasonable person, or an attempt by the person killed to commit a serious personal injury on the person killing.

2. Voluntary manslaughter does not include vehicular manslaughter as described in NRS 484B.657.

*NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.060 (2011).* WHEN KILLING PUNISHED AS MURDER.

The killing must be the result of that sudden, violent impulse of passion supposed to be irresistible; for, if there should appear to have been an interval between the assault or provocation given and the killing, sufficient for the voice of reason and humanity to be heard, the killing shall be attributed to deliberate revenge and punished as murder.

*NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.070 (2011).* "IN VoLTARY MANSLAUGHTER" DEFINED.

1. Except under the circumstances provided in NRS 484B.550 and 484B.653, involuntary manslaughter is the killing of a human being, without any intent to do so, in the commission of an unlawful act, or a
lawful act which probably might produce such a consequence in an unlawful manner, but where the involuntary killing occurs in the commission of an unlawful act, which, in its consequences, naturally tends to destroy the life of a human being, or is committed in the prosecution of a felonious intent, the offense is murder.

2. Involuntary manslaughter does not include vehicular manslaughter as described in NRS 484B.657.

**NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.080 (2011). PUNISHMENT FOR VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.**

A person convicted of the crime of voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a category B felony and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 10 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than $10,000.

**NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.090 (2011). PUNISHMENT FOR IN VOLUNTARY MAN SLAUGHTER.**

A person convicted of involuntary manslaughter is guilty of a category D felony and shall be punished as provided in NRS 193.130.


A person who willfully kills an unborn quick child, by any injury committed upon the mother of the child, commits manslaughter and shall be punished for a category B felony by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 10 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than $10,000.

**NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.220 (2011). TAKING DRUGS TO TERMINATE PREGNANCY; PENALTY.**

A woman who takes or uses, or submits to the use of, any drug, medicine or substance, or any instrument or other means, with the intent to terminate her pregnancy after the 24th week of pregnancy, unless the same is performed upon herself upon the advice of a physician acting pursuant to the provisions of NRS 442.250, and thereby causes the death of the child of the pregnancy, commits manslaughter and shall be punished for a category B felony by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 10 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than $10,000.

**NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 200.230 (2011). DEATH RESULTING FROM OVERLOADING OF PASSENGER VESSEL; PENALTIES.**

A person navigating a vessel for gain who willfully or negligently receives so many passengers or such a quantity of other lading on board that by means thereof the vessel sinks, is overset or injured, and thereby a human being is drowned or otherwise killed, commits manslaughter and shall be punished:

1. If the overloading is negligent, for a category D felony as provided in NRS 193.130.

2. If the overloading is willful, for a category B felony by imprisonment in the state prison for a minimum term of not less than 1 year and a maximum term of not more than 10 years, and may be further punished by a fine of not more than $10,000.
**NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.150 (2011). CONCEALING BIRTH; PENALTY.**

Every person who shall endeavor to conceal the birth of a child by any disposition of its dead body, whether the child died before or after its birth, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.

**NEW HAMPSHIRE**

**N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-C: 74 (2013). REPORTING FETAL DEATHS.**

I. A copy of the fetal death report prepared pursuant to RSA 290:1-a and RSA 5-C:75, shall be forwarded to the division by either the person in charge of the hospital or institution where the fetal death occurred, or the physician or APRN in attendance at or after delivery when a fetal death occurs outside a hospital or institution.

II. In the case of an unwed mother, unless a report of fetal death paternity affidavit has been executed, the notation “not stated” shall be entered for information concerning the father.

III. When a fetal death occurs in a moving conveyance and the fetus is first removed from the conveyance in New Hampshire, or when a dead fetus is found in New Hampshire and the place of fetal death is unknown, the fetal death shall be reported to the division. The place where the fetus was first removed from the conveyance or the dead fetus was found shall be considered the place of fetal death.

IV. Upon request, the division shall issue a non-certified copy of the fetal death report to the parents.

V. Upon request of a parent, the division shall complete and issue to the parent or parents a certificate of stillbirth for a fetal death, as defined in RSA 5-C:1, XII, on the form established pursuant to RSA 5-C:75-a.

**N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 170-C: 5 (2013). GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION OF THE PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP.**

The petition may be granted where the court finds that one or more of the following conditions exist:

I. The parent has abandoned the child. It shall be presumed that the parent intends to abandon the child who has been left by his parent without provision for his identification or who has been left by his parent in the care and custody of another without any provision for his support, or without communication from such parent for a period of 6 months. If in the opinion of the court the evidence indicates that such parent has made only minimal efforts to support or communicate with the child, the court may declare the child to be abandoned.

II. That, although the parents are financially able, they have substantially and continuously neglected to provide the child with necessary subsistence, education or other care necessary for his mental, emotional, or physical health or have substantially and continuously neglected to pay for such subsistence, education or other care when legal custody is lodged with others; provided, however, it shall not be grounds for the termination of the parent-child relationship for the sole reason the parent of said child relies upon spiritual means through prayer in accordance with a recognized religious method of healing in lieu of medical treatment for the healing of said child.
III. The parents, subsequent to a finding of child neglect or abuse under RSA 169-C, have failed to correct the conditions leading to such a finding within 12 months of the finding despite reasonable efforts under the direction of the district court to rectify the conditions.

IV. Because of mental deficiency or mental illness, the parent is and will continue to be incapable of giving the child proper parental care and protection for a longer period of time than would be wise or prudent to leave the child in an unstable or impermanent environment. Mental deficiency or mental illness shall be established by the testimony of either 2 licensed psychiatrists or clinical psychologists or one of each acting together.

V. The parent knowingly or willfully caused or permitted another to cause severe sexual, physical, emotional, or mental abuse of the child. Subsequent to a finding of such abuse pursuant to RSA 169-C, the parent-child relationship may be terminated if return of the child to the parent would result in a substantial possibility of harm to the child. A substantial possibility of harm to the child shall be established by testimony of at least 2 of the following factors:

(a) The parent's conduct toward the child has resulted in severe harm to the child.

(b) The parent's conduct toward the child has continued despite the reasonable efforts of authorized agencies in obtaining or providing services for the parent to reduce or alleviate such conduct.

(c) The parent's conduct has continued to occur either over a period of time, or many times, or to such a degree so as to indicate a pattern of behavior on the part of the parent which indicates a complete disregard for the child's health and welfare.

(d) Such conduct is likely to continue with no change in parental behavior, attitude or actions.

Testimony shall be provided by any combination of at least 2 of the following people: a licensed psychiatrist, a clinical psychologist, a physician, or a social worker who possesses a master's degree in social work and is a member of the Academy of Certified Social Workers.

VI. If the parent or guardian is, as a result of incarceration for a felony offense, unable to discharge his responsibilities to and for the child and, in addition, has been found pursuant to RSA 169-C to have abused or neglected his child or children, the court may review the conviction of the parent or guardian to determine whether the felony offense is of such a nature, and the period of incarceration imposed of such duration, that the child would be deprived of proper parental care and protection and left in an unstable or impermanent environment for a longer period of time than would be prudent. Placement of the child in foster care shall not be considered proper parental care and protection for purposes of this paragraph. Incarceration in and of itself shall not be grounds for termination of parental rights.

VII. The parent has been convicted of one or more of the following offenses:

(a) Murder, pursuant to RSA 630:1-a or 630:1-b, of another child of the parent, a sibling or step-sibling of the child, the child's other parent, or other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, including a minor child who resided with the defendant.

(b) Manslaughter, pursuant to RSA 630:2, of another child of the parent, a sibling or step-sibling of the child, the child's other parent, or other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, including a minor child who resided with the defendant.
(c) Attempt, pursuant to RSA 629:1, solicitation, pursuant to RSA 629:2, or conspiracy, pursuant to RSA 629:3, to commit any of the offenses specified in subparagraphs VII(a) and VII(b).

(d) A felony assault under RSA 631:1, 631:2, 632-A:2, or 632-A:3 which resulted in injury to the child, a sibling or step-sibling of the child, the child's other parent, or other persons related by consanguinity or affinity, including a minor child who resided with the defendant.


I. A person is guilty of capital murder if he knowingly causes the death of:

(a) A law enforcement officer or a judicial officer acting in the line of duty or when the death is caused as a consequence of or in retaliation for such person's actions in the line of duty;

(b) Another before, after, while engaged in the commission of, or while attempting to commit kidnapping as that offense is defined in RSA 633:1;

(c) Another by criminally soliciting a person to cause said death or after having been criminally solicited by another for his personal pecuniary gain;

(d) Another after being sentenced to life imprisonment without parole pursuant to RSA 630:1-a, III;

(e) Another before, after, while engaged in the commission of, or while attempting to commit aggravated felonious sexual assault as defined in RSA 632-A:2;

(f) Another before, after, while engaged in the commission of, or while attempting to commit an offense punishable under RSA 318-B:26, I(a) or (b); or

(g) Another, who is licensed or privileged to be within an occupied structure, or separately secured or occupied section thereof, before, after, or while in the commission of, or while attempting to commit, burglary as defined in RSA 635:1.

II. As used in this section, a “law enforcement officer” is a sheriff or deputy sheriff of any county, a state police officer, a constable or police officer of any city or town, an official or employee of any prison, jail or corrections institution, a probation-parole officer, or a conservation officer.

II-a. As used in this section, a “judicial officer” is a judge of a district, probate, superior or supreme court; an attorney employed by the department of justice or a municipal prosecutor's office; or a county attorney; or attorney employed by the county attorney.

III. A person convicted of a capital murder may be punished by death.

IV. As used in this section and RSA 630:1-a, 1-b, 2, 3 and 4, the meaning of “another” does not include a foetus.

V. In no event shall any person under the age of 18 years at the time the offense was committed be culpable of a capital murder.

I. A person is guilty of murder in the first degree if he:

(a) Purposely causes the death of another; or

(b) Knowingly causes the death of:

(1) Another before, after, while engaged in the commission of, or while attempting to commit felonious sexual assault as defined in RSA 632-A:3;

(2) Another before, after, while engaged in the commission of, or while attempting to commit robbery or burglary while armed with a deadly weapon, the death being caused by the use of such weapon;

(3) Another in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate arson as defined in RSA 634:1, I, II, or III;

(4) The president or president-elect or vice-president or vice-president-elect of the United States, the governor or governor-elect of New Hampshire or any state or any member or member-elect of the congress of the United States, or any candidate for such office after such candidate has been nominated at his party's primary, when such killing is motivated by knowledge of the foregoing capacity of the victim.

II. For the purpose of RSA 630:1-a, I(a), “purposely” shall mean that the actor's conscious object is the death of another, and that his act or acts in furtherance of that object were deliberate and premeditated.

III. A person convicted of a murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to life imprisonment and shall not be eligible for parole at any time.


I. A person is guilty of murder in the second degree if:

(a) He knowingly causes the death of another; or

(b) He causes such death recklessly under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life. Such recklessness and indifference are presumed if the actor causes the death by the use of a deadly weapon in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit, or in immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit any class A felony.

II. Murder in the second degree shall be punishable by imprisonment for life or for such term as the court may order.


I. A person is guilty of manslaughter when he causes the death of another:

(a) Under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance caused by extreme provocation but which would otherwise constitute murder; or
II. Manslaughter shall be punishable by imprisonment for a term of not more than 30 years.

III. In addition to any other penalty imposed, if the death of another person resulted from the driving of a motor vehicle, the court may revoke the license or driving privilege of the convicted person indefinitely.


I. A person is guilty of a class B felony when he causes the death of another negligently.

II. A person is guilty of a class A felony when in consequence of being under the influence of intoxicating liquor or a controlled drug or any combination of intoxicating liquor and controlled drug while operating a propelled vehicle, as defined in RSA 637:9, III or a boat as defined in RSA 265-A:1, II, he or she causes the death of another.

III. In addition to any other penalty imposed, if the death of another person resulted from the negligent driving of a motor vehicle, the court may revoke the license or driving privilege of the convicted person for up to 7 years. In cases where the person is convicted under paragraph II, the court shall revoke the license or driving privilege of the convicted person indefinitely and the person shall not petition for eligibility to reapply for a driver's license for at least 7 years. In a case in which alcohol was involved, the court may also require that the convicted person shall not have a license to drive reinstated until after the division of motor vehicles receives certification of installation of an ignition interlock device as described in RSA 265-A:36, which shall remain in place for a period not to exceed 5 years.


A person is guilty of a class B felony if he knowingly conceals the corpse of a newborn child.


I. A convicted person may be sentenced according to paragraph III if the jury also finds beyond a reasonable doubt that such person:

   (a) Based on the circumstances for which he or she is to be sentenced, has knowingly devoted himself or herself to criminal activity as a major source of livelihood;

   (b) Has been subjected to a court-ordered psychiatric examination on the basis of which the jury finds that such person is a serious danger to others due to a gravely abnormal mental condition;

   (c) Has manifested exceptional cruelty or depravity in inflicting death or serious bodily injury on the victim of the crime;

   (d) Has committed an offense involving the use of force against a person with the intention of taking advantage of the victim's age or physical disability;

   (e) Has committed or attempted to commit any of the crimes defined in RSA 631 or 632-A against a person under 13 years of age;
(f) Was substantially motivated to commit the crime because of hostility towards the victim's religion, race, creed, sexual orientation as defined in RSA 21:49, national origin or sex;

(g) Has knowingly committed or attempted to commit any of the crimes defined in RSA 631 where he or she knows the victim was, at the time of the commission of the crime, a law enforcement officer, a paid firefighter, volunteer firefighter, on-call firefighter, or licensed emergency medical care provider as defined in RSA 153-A:2, V acting in the line of duty;

(h) Was an on-duty law enforcement officer at the time that he or she committed or attempted to commit any of the crimes defined in RSA 631;

(i) Has committed a crime listed in RSA 193-D:1 in a safe school zone under RSA 193-D;

(j) Possesses a radio device with the intent to use that device in the commission of robbery, burglary, theft, gambling, stalking, or a violation of any provision of RSA 318-B. In this section, the term “radio device” means any device capable of receiving a wireless transmission on any frequency allocated for law enforcement use, or any device capable of transmitting and receiving a wireless transmission;

(k) Has committed or attempted to commit negligent homicide as defined in RSA 630:3, I against a person under 13 years of age who was in the care of, or under the supervision of, the defendant at the time of the offense;

(l) Has committed or attempted to commit any of the crimes defined in RSA 637 or RSA 638 against a victim who is 65 years of age or older or who has a physical or mental disability and that in perpetrating the crime, the defendant intended to take advantage of the victim's age or a physical or mental condition that impaired the victim's ability to manage his or her property or financial resources or to protect his or her rights or interests;

(m) Has committed or attempted to commit aggravated felonious sexual assault in violation of RSA 632-A:2, I(1) or RSA 632-A:2, II where the defendant was 18 years of age or older at the time of the offense;

(n) Has committed or attempted to commit aggravated felonious sexual assault in violation of RSA 632-A:2, III, and one or more of the acts comprising the pattern of sexual assault was an offense under RSA 632-A:2, I(1) or RSA 632-A:2, II, or both, and the defendant was 18 years of age or older when the pattern of sexual assault began;

(o) Has purposely, knowingly, or recklessly with extreme indifference to the value of human life committed an act or acts constituting first degree assault as defined in RSA 631:1 against a person under 13 years of age where the serious bodily injury has resulted in brain damage or physical disability to the child that is likely to be permanent;

(p) Has committed murder as defined in RSA 630:1-b against a person under 13 years of age;

(q) Has knowingly committed any of the following offenses as a criminal street gang member, or for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang, with the purpose to promote, further, or assist in any such criminal conduct by criminal street gang members:

(1) Violent crime as defined in RSA 651:5, XIII.
(2) A crime involving the distribution, sale, or manufacture of a controlled drug under RSA 318-B:2.

(3) Class A felony theft where the property stolen was a firearm.

(4) Unlawful sale of a pistol or a revolver.

(5) Witness tampering.

(6) Criminal street gang solicitation as defined in RSA 644:20; or

(r) Has committed an offense under RSA 637 where such person knowingly activated an audible alarm system to avoid detection or apprehension, or cause a distraction during the commission of the offense.

I-a. As used in this section:

(a) “Law enforcement officer” means a sheriff or deputy sheriff of any county, a state police officer, a constable or police officer of any city or town, an official or employee of any prison, jail, or corrections institution, a probation-parole officer, a juvenile probation and parole officer, or a conservation officer.

(b) “Criminal street gang member” means an individual to whom 2 or more of the following apply:

(1) Admits to criminal street gang membership;

(2) Is identified as a criminal street gang member by a law enforcement officer, parent, guardian, or documented reliable informant;

(3) Resides in or frequents a particular criminal street gang's area and adopts its style of dress, its use of hand or other signs, tattoos, or other physical markings, and associates with known criminal street gang members; or

(4) Has been arrested more than once in the company of individuals who are identified as criminal street gang members by law enforcement, for offenses that are consistent with usual criminal street gang activity.

(c) “Criminal street gang” means a formal or informal ongoing organization, association, or group of 3 or more persons, which has as one of its primary objectives or activities the commission of criminal activity, whose members share a common name, identifying sign, symbol, physical marking, style of dress, or use of hand sign, and whose members individually or collectively have engaged in the commission, attempted commission, solicitation to commit, or conspiracy to commit 2 or more the following offenses, or a reasonably equivalent offense in another jurisdiction, on separate occasions within the preceding 3 years:

(1) Violent crimes, as defined in RSA 651:5, XIII;

(2) Distribution, sale, or manufacture of a controlled drug in violation of RSA 318-B:2;

(3) Class A felony theft;

(4) Unlawful sale of a pistol or revolver; or
(5) Witness tampering.

II. A convicted person may be sentenced according to the terms of paragraph III if the court finds, and includes such findings in the record, that such person:

(a) Has twice previously been convicted in this state, or in another jurisdiction, on sentences in excess of one year;

(b) Has previously been convicted of a violation of RSA 630:3, II, RSA 265-A:3, I(b) or II(b), or any crime in any other jurisdiction involving driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle under the influence of controlled drugs, prescription drugs, over-the-counter drugs, or any other chemical substances, natural or synthetic, which impair a person's ability to drive or intoxicating liquors, or both, and such person has committed a crime as defined under RSA 630:3, II or RSA 265-A:3, I(b) or II(b); or

(c) Has twice previously been convicted in this state or any other jurisdiction, for driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquors or controlled drugs, prescription drugs, over-the-counter drugs, or any other chemical substances, natural or synthetic, which impair a person's ability to drive, or both, and such person has committed a crime as defined under RSA 630:3, II or RSA 265-A:3, I(b) or II(b).

III. If authorized by paragraph I or II, and if written notice of the possible application of this section is given the defendant at least 21 days prior to the commencement of jury selection for his or her trial, a defendant may be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment. An extended term is, for a person convicted of:

(a) Any felony, other than murder or manslaughter, a minimum to be fixed by the court of not more than 10 years and a maximum to be fixed by the court of not more than 30 years;

(b) A misdemeanor, a minimum to be fixed by the court of not more than 2 years and a maximum to be fixed by the court of not more than 5 years;

(c) Manslaughter, a minimum to be fixed by the court of not more than 20 years and a maximum to be fixed by the court of not more than 40 years;

(d) Murder, life imprisonment;

(e) Two or more offenses under RSA 632-A:2, life imprisonment without parole;

(f) A third offense under RSA 632-A:3, life imprisonment; or

(g) Any of the crimes listed under RSA 651:6, I(j), a minimum to be fixed by the court of not less than 90 days and a maximum of not more than one year.

IV. If authorized by subparagraphs I(m), (n), or (o) and if notice of the possible application of this section is given to the defendant prior to the commencement of trial:

(a) There is a presumption that a person shall be sentenced to a minimum to be fixed by the court of not less than 25 years and a maximum of life imprisonment unless the court makes a determination that the goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, and punishment would not be served, based on the specific circumstances of the case, by such a sentence and the court makes specific written findings in support of
the lesser sentence. Before the court can determine whether the presumption has been overcome, the court shall consider, but is not limited to, the following factors:

(1) Age of victim at time of offense.

(2) Age of the defendant at the time of the offense.

(3) Relationship between defendant and victim.

(4) Injuries to victim.

(5) Use of force, fear, threats, or coercion to the victim or another.

(6) Length of time defendant offended against victim.

(7) Number of times defendant offended against victim.

(8) Number of other victims.

(9) Acceptance of responsibility by defendant.

(10) Defendant's criminal history.

(11) Use of a weapon.

(12) Medical or psychological condition of the victim at the time of the assault.

(b) The sentence shall also include, in addition to any other penalties provided by law, a special sentence of lifetime supervision by the department of corrections. The defendant shall comply with the conditions of lifetime supervision which are imposed by the court or the department of corrections. Violation of any of the conditions of lifetime supervision shall be deemed contempt of court. The special sentence of lifetime supervision shall begin upon the offender's release from incarceration, parole, or probation. A defendant who is sentenced to lifetime supervision pursuant to this paragraph shall not be eligible for release from the lifetime supervision pursuant to RSA 632-A:10-a, V(b).

(c) Any decision by the superior court under subparagraph (a) may be reviewed by the sentence review division of the superior court at the request of the defendant or at the request of the state pursuant to RSA 651:58.

V. If authorized by subparagraph I(p) and if notice of the possible application of this section is given to the defendant prior to the commencement of trial, a person shall be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment as follows: a minimum to be fixed by the court of not less than 35 years and a maximum of life imprisonment.

VI. A person shall be sentenced according to the terms of paragraph VII if the court finds, and includes such findings in the record, that such person:

(a)(1) Committed a violation of RSA 632-A:2, I(l), RSA 632-A:2, II, or RSA 632-A:2, III, in which one or more of the acts comprising the pattern of sexual assault was an offense under RSA 632-A:2, I(l) or RSA 632-A:2, II, or both, after having previously been convicted of an offense in violation of one of
the aforementioned offenses or any other statute prohibiting the same conduct in another state, territory or possession of the United States, and

(2) The person committed the subsequent offense while released on bail on the earlier offense or the sentence for the earlier conviction involved a term of incarceration, probation, parole, or other supervised release; or

(b)(1) Committed a violation of RSA 631:1 after having previously been convicted of an offense in violation of RSA 631:1, or any other statute prohibiting the same conduct in another state, territory or possession of the United States, if the earlier offense also involved a victim under 13 years of age where the serious bodily injury resulted in brain damage or physical disability to the child that is likely to be permanent; and

(2) The person committed the subsequent offense while released on bail on the earlier offense or the sentence for the earlier conviction involved a term of incarceration, probation, parole, or other supervised release; or

(c)(1) Committed a violation of RSA 630:1-b after having previously been convicted of an offense in violation of RSA 630:1-b, or any other statute prohibiting the same conduct in another state, territory, or possession of the United States; and

(2) The person committed the subsequent offense while released on bail on the earlier offense or the sentence for the earlier conviction involved a term of incarceration, probation, parole, or other supervised release.

VII. If the court has made the findings authorized by RSA 651:6, VI, and if notice of the possible application of this section is given to the defendant prior to the commencement of trial, a person shall be sentenced to an extended term of imprisonment of life without parole.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5 (2013). PROCEDURE IN CAPITAL MURDER.

I. Whenever the state intends to seek the sentence of death for the offense of capital murder, the attorney for the state, before trial or acceptance by the court of a plea of guilty, shall file with the court and serve upon the defendant, a notice:

(a) That the state in the event of conviction will seek the sentence of death; and

(b) Setting forth the aggravating factors enumerated in paragraph VII of this section and any other aggravating factors which the state will seek to prove as the basis for the death penalty.

The court may permit the attorney for the state to amend this notice for good cause shown. Any such amended notice shall be served upon the defendant as provided in this section.

II. When the attorney for the state has filed a notice as required under paragraph I and the defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to the offense of capital murder, the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered, or any other judge if the judge who presided at the trial or before whom the guilty plea was entered is unavailable, shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine the punishment to be imposed. The hearing shall be conducted:
(a) Before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt;

(b) Before a jury impaneled for the purpose of the hearing if:

   (1) the defendant was convicted upon a plea of guilty; or

   (2) the jury which determined the defendant's guilt has been discharged for good cause; or

   (3) after initial imposition of a sentence under this section, redetermination of the sentence under this section is necessary.

A jury impaneled under subparagraph (b) shall consist of 12 members, unless at any time before the conclusion of the hearing, the parties stipulate with the approval of the court that it shall consist of any number less than 12.

III. When a defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to the offense of capital murder, no presentence report shall be prepared. In the sentencing hearing, information may be presented as to matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating factors set forth in paragraphs VI and VII, or any other mitigating factor or any other aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under subparagraph I(b). Where information is presented relating to any of the aggravating factors set forth in paragraph VII, information may be presented relating to any other aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under subparagraph I(b). Information presented may include the trial transcript and exhibits if the hearing is held before a jury or judge not present during the trial, or at the trial judge's discretion. Any other information relevant to such mitigating or aggravating factors may be presented by either the state or the defendant, regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials, except that information may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. The state and the defendant shall be permitted to rebut any information received at the hearing and shall be given fair opportunity to present argument as to the adequacy of the information to establish the existence of any of the aggravating or mitigating factors and as to appropriateness in that case of imposing a sentence of death. The state shall open and the defendant shall conclude the argument to the jury. The burden of establishing the existence of any aggravating factor is on the state, and is not satisfied unless established beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of establishing the existence of any mitigating factor is on the defendant, and is not satisfied unless established by a preponderance of the evidence.

IV. The jury shall consider all the information received during the hearing. It shall return special findings identifying any aggravating factors set forth in paragraph VII, which are found to exist. If one of the aggravating factors set forth in subparagraph VII(a) and another of the aggravating factors set forth in subparagraphs VII(b)-(j) is found to exist, a special finding identifying any other aggravating factor for which notice has been provided under subparagraph I(b) may be returned. A finding with respect to a mitigating factor may be made by one or more of the members of the jury, and any member of the jury who finds the existence of a mitigating factor may consider such a factor established for purposes of this section, regardless of the number of jurors who concur that the factor has been established. A finding with respect to any aggravating factor must be unanimous. If an aggravating factor set forth in subparagraph VII(a) is not found to exist or an aggravating factor set forth in subparagraph VII(a) is found to exist but no other aggravating factor set forth in paragraph VII is found to exist, the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. If an aggravating factor set forth in subparagraph VII(a) and one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subparagraph VII (b)-(j) are found to exist, the jury shall then consider whether the aggravating factors found to exist sufficiently outweigh any mitigating factor or factors found to exist, or in the absence of mitigating factors, whether the aggravating factors set forth in subparagraph VII(a) and one or more of the aggravating factors set forth in subparagraph VII (b)-(j) are found to exist.
factors are themselves sufficient to justify a sentence of death. Based upon this consideration, if the jury concludes that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors or that the aggravating factors, in the absence of any mitigating factors, are themselves sufficient to justify a death sentence, the jury, by unanimous vote only, may recommend that a sentence of death be imposed rather than a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. The jury, regardless of its findings with respect to aggravating and mitigating factors, is never required to impose a death sentence and the jury shall be so instructed.

V. Upon the recommendation that the sentence of death be imposed, the court shall sentence the defendant to death. Otherwise the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.

VI. In determining whether a sentence of death is to be imposed upon a defendant, the jury shall consider mitigating factors, including the following:

(a) The defendant's capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was significantly impaired, regardless of whether the capacity was so impaired as to constitute a defense to the charge.

(b) The defendant was under unusual and substantial duress, regardless of whether the duress was of such a degree as to constitute a defense to the charge.

(c) The defendant is punishable as an accomplice (as defined in RSA 626:8) in the offense, which was committed by another, but the defendant's participation was relatively minor, regardless of whether the participation was so minor as to constitute a defense to the charge.

(d) The defendant was youthful, although not under the age of 18.

(e) The defendant did not have a significant prior criminal record.

(f) The defendant committed the offense under severe mental or emotional disturbance.

(g) Another defendant or defendants, equally culpable in the crime, will not be punished by death.

(h) The victim consented to the criminal conduct that resulted in the victim's death.

(i) Other factors in the defendant's background or character mitigate against imposition of the death sentence.

VII. If the defendant is found guilty of or pleads guilty to the offense of capital murder, the following aggravating factors are the only aggravating factors that shall be considered, unless notice of additional aggravating factors is provided under subparagraph I(b):

(a) The defendant:

(1) purposely killed the victim;

(2) purposely inflicted serious bodily injury which resulted in the death of the victim;

(3) purposely engaged in conduct which:
(A) the defendant knew would create a grave risk of death to a person, other than one of the participants in the offense; and

(B) resulted in the death of the victim.

(b) The defendant has been convicted of another state or federal offense resulting in the death of a person, for which a sentence of life imprisonment or a sentence of death was authorized by law.

(c) The defendant has previously been convicted of 2 or more state or federal offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year, committed on different occasions, involving the infliction of, or attempted infliction of, serious bodily injury upon another person.

(d) The defendant has previously been convicted of 2 or more state or federal offenses punishable by a term of imprisonment of more than one year, committed on different occasions, involving the distribution of a controlled substance.

(e) In the commission of the offense of capital murder, the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to one or more persons in addition to the victims of the offense.

(f) The defendant committed the offense after substantial planning and premeditation.

(g) The victim was particularly vulnerable due to old age, youth, or infirmity.

(h) The defendant committed the offense in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse to the victim.

(i) The murder was committed for pecuniary gain.

(j) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from lawful custody.

VIII. If a person is convicted of the offense of capital murder and the court does not impose the penalty of death, the court shall impose a sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole.

IX. If the jury cannot agree on the punishment within a reasonable time, the judge shall impose the sentence of life imprisonment without possibility of parole. If the case is reversed on appeal because of error only in the presentence hearing, the new trial which may be ordered shall apply only to the issue of punishment.

X. In all cases of capital murder where the death penalty is imposed, the judgment of conviction and the sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the supreme court within 60 days after certification by the sentencing court of the entire record unless time is extended for an additional period not to exceed 30 days by the supreme court for good cause shown. Such review by the supreme court shall have priority over all other cases and shall be heard in accordance with rules adopted by said court.

XI. With regard to the sentence the supreme court shall determine:

(a) Whether the sentence of death was imposed under the influence of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; and
(b) Whether the evidence supports the jury's finding of an aggravating circumstance, as authorized by law; and

(c) Whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defendant.

XII. In addition to its authority regarding correction of errors, the court, with regard to review of death sentences, shall be authorized to:

(a) Affirm the sentence of death; or

(b) Set the sentence aside and remand the case for resentencing.

XIII. When the penalty of death is imposed, the sentence shall be that the defendant be imprisoned in the state prison at Concord until the day appointed for his execution, which shall not be within one year from the day sentence is passed. The punishment of death shall be inflicted by continuous, intravenous administration of a lethal quantity of an ultrashort-acting barbiturate in combination with a chemical paralytic agent until death is pronounced by a licensed physician according to accepted standards of medical practice.

XIV. The commissioner of corrections or his designee shall determine the substance or substances to be used and the procedures to be used in any execution, provided, however, that if for any reason the commissioner finds it to be impractical to carry out the punishment of death by administration of the required lethal substance or substances, the sentence of death may be carried out by hanging under the provisions of law for the death penalty by hanging in effect on December 31, 1986.

XV. An execution carried out by lethal injection shall be performed by a person selected by the commissioner of the department of corrections and trained to administer the injection. The person administering the injection need not be a physician, registered nurse, or licensed practical nurse, licensed or registered under the laws of this or any other state.

XVI. The infliction of the punishment of death by administration of the required lethal substance or substances in the manner required by this section shall not be construed to be the practice of medicine, and any pharmacist or pharmaceutical supplier is authorized to dispense drugs to the commissioner of corrections or his designee, without prescription, for carrying out the provisions of this section, notwithstanding any other provision of law.

XVII. The governor and council or their designee shall determine the time of performing such execution and shall be responsible for providing facilities for the implementation thereof. In no event shall a sentence of death be carried out upon a pregnant woman or a person for an offense committed while a minor.

NEW JERSEY


a. A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he purposely, knowingly, recklessly or, under the circumstances set forth in section 2C:11-5, causes the death of another human being.
b. Criminal homicide is murder, manslaughter or death by auto.


The length of time which has elapsed between the initial assault and the death of the victim shall not be a bar to prosecution of the actor for criminal homicide.


a. Except as provided in N.J.S.2C:11-4, criminal homicide constitutes murder when:

(1) The actor purposely causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or

(2) The actor knowingly causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death; or

(3) It is committed when the actor, acting either alone or with one or more other persons, is engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking, criminal escape or terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c. 26 (C.2C:38-2), and in the course of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, any person causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subsection, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:

   (a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and

   (b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and

   (c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and

   (d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.

b. (1) Murder is a crime of the first degree but a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced, except as provided in paragraphs (2), (3) and (4) of this subsection, by the court to a term of 30 years, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole, or be sentenced to a specific term of years which shall be between 30 years and life imprisonment of which the person shall serve 30 years before being eligible for parole.

   (2) If the victim was a law enforcement officer and was murdered while performing his official duties or was murdered because of his status as a law enforcement officer, the person convicted of that murder shall be sentenced by the court to a term of life imprisonment, during which the person shall not be eligible for parole.
(3) A person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole if the murder was committed under all of the following circumstances:

(a) The victim is less than 14 years old; and

(b) The act is committed in the course of the commission, whether alone or with one or more persons, of a violation of N.J.S.2C:14-2 or N.J.S.2C:14-3.

(4) Any person convicted under subsection a.(1) or (2) who committed the homicidal act by his own conduct; or who as an accomplice procured the commission of the offense by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value; or who, as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the offense, or, if the murder occurred during the commission of the crime of terrorism, any person who committed the crime of terrorism, shall be sentenced by the court to life imprisonment without eligibility for parole, which sentence shall be served in a maximum security prison, if a jury finds beyond a reasonable doubt that any of the following aggravating factors exist:

(a) The defendant has been convicted, at any time, of another murder. For purposes of this section, a conviction shall be deemed final when sentence is imposed and may be used as an aggravating factor regardless of whether it is on appeal;

(b) In the commission of the murder, the defendant purposely or knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim;

(c) The murder was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated assault to the victim;

(d) The defendant committed the murder as consideration for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt of anything of pecuniary value;

(e) The defendant procured the commission of the murder by payment or promise of payment of anything of pecuniary value;

(f) The murder was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, punishment or confinement for another offense committed by the defendant or another;

(g) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit murder, robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping, carjacking or the crime of contempt in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-9;

(h) The defendant murdered a public servant, as defined in N.J.S.2C:27-1, while the victim was engaged in the performance of his official duties, or because of the victim's status as a public servant;

(i) The defendant: (i) as a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 and in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3, committed, commanded or by threat or promise solicited the commission of the murder or (ii) committed the murder at the direction of a leader of a narcotics trafficking network as defined in N.J.S.2C:35-3 in furtherance of a conspiracy enumerated in N.J.S.2C:35-3;

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
163
(j) The homicidal act that the defendant committed or procured was in violation of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:17-2;

(k) The victim was less than 14 years old; or

(l) The murder was committed during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, terrorism pursuant to section 2 of P.L.2002, c. 26 (C.2C:38-2).

(5) A juvenile who has been tried as an adult and convicted of murder shall be sentenced pursuant to paragraph (1), (2) or (3) of this subsection.

c. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c. 204).

d. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c. 204).

e. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c. 204).

f. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c. 204).

g. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c. 204).

h. (Deleted by amendment, P.L.2007, c. 204).

i. For purposes of this section the term “homicidal act” shall mean conduct that causes death or serious bodily injury resulting in death.

j. In a sentencing proceeding conducted pursuant to this section, the display of a photograph of the victim taken before the homicide shall be permitted.


a. Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated manslaughter when:

(1) The actor recklessly causes death under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life; or

(2) The actor causes the death of another person while fleeing or attempting to elude a law enforcement officer in violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2. Notwithstanding the provision of any other law to the contrary, the actor shall be strictly liable for a violation of this paragraph upon proof of a violation of subsection b. of N.J.S.2C:29-2 which resulted in the death of another person. As used in this paragraph, “actor” shall not include a passenger in a motor vehicle.

b. Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:

(1) It is committed recklessly; or

(2) A homicide which would otherwise be murder under section 2C:11-3 is committed in the heat of passion resulting from a reasonable provocation.
c. Aggravated manslaughter under paragraph (1) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the first degree and upon conviction thereof a person may, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1) of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:43-6, be sentenced to an ordinary term of imprisonment between 10 and 30 years. Aggravated manslaughter under paragraph (2) of subsection a. of this section is a crime of the first degree. Manslaughter is a crime of the second degree.


a. Criminal homicide constitutes vehicular homicide when it is caused by driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.
Proof that the defendant fell asleep while driving or was driving after having been without sleep for a period in excess of 24 consecutive hours may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant was driving while intoxicated in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or was operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of section 3 of P.L.1952, c. 157 (C.12:7-46) shall give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Proof that the defendant was operating a hand-held wireless telephone while driving a motor vehicle in violation of section 1 of P.L.2003, c. 310 (C.39:4-97.3) may give rise to an inference that the defendant was driving recklessly. Nothing in this section shall be construed to in any way limit the conduct or conditions that may be found to constitute driving a vehicle or vessel recklessly.

b. Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, vehicular homicide is a crime of the second degree.

(1) If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the prohibited level as prescribed in R.S.39:4-50, or if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c. 512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L.1982, c. 85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96, the defendant shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment by the court. The term of imprisonment shall include the imposition of a minimum term. The minimum term shall be fixed at, or between, one-third and one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or three years, whichever is greater, during which the defendant shall be ineligible for parole.

(2) The court shall not impose a mandatory sentence pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection unless the grounds therefor have been established at a hearing. At the hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, the prosecutor shall establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while under the influence of any intoxicating liquor, narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug, or with a blood alcohol concentration at or above the level prescribed in R.S.39:4-50 or that the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while his driver's license or reciprocity privilege was suspended or revoked for any violation of R.S.39:4-50, section 2 of P.L.1981, c. 512 (C.39:4-50.4a), by the Director of the Division of Motor Vehicles pursuant to P.L.1982, c. 85 (C.39:5-30a et seq.), or by the court for a violation of R.S.39:4-96. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information.

(3) Vehicular homicide is a crime of the first degree if the defendant was operating the auto or vessel while in violation of R.S.39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c. 512 (C.39:4-50.4a) while:
(a) on any school property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board, or within 1,000 feet of such school property;

(b) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 if the municipality, by ordinance or resolution, has designated the school crossing as such; or

(c) driving through a school crossing as defined in R.S.39:1-1 knowing that juveniles are present if the municipality has not designated the school crossing as such by ordinance or resolution.

A map or true copy of a map depicting the location and boundaries of the area on or within 1,000 feet of any property used for school purposes which is owned by or leased to any elementary or secondary school or school board produced pursuant to section 1 of P.L.1987, c. 101 (C.2C:35-7) may be used in a prosecution under subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

It shall be no defense to a prosecution for a violation of subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that the defendant was unaware that the prohibited conduct took place while on or within 1,000 feet of any school property or while driving through a school crossing. Nor shall it be a defense to a prosecution under subparagraph (a) or (b) of this paragraph that no juveniles were present on the school property or crossing zone at the time of the offense or that the school was not in session.

(4) If the defendant was operating the auto or vessel in violation of R.S. 39:4-50 or section 2 of P.L.1981, c. 512 (C.39:4-50.4a), the defendant's license to operate a motor vehicle shall be suspended for a period of between five years and life, which period shall commence upon completion of any prison sentence imposed upon that person.

c. For good cause shown, the court may, in accepting a plea of guilty under this section, order that such plea not be evidential in any civil proceeding.

d. Nothing herein shall be deemed to preclude, if the evidence so warrants, an indictment and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of subsection a. of N.J.S.2C:11-4.

As used in this section, “auto or vessel” means all means of conveyance propelled otherwise than by muscular power.

e. Any person who violates paragraph (3) of subsection b. of this section shall forfeit the auto or vessel used in the commission of the offense, unless the defendant can establish at a hearing, which may occur at the time of sentencing, by a preponderance of the evidence that such forfeiture would constitute a serious hardship to the family of the defendant that outweighs the need to deter such conduct by the defendant and others. In making its findings, the court shall take judicial notice of any evidence, testimony or information adduced at the trial, plea hearing, or other court proceedings and shall also consider the presentence report and any other relevant information. Forfeiture pursuant to this subsection shall be in addition to, and not in lieu of, civil forfeiture pursuant to chapter 64 of this title.

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:11-5.1 (2013). LEAVING THE SCENE OF A MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENT.

A motor vehicle operator who knows he is involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the scene of that accident under circumstances that violate the provisions of R.S.39:4-129 shall be guilty of a crime of the second degree if the accident results in the death of another person.
If the evidence so warrants, nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude an indictment and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-4 or vehicular homicide under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-5.

Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other provisions of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-4 or for vehicular homicide under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-5 and a separate sentence shall be imposed upon each such conviction.

Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:44-5 or any other provisions of law, when the court imposes multiple sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense, those sentences shall run consecutively.

For the purposes of this section, neither knowledge of the death nor knowledge of the violation are elements of the offense and it shall not be a defense that the operator of the motor vehicle was unaware of the death or of the provisions of R.S.39:4-129.

NEW MEXICO

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-14-22 (2012). REPORTS OF SPONTANEOUS FETAL DEATH.

A. Each spontaneous fetal death, where the fetus has a weight of five hundred grams or more, which occurs in this state shall be reported to the state registrar.

B. When a dead fetus is delivered in an institution, the person in charge of the institution or his designated representative shall prepare and file the report.

C. When the spontaneous fetal death occurs on a moving conveyance and the fetus is first removed from the conveyance in this state, or when a dead fetus is found in this state and the place of fetal death is unknown, the fetal death shall be reported in this state. The place where the fetus was first removed from the conveyance or the dead fetus was found shall be considered the place of fetal death.

D. When a spontaneous fetal death required to be reported by this section occurs without medical attendance at or immediately after the delivery or when inquiry is required by law, the state medical investigator shall investigate the cause of fetal death and shall prepare and file the report.

E. The names of the parents shall be entered on the spontaneous fetal death report in accordance with the provisions of Section 24-14-13 NMSA 1978.

F. Except as otherwise provided in this section, all spontaneous fetal death reports shall be completed and filed with the state registrar within ten days following the spontaneous fetal death.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-1 (2012). MURDER.

A. Murder in the first degree is the killing of one human being by another without lawful justification or excuse, by any of the means with which death may be caused:

(1) by any kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing;
(2) in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony; or  

(3) by any act greatly dangerous to the lives of others, indicating a depraved mind regardless of human life.

Whoever commits murder in the first degree is guilty of a capital felony.

B. Unless he is acting upon sufficient provocation, upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion, a person who kills another human being without lawful justification or excuse commits murder in the second degree if in performing the acts which cause the death he knows that such acts create a strong probability of death or great bodily harm to that individual or another. Murder in the second degree is a lesser included offense of the crime of murder in the first degree.

Whoever commits murder in the second degree is guilty of a second degree felony resulting in the death of a human being.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-2-3 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER.

Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice.

A. Voluntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed upon a sudden quarrel or in the heat of passion.

Whoever commits voluntary manslaughter is guilty of a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being.

B. Involuntary manslaughter consists of manslaughter committed in the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to felony, or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death in an unlawful manner or without due caution and circumspection.

Whoever commits involuntary manslaughter is guilty of a fourth degree felony.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5-3 (2012). CRIMINAL ABORTION

Criminal abortion consists of administering to any pregnant woman any medicine, drug or other substance, or using any method or means whereby an untimely termination of her pregnancy is produced, or attempted to be produced, with the intent to destroy the fetus, and the termination is not a justified medical termination.

Whoever commits criminal abortion is guilty of a fourth degree felony. Whoever commits criminal abortion which results in the death of the woman is guilty of a second degree felony.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5A-3 (2012). PROHIBITION OF PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS.

No person shall perform a partial-birth abortion except a physician who has determined that in his opinion the partial-birth abortion is necessary to save the life of a pregnant female or prevent great bodily harm to a pregnant female:

A. because her life is endangered or she is at risk of great bodily harm due to a physical disorder, illness
or injury, including a condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy; and

B. no other medical procedure would suffice for the purpose of saving her life or preventing great bodily harm to her.

**N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-15 (2012). Sentencing Authority; Noncapital Felonies; Basic Sentences and Fines; Parole Authority; Meritorious Deductions.**

A. If a person is convicted of a noncapital felony, the basic sentence of imprisonment is as follows:

1. for a first degree felony resulting in the death of a child, life imprisonment;
2. for a first degree felony for aggravated criminal sexual penetration, life imprisonment;
3. for a first degree felony, eighteen years imprisonment;
4. for a second degree felony resulting in the death of a human being, fifteen years imprisonment;
5. for a second degree felony for a sexual offense against a child, fifteen years imprisonment;
6. for a second degree felony, nine years imprisonment;
7. for a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being, six years imprisonment;
8. for a third degree felony for a sexual offense against a child, six years imprisonment;
9. for a third degree felony, three years imprisonment; or
10. for a fourth degree felony, eighteen months imprisonment.

B. The appropriate basic sentence of imprisonment shall be imposed upon a person convicted and sentenced pursuant to Subsection A of this section, unless the court alters the sentence pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Sentencing Act.

C. The court shall include in the judgment and sentence of each person convicted and sentenced to imprisonment in a corrections facility designated by the corrections department authority for a period of parole to be served in accordance with the provisions of Section 31-21-10 NMSA 1978 after the completion of any actual time of imprisonment and authority to require, as a condition of parole, the payment of the costs of parole services and reimbursement to a law enforcement agency or local crime stopper program in accordance with the provisions of that section. The period of parole shall be deemed to be part of the sentence of the convicted person in addition to the basic sentence imposed pursuant to Subsection A of this section together with alterations, if any, pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Sentencing Act.

D. When a court imposes a sentence of imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15.1, 31-18-16, 31-18-16.1 or 31-18-17 NMSA 1978 and suspends or defers the basic sentence of imprisonment provided pursuant to the provisions of Subsection A of this section, the period of parole shall be served in accordance with the provisions of Section 31-21-10 NMSA 1978 for the degree of felony for the basic sentence for which the inmate was convicted. For the purpose of designating a period
of parole, a court shall not consider that the basic sentence of imprisonment was suspended or deferred and that the inmate served a period of imprisonment pursuant to the provisions of the Criminal Sentencing Act.

E. The court may, in addition to the imposition of a basic sentence of imprisonment, impose a fine not to exceed:

1. for a first degree felony resulting in the death of a child, seventeen thousand five hundred dollars ($17,500);
2. for a first degree felony for aggravated criminal sexual penetration, seventeen thousand five hundred dollars ($17,500);
3. for a first degree felony, fifteen thousand dollars ($15,000);
4. for a second degree felony resulting in the death of a human being, twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500);
5. for a second degree felony for a sexual offense against a child, twelve thousand five hundred dollars ($12,500);
6. for a second degree felony, ten thousand dollars ($10,000);
7. for a third degree felony resulting in the death of a human being, five thousand dollars ($5,000);
8. for a third degree felony for a sexual offense against a child, five thousand dollars ($5,000); or
9. for a third or fourth degree felony, five thousand dollars ($5,000).

F. When the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment for a felony offense, the court shall indicate whether or not the offense is a serious violent offense, as defined in Section 33-2-34 NMSA 1978. The court shall inform an offender that the offender's sentence of imprisonment is subject to the provisions of Sections 33-2-34, 33-2-36, 33-2-37 and 33-2-38 NMSA 1978. If the court fails to inform an offender that the offender's sentence is subject to those provisions or if the court provides the offender with erroneous information regarding those provisions, the failure to inform or the error shall not provide a basis for a writ of habeas corpus.

G. No later than October 31 of each year, the New Mexico sentencing commission shall provide a written report to the secretary of corrections, all New Mexico criminal court judges, the administrative office of the district attorneys and the chief public defender. The report shall specify the average reduction in the sentence of imprisonment for serious violent offenses and nonviolent offenses, as defined in Section 33-2-34 NMSA 1978, due to meritorious deductions earned by prisoners during the previous fiscal year pursuant to the provisions of Sections 33-2-34, 33-2-36, 33-2-37 and 33-2-38 NMSA 1978. The corrections department shall allow the commission access to documents used by the department to determine earned meritorious deductions for prisoners.


The aggravating circumstances to be considered by the sentencing court or jury pursuant to the
provisions of Section 31-20A-2 NMSA 1978 are limited to the following:

A. the victim was a peace officer who was acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty when he was murdered;

B. the murder was committed with intent to kill in the commission of or attempt to commit kidnaping, criminal sexual contact of a minor or criminal sexual penetration;

C. the murder was committed with the intent to kill by the defendant while attempting to escape from a penal institution of New Mexico;

D. while incarcerated in a penal institution in New Mexico, the defendant, with the intent to kill, murdered a person who was at the time incarcerated in or lawfully on the premises of a penal institution in New Mexico. As used in this subsection “penal institution” includes facilities under the jurisdiction of the corrections and criminal rehabilitation department [corrections department] and county and municipal jails;

E. while incarcerated in a penal institution in New Mexico, the defendant, with the intent to kill, murdered an employee of the corrections and criminal rehabilitation department [corrections department];

F. the capital felony was committed for hire; and

G. the capital felony was murder of a witness to a crime or any person likely to become a witness to a crime, for the purpose of preventing report of the crime or testimony in any criminal proceeding, or for retaliation for the victim having testified in any criminal proceeding.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-8-101 (2012). HOMICIDE BY VEHICLE; GREAT BODILY HARM BY VEHICLE.

A. Homicide by vehicle is the killing of a human being in the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle.

B. Great bodily harm by vehicle is the injuring of a human being, to the extent defined in Section 30-1-12 NMSA 1978, in the unlawful operation of a motor vehicle.

C. A person who commits homicide by vehicle or great bodily harm by vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or while under the influence of any drug or while violating Section 66-8-113 NMSA 1978 is guilty of a third degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978, provided that violation of speeding laws as set forth in the Motor Vehicle Code shall not per se be a basis for violation of Section 66-8-113 NMSA 1978.

D. A person who commits homicide by vehicle or great bodily harm by vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or while under the influence of any drug, as provided in Subsection C of this section, and who has incurred a prior DWI conviction within ten years of the occurrence for which he is being sentenced under this section shall have his basic sentence increased by four years for each prior DWI conviction.

E. For the purposes of this section, “prior DWI conviction” means:

(1) a prior conviction under Section 66-8-102 NMSA 1978; or

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
171
(2) a prior conviction in New Mexico or any other jurisdiction, territory or possession of the United States, including a tribal jurisdiction, when the criminal act is driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs.

F. A person who willfully operates a motor vehicle in violation of Subsection C of Section 30-22-1 NMSA 1978 and directly or indirectly causes the death of or great bodily harm to a human being is guilty of a third degree felony and shall be sentenced pursuant to the provisions of Section 31-18-15 NMSA 1978.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 66-7-207.1 (2012). MOTOR VEHICLE ACCIDENTS INVOLVING A SCHOOL BUS; INVESTIGATION BY A LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER CERTIFIED AS AN ACCIDENT RECONSTRUCTIONIST.

All motor vehicle accidents involving a school bus that result in a fatality or life threatening injury shall be investigated by a law enforcement officer certified as an accident reconstructionist.

NEW YORK

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.00 (2013). HOMICIDE DEFINED.

Homicide means conduct which causes the death of a person or an unborn child with which a female has been pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks under circumstances constituting murder, manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the second degree, criminally negligent homicide, abortion in the first degree or self-abortion in the first degree.

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05 (2013). HOMICIDE, ABORTION AND RELATED OFFENSES; DEFINITIONS OF TERMS.

The following definitions are applicable to this article:

1. “Person,” when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who has been born and is alive.

2. “Abortional act” means an act committed upon or with respect to a female, whether by another person or by the female herself, whether she is pregnant or not, whether directly upon her body or by the administering, taking or prescription of drugs or in any other manner, with intent to cause a miscarriage of such female.

3. “Justifiable abortional act.” An abortional act is justifiable when committed upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed physician acting (a) under a reasonable belief that such is necessary to preserve her life, or, (b) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. A pregnant female's commission of an abortional act upon herself is justifiable when she acts upon the advice of a duly licensed physician (1) that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, (2) within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy. The submission by a female to an abortional act is justifiable when she believes that it is being committed by a duly licensed physician, acting under a reasonable belief.
that such act is necessary to preserve her life, or, within twenty-four weeks from the commencement of her pregnancy.

**N.Y. Penal Law § 125.10 (2013). CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.**

A person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person.

Criminally negligent homicide is a class E felony.

**N.Y. Penal Law § 125.11 (2013). AGGRAVATED CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.**

A person is guilty of aggravated criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of a police officer or peace officer where such officer was in the course of performing his or her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a police officer or peace officer.

Aggravated criminally negligent homicide is a class C felony.

**N.Y. Penal Law § 125.12 (2013). VEHICULAR MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.**

A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree when he or she causes the death of another person, and either:

1. operates a motor vehicle in violation of subdivision two, three, four or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law or operates a vessel or public vessel in violation of paragraph (b), (c), (d) or (e) of subdivision two of section forty-nine-a of the navigation law, and as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates such motor vehicle, vessel or public vessel in a manner that causes the death of such other person, or

2. operates a motor vehicle with a gross vehicle weight rating of more than eighteen thousand pounds which contains flammable gas, radioactive materials or explosives in violation of subdivision one of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, and such flammable gas, radioactive materials or explosives is the cause of such death, and as a result of such impairment by the use of alcohol, operates such motor vehicle in a manner that causes the death of such other person, or

3. operates a snowmobile in violation of paragraph (b), (c) or (d) of subdivision one of section 25.24 of the parks, recreation and historic preservation law or operates an all terrain vehicle as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section twenty-two hundred eighty-one of the vehicle and traffic law in violation of subdivision two, three, four, or four-a of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, and as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, operates such snowmobile or all terrain vehicle in a manner that causes the death of such other person.

If it is established that the person operating such motor vehicle, vessel, public vessel, snowmobile or all terrain vehicle caused such death while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol or a drug, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, such
person operated the motor vehicle, vessel, public vessel, snowmobile or all terrain vehicle in a manner that caused such death, as required by this section. Vehicular manslaughter in the second degree is a class D felony.

**N.Y. Penal Law § 125.13 (2013). Vehicular Manslaughter in the First Degree.**

A person is guilty of vehicular manslaughter in the first degree when he or she commits the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.12 of this article, and either:

(1) commits such crime while operating a motor vehicle while such person has .18 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in such person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or saliva made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law;

(2) commits such crime while knowing or having reason to know that: (a) his or her license or his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in another state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle in another state is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation is based upon a conviction in such other state for an offense which would, if committed in this state, constitute a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law; or (b) his or her license or his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in the state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license issued by the commissioner of motor vehicles is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation is based upon either a refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law or following a conviction for a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law;

(3) has previously been convicted of violating any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law within the preceding ten years, provided that, for the purposes of this subdivision, a conviction in any other state or jurisdiction for an offense which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, shall be treated as a violation of such law;

(4) causes the death of more than one other person;

(5) has previously been convicted of violating any provision of this article or article one hundred twenty of this title involving the operation of a motor vehicle, or was convicted in any other state or jurisdiction of an offense involving the operation of a motor vehicle which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of this article or article one hundred twenty of this title; or

(6) commits such crime while operating a motor vehicle while a child who is fifteen years of age or less is a passenger in such motor vehicle and causes the death of such child. If it is established that the person operating such motor vehicle caused such death or deaths while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, such person operated the motor vehicle in a manner that caused such death or deaths, as required by this section and section 125.12 of this article.

Vehicular manslaughter in the first degree is a class C felony.

A person is guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide when he or she engages in reckless driving as defined by section twelve hundred twelve of the vehicle and traffic law, and commits the crime of vehicular manslaughter in the second degree as defined in section 125.12 of this article, and either:

(1) commits such crimes while operating a motor vehicle while such person has .18 of one per centum or more by weight of alcohol in such person's blood as shown by chemical analysis of such person's blood, breath, urine or saliva made pursuant to the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law;

(2) commits such crimes while knowing or having reason to know that: (a) his or her license or his or her privilege of obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle in another state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license to operate a motor vehicle in another state is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation is based upon a conviction in such other state for an offense which would, if committed in this state, constitute a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law; or (b) his or her license or his or her privilege of operating a motor vehicle in this state or his or her privilege of obtaining a license issued by the commissioner of motor vehicles is suspended or revoked and such suspension or revocation is based upon either a refusal to submit to a chemical test pursuant to section eleven hundred ninety-four of the vehicle and traffic law or following a conviction for a violation of any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law;

(3) has previously been convicted of violating any of the provisions of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law within the preceding ten years, provided that, for the purposes of this subdivision, a conviction in any other state or jurisdiction for an offense which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of section eleven hundred ninety-two of the vehicle and traffic law, shall be treated as a violation of such law;

(4) causes the death of more than one other person;

(5) causes the death of one person and the serious physical injury of at least one other person;

(6) has previously been convicted of violating any provision of this article or article one hundred twenty of this title involving the operation of a motor vehicle, or was convicted in any other state or jurisdiction of an offense involving the operation of a motor vehicle which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of this article or article one hundred twenty of this title; or

(7) commits such crime while operating a motor vehicle while a child who is fifteen years of age or less is a passenger in such motor vehicle and causes the death of such child.

If it is established that the person operating such motor vehicle caused such death or deaths while unlawfully intoxicated or impaired by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, then there shall be a rebuttable presumption that, as a result of such intoxication or impairment by the use of alcohol or a drug, or by the combined influence of drugs or of alcohol and any drug or drugs, such person operated the motor vehicle in a manner that caused such death or deaths, as required by this section and section 125.12 of this article.

Aggravated vehicular homicide is a class B felony.
**N.Y. Penal Law § 125.15 (2013). Manslaughter in the Second Degree.**

A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when:

1. He recklessly causes the death of another person; or

2. He commits upon a female an abortional act which causes her death, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05; or

3. He intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide.

Manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.

**N.Y. Penal Law § 125.20 (2013). Manslaughter in the First Degree.**

A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:

1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; or

2. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision; or

3. He commits upon a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks an abortional act which causes her death, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05; or

4. Being eighteen years old or more and with intent to cause physical injury to a person less than eleven years old, the defendant recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury to such person and thereby causes the death of such person.

Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.

**N.Y. Penal Law § 125.21 (2013). Aggravated Manslaughter in the Second Degree.**

A person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter in the second degree when he or she recklessly causes the death of a police officer or peace officer where such officer was in the course of performing his or her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a police officer or peace officer.

Aggravated manslaughter in the second degree is a class C felony.

**N.Y. Penal Law § 125.22 (2013). Aggravated Manslaughter in the First Degree.**

A person is guilty of aggravated manslaughter in the first degree when:
1. with intent to cause serious physical injury to a police officer or peace officer, where such officer was in the course of performing his or her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a police officer or a peace officer, he or she causes the death of such officer or another police officer or peace officer; or

2. with intent to cause the death of a police officer or peace officer, where such officer was in the course of performing his or her official duties and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that such victim was a police officer or peace officer, he or she causes the death of such officer or another police officer or peace officer under circumstances which do not constitute murder because he or she acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, as defined in paragraph (a) of subdivision one of section 125.25. The fact that homicide was committed under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing murder to aggravated manslaughter in the first degree or manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution initiated under this subdivision.

Aggravated manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.

**N.Y. Penal Law § 125.25 (2013). Murder in the Second Degree.**

A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:

1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, it is an affirmative defense that:

   (a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime; or

   (b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime; or

2. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person, and thereby causes the death of another person; or

3. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse, escape in the first degree, or escape in the second degree, and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if there be any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision, in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:

   (a) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid the commission thereof; and

   (b) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article or substance readily capable of
causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons; and

(c) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article or substance; and

(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury; or

4. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, and being eighteen years old or more the defendant recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of serious physical injury or death to another person less than eleven years old and thereby causes the death of such person; or

5. Being eighteen years old or more, while in the course of committing rape in the first, second or third degree, criminal sexual act in the first, second or third degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first, second, third or fourth degree, or incest in the first, second or third degree, against a person less than fourteen years old, he or she intentionally causes the death of such person.

Murder in the second degree is a class A-I felony.

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.26 (2013). AGGRAVATED MURDER.

A person is guilty of aggravated murder when:

1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person, or of a third person who was a person described in subparagraph (i), (ii) or (iii) of paragraph (a) of this subdivision engaged at the time of the killing in the course of performing his or her official duties; and

   (a) Either:

      (i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision thirty-four of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his or her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a police officer; or

      (ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his or her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was such a uniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee of the division for youth; or

      (iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his or her official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was an employee of a state correctional institution or a local correctional facility; and

   (b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime; or
2. (a) With intent to cause the death of a person less than fourteen years old, he or she causes the death of such person, and the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death. As used in this subdivision, “torture” means the intentional and depraved infliction of extreme physical pain that is separate and apart from the pain which otherwise would have been associated with such cause of death; and

(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime.

3. In any prosecution under subdivision one or two of this section, it is an affirmative defense that:

(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, aggravated manslaughter in the first degree, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree; or

(b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, aggravated manslaughter in the second degree, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.

Aggravated murder is a class A-I felony.

N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.27 (2013). MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.

A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:

1. With intent to cause the death of another person, he causes the death of such person or of a third person; and

(a) Either:

(i) the intended victim was a police officer as defined in subdivision 34 of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was a police officer; or

(ii) the intended victim was a peace officer as defined in paragraph a of subdivision twenty-one, subdivision twenty-three, twenty-four or sixty-two (employees of the division for youth) of section 2.10 of the criminal procedure law who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was such a uniformed court officer, parole officer, probation officer, or employee of the division for youth; or

(iii) the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional institution or was an employee of a local correctional facility as defined in subdivision two of section forty of the correction law, who was at the time of the killing engaged in the course of performing his official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the intended victim was an employee of a state correctional institution or a local correctional facility; or
(iv) at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant was confined in a state correctional institution or was otherwise in custody upon a sentence for the term of his natural life, or upon a sentence commuted to one of natural life, or upon a sentence for an indeterminate term the minimum of which was at least fifteen years and the maximum of which was natural life, or at the time of the commission of the killing, the defendant had escaped from such confinement or custody while serving such a sentence and had not yet been returned to such confinement or custody; or

(v) the intended victim was a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the death was caused for the purpose of preventing the intended victim's testimony in any criminal action or proceeding whether or not such action or proceeding had been commenced, or the intended victim had previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution for such prior testimony, or the intended victim was an immediate family member of a witness to a crime committed on a prior occasion and the killing was committed for the purpose of preventing or influencing the testimony of such witness, or the intended victim was an immediate family member of a witness who had previously testified in a criminal action or proceeding and the killing was committed for the purpose of exacting retribution upon such witness for such prior testimony. As used in this subparagraph “immediate family member” means a husband, wife, father, mother, daughter, son, brother, sister, stepparent, grandparent, stepchild or grandchild; or

(vi) the defendant committed the killing or procured commission of the killing pursuant to an agreement with a person other than the intended victim to commit the same for the receipt, or in expectation of the receipt, of anything of pecuniary value from a party to the agreement or from a person other than the intended victim acting at the direction of a party to such agreement; or

(vii) the victim was killed while the defendant was in the course of committing or attempting to commit and in furtherance of robbery, burglary in the first degree or second degree, kidnapping in the first degree, arson in the first degree or second degree, rape in the first degree, criminal sexual act in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, aggravated sexual abuse in the first degree or escape in the first degree, or in the course of and furtherance of immediate flight after committing or attempting to commit any such crime or in the course of and furtherance of immediate flight after attempting to commit the crime of murder in the second degree; provided however, the victim is not a participant in one of the aforementioned crimes and, provided further that, unless the defendant's criminal liability under this subparagraph is based upon the defendant having commanded another person to cause the death of the victim or intended victim pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter, this subparagraph shall not apply where the defendant's criminal liability is based upon the conduct of another pursuant to section 20.00 of this chapter; or

(viii) as part of the same criminal transaction, the defendant, with intent to cause serious physical injury to or the death of an additional person or persons, causes the death of an additional person or persons; provided, however, the victim is not a participant in the criminal transaction; or

(ix) prior to committing the killing, the defendant had been convicted of murder as defined in this section or section 125.25 of this article, or had been convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense which, if committed in this state, would constitute a violation of either of such sections; or

(x) the defendant acted in an especially cruel and wanton manner pursuant to a course of conduct intended to inflict and inflicting torture upon the victim prior to the victim's death. As used in this subparagraph, “torture” means the intentional and depraved infliction of extreme physical pain; “depraved” means the defendant relished the infliction of extreme physical pain upon the victim.
evidencing debasement or perversion or that the defendant evidenced a sense of pleasure in the infliction of extreme physical pain; or

(xi) the defendant intentionally caused the death of two or more additional persons within the state in separate criminal transactions within a period of twenty-four months when committed in a similar fashion or pursuant to a common scheme or plan; or

(xii) the intended victim was a judge as defined in subdivision twenty-three of section 1.20 of the criminal procedure law and the defendant killed such victim because such victim was, at the time of the killing, a judge; or

(xiii) the victim was killed in furtherance of an act of terrorism, as defined in paragraph (b) of subdivision one of section 490.05 of this chapter; and

(b) The defendant was more than eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the crime.

2. In any prosecution under subdivision one, it is an affirmative defense that:

(a) The defendant acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse, the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to be. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree; or

(b) The defendant's conduct consisted of causing or aiding, without the use of duress or deception, another person to commit suicide. Nothing contained in this paragraph shall constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the second degree or any other crime except murder in the second degree.

Murder in the first degree is a class A-I felony.


A person is guilty of abortion in the second degree when he commits an abortional act upon a female, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.

Abortion in the second degree is a class E felony.


A person is guilty of abortion in the first degree when he commits upon a female pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks an abortional act which causes the miscarriage of such female, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.

Abortion in the first degree is a class D felony.


A female is guilty of self-abortion in the second degree when, being pregnant, she commits or submits to
an abortional act upon herself, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.

Self-abortion in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.

**N.Y. Penal Law § 125.55 (2013). Self-abortion in the first degree.**

A female is guilty of self-abortion in the first degree when, being pregnant for more than twenty-four weeks, she commits or submits to an abortional act upon herself which causes her miscarriage, unless such abortional act is justifiable pursuant to subdivision three of section 125.05.

Self-abortion in the first degree is a class A misdemeanor.

**NORTH CAROLINA**

**N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-301. (2013). Duty to report abuse, neglect, dependency, or death due to maltreatment.**

Any person or institution who has cause to suspect that any juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent, as defined by G.S. 7B-101, or has died as the result of maltreatment, shall report the case of that juvenile to the director of the department of social services in the county where the juvenile resides or is found. The report may be made orally, by telephone, or in writing. The report shall include information as is known to the person making it including the name and address of the juvenile; the name and address of the juvenile's parent, guardian, or caretaker; the age of the juvenile; the names and ages of other juveniles in the home; the present whereabouts of the juvenile if not at the home address; the nature and extent of any injury or condition resulting from abuse, neglect, or dependency; and any other information which the person making the report believes might be helpful in establishing the need for protective services or court intervention. If the report is made orally or by telephone, the person making the report shall give the person's name, address, and telephone number. Refusal of the person making the report to give a name shall not preclude the department's assessment of the alleged abuse, neglect, dependency, or death as a result of maltreatment.

Upon receipt of any report of sexual abuse of the juvenile in a child care facility, the director shall notify the State Bureau of Investigation within 24 hours or on the next workday. If sexual abuse in a child care facility is not alleged in the initial report, but during the course of the assessment there is reason to suspect that sexual abuse has occurred, the director shall immediately notify the State Bureau of Investigation. Upon notification that sexual abuse may have occurred in a child care facility, the State Bureau of Investigation may form a task force to investigate the report.

**N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2902 (2013). Disclosure in child fatality or near fatality cases.**

(a) The following definitions apply in this section:

(1) Child fatality. -- The death of a child from suspected abuse, neglect, or maltreatment.

(2) Findings and information. -- A written summary, as allowed by subsections (c) through (f) of this section, of actions taken or services rendered by a public agency following receipt of information that a
child might be in need of protection. The written summary shall include any of the following information the agency is able to provide:

a. The dates, outcomes, and results of any actions taken or services rendered.

b. The results of any review by the State Child Fatality Prevention Team, a local child fatality prevention team, a local community child protection team, the Child Fatality Task Force, or any public agency.

c. Confirmation of the receipt of all reports, accepted or not accepted by the county department of social services, for investigation of suspected child abuse, neglect, or maltreatment, including confirmation that investigations were conducted, the results of the investigations, a description of the conduct of the most recent investigation and the services rendered, and a statement of basis for the department's decision.

(3) Near fatality. -- A case in which a physician determines that a child is in serious or critical condition as the result of sickness or injury caused by suspected abuse, neglect, or maltreatment.

(4) Public agency. -- Any agency of State government or its subdivisions as defined in G.S. 132-1(a).

(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subject to the provisions of subsections (c) through (f) of this section, a public agency shall disclose to the public, upon request, the findings and information related to a child fatality or near fatality if:

(1) A person is criminally charged with having caused the child fatality or near fatality; or

(2) The district attorney has certified that a person would be charged with having caused the child fatality or near fatality but for that person's prior death.

(c) Nothing herein shall be deemed to authorize access to the confidential records in the custody of a public agency, or the disclosure to the public of the substance or content of any psychiatric, psychological, or therapeutic evaluations or like materials or information pertaining to the child or the child's family unless directly related to the cause of the child fatality or near fatality, or the disclosure of information that would reveal the identities of persons who provided information related to the suspected abuse, neglect, or maltreatment of the child.

(d) Within five working days from the receipt of a request for findings and information related to a child fatality or near fatality, a public agency shall consult with the appropriate district attorney and provide the findings and information unless the agency has a reasonable belief that release of the information:

(1) Is not authorized by subsections (a) and (b) of this section;

(2) Is likely to cause mental or physical harm or danger to a minor child residing in the deceased or injured child's household;

(3) Is likely to jeopardize the State's ability to prosecute the defendant;

(4) Is likely to jeopardize the defendant's right to a fair trial;

(5) Is likely to undermine an ongoing or future criminal investigation; or
(6) Is not authorized by federal law and regulations.

(e) Any person whose request is denied may apply to the appropriate superior court for an order compelling disclosure of the findings and information of the public agency. The application shall set forth, with reasonable particularity, factors supporting the application. The superior court shall have jurisdiction to issue such orders. Actions brought pursuant to this section shall be set down for immediate hearing, and subsequent proceedings in such actions shall be accorded priority by the appellate courts. After the court has reviewed the specific findings and information, in camera, the court shall issue an order compelling disclosure unless the court finds that one or more of the circumstances in subsection (d) of this section exist.

(f) Access to criminal investigative reports and criminal intelligence information of public law enforcement agencies and confidential information in the possession of the State Child Fatality Prevention Team, the local teams, and the Child Fatality Task Force, shall be governed by G.S. 132-1.4 and G.S. 7B-1413 respectively. Nothing herein shall be deemed to require the disclosure or release of any information in the possession of a district attorney.

(g) Any public agency or its employees acting in good faith in disclosing or declining to disclose information pursuant to this section shall be immune from any criminal or civil liability that might otherwise be incurred or imposed for such action.

(h) Nothing herein shall be deemed to narrow or limit the definition of “public records” as set forth in G.S. 132-1(a).


(a) A murder which shall be perpetrated by means of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon of mass destruction as defined in G.S. 14-288.21, poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, torture, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of any arson, rape or a sex offense, robbery, kidnapping, burglary, or other felony committed or attempted with the use of a deadly weapon shall be deemed to be murder in the first degree, a Class A felony, and any person who commits such murder shall be punished with death or imprisonment in the State's prison for life without parole as the court shall determine pursuant to G.S. 15A-2000, except that any such person who was under 18 years of age at the time of the murder shall be punished with imprisonment in the State's prison for life without parole.

(b) A murder other than described in subsection (a) of this section or in G.S. 14-23.2 shall be deemed second degree murder. Any person who commits second degree murder shall be punished as a Class B1 felon, except that a person who commits second degree murder shall be punished as a Class B2 felon in either of the following circumstances:

(1) The malice necessary to prove second degree murder is based on an inherently dangerous act or omission, done in such a reckless and wanton manner as to manifest a mind utterly without regard for human life and social duty and deliberately bent on mischief.

(2) The murder is one that was proximately caused by the unlawful distribution of opium or any synthetic or natural salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of opium, or cocaine or other substance described in G.S. 90-90(1)d., or methamphetamine, and the ingestion of such substance caused the death of the user.

Voluntary manslaughter shall be punishable as a Class D felony, and involuntary manslaughter shall be punishable as a Class F felony.


As used in this Article only, “unborn child” means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb.


(a) A person who unlawfully causes the death of an unborn child is guilty of the separate offense of murder of an unborn child if the person does any one of the following:

1. Willfully and maliciously commits an act with the intent to cause the death of the unborn child.
2. Causes the death of the unborn child in perpetration or attempted perpetration of any of the criminal offenses set forth under G.S. 14-17.
3. Commits an act causing the death of the unborn child that is inherently dangerous to human life and is done so recklessly and wantonly that it reflects disregard of life.

(b) Penalty.--An offense under:

1. Subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2) of this section shall be a Class A felony, and any person who commits such offense shall be punished with imprisonment in the State's prison for life without parole.
2. Subdivision (a)(3) of this section shall be subject to the same sentence as if the person had been convicted of second degree murder pursuant to G.S. 14-17.


(a) A person is guilty of the separate offense of voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child if the person unlawfully causes the death of an unborn child by an act that would be voluntary manslaughter if it resulted in the death of the mother.

(b) Penalty.--Any person who commits an offense under this section shall be guilty of a Class D felony.


(a) A person is guilty of the separate offense of involuntary manslaughter of an unborn child if the person unlawfully causes the death of an unborn child by an act that would be involuntary manslaughter if it resulted in the death of the mother.

(b) Penalty.--Any person who commits an offense under this section shall be guilty of a Class F felony.


Nothing in this Article shall be construed to permit the prosecution under this Article of any of the following:

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
185
(1) Acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were lawful, pursuant to the provisions of G.S. 14-45.1.

(2) Acts which are committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.

(3) Acts committed by a pregnant woman with respect to her own unborn child, including, but not limited to, acts which result in miscarriage or stillbirth by the woman. The following definitions shall apply in this section:

   a. Miscarriage.--The interruption of the normal development of an unborn child, other than by a live birth, and which is not an induced abortion permitted under G.S. 14-45.1, resulting in the complete expulsion or extraction from a pregnant woman of the unborn child.

   b. Stillbirth.--The death of an unborn child prior to the complete expulsion or extraction from a woman, irrespective of the duration of pregnancy and which is not an induced abortion permitted under G.S. 14-45.1.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-23.8 (2013). KNOWLEDGE NOT REQUIRED.

Except for an offense under G.S. 14-23.2(a)(1), an offense under this Article does not require proof of either of the following:

(1) The person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant.

(2) The defendant intended to cause the death of, or bodily injury to, the unborn child.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-46. (2013). CONCEALING BIRTH OF CHILD.

If any person shall, by secretly burying or otherwise disposing of the dead body of a newborn child, endeavor to conceal the birth of such child, such person shall be punished as a Class I felon. Any person aiding, counseling or abetting any other person in concealing the birth of a child in violation of this statute shall be guilty of a Class I misdemeanor.

N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-141.4 (2013). FELONY AND MISDEMEANOR DEATH BY VEHICLE; FELONY SERIOUS INJURY BY VEHICLE; AGGRAVATED OFFENSES; REPEAT FELONY DEATH BY VEHICLE.

(a) Repealed by Session Laws 1983, c. 435, § 27.

   (a1) Felony Death by Vehicle. -- A person commits the offense of felony death by vehicle if:

       (1) The person unintentionally causes the death of another person,

       (2) The person was engaged in the offense of impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 or G.S. 20-138.2, and

       (3) The commission of the offense in subdivision (2) of this subsection is the proximate cause of
the death.

(a2) Misdemeanor Death by Vehicle. -- A person commits the offense of misdemeanor death by vehicle if:

(1) The person unintentionally causes the death of another person,

(2) The person was engaged in the violation of any State law or local ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, other than impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1, and

(3) The commission of the offense in subdivision (2) of this subsection is the proximate cause of the death.

(a3) Felony Serious Injury by Vehicle. -- A person commits the offense of felony serious injury by vehicle if:

(1) The person unintentionally causes serious injury to another person,

(2) The person was engaged in the offense of impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 or G.S. 20-138.2, and

(3) The commission of the offense in subdivision (2) of this subsection is the proximate cause of the serious injury.

(a4) Aggravated Felony Serious Injury by Vehicle. -- A person commits the offense of aggravated felony serious injury by vehicle if:

(1) The person unintentionally causes serious injury to another person,

(2) The person was engaged in the offense of impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 or G.S. 20-138.2,

(3) The commission of the offense in subdivision (2) of this subsection is the proximate cause of the serious injury, and

(4) The person has a previous conviction involving impaired driving, as defined in G.S. 20-4.01(24a), within seven years of the date of the offense.

(a5) Aggravated Felony Death by Vehicle. -- A person commits the offense of aggravated felony death by vehicle if:

(1) The person unintentionally causes the death of another person,

(2) The person was engaged in the offense of impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 or G.S. 20-138.2,

(3) The commission of the offense in subdivision (2) of this subsection is the proximate cause of the death, and
(4) The person has a previous conviction involving impaired driving, as defined in G.S. 20-4.01(24a), within seven years of the date of the offense.

(a6) Repeat Felony Death by Vehicle Offender.--A person commits the offense of repeat felony death by vehicle if:

(1) The person commits an offense under subsection (a1) or subsection (a5) of this section; and

(2) The person has a previous conviction under:

a. Subsection (a1) of this section;

b. Subsection (a5) of this section; or

c. G.S. 14-17 or G.S. 14-18, and the basis of the conviction was the unintentional death of another person while engaged in the offense of impaired driving under G.S. 20-138.1 or G.S. 20-138.2.

The pleading and proof of previous convictions shall be in accordance with the provisions of G.S. 15A-928.

(b) Punishments.--Unless the conduct is covered under some other provision of law providing greater punishment, the following classifications apply to the offenses set forth in this section:

(1) Repeat felony death by vehicle is a Class B2 felony.

(1a) Aggravated felony death by vehicle is a Class D felony. Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 15A-1340.17, the court shall sentence the defendant in the aggravated range of the appropriate Prior Record Level.

(2) Felony death by vehicle is a Class D felony. Notwithstanding the provisions of G.S. 15A-1340.17, intermediate punishment is authorized for a defendant who is a Prior Record Level I offender.

(3) Aggravated felony serious injury by vehicle is a Class E felony.

(4) Felony serious injury by vehicle is a Class F felony.

(5) Misdemeanor death by vehicle is a Class A1 misdemeanor.

(c) No Double Prosecutions. -- No person who has been placed in jeopardy upon a charge of death by vehicle may be prosecuted for the offense of manslaughter arising out of the same death; and no person who has been placed in jeopardy upon a charge of manslaughter may be prosecuted for death by vehicle arising out of the same death.

NORTH DAKOTA


1. A person is guilty of murder, a class AA felony, if the person:

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
188
a. Intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another human being;

b. Causes the death of another human being under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or

c. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, commits or attempts to commit treason, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, felonious restraint, arson, gross sexual imposition, a felony offense against a child under section 12.1-20-03, 12.1-27.2-02, 12.1-27.2-03, 12.1-27.2-04, or 14-09-22, or escape and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, the person or any other participant in the crime causes the death of any person. In any prosecution under this subsection in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:

   (1) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, command, induce, procure, counsel, or aid the commission thereof;

   (2) Was not armed with a firearm, destructive device, dangerous weapon, or other weapon which under the circumstances indicated a readiness to inflict serious bodily injury;

   (3) Reasonably believed that no other participant was armed with such a weapon; and

   (4) Reasonably believed that no other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily injury.

Subdivisions a and b are inapplicable in the circumstances covered by subsection 2.

2. A person is guilty of murder, a class A felony, if the person causes the death of another human being under circumstances which would be class AA felony murder, except that the person causes the death under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse. The reasonableness of the excuse must be determined from the viewpoint of a person in that person's situation under the circumstances as that person believes them to be. An extreme emotional disturbance is excusable, within the meaning of this subsection only, if it is occasioned by substantial provocation, or a serious event, or situation for which the offender was not culpably responsible.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-02 (2011). MANSLAUGHTER.

A person is guilty of manslaughter, a class B felony, if he recklessly causes the death of another human being.

N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-16-03 (2011). NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.

A person is guilty of a class C felony if he negligently causes the death of another human being.


As used in this chapter:

1. “Abortion” means the termination of human pregnancy with an intention other than to produce a live birth or to remove a dead embryo or fetus.
2. “Person” does not include the pregnant woman.

3. “Unborn child” means the conceived but not yet born offspring of a human being, which, but for the action of the actor would beyond a reasonable doubt have subsequently been born alive.

**N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-02 (2011). MURDER OF AN UNBORN CHILD.**

1. A person is guilty of murder of an unborn child, a class AA felony, if the person:

   a. Intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an unborn child;

   b. Causes the death of an unborn child under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of the life of the unborn child or the pregnant woman; or

   c. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, commits or attempts to commit treason, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, felonious restraint, arson, gross sexual imposition, or escape and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, the person, or another participant, if any, causes the death of an unborn child; except that in any prosecution under this subsection in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, it is an affirmative defense that the defendant:

      (1) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, command, induce, procure, counsel, or aid the commission thereof;

      (2) Was not armed with a firearm, destructive device, dangerous weapon, or other weapon that under the circumstances indicated a readiness to inflict serious bodily injury;

      (3) Reasonably believed that no other participant was armed with such a weapon; and

      (4) Reasonably believed that no other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious bodily injury.

   Subdivisions a and b are inapplicable in the circumstances covered by subsection 2.

2. A person is guilty of murder of an unborn child, a class A felony, if the person causes the death of an unborn child under circumstances which would be class AA murder, except that the person causes the death of the unborn child under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable excuse. The reasonableness of the excuse must be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the person's situation under the circumstances as the person believes them to be. An extreme emotional disturbance is excusable, within the meaning of this subsection only, if it is occasioned by substantial provocation or a serious event or situation for which the offender was not culpably responsible.

**N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-17.1-03 (2011). MANSLAUGHTER OF AN UNBORN CHILD.**

A person is guilty of manslaughter of an unborn child, a class B felony, if the person recklessly causes the death of an unborn child.

A person is guilty of negligent homicide of an unborn child, a class C felony, if the person negligently causes the death of an unborn child.


This chapter does not apply to acts or omissions that cause the death or injury of an unborn child if those acts or omissions are committed during an abortion performed by or under the supervision of a licensed physician to which the pregnant woman has consented, nor does it apply to acts or omissions that are committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic or therapeutic treatment performed by or under the supervision of a licensed physician.

**N.D. CENT. CODE § 39.4-08-04 (2011). ACCIDENTS INVOLVING DEATH OR PERSONAL INJURIES— PENALTY.**

1. The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop or return with the vehicle as close as possible to the scene of the accident and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until that driver has fulfilled the requirements of section 39-08-06. Every stop required by this section must be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary.

2. Any person failing to comply with the requirements of this section under circumstances involving personal injury is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. Any person negligently failing to comply with the requirements of this section under circumstances involving serious personal injury is guilty of a class C felony. Any person negligently failing to comply with the requirements of this section under circumstances involving death is guilty of a class B felony.

3. The director shall revoke the license or permit to drive or nonresident operating privilege of a person convicted under this section.

**OHIO**

**OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.114 (2012). LIMITATION OF ACTION FOR PARTIAL BIRTH FETICIDE.**

A civil action pursuant to section 2307.53 of the Revised Code for partial birth feticide shall be commenced within one year after the commission of that offense.

**OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.53 (2012). CIVIL ACTION FOR PARTIAL BIRTH FETICIDE.**

(A) As used in this section:

(1) “Frivolous conduct” has the same meaning as in section 2323.51 of the Revised Code.

(2) “Partial birth procedure” has the same meaning as in section 2919.151 of the Revised Code.

(B) A woman upon whom a partial birth procedure is performed in violation of division (B) or (C) of section 2919.151 of the Revised Code, the father of the child if the child was not conceived by rape, or the parent of the woman if the woman is not eighteen years of age or older at the time of the violation has and may commence a civil action for compensatory damages, punitive or exemplary
damages if authorized by section 2315.21 of the Revised Code, and court costs and reasonable attorney's fees against the person who committed the violation.

(C) If a judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant in a civil action commenced pursuant to division (B) of this section and the court finds, upon the filing of a motion under section 2323.51 of the Revised Code, that the commencement of the civil action constitutes frivolous conduct and that the defendant was adversely affected by the frivolous conduct, the court shall award in accordance with section 2323.51 of the Revised Code reasonable attorney's fees to the defendant.

**Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.01 (2012). Aggravated Murder.**

(A) No person shall purposely, and with prior calculation and design, cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy.

(B) No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy while committing or attempting to commit, or while fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit, kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated robbery, robbery, aggravated burglary, burglary, trespass in a habitation when a person is present or likely to be present, terrorism, or escape.

(C) No person shall purposely cause the death of another who is under thirteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense.

(D) No person who is under detention as a result of having been found guilty of or having pleaded guilty to a felony or who breaks that detention shall purposely cause the death of another.

(E) No person shall purposely cause the death of a law enforcement officer whom the offender knows or has reasonable cause to know is a law enforcement officer when either of the following applies:

(1) The victim, at the time of the commission of the offense, is engaged in the victim's duties.

(2) It is the offender's specific purpose to kill a law enforcement officer.

(F) Whoever violates this section is guilty of aggravated murder, and shall be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised Code.

(G) As used in this section:

(1) “Detention” has the same meaning as in section 2921.01 of the Revised Code.

(2) “Law enforcement officer” has the same meaning as in section 2911.01 of the Revised Code.

**Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903.02 (2012). Murder.**

(A) No person shall purposely cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy.

(B) No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree and that is not a
violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the Revised Code.

(C) Division (B) of this section does not apply to an offense that becomes a felony of the first or second degree only if the offender previously has been convicted of that offense or another specified offense.

(D) Whoever violates this section is guilty of murder, and shall be punished as provided in section 2929.02 of the Revised Code.

**OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.03 (2012). VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.**

<Note: See also version(s) of this section with later effective date(s).>

(A) No person, while under the influence of sudden passion or in a sudden fit of rage, either of which is brought on by serious provocation occasioned by the victim that is reasonably sufficient to incite the person into using deadly force, shall knowingly cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy.

(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, a felony of the first degree.

**OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.04 (2012). IN Voluntary MANSLAUGHTER.**

(A) No person shall cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit a felony.

(B) No person shall cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit a misdemeanor of any degree, a regulatory offense, or a minor misdemeanor other than a violation of any section contained in Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a minor misdemeanor and other than a violation of an ordinance of a municipal corporation that, regardless of the penalty set by ordinance for the violation, is substantially equivalent to any section contained in Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a minor misdemeanor.

(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of involuntary manslaughter. Violation of division (A) of this section is a felony of the first degree. Violation of division (B) of this section is a felony of the third degree.

(D) If an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A) or (B) of this section and if the felony, misdemeanor, or regulatory offense that the offender committed or attempted to commit, that proximately resulted in the death of the other person or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy, and that is the basis of the offender's violation of division (A) or (B) of this section was a violation of division (A) or (B) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance or included, as an element of that felony, misdemeanor, or regulatory offense, the offender's operation or participation in the operation of a snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft while the offender was under the influence of alcohol, a drug of abuse, or alcohol and a drug of abuse, both of the following apply:

(1) The court shall impose a class one suspension of the offender's driver's or commercial driver's license or permit or nonresident operating privilege as specified in division (A)(1) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code.
(2) The court shall impose a mandatory prison term for the violation of division (A) or (B) of this section from the range of prison terms authorized for the level of the offense under section 2929.14 of the Revised Code.


(A) No person shall recklessly cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy.

(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of reckless homicide, a felony of the third degree.

**Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903. 05 (2012). Negligent Homicide.**

(A) No person shall negligently cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy by means of a deadly weapon or dangerous ordnance as defined in section 2923.11 of the Revised Code.

(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of negligent homicide, a misdemeanor of the first degree.

**Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2903. 06 (2012). Aggravated Vehicular Homicide; Vehicular Homicide; Vehicular Manslaughter; Effect of Prior Convictions; Penalties.**

(A) No person, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle, motorcycle, snowmobile, locomotive, watercraft, or aircraft, shall cause the death of another or the unlawful termination of another's pregnancy in any of the following ways:

1. (a) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance;

   (b) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A) of section 1547.11 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance;

   (c) As the proximate result of committing a violation of division (A)(3) of section 4561.15 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance.

2. In one of the following ways:

   (a) Recklessly;

   (b) As the proximate result of committing, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle or motorcycle in a construction zone, a reckless operation offense, provided that this division applies only if the person whose death is caused or whose pregnancy is unlawfully terminated is in the construction zone at the time of the offender's commission of the reckless operation offense in the construction zone and does not apply as described in division (F) of this section.

3. In one of the following ways:

   (a) Negligently;
(b) As the proximate result of committing, while operating or participating in the operation of a motor vehicle or motorcycle in a construction zone, a speeding offense, provided that this division applies only if the person whose death is caused or whose pregnancy is unlawfully terminated is in the construction zone at the time of the offender's commission of the speeding offense in the construction zone and does not apply as described in division (F) of this section.

(4) As the proximate result of committing a violation of any provision of any section contained in Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a minor misdemeanor or of a municipal ordinance that, regardless of the penalty set by ordinance for the violation, is substantially equivalent to any provision of any section contained in Title XLV of the Revised Code that is a minor misdemeanor:

(B)(1) Whoever violates division (A)(1) or (2) of this section is guilty of aggravated vehicular homicide and shall be punished as provided in divisions (B)(2) and (3) of this section.

(2)(a) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2)(b) or (c) of this section, aggravated vehicular homicide committed in violation of division (A)(1) of this section is a felony of the second degree and the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender as described in division (E) of this section.

(b) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2)(c) of this section, aggravated vehicular homicide committed in violation of division (A)(1) of this section is a felony of the first degree, and the court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender as described in division (E) of this section, if any of the following apply:

(i) At the time of the offense, the offender was driving under a suspension or cancellation imposed under Chapter 4510. or any other provision of the Revised Code or was operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle, did not have a valid driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege, and was not eligible for renewal of the offender's driver's license or commercial driver's license without examination under section 4507.10 of the Revised Code.

(ii) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section.

(iii) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to any traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense.

(c) Aggravated vehicular homicide committed in violation of division (A)(1) of this section is a felony of the first degree, and the court shall sentence the offender to a mandatory prison term as provided in section 2929.142 of the Revised Code and described in division (E) of this section if any of the following apply:

(i) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more prior violations of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance within the previous six years.

(ii) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more prior violations of division (A) of section 1547.11 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent municipal ordinance within the previous six years.

(iii) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more prior violations of division (A)(3) of section 4561.15 of the Revised Code or of a substantially equivalent
municipal ordinance within the previous six years.

(iv) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more prior violations of division (A)(1) of this section within the previous six years.

(v) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more prior violations of division (A)(1) of section 2903.08 of the Revised Code within the previous six years.

(vi) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more prior violations of section 2903.04 of the Revised Code within the previous six years in circumstances in which division (D) of that section applied regarding the violations.

(vii) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to three or more violations of any combination of the offenses listed in division (B)(2)(c)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), or (vi) of this section within the previous six years.

(viii) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a second or subsequent felony violation of division (A) of section 4511.19 of the Revised Code.

(d) In addition to any other sanctions imposed pursuant to division (B)(2)(a), (b), or (c) of this section for aggravated vehicular homicide committed in violation of division (A)(1) of this section, the court shall impose upon the offender a class one suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege as specified in division (A)(1) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code.

(3) Except as otherwise provided in this division, aggravated vehicular homicide committed in violation of division (A)(2) of this section is a felony of the third degree. Aggravated vehicular homicide committed in violation of division (A)(2) of this section is a felony of the second degree if, at the time of the offense, the offender was driving under a suspension or cancellation imposed under Chapter 4510. or any other provision of the Revised Code or was operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle, did not have a valid driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege, and was not eligible for renewal of the offender's driver's license or commercial driver's license without examination under section 4507.10 of the Revised Code or if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section or any traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense. The court shall impose a mandatory prison term on the offender when required by division (E) of this section.

In addition to any other sanctions imposed pursuant to this division for a violation of division (A)(2) of this section, the court shall impose upon the offender a class two suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(2) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code or, if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a traffic-related murder, felonious assault, or attempted murder offense, a class one suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege as specified in division (A)(1) of that section.

(C) Whoever violates division (A)(3) of this section is guilty of vehicular homicide. Except as otherwise provided in this division, vehicular homicide is a misdemeanor of the first degree. Vehicular homicide committed in violation of division (A)(3) of this section is a felony of the fourth degree if, at the time of the offense, the offender was driving under a suspension or cancellation imposed under Chapter 4510. or...
any other provision of the Revised Code or was operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle, did not have a valid driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege, and was not eligible for renewal of the offender's driver's license or commercial driver's license without examination under section 4507.10 of the Revised Code or if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section or any traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense. The court shall impose a mandatory jail term or a mandatory prison term on the offender when required by division (E) of this section.

In addition to any other sanctions imposed pursuant to this division, the court shall impose upon the offender a class four suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(4) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code, or, if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section or any traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense, a class three suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(3) of that section, or, if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a traffic-related murder, felonious assault, or attempted murder offense, a class two suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege as specified in division (A)(2) of that section.

(D) Whoever violates division (A)(4) of this section is guilty of vehicular manslaughter. Except as otherwise provided in this division, vehicular manslaughter is a misdemeanor of the second degree. Vehicular manslaughter is a misdemeanor of the first degree if, at the time of the offense, the offender was driving under a suspension or cancellation imposed under Chapter 4510. or any other provision of the Revised Code or was operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle, did not have a valid driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege, and was not eligible for renewal of the offender's driver's license or commercial driver's license without examination under section 4507.10 of the Revised Code or if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section or any traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense. In addition to any other sanctions imposed pursuant to this division, the court shall impose upon the offender a class six suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(6) of section 4510.02 of the Revised Code or, if the offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section, any traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense, or a traffic-related murder, felonious assault, or attempted murder offense, a class four suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege from the range specified in division (A)(4) of that section.

(E) The court shall impose a mandatory prison term on an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(1) of this section. If division (B)(2)(c)(i), (ii), (iii), (iv), (v), (vi), (vii), or (viii) of this section applies to an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to the violation of division (A)(1) of this section, the court shall impose the mandatory prison term pursuant to section 2929.142 of the Revised Code. The court shall impose a mandatory jail term of at least fifteen days on an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a misdemeanor violation of division (A)(3)(b) of this section and may impose upon the offender a longer jail term as authorized pursuant to section 2929.24 of the Revised Code. The court shall impose a mandatory prison term on an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to a violation of division (A)(2) or (3)(a) of this section or a felony violation of division (A)(3)(b) of this section if either of the following applies:

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
197
(1) The offender previously has been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a violation of this section or section 2903.08 of the Revised Code.

(2) At the time of the offense, the offender was driving under suspension or cancellation under Chapter 4510. or any other provision of the Revised Code or was operating a motor vehicle or motorcycle, did not have a valid driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege, and was not eligible for renewal of the offender's driver's license or commercial driver's license without examination under section 4507.10 of the Revised Code.

(F) Divisions (A)(2)(b) and (3)(b) of this section do not apply in a particular construction zone unless signs of the type described in section 2903.081 of the Revised Code are erected in that construction zone in accordance with the guidelines and design specifications established by the director of transportation under section 5501.27 of the Revised Code. The failure to erect signs of the type described in section 2903.081 of the Revised Code in a particular construction zone in accordance with those guidelines and design specifications does not limit or affect the application of division (A)(1), (A)(2)(a), (A)(3)(a), or (A)(4) of this section in that construction zone or the prosecution of any person who violates any of those divisions in that construction zone.

(G)(1) As used in this section:

(a) “Mandatory prison term” and “mandatory jail term” have the same meanings as in section 2929.01 of the Revised Code.

(b) “Traffic-related homicide, manslaughter, or assault offense” means a violation of section 2903.04 of the Revised Code in circumstances in which division (D) of that section applies, a violation of section 2903.06 or 2903.08 of the Revised Code, or a violation of section 2903.06, 2903.07, or 2903.08 of the Revised Code as they existed prior to March 23, 2000.

(c) “Construction zone” has the same meaning as in section 5501.27 of the Revised Code.

(d) “Reckless operation offense” means a violation of section 4511.20 of the Revised Code or a municipal ordinance substantially equivalent to section 4511.20 of the Revised Code.

(e) “Speeding offense” means a violation of section 4511.21 of the Revised Code or a municipal ordinance pertaining to speed.

(f) “Traffic-related murder, felonious assault, or attempted murder offense” means a violation of section 2903.01 or 2903.02 of the Revised Code in circumstances in which the offender used a motor vehicle as the means to commit the violation, a violation of division (A)(2) of section 2903.11 of the Revised Code in circumstances in which the deadly weapon used in the commission of the violation is a motor vehicle, or an attempt to commit aggravated murder or murder in violation of section 2923.02 of the Revised Code in circumstances in which the offender used a motor vehicle as the means to attempt to commit the aggravated murder or murder.

(g) “Motor vehicle” has the same meaning as in section 4501.01 of the Revised Code.

(2) For the purposes of this section, when a penalty or suspension is enhanced because of a prior or current violation of a specified law or a prior or current specified offense, the reference to the violation of...
the specified law or the specified offense includes any violation of any substantially equivalent municipal ordinance, former law of this state, or current or former law of another state or the United States.

**OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.15 (2012). PERMITTING CHILD ABUSE.**

(A) No parent, guardian, custodian, or person having custody of a child under eighteen years of age or of a mentally or physically handicapped child under twenty-one years of age shall cause serious physical harm to the child, or the death of the child, as a proximate result of permitting the child to be abused, to be tortured, to be administered corporal punishment or other physical disciplinary measure, or to be physically restrained in a cruel manner or for a prolonged period.

(B) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under this section that the defendant did not have readily available a means to prevent the harm to the child or the death of the child and that the defendant took timely and reasonable steps to summon aid.

(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of permitting child abuse. If the violation of this section causes serious physical harm to the child, permitting child abuse is a felony of the third degree. If the violation of this section causes the death of the child, permitting child abuse is a felony of the first degree.

**OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.13 (2012). ABORTION MANSLAUGHTER.**

(A) No person shall purposely take the life of a child born by attempted abortion who is alive when removed from the uterus of the pregnant woman.

(B) No person who performs an abortion shall fail to take the measures required by the exercise of medical judgment in light of the attending circumstances to preserve the life of a child who is alive when removed from the uterus of the pregnant woman.

(C) Whoever violates this section is guilty of abortion manslaughter, a felony of the first degree.

**OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151 (2012). PARTIAL BIRTH FETICIDE.**

(A) As used in this section:

   (1) “Dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion” does not include the dilation and extraction procedure of abortion.

   (2) “From the body of the mother” means that the portion of the fetus' body in question is beyond the mother's vaginal introitus in a vaginal delivery.

   (3) “Partial birth procedure” means the medical procedure that includes all of the following elements in sequence:

      (a) Intentional dilation of the cervix of a pregnant woman, usually over a sequence of days;

      (b) In a breech presentation, intentional extraction of at least the lower torso to the navel, but not the entire body, of an intact fetus from the body of the mother, or in a cephalic presentation, intentional extraction of at least the complete head, but not the entire body, of an intact fetus from the body of the mother;
(c) Intentional partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of the fetus, which procedure the person performing the procedure knows will cause the death of the fetus, intentional compression of the head of the fetus, which procedure the person performing the procedure knows will cause the death of the fetus, or performance of another intentional act that the person performing the procedure knows will cause the death of the fetus;

(d) Completion of the vaginal delivery of the fetus.

(4) “Partially born” means that the portion of the body of an intact fetus described in division (A)(3)(b) of this section has been intentionally extracted from the body of the mother.

(5) “Serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function” means any medically diagnosed condition that so complicates the pregnancy of the woman as to directly or indirectly cause the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.

(6) “Viable” has the same meaning as in section 2901.01 of the Revised Code.

(B) When the fetus that is the subject of the procedure is viable, no person shall knowingly perform a partial birth procedure on a pregnant woman when the procedure is not necessary, in reasonable medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the mother as a result of the mother's life or health being endangered by a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.

(C) When the fetus that is the subject of the procedure is not viable, no person shall knowingly perform a partial birth procedure on a pregnant woman when the procedure is not necessary, in reasonable medical judgment, to preserve the life or health of the mother as a result of the mother's life or health being endangered by a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function.

(D) Whoever violates division (B) or (C) of this section is guilty of partial birth feticide, a felony of the second degree.

(E) A pregnant woman upon whom a partial birth procedure is performed in violation of division (B) or (C) of this section is not guilty of committing, attempting to commit, complicity in the commission of, or conspiracy in the commission of a violation of those divisions.

(F) This section does not prohibit the suction curettage procedure of abortion, the suction aspiration procedure of abortion, or the dilation and evacuation procedure of abortion.

(G) This section does not apply to any person who performs or attempts to perform a legal abortion if the act that causes the death of the fetus is performed prior to the fetus being partially born even though the death of the fetus occurs after it is partially born.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.17 (2012). TERMINATING OR ATTEMPTING TO TERMINATE A HUMAN PREGNANCY AFTER VIABILITY.

(A) No person shall purposely perform or induce or attempt to perform or induce an abortion on a pregnant woman when the unborn child is viable.

(B)(1) It is an affirmative defense to a charge under division (A) of this section that the abortion was
performed or induced or attempted to be performed or induced by a physician and that the physician
determined, in the physician's good faith medical judgment, based on the facts known to the physician at
that time, that either of the following applied:

(a) The unborn child was not viable.

(b) The abortion was necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or a serious risk of the
substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman.

(2) No abortion shall be considered necessary under division (B)(1)(b) of this section on the basis of a
claim or diagnosis that the pregnant woman will engage in conduct that would result in the pregnant
woman's death or a substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant
woman or based on any reason related to the woman's mental health.

(C) Except when a medical emergency exists that prevents compliance with section 2919.18 of the
Revised Code, the affirmative defense set forth in division (B)(1)(a) of this section does not apply unless
the physician who performs or induces or attempts to perform or induce the abortion performs the
viability testing required by division (A) of section 2919.18 of the Revised Code and certifies in writing,
based on the results of the tests performed, that in the physician's good faith medical judgment the unborn
child is not viable.

(D) Except when a medical emergency exists that prevents compliance with one or more of the following
conditions, the affirmative defense set forth in division (B)(1)(b) of this section does not apply unless the
physician who performs or induces or attempts to perform or induce the abortion complies with all of the
following conditions:

(1) The physician who performs or induces or attempts to perform or induce the abortion certifies in
writing that, in the physician's good faith medical judgment, based on the facts known to the physician at
that time, the abortion is necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant woman or a serious risk of the
substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman.

(2) Another physician who is not professionally related to the physician who intends to perform or
induce the abortion certifies in writing that, in that physician's good faith medical judgment, based on the
facts known to that physician at that time, the abortion is necessary to prevent the death of the pregnant
woman or a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible impairment of a major bodily function of the
pregnant woman.

(3) The physician performs or induces or attempts to perform or induce the abortion in a hospital or
other health care facility that has appropriate neonatal services for premature infants.

(4) The physician who performs or induces or attempts to perform or induce the abortion terminates or
attempts to terminate the pregnancy in the manner that provides the best opportunity for the unborn child
to survive, unless that physician determines, in the physician's good faith medical judgment, based on the
facts known to the physician at that time, that the termination of the pregnancy in that manner poses a
greater risk of the death of the pregnant woman or a greater risk of the substantial and irreversible
impairment of a major bodily function of the pregnant woman than would other available methods of
abortion.

(5) The physician certifies in writing the available method or techniques considered and the reasons for
choosing the method or technique employed.
(6) The physician who performs or induces or attempts to perform or induce the abortion has arranged for the attendance in the same room in which the abortion is to be performed or induced or attempted to be performed or induced at least one other physician who is to take control of, provide immediate medical care for, and take all reasonable steps necessary to preserve the life and health of the unborn child immediately upon the child's complete expulsion or extraction from the pregnant woman.

(E) For purposes of this section, there is a rebuttable presumption that an unborn child of at least twenty-four weeks gestational age is viable.

(F) Whoever violates this section is guilty of terminating or attempting to terminate a human pregnancy after viability, a felony of the fourth degree.

(G) The state medical board shall revoke a physician's license to practice medicine in this state if the physician violates this section.

(H) Any physician who performs or induces an abortion or attempts to perform or induce an abortion with actual knowledge that neither of the affirmative defenses set forth in division (B)(1) of this section applies, or with a heedless indifference as to whether either affirmative defense applies, is liable in a civil action for compensatory and exemplary damages and reasonable attorney's fees to any person, or the representative of the estate of any person, who sustains injury, death, or loss to person or property as the result of the performance or inducement or the attempted performance or inducement of the abortion. In any action under this division, the court also may award any injunctive or other equitable relief that the court considers appropriate.

(I) A pregnant woman on whom an abortion is performed or induced or attempted to be performed or induced in violation of division (A) of this section is not guilty of violating division (A) of this section or of attempting to commit, conspiring to commit, or complicity in committing a violation of division (A) of this section.

**Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2919.225 (2012). Failure of Certain Family Day-Care Homes to Disclose Death or Serious Injury of Child.**

(A) Subject to division (C) of this section, no owner, provider, or administrator of a type A family day-care home or type B family day-care home, knowing that the event described in division (A)(1) or (2) of this section has occurred, shall accept a child into that home without first disclosing to the parent, guardian, custodian, or other person responsible for the care of that child any of the following that has occurred:

1. A child died while under the care of the home or while receiving child care from the owner, provider, or administrator or died as a result of injuries suffered while under the care of the home or while receiving child care from the owner, provider, or administrator.

2. Within the preceding ten years, a child suffered injuries while under the care of the home or while receiving child care from the owner, provider, or administrator, and those injuries led to the child being hospitalized for more than twenty-four hours.

(B)(1) Subject to division (C) of this section, no owner, provider, or administrator of a type A family day-care home or type B family day-care home shall fail to provide notice in accordance with division (B)(3)
of this section to the persons and entities specified in division (B)(2) of this section, of any of the following that occurs:

(a) A child who is under the care of the home or is receiving child care from the owner, provider, or administrator dies while under the care of the home or while receiving child care from the owner, provider, or administrator or dies as a result of injuries suffered while under the care of the home or while receiving child day-care from the owner, provider, or administrator.

(b) A child who is under the care of the home or is receiving child care from the owner, provider, or administrator is hospitalized for more than twenty-four hours as a result of injuries suffered while under the care of the home or while receiving child care from the owner, provider, or administrator.

(2) An owner, provider, or administrator of a home shall provide the notices required under division (B)(1) of this section to each of the following:

(a) For each child who, at the time of the injury or death for which the notice is required, is receiving or is enrolled to receive child care at the home or from the owner, provider, or administrator, to the parent, guardian, custodian, or other person responsible for the care of the child;

(b) If the notice is required as the result of the death of a child as described in division (B)(1)(a) of this section, to the public children services agency of the county in which the home is located or the child care was given, a municipal or county peace officer in the county in which the child resides or in which the home is located or the child care was given, and the child fatality review board appointed under section 307.621 of the Revised Code that serves the county in which the home is located or the child care was given.

(3) An owner, provider, or administrator of a home shall provide the notices required by divisions (B)(1) and (2) of this section not later than forty-eight hours after the child dies or, regarding a child who is hospitalized for more than twenty-four hours as a result of injuries suffered while under the care of the home, not later than forty-eight hours after the child suffers the injuries. If a child is hospitalized for more than twenty-four hours as a result of injuries suffered while under the care of the home, and the child subsequently dies as a result of those injuries, the owner, provider, or administrator shall provide separate notices under divisions (B)(1) and (2) of this section regarding both the injuries and the death. All notices provided under divisions (B)(1) and (2) of this section shall state that the death or injury occurred.

(C) Division (A) of this section does not require more than one person to make disclosures to the same parent, guardian, custodian, or other person responsible for the care of a child regarding any single injury or death for which disclosure is required under that division. Division (B) of this section does not require more than one person to give notices to the same parent, guardian, custodian, other person responsible for the care of the child, public children services agency, peace officer, or child fatality review board regarding any single injury or death for which disclosure is required under division (B)(1) of this section.

(D) An owner, provider, or administrator of a type A family day-care home or type B family day-care home is not subject to civil liability solely for making a disclosure required by this section.

(E) Whoever violates division (A) or (B) of this section is guilty of failure of a type A or type B family day-care home to disclose the death or serious injury of a child, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.227 (2012). FAILURE OF CHILD CARE CENTER TO DISCLOSE DEATH OR SERIOUS INJURY OF CHILD.

(Note: See also version(s) of this section with later effective date(s).)

(A)(1) No child care center licensee shall accept a child into that center without first providing to the parent, guardian, custodian, or other person responsible for the care of that child the following information, if the parent, guardian, custodian, or other person responsible for the care of the child requests the information:

(a) The types of injuries to children, as reported in accordance with rules adopted under section 5104.011 of the Revised Code, that occurred at the center on or after April 1, 2003, or the date that is two years before the date the information is requested, whichever date is more recent;

(b) The number of each type of injury to children that occurred at the center during that period.

(2) If a death described in division (A)(2)(a) or (A)(2)(b) of this section occurred during the fifteen-year period immediately preceding the date that the parent, guardian, custodian, or other person responsible for the care of a child seeks to enroll that child, no child care center licensee shall accept that child into that center without first providing to the parent, guardian, custodian, or other person responsible for the care of that child a notice that states that the death occurred.

(a) A child died while under the care of the center or while receiving child care from the owner, provider, or administrator of the center;

(b) A child died as a result of injuries suffered while under the care of the center or while receiving child care from the owner, provider, or administrator of the center.

(3) Each child care center licensee shall keep on file at the center a copy of the information provided under this division for at least three years after providing the information.

(B)(1) No child care center licensee shall fail to provide notice in accordance with division (B)(3) of this section to the persons and entities specified in division (B)(2) of this section if a child who is under the care of the center or is receiving child care from the owner, provider, or administrator of the center dies while under the care of the center or while receiving child care from the owner, provider, or administrator or dies as a result of injuries suffered while under the care of the center or while receiving child care from the owner, provider, or administrator.

(2) A child care center licensee shall provide the notice required under division (B)(1) of this section to all of the following:

(a) The parent, guardian, custodian, or other person responsible for the care of each child who, at the time of the death for which notice is required, is receiving or is enrolled to receive child care from the center;

(b) The public children services agency of the county in which the center is located or the child care was given;

(c) A municipal or county peace officer in the county in which the child resides or in which the center is located or the child care was given;
(d) The child fatality review board appointed under section 307.621 of the Revised Code that serves the county in which the center is located or the child care was given.

(3) A child care center licensee shall provide the notice required by division (B)(1) of this section not later than forty-eight hours after the child dies. The notice shall state that the death occurred.

(C) Whoever violates division (A) or (B) of this section is guilty of failure of a child care center to disclose the death or serious injury of a child, a misdemeanor of the fourth degree.


(A) Whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to aggravated murder in violation of section 2903.01 of the Revised Code shall suffer death or be imprisoned for life, as determined pursuant to sections 2929.022, 2929.03, and 2929.04 of the Revised Code, except that no person who raises the matter of age pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code and who is not found to have been eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense shall suffer death. In addition, the offender may be fined an amount fixed by the court, but not more than twenty-five thousand dollars.

(B) (1) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(2) or (3) of this section, whoever is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder in violation of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code shall be imprisoned for an indefinite term of fifteen years to life.

(2) Except as otherwise provided in division (B)(3) of this section, if a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder in violation of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code, the victim of the offense was less than thirteen years of age, and the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, the court shall impose an indefinite prison term of thirty years to life pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(3) If a person is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder in violation of section 2903.02 of the Revised Code and also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that were included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the murder, the court shall impose upon the offender a term of life imprisonment without parole that shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(4) In addition, the offender may be fined an amount fixed by the court, but not more than fifteen thousand dollars.

(C) The court shall not impose a fine or fines for aggravated murder or murder which, in the aggregate and to the extent not suspended by the court, exceeds the amount which the offender is or will be able to pay by the method and within the time allowed without undue hardship to the offender or to the dependents of the offender, or will prevent the offender from making reparation for the victim's wrongful death.

(D)(1) In addition to any other sanctions imposed for a violation of section 2903.01 or 2903.02 of the Revised Code, if the offender used a motor vehicle as the means to commit the violation, the court shall impose upon the offender a class two suspension of the offender's driver's license, commercial driver's license, temporary instruction permit, probationary license, or nonresident operating privilege as specified
(A) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder does not contain one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, then, following a verdict of guilty of the charge of aggravated murder, the trial court shall impose sentence on the offender as follows:

(1) Except as provided in division (A)(2) of this section, the trial court shall impose one of the following sentences on the offender:

(a) Life imprisonment without parole;

(b) Subject to division (A)(1)(e) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment;

(c) Subject to division (A)(1)(e) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment;

(d) Subject to division (A)(1)(e) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment;

(e) If the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the trial court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole on the offender pursuant to division (A)(1)(a) of this section, the trial court shall sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code to an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment that shall be served pursuant to that section.

(2) If the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that are included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information that charged the aggravated murder, the trial court shall impose upon the offender a sentence of life imprisonment without parole that shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(B) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder contains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the verdict shall separately state whether the accused is found guilty or not guilty of the principal charge and, if guilty of the principal charge, whether the offender was eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense, if the matter of age was raised by the offender pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code, and whether the offender is guilty or not guilty of each specification. The jury shall be instructed on its duties in this regard. The instruction to the jury shall include an instruction that a specification shall be proved beyond a reasonable doubt in order to support a guilty verdict on the specification, but the instruction shall not mention the penalty that may be the consequence of a guilty or
not guilty verdict on any charge or specification.

(C)(1) If the indictment or count in the indictment charging aggravated murder contains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, then, following a verdict of guilty of the charge but not guilty of each of the specifications, and regardless of whether the offender raised the matter of age pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code, the trial court shall impose sentence on the offender as follows:

(a) Except as provided in division (C)(1)(b) of this section, the trial court shall impose one of the following sentences on the offender:

(i) Life imprisonment without parole;

(ii) Subject to division (C)(1)(a)(v) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty years of imprisonment;

(iii) Subject to division (C)(1)(a)(v) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment;

(iv) Subject to division (C)(1)(a)(v) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment;

(v) If the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the trial court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole on the offender pursuant to division (C)(1)(a)(i) of this section, the trial court shall sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code to an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(b) If the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that are included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the trial court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole on the offender pursuant to division (C)(1)(a)(i) of this section, the trial court shall sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(2)(a) If the indictment or count in the indictment contains one or more specifications of aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code and if the offender is found guilty of both the charge and one or more of the specifications, the penalty to be imposed on the offender shall be one of the following:

(i) Except as provided in division (C)(2)(a)(ii) or (iii) of this section, the penalty to be imposed on the offender shall be death, life imprisonment without parole, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment.

(ii) Except as provided in division (C)(2)(a)(iii) of this section, if the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the trial court does not impose a sentence of death or life imprisonment without parole on the offender pursuant to division (C)(2)(a)(i) of this section, the penalty to be imposed on the

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
207
offender shall be an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment that shall be imposed pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and served pursuant to that section.

(iii) If the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that are included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information that charged the aggravated murder, the penalty to be imposed on the offender shall be death or life imprisonment without parole that shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(b) A penalty imposed pursuant to division (C)(2)(a)(i), (ii), or (iii) of this section shall be determined pursuant to divisions (D) and (E) of this section and shall be determined by one of the following:

(i) By the panel of three judges that tried the offender upon the offender's waiver of the right to trial by jury;

(ii) By the trial jury and the trial judge, if the offender was tried by jury.

(D)(1) Death may not be imposed as a penalty for aggravated murder if the offender raised the matter of age at trial pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code and was not found at trial to have been eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense. When death may be imposed as a penalty for aggravated murder, the court shall proceed under this division. When death may be imposed as a penalty, the court, upon the request of the defendant, shall require a pre-sentence investigation to be made and, upon the request of the defendant, shall require a mental examination to be made, and shall require reports of the investigation and of any mental examination submitted to the court, pursuant to section 2947.06 of the Revised Code. No statement made or information provided by a defendant in a mental examination or proceeding conducted pursuant to this division shall be disclosed to any person, except as provided in this division, or be used in evidence against the defendant on the issue of guilt in any retrial. A pre-sentence investigation or mental examination shall not be made except upon request of the defendant. Copies of any reports prepared under this division shall be furnished to the court, to the trial jury if the offender was tried by a jury, to the prosecutor, and to the offender or the offender's counsel for use under this division. The court, and the trial jury if the offender was tried by a jury, shall consider any report prepared pursuant to this division and furnished to it and any evidence raised at trial that is relevant to the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing or to any factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death. The court shall hear testimony and other evidence that is relevant to the nature and circumstances of the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing, the mitigating factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, and any other factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death, and shall hear the statement, if any, of the offender, and the arguments, if any, of counsel for the defense and prosecution, that are relevant to the penalty that should be imposed on the offender. The defendant shall be given great latitude in the presentation of evidence of the mitigating factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code and of any other factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death. If the offender chooses to make a statement, the offender is subject to cross-examination only if the offender consents to make the statement under oath or affirmation. The defendant shall have the burden of going forward with the evidence of any factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death. The prosecution shall have the burden of proving, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the defendant was found guilty of committing are sufficient to outweigh the factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death.

(2) Upon consideration of the relevant evidence raised at trial, the testimony, other evidence, statement
of the offender, arguments of counsel, and, if applicable, the reports submitted pursuant to division (D)(1) of this section, the trial jury, if the offender was tried by a jury, shall determine whether the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing are sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors present in the case. If the trial jury unanimously finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors, the trial jury shall recommend to the court that the sentence of death be imposed on the offender. Absent such a finding, the jury shall recommend that the offender be sentenced to one of the following:

(a) Except as provided in division (D)(2)(b) or (c) of this section, to life imprisonment without parole, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment, or life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment;

(b) Except as provided in division (D)(2)(c) of this section, if the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the jury does not recommend a sentence of life imprisonment without parole pursuant to division (D)(2)(a) of this section, to an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment to be imposed pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code and served pursuant to that section.

(c) If the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that are included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information that charged the aggravated murder, to life imprisonment without parole.

If the trial jury recommends that the offender be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment, or an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment to be imposed pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code, the court shall impose the sentence recommended by the jury upon the offender. If the sentence is an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment imposed as described in division (D)(2)(b) of this section or a sentence of life imprisonment without parole imposed under division (D)(2)(c) of this section, the sentence shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code. If the trial jury recommends that the sentence of death be imposed upon the offender, the court shall proceed to impose sentence pursuant to division (D)(3) of this section.

(3) Upon consideration of the relevant evidence raised at trial, the testimony, other evidence, statement of the offender, arguments of counsel, and, if applicable, the reports submitted to the court pursuant to division (D)(1) of this section, if, after receiving pursuant to division (D)(2) of this section the trial jury's recommendation that the sentence of death be imposed, the court finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, or if the panel of three judges unanimously finds, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, that the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing outweigh the mitigating factors, it shall impose sentence of death on the offender. Absent such a finding by the court or panel, the court or the panel shall impose one of the following sentences on the offender:

(a) Except as provided in division (D)(3)(b) of this section, one of the following:

(i) Life imprisonment without parole;

(ii) Subject to division (D)(3)(a)(iv) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after
serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment;

(iii) Subject to division (D)(3)(a)(iv) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment;

(iv) If the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the trial court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole on the offender pursuant to division (D)(3)(a)(i) of this section, the court or panel shall sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code to an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(b) If the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that are included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information that charged the aggravated murder, life imprisonment without parole that shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(E) If the offender raised the matter of age at trial pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code, was convicted of aggravated murder and one or more specifications of an aggravating circumstance listed in division (A) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, and was not found at trial to have been eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense, the court or the panel of three judges shall not impose a sentence of death on the offender. Instead, the court or panel shall impose one of the following sentences on the offender:

(1) Except as provided in division (E)(2) of this section, one of the following:

(a) Life imprisonment without parole;

(b) Subject to division (E)(2)(d) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving twenty-five full years of imprisonment;

(c) Subject to division (E)(2)(d) of this section, life imprisonment with parole eligibility after serving thirty full years of imprisonment;

(d) If the victim of the aggravated murder was less than thirteen years of age, the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification that was included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information charging the offense, and the trial court does not impose a sentence of life imprisonment without parole on the offender pursuant to division (E)(2)(a) of this section, the court or panel shall sentence the offender pursuant to division (B)(3) of section 2971.03 of the Revised Code to an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment.

(2) If the offender also is convicted of or pleads guilty to a sexual motivation specification and a sexually violent predator specification that are included in the indictment, count in the indictment, or information that charged the aggravated murder, life imprisonment without parole that shall be served pursuant to section 2971.03 of the Revised Code.

(F) The court or the panel of three judges, when it imposes sentence of death, shall state in a separate opinion its specific findings as to the existence of any of the mitigating factors set forth in division (B) of
section 2929.04 of the Revised Code, the existence of any other mitigating factors, the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing, and the reasons why the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors. The court or panel, when it imposes life imprisonment or an indefinite term consisting of a minimum term of thirty years and a maximum term of life imprisonment under division (D) of this section, shall state in a separate opinion its specific findings of which of the mitigating factors set forth in division (B) of section 2929.04 of the Revised Code it found to exist, what other mitigating factors it found to exist, what aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing, and why it could not find that these aggravating circumstances were sufficient to outweigh the mitigating factors. For cases in which a sentence of death is imposed for an offense committed before January 1, 1995, the court or panel shall file the opinion required to be prepared by this division with the clerk of the appropriate court of appeals and with the clerk of the supreme court within fifteen days after the court or panel imposes sentence. For cases in which a sentence of death is imposed for an offense committed on or after January 1, 1995, the court or panel shall file the opinion required to be prepared by this division with the clerk of the supreme court within fifteen days after the court or panel imposes sentence. The judgment in a case in which a sentencing hearing is held pursuant to this section is not final until the opinion is filed.

(G)(1) Whenever the court or a panel of three judges imposes a sentence of death for an offense committed before January 1, 1995, the clerk of the court in which the judgment is rendered shall deliver the entire record in the case to the appellate court.

(2) Whenever the court or a panel of three judges imposes a sentence of death for an offense committed on or after January 1, 1995, the clerk of the court in which the judgment is rendered shall deliver the entire record in the case to the supreme court.

OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.04 (2012). CRITERIA FOR IMPOSING DEATH OR IMPRISONMENT FOR A CAPITAL OFFENSE.

(A) Imposition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is precluded unless one or more of the following is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment pursuant to section 2941.14 of the Revised Code and proved beyond a reasonable doubt:

(1) The offense was the assassination of the president of the United States or a person in line of succession to the presidency, the governor or lieutenant governor of this state, the president-elect or vice president-elect of the United States, the governor-elect or lieutenant governor-elect of this state, or a candidate for any of the offices described in this division. For purposes of this division, a person is a candidate if the person has been nominated for election according to law, if the person has filed a petition or petitions according to law to have the person's name placed on the ballot in a primary or general election, or if the person campaigns as a write-in candidate in a primary or general election.

(2) The offense was committed for hire.

(3) The offense was committed for the purpose of escaping detection, apprehension, trial, or punishment for another offense committed by the offender.

(4) The offense was committed while the offender was under detention or while the offender was at large after having broken detention. As used in division (A)(4) of this section, “detention” has the same meaning as in section 2921.01 of the Revised Code, except that detention does not include hospitalization, institutionalization, or confinement in a mental health facility or mental retardation and
developmentally disabled facility unless at the time of the commission of the offense either of the following circumstances apply:

(a) The offender was in the facility as a result of being charged with a violation of a section of the Revised Code.

(b) The offender was under detention as a result of being convicted of or pleading guilty to a violation of a section of the Revised Code.

(5) Prior to the offense at bar, the offender was convicted of an offense an essential element of which was the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill another, or the offense at bar was part of a course of conduct involving the purposeful killing of or attempt to kill two or more persons by the offender.

(6) The victim of the offense was a law enforcement officer, as defined in section 2911.01 of the Revised Code, whom the offender had reasonable cause to know or knew to be a law enforcement officer as so defined, and either the victim, at the time of the commission of the offense, was engaged in the victim's duties, or it was the offender's specific purpose to kill a law enforcement officer as so defined.

(7) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, rape, aggravated arson, aggravated robbery, or aggravated burglary, and either the offender was the principal offender in the commission of the aggravated murder or, if not the principal offender, committed the aggravated murder with prior calculation and design.

(8) The victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense who was purposely killed to prevent the victim's testimony in any criminal proceeding and the aggravated murder was not committed during the commission, attempted commission, or flight immediately after the commission or attempted commission of the offense to which the victim was a witness, or the victim of the aggravated murder was a witness to an offense and was purposely killed in retaliation for the victim's testimony in any criminal proceeding.

(9) The offender, in the commission of the offense, purposefully caused the death of another who was under thirteen years of age at the time of the commission of the offense, and either the offender was the principal offender in the commission of the offense or, if not the principal offender, committed the offense with prior calculation and design.

(10) The offense was committed while the offender was committing, attempting to commit, or fleeing immediately after committing or attempting to commit terrorism.

(B) If one or more of the aggravating circumstances listed in division (A) of this section is specified in the indictment or count in the indictment and proved beyond a reasonable doubt, and if the offender did not raise the matter of age pursuant to section 2929.023 of the Revised Code or if the offender, after raising the matter of age, was found at trial to have been eighteen years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense, the court, trial jury, or panel of three judges shall consider, and weigh against the aggravating circumstances proved beyond a reasonable doubt, the nature and circumstances of the offense, the history, character, and background of the offender, and all of the following factors:

(1) Whether the victim of the offense induced or facilitated it;

(2) Whether it is unlikely that the offense would have been committed, but for the fact that the

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
212
offender was under duress, coercion, or strong provocation;

(3) Whether, at the time of committing the offense, the offender, because of a mental disease or defect, lacked substantial capacity to appreciate the criminality of the offender's conduct or to conform the offender's conduct to the requirements of the law;

(4) The youth of the offender;

(5) The offender's lack of a significant history of prior criminal convictions and delinquency adjudications;

(6) If the offender was a participant in the offense but not the principal offender, the degree of the offender's participation in the offense and the degree of the offender's participation in the acts that led to the death of the victim;

(7) Any other factors that are relevant to the issue of whether the offender should be sentenced to death.

(C) The defendant shall be given great latitude in the presentation of evidence of the factors listed in division (B) of this section and of any other factors in mitigation of the imposition of the sentence of death.

The existence of any of the mitigating factors listed in division (B) of this section does not preclude the imposition of a sentence of death on the offender but shall be weighed pursuant to divisions (D)(2) and (3) of section 2929.03 of the Revised Code by the trial court, trial jury, or the panel of three judges against the aggravating circumstances the offender was found guilty of committing.

OKLAHOMA

OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 53 (2012). ATTEMPT TO CONCEAL DEATH OF CHILD—FELONY ON SUBSEQUENT CONVICTION.

Every woman who, having been convicted of endeavoring to conceal the birth of an issue of her body, which, if born alive, would be a bastard, or the death of any such issue under the age of two (2) years, subsequently to such conviction endeavors to conceal any such birth or death of issue of her body, shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary not exceeding five (5) years and not less than two (2) years.

OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 652 (2012). SHOOTING OR DISCHARGING FIREARM WITH INTENT TO KILL - USE OF VEHICLE TO FACILITATE DISCHARGE OF WEAPON IN CONSCIOUS DISREGARD OF SAFETY OF OTHERS—ASSAULT AND BATTERY WITH DEADLY WEAPON.

A. Every person who intentionally and wrongfully shoots another with or discharges any kind of firearm, with intent to kill any person, including an unborn child as defined in Section 1-730 of Title 63 of the Oklahoma Statutes, shall upon conviction be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary not exceeding life.

B. Every person who uses any vehicle to facilitate the intentional discharge of any kind of firearm,
crossbow or other weapon in conscious disregard for the safety of any other person or persons, including an unborn child as defined in Section 1-730 of Title 63 of the Oklahoma Statutes, shall upon conviction be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections for a term not less than two (2) years nor exceeding life.

C. Any person who commits any assault and battery upon another, including an unborn child as defined in Section 1-730 of Title 63 of the Oklahoma Statutes, by means of any deadly weapon, or by such other means or force as is likely to produce death, or in any manner attempts to kill another, including an unborn child as defined in Section 1-730 of Title 63 of the Oklahoma Statutes, or in resisting the execution of any legal process, shall upon conviction be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary not exceeding life.

D. The provisions of this section shall not apply to:

1. Acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during a legal abortion to which the pregnant woman consented; or

2. Acts which are committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.

E. Under no circumstances shall the mother of the unborn child be prosecuted for causing the death of the unborn child unless the mother has committed a crime that caused the death of the unborn child.

**OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 691 (2012). HOMICIDE DEFINED.**

A. Homicide is the killing of one human being by another.

B. As used in this section, “human being” includes an unborn child, as defined in Section 1-730 of Title 63 of the Oklahoma Statutes.

C. Homicide shall not include:

1. Acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during a legal abortion to which the pregnant woman consented; or

2. Acts which are committed pursuant to usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment.

D. Under no circumstances shall the mother of the unborn child be prosecuted for causing the death of the unborn child unless the mother has committed a crime that caused the death of the unborn child.

**OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 701.7 (2012). MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.**

A. A person commits murder in the first degree when that person unlawfully and with malice aforethought causes the death of another human being. Malice is that deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested by external circumstances capable of proof.

B. A person also commits the crime of murder in the first degree, regardless of malice, when that person or any other person takes the life of a human being during, or if the death of a human being results from,
the commission or attempted commission of murder of another person, shooting or discharge of a firearm or crossbow with intent to kill, intentional discharge of a firearm or other deadly weapon into any dwelling or building as provided in Section 1289.17A of this title, forcible rape, robbery with a dangerous weapon, kidnapping, escape from lawful custody, eluding an officer, first degree burglary, first degree arson, unlawful distributing or dispensing of controlled dangerous substances or synthetic controlled substances, trafficking in illegal drugs, or manufacturing or attempting to manufacture a controlled dangerous substance.

1. Except as provided in paragraph 3 of this subsection, the term “synthetic controlled substance” means a substance:

   a. the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the chemical structure of a controlled substance in Schedule I or II,

   b. which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in Schedule I or II, or

   c. with respect to a particular person, which such person represents or intends to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system that is substantially similar to or greater than the stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of a controlled substance in Schedule I or II.

2. The designation of gamma butyrolactone does not preclude a finding pursuant to paragraph 1 of this subsection that the chemical is a synthetic controlled substance.

3. Such term does not include:

   a. a controlled substance,

   b. any substance for which there is an approved new drug application,

   c. with respect to a particular person any substance, if an exemption is in effect for investigational use, for that person, under Section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (21 U.S.C. 355) to the extent conduct with respect to such substance is pursuant to such exemption, or

   d. any substance to the extent not intended for human consumption before such an exemption takes effect with respect to that substance.

C. A person commits murder in the first degree when the death of a child results from the willful or malicious injuring, torturing, maiming or using of unreasonable force by said person or who shall willfully cause, procure or permit any of said acts to be done upon the child pursuant to Section 843.5 of this title. It is sufficient for the crime of murder in the first degree that the person either willfully tortured or used unreasonable force upon the child or maliciously injured or maimed the child.

D. A person commits murder in the first degree when that person unlawfully and with malice aforethought solicits another person or persons to cause the death of a human being in furtherance of unlawfully manufacturing, distributing or dispensing controlled dangerous substances, as defined in the Uniform Controlled Dangerous Substances Act,1 unlawfully possessing with intent to distribute or dispense controlled dangerous substances, or trafficking in illegal drugs.

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
215
E. A person commits murder in the first degree when that person intentionally causes the death of a law enforcement officer, correctional officer, or corrections employee while the officer or employee is in the performance of official duties.

**OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 701.8 (2012). MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.**

Homicide is murder in the second degree in the following cases:

1. When perpetrated by an act imminently dangerous to another person and evincing a depraved mind, regardless of human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular individual; or

2. When perpetrated by a person engaged in the commission of any felony other than the unlawful acts set out in Section 1, subsection B, of this act.

**OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 701.9 (2012). PUNISHMENT FOR MURDER.**

A. A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to murder in the first degree shall be punished by death, by imprisonment for life without parole or by imprisonment for life. A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to murder in the first degree, as described in subsection E of Section 701.7 of this title, shall not be entitled to or afforded the benefit of deferment of the sentence.

B. A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty or nolo contendere to murder in the second degree shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in a state penal institution for not less than ten (10) years nor more than life.

**OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 701.10 (2012). SENTENCING PROCEEDING—MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.**

A. Upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder in the first degree, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment. The proceeding shall be conducted by the trial judge before the same trial jury as soon as practicable without presentence investigation.

B. If the trial jury has been waived by the defendant and the state, or if the defendant pleaded guilty or nolo contendere, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before the court.

C. In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any mitigating circumstances or as to any of the aggravating circumstances enumerated in Section 701.7 et seq. of this title. Only such evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to the defendant prior to his trial shall be admissible. In addition, the state may introduce evidence about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the family of the victim.

D. This section shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitutions of the United States or of the State of Oklahoma. The state and the defendant or his counsel shall be permitted to present argument for or against sentence of death.
**OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 711 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER IN THE FIRST DEGREE DEFINE.**

Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree in the following cases:

1. When perpetrated without a design to effect death by a person while engaged in the commission of a misdemeanor.

2. When perpetrated without a design to effect death, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner, or by means of a dangerous weapon; unless it is committed under such circumstances as constitute excusable or justifiable homicide.

3. When perpetrated unnecessarily either while resisting an attempt by the person killed to commit a crime, or after such attempt shall have failed.

**OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 714 (2012). PROCURING DESTRUCTION OF UNBORN CHILD.**

Every person who administers to any woman pregnant with a quick child, or who prescribes for such woman, or advises or procures any such woman to take any medicine, drug or substance whatever, or who uses or employs any instrument or other means with intent thereby to destroy such child, unless the same shall have been necessary to preserve the life of such mother, is guilty in case the death of the child or of the mother is thereby produced, of manslaughter in the first degree.

**OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 716 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.**

Every killing of one human being by the act, procurement or culpable negligence of another, which, under the provisions of this chapter, is not murder, nor manslaughter in the first degree, nor excusable nor justifiable homicide, is manslaughter in the second degree.

**OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 723 (2012). OFFENDER’S KNOWLEDGE OF VICTIM’S PREGNANCY.**

Any offense committed pursuant to the provisions of Sections 652 and 713 of Title 21 of the Oklahoma Statutes does not require proof that the person engaging in the conduct had knowledge or should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant or that the offender intended to cause the death or bodily injury to the unborn child.

**OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 861 (2012). PROCURING AN ABORTION.**

Every person who administers to any woman, or who prescribes for any woman, or advises or procures any woman to take any medicine, drug or substance, or uses or employs any instrument, or other means whatever, with intent thereby to procure the miscarriage of such woman, unless the same is necessary to preserve her life, shall be guilty of a felony punishable by imprisonment in the State Penitentiary for not less than two (2) years nor more than five (5) years.

**OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 21, § 863 (2012). CONCEALING STILLBIRTH OR DEATH OF CHILD.**

Every woman who endeavors either by herself or by the aid of others to conceal the stillbirth of an issue of her body, which if born alive would be a bastard, or the death of any such issue under the age of two
OKLAHOMA

OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT. 47, § 11-903 (2012). NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.

A. When the death of any person ensues within one (1) year as a proximate result of injury received by the driving of any vehicle by any person in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide.

B. Any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment in the county jail for not more than one (1) year or by fine of not less than One Thousand Dollars ($1,000.00), or by both such fine and imprisonment.

In addition to the fine or penalty, the court shall order the person to attend a driver improvement or defensive driving course, as provided in Section 6-206.1 of this title. Furthermore, if the records of the Department of Public Safety for the person reflect a conviction for any traffic offense within the three (3) years immediately preceding the conviction for negligent homicide, the fine shall be enhanced to double the amount of the fine imposed pursuant to this subsection.

C. The Commissioner of Public Safety shall revoke the license or permit to drive and any nonresident operating privilege of any person convicted of negligent homicide.

OREGON

OR. REV. STAT. § 163.005 (2012). CRIMINAL HOMICIDE.

(1) A person commits criminal homicide if, without justification or excuse, the person intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or with criminal negligence causes the death of another human being.

(2) “Criminal homicide” is murder, manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide or aggravated vehicular homicide.

(3) “Human being” means a person who has been born and was alive at the time of the criminal act.

OR. REV. STAT. § 163.095 (2012). AGGRAVATED MURDER.

As used in ORS 163.105 and this section, “aggravated murder” means murder as defined in ORS 163.115 which is committed under, or accompanied by, any of the following circumstances:

(1)(a) The defendant committed the murder pursuant to an agreement that the defendant receive money or other thing of value for committing the murder.

(b) The defendant solicited another to commit the murder and paid or agreed to pay the person money or other thing of value for committing the murder.

(c) The defendant committed murder after having been convicted previously in any jurisdiction of
any homicide, the elements of which constitute the crime of murder as defined in ORS 163.115 or manslaughter in the first degree as defined in ORS 163.118.

(d) There was more than one murder victim in the same criminal episode as defined in ORS 131.505.

(e) The homicide occurred in the course of or as a result of intentional maiming or torture of the victim.

(f) The victim of the intentional homicide was a person under the age of 14 years.

(2)(a) The victim was one of the following and the murder was related to the performance of the victim's official duties in the justice system:

(A) A police officer as defined in ORS 181.610;

(B) A correctional, parole and probation officer or other person charged with the duty of custody, control or supervision of convicted persons;

(C) A member of the Oregon State Police;

(D) A judicial officer as defined in ORS 1.210;

(E) A juror or witness in a criminal proceeding;

(F) An employee or officer of a court of justice;

(G) A member of the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision; or

(H) A liquor enforcement inspector.

(b) The defendant was confined in a state, county or municipal penal or correctional facility or was otherwise in custody when the murder occurred.

(c) The defendant committed murder by means of an explosive as defined in ORS 164.055.

(d) Notwithstanding ORS 163.115 (1)(b), the defendant personally and intentionally committed the homicide under the circumstances set forth in ORS 163.115 (1)(b).

(e) The murder was committed in an effort to conceal the commission of a crime, or to conceal the identity of the perpetrator of a crime.

(f) The murder was committed after the defendant had escaped from a state, county or municipal penal or correctional facility and before the defendant had been returned to the custody of the facility.

OR. REV. STAT. § 163.105 (2012). SENTENCING FOR AGGRAVATED MURDER.
Notwithstanding the provisions of ORS chapter 144 and ORS 421.450 to 421.490:

(1)(a) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 137.700, when a defendant is convicted of aggravated murder
as defined by ORS 163.095, the defendant shall be sentenced, pursuant to ORS 163.150, to death, life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole or life imprisonment.

(b) A person sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole under this section shall not have that sentence suspended, deferred or commuted by any judicial officer, and the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision may not parole the prisoner nor reduce the period of confinement in any manner whatsoever. The Department of Corrections or any executive official may not permit the prisoner to participate in any sort of release or furlough program.

(c) If sentenced to life imprisonment, the court shall order that the defendant shall be confined for a minimum of 30 years without possibility of parole, release to post-prison supervision, release on work release or any form of temporary leave or employment at a forest or work camp.

(2) At any time after completion of a minimum period of confinement pursuant to subsection (1)(c) of this section, the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, upon the petition of a prisoner so confined, shall hold a hearing to determine if the prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. The sole issue is whether or not the prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. At the hearing, the prisoner has:

(a) The burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the likelihood of rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time;

(b) The right, if the prisoner is without sufficient funds to employ an attorney, to be represented by legal counsel, appointed by the board, at board expense; and

(c) The right to a subpoena upon a showing of the general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought, provided that any subpoena issued on behalf of the prisoner must be issued by the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision pursuant to rules adopted by the board.

(3) If, upon hearing all of the evidence, the board, upon a unanimous vote of all of its members, finds that the prisoner is capable of rehabilitation and that the terms of the prisoner's confinement should be changed to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, release to post-prison supervision or work release, it shall enter an order to that effect and the order shall convert the terms of the prisoner's confinement to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, release to post-prison supervision or work release and may set a release date. Otherwise the board shall deny the relief sought in the petition.

(4) If the board denies the relief sought in the petition, the board shall determine the date of the subsequent hearing, and the prisoner may petition for an interim hearing, in accordance with ORS 144.285.

(5) The board's final order shall be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact shall consist of a concise statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings as to each contested issue of fact and as to each ultimate fact required to support the board's order.

OR. REV. STAT. § 163.115 (2012). MURDER, AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES; FELONY MURDER; SENTENCE.

(1) Except as provided in ORS 163.118 and 163.125, criminal homicide constitutes murder:

(a) When it is committed intentionally, except that it is an affirmative defense that, at the time of the homicide, the defendant was under the influence of an extreme emotional disturbance;
(b) When it is committed by a person, acting either alone or with one or more persons, who commits or attempts to commit any of the following crimes and in the course of and in furtherance of the crime the person is committing or attempting to commit, or during the immediate flight therefrom, the person, or another participant if there be any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants:

(A) Arson in the first degree as defined in ORS 164.325;

(B) Criminal mischief in the first degree by means of an explosive as defined in ORS 164.365;

(C) Burglary in the first degree as defined in ORS 164.225;

(D) Escape in the first degree as defined in ORS 162.165;

(E) Kidnapping in the second degree as defined in ORS 163.225;

(F) Kidnapping in the first degree as defined in ORS 163.235;

(G) Robbery in the first degree as defined in ORS 164.415;

(H) Any felony sexual offense in the first degree defined in this chapter;

(I) Compelling prostitution as defined in ORS 167.017; or

(J) Assault in the first degree, as defined in ORS 163.185, and the victim is under 14 years of age, or assault in the second degree, as defined in ORS 163.175 (1)(a) or (b), and the victim is under 14 years of age; or

(c) By abuse when a person, recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life, causes the death of a child under 14 years of age or a dependent person, as defined in ORS 163.205, and:

(A) The person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of the victim or another child under 14 years of age or a dependent person; or

(B) The person causes the death by neglect or maltreatment.

(2) An accusatory instrument alleging murder by abuse under subsection (1)(c) of this section need not allege specific incidents of assault or torture.

(3) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of violating subsection (1)(b) of this section that the defendant:

(a) Was not the only participant in the underlying crime;

(b) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause or aid in the commission thereof;

(c) Was not armed with a dangerous or deadly weapon;

(d) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with a dangerous or
deadly weapon; and

(e) Had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death.

(4) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of violating subsection (1)(c)(B) of this section that the victim was a dependent person who was at least 18 years of age and was under care or treatment solely by spiritual means pursuant to the religious beliefs or practices of the dependent person or the guardian of the dependent person.

(5)(a) Except as otherwise provided in ORS 163.155, a person convicted of murder, who was at least 15 years of age at the time of committing the murder, shall be punished by imprisonment for life.

(b) When a defendant is convicted of murder under this section, the court shall order that the defendant shall be confined for a minimum of 25 years without possibility of parole, release to post-prison supervision, release on work release or any form of temporary leave or employment at a forest or work camp.

(c) At any time after completion of a minimum period of confinement pursuant to paragraph (b) of this subsection, the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision, upon the petition of a prisoner so confined, shall hold a hearing to determine if the prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. The sole issue is whether the prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. At the hearing the prisoner has:

(A) The burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the likelihood of rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time;

(B) The right, if the prisoner is without sufficient funds to employ an attorney, to be represented by legal counsel, appointed by the board, at board expense; and

(C) The right to a subpoena upon a showing of the general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought, provided that any subpoena issued on behalf of the prisoner must be issued by the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision pursuant to rules adopted by the board.

(d) If, upon hearing all of the evidence, the board, upon a unanimous vote of all of its members, finds that the prisoner is capable of rehabilitation and that the terms of the prisoner's confinement should be changed to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, release to post-prison supervision or work release, it shall enter an order to that effect and the order shall convert the terms of the prisoner's confinement to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, release to post-prison supervision or work release and may set a release date. Otherwise, the board shall deny the relief sought in the petition.

(e) If the board denies the relief sought in the petition, the board shall determine the date of the subsequent hearing, and the prisoner may petition for an interim hearing, in accordance with ORS 144.285.

(f) The board's final order shall be accompanied by findings of fact and conclusions of law. The findings of fact shall consist of a concise statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings as to each contested issue of fact and as to each ultimate fact required to support the board's order.

(6) As used in this section:
(a) “Assault” means to intentionally, knowingly or recklessly cause physical injury to another person. “Assault” does not include the causing of physical injury in a motor vehicle accident that occurs by reason of the reckless conduct of a defendant.

(b) “Neglect or maltreatment” means a violation of ORS 163.535, 163.545 or 163.547 or a failure to provide adequate food, clothing, shelter or medical care that is likely to endanger the health or welfare of a child under 14 years of age or a dependent person. This paragraph is not intended to replace or affect the duty or standard of care required under ORS chapter 677.

(c) “Pattern or practice” means one or more previous episodes.

(d) “Torture” means to intentionally inflict intense physical pain upon an unwilling victim as a separate objective apart from any other purpose.

OR. REV. STAT. § 163.118 (2012). FIRST DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter in the first degree when:

   (a) It is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life;

   (b) It is committed intentionally by a defendant under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance as provided in ORS 163.135, which constitutes a mitigating circumstance reducing the homicide that would otherwise be murder to manslaughter in the first degree and need not be proved in any prosecution;

   (c) A person recklessly causes the death of a child under 14 years of age or a dependent person, as defined in ORS 163.205, and:

      (A) The person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of the victim or another child under 14 years of age or a dependent person; or

      (B) The person causes the death by neglect or maltreatment, as defined in ORS 163.115; or

   (d) It is committed recklessly or with criminal negligence by a person operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants in violation of ORS 813.010 and:

      (A) The person has at least three previous convictions for driving while under the influence of intoxicants under ORS 813.010, or its statutory counterpart in any jurisdiction, in the 10 years prior to the date of the current offense; or

      (B)(i) The person has a previous conviction for any of the crimes described in subsection (2) of this section, or their statutory counterparts in any jurisdiction; and (ii) The victim's serious physical injury in the previous conviction was caused by the person driving a motor vehicle.

(2) The previous convictions to which subsection (1)(d)(B) of this section applies are:

   (a) Assault in the first degree under ORS 163.185;
(b) Assault in the second degree under ORS 163.175; or

(c) Assault in the third degree under ORS 163.165.

(3) Manslaughter in the first degree is a Class A felony.

(4) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of violating:

(a) Subsection (1)(c)(B) of this section that the victim was a dependent person who was at least 18 years of age and was under care or treatment solely by spiritual means pursuant to the religious beliefs or practices of the dependent person or the guardian of the dependent person.

(b) Subsection (1)(d)(B) of this section that the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicants at the time of the conduct that resulted in the previous conviction.

**OR. REV. STAT. § 163.125 (2012). SECOND DEGREE MANSLAUGHTER.**

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter in the second degree when:

(a) It is committed recklessly;

(b) A person intentionally causes or aids another person to commit suicide; or

(c) A person, with criminal negligence, causes the death of a child under 14 years of age or a dependent person, as defined in ORS 163.205, and:

(A) The person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of the victim or another child under 14 years of age or a dependent person; or

(B) The person causes the death by neglect or maltreatment, as defined in ORS 163.115.

(2) Manslaughter in the second degree is a Class B felony.

**OR. REV. STAT. § 163.145 (2012). CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.**

(1) A person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide when, with criminal negligence, the person causes the death of another person.

(2) Criminally negligent homicide is a Class B felony.

**OR. REV. STAT. § 163.147 (2012). CLASSIFICATIONS OF MANSLAUGHTER AND CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.**

The Oregon Criminal Justice Commission shall classify manslaughter in the second degree as described in ORS 163.125 and criminally negligent homicide as described in ORS 163.145 as crime category 9 of the sentencing guidelines grid of the commission if:

(1) The manslaughter or criminally negligent homicide resulted from the operation of a motor vehicle; and
(2) The driver of the motor vehicle was driving while under the influence of intoxicants.

**OR. REV. STAT. § 163.149 (2012). AGGRAVATED VEHICULAR HOMICIDE; DEFENSE.**

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated vehicular homicide when it is committed with criminal negligence, recklessly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life by a person operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants in violation of ORS 813.010 and:

(a) The person has a previous conviction for any of the crimes described in subsection (2) of this section, or their statutory counterparts in any jurisdiction; and

(b) The victim's death in the previous conviction was caused by the person driving a motor vehicle.

(2) The previous convictions to which subsection (1) of this section applies are:

(a) Manslaughter in the first degree under ORS 163.118;

(b) Manslaughter in the second degree under ORS 163.125; or

(c) Criminally negligent homicide under ORS 163.145.

(3) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under this section that the defendant was not under the influence of intoxicants at the time of the conduct that resulted in the previous conviction.

(4) Aggravated vehicular homicide is a Class A felony.

**OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150 (2012). SENTENCING; AGGRAVATED MURDER.**

(1)(a) Upon a finding that the defendant is guilty of aggravated murder, the court, except as otherwise provided in subsection (3) of this section, shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment, as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(c), life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole, as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(b), or death. The proceeding shall be conducted in the trial court before the trial jury as soon as practicable. If a juror for any reason is unable to perform the function of a juror, the juror shall be dismissed from the sentencing proceeding. The court shall cause to be drawn the name of one of the alternate jurors, who shall then become a member of the jury for the sentencing proceeding notwithstanding the fact that the alternate juror did not deliberate on the issue of guilt. The substitution of an alternate juror shall be allowed only if the jury has not begun to deliberate on the issue of sentence. If the defendant has pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence including, but not limited to, victim impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim or the impact of the crime on the victim's family and any aggravating or mitigating evidence relevant to the issue in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection; however, neither the state nor the defendant shall be allowed to introduce repetitive evidence that has previously been offered and received during the trial on the issue of guilt. The court shall instruct the jury that all evidence previously offered and received may be considered for purposes of the sentencing hearing. This paragraph shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or of the
State of Oregon. The state and the defendant or the counsel of the defendant shall be permitted to present arguments for or against a sentence of death and for or against a sentence of life imprisonment with or without the possibility of release or parole.

(b) Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall submit the following issues to the jury:

(A) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that death of the deceased or another would result;

(B) Whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society;

(C) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased; and

(D) Whether the defendant should receive a death sentence.

(c)(A) The court shall instruct the jury to consider, in determining the issues in paragraph (b) of this subsection, any mitigating circumstances offered in evidence, including but not limited to the defendant's age, the extent and severity of the defendant's prior criminal conduct and the extent of the mental and emotional pressure under which the defendant was acting at the time the offense was committed.

(B) The court shall instruct the jury to answer the question in paragraph (b)(D) of this subsection “no” if, after considering any aggravating evidence and any mitigating evidence concerning any aspect of the defendant's character or background, or any circumstances of the offense and any victim impact evidence as described in paragraph (a) of this subsection, one or more of the jurors believe that the defendant should not receive a death sentence.

(d) The state must prove each issue submitted under paragraph (b)(A) to (C) of this subsection beyond a reasonable doubt, and the jury shall return a special verdict of “yes” or “no” on each issue considered.

(e) The court shall charge the jury that it may not answer any issue “yes,” under paragraph (b) of this subsection unless it agrees unanimously.

(f) If the jury returns an affirmative finding on each issue considered under paragraph (b) of this subsection, the trial judge shall sentence the defendant to death.

(2)(a) Upon the conclusion of the presentation of the evidence, the court shall also instruct the jury that if it reaches a negative finding on any issue under subsection (1)(b) of this section, the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole, as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(b), unless 10 or more members of the jury further find that there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life imprisonment, in which case the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(c).

(b) If the jury returns a negative finding on any issue under subsection (1)(b) of this section and further finds that there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life imprisonment, the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections as provided in ORS 163.105 (1)(c).
(3)(a) When the defendant is found guilty of aggravated murder, and ORS 137.707 (2) applies or the state advises the court on the record that the state declines to present evidence for purposes of sentencing the defendant to death, the court:

(A) Shall not conduct a sentencing proceeding as described in subsection (1) of this section, and a sentence of death shall not be ordered.

(B) Shall conduct a sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(b) or life imprisonment as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(c). If the defendant waives all rights to a jury sentencing proceeding, the court shall conduct the sentencing proceeding as the trier of fact. The procedure for the sentencing proceeding, whether before a court or a jury, shall follow the procedure of subsection (1)(a) of this section, as modified by this subsection. In the proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to sentence, including, but not limited to, victim impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim or the impact of the crime on the victim's family.

(b) Following the presentation of evidence and argument under paragraph (a) of this subsection, the court shall instruct the jury that the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(b), unless after considering all of the evidence submitted, 10 or more members of the jury find there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life imprisonment with the possibility of parole as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(c). If 10 or more members of the jury find there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(c).

(c) Nothing in this subsection shall preclude the court from sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment, as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(c), or life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole, as described in ORS 163.105 (1)(b), pursuant to a stipulation of sentence or stipulation of sentencing facts agreed to and offered by both parties if the defendant waives all rights to a jury sentencing proceeding.

(4) If any part of subsection (2) of this section is held invalid and as a result thereof a defendant who has been sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of release or parole will instead be sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections as provided in ORS 163.105 (2), the defendant shall be confined for a minimum of 30 years without possibility of parole, release on work release or any form of temporary leave or employment at a forest or work camp. Subsection (2) of this section shall apply only to trials commencing on or after July 19, 1989.

(5) Notwithstanding subsection (1)(a) of this section, if the trial court grants a mistrial during the sentencing proceeding, the trial court, at the election of the state, shall either:

(a) Sentence the defendant to imprisonment for life in the custody of the Department of Corrections as provided in ORS 163.105 (1)(c); or

(b) Impanel a new sentencing jury for the purpose of conducting a new sentencing proceeding to determine if the defendant should be sentenced to:

(A) Death;

(B) Imprisonment for life without the possibility of release or parole as provided in ORS 163.105
(1)(b); or

(C) Imprisonment for life in the custody of the Department of Corrections as provided in ORS 163.105 (1)(c).

**OR. REV. STAT. § 163.155 (2012). MURDER CONVICTION OF PREGNANT VICTIM; SENTENCING.**

(1) When a defendant, who was at least 15 years of age at the time of committing the murder, is convicted of murdering a pregnant victim under ORS 163.115 (1)(a) and the defendant knew that the victim was pregnant, the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole or to life imprisonment. The court shall conduct a sentencing proceeding to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole as described in subsection (4) of this section or to life imprisonment as described in subsection (5) of this section. If the defendant waives all rights to a jury sentencing proceeding, the court shall conduct the sentencing proceeding as the trier of fact. The procedure for the sentencing proceeding, whether before a court or a jury, shall follow the procedure of ORS 163.150 (1)(a), as modified by this section.

(2) Following the presentation of evidence and argument under subsection (1) of this section, the court shall instruct the jury that the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole as described in subsection (4) of this section, unless after considering all of the evidence submitted, 10 or more members of the jury find there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life imprisonment with the possibility of release or parole as described in subsection (5) of this section. If 10 or more members of the jury do not find there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life imprisonment with the possibility of release or parole, the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole as described in subsection (4) of this section. If 10 or more members of the jury find there are sufficient mitigating circumstances to warrant life imprisonment with the possibility of release or parole, the trial court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as described in subsection (5) of this section.

(3) Nothing in this section precludes the court from sentencing the defendant to life imprisonment, as described in subsection (5) of this section, or life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole, as described in subsection (4) of this section, pursuant to a stipulation of sentence or stipulation of sentencing facts agreed to and offered by both parties if the defendant waives all rights to a jury sentencing proceeding.

(4) A sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole under this section may not be suspended, deferred or commuted by any judicial officer, and the State Board of Parole and Post-Prison Supervision may neither parole the prisoner nor reduce the period of confinement in any manner whatsoever. The Department of Corrections or any executive official may not permit the prisoner to participate in any sort of release or furlough program.

(5) If the defendant is sentenced to life imprisonment, the court shall order that the defendant be confined for a minimum of 30 years without possibility of parole, release to post-prison supervision, release on work release or any form of temporary leave or employment at a forest or work camp.

(6) At any time after completion of the minimum period of confinement pursuant to subsection (5) of this section, the board, upon the petition of a prisoner so confined, shall hold a hearing to determine if the prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. The sole issue shall be whether the prisoner is likely to be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. The proceeding shall be conducted in the manner prescribed for a contested case hearing under ORS chapter 183, except that:
(a) The prisoner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the likelihood of rehabilitation within a reasonable period of time;

(b) The prisoner has the right, if the prisoner is without sufficient funds to employ an attorney, to be represented by legal counsel, appointed by the board, at board expense; and

(c) The prisoner has the right to a subpoena upon a showing of the general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought, provided that any subpoena issued on behalf of the prisoner must be issued by the board pursuant to rules adopted by the board.

(7) If, upon hearing all of the evidence, the board, upon a unanimous vote of all of its members, finds that the prisoner is capable of rehabilitation and that the terms of the prisoner's confinement should be changed to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, release on post-prison supervision or work release, it shall enter an order to that effect and the order shall convert the terms of the prisoner's confinement to life imprisonment with the possibility of parole, release on post-prison supervision or work release and may set a release date. Otherwise the board shall deny the relief sought in the petition.

(8) Not less than two years after the denial of the relief sought in a petition under this section, the prisoner may petition again for a change in the terms of confinement. Further petitions for a change may be filed at intervals of not less than two years thereafter.

**OR. REV. STAT. § 163.820 (2012). CONCEALING BIRTH OF AN INFANT.**

(1) A person commits the crime of concealing the birth of an infant if the person conceals the corpse of a newborn child with intent to conceal the fact of its birth or to prevent a determination of whether it was born dead or alive.

(2) Concealing the birth of an infant is a Class A misdemeanor.

**PENNSYLVANIA**

**18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1102 (2012). SENTENCE FOR MURDER, MURDER OF UNBORN CHILD AND MURDER OF LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICER.**

(a) First degree.--

(1) Except as provided under section 1102.1 (relating to sentence of persons under the age of 18 for murder, murder of an unborn child and murder of a law enforcement officer), a person who has been convicted of a murder of the first degree or of murder of a law enforcement officer of the first degree shall be sentenced to death or to a term of life imprisonment in accordance with 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711 (relating to sentencing procedure for murder of the first degree).

(2) The sentence for a person who has been convicted of first degree murder of an unborn child shall be the same as the sentence for murder of the first degree, except that the death penalty shall not be imposed. This paragraph shall not affect the determination of an aggravating circumstance under 42
Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(17) for the killing of a pregnant woman.

(b) Second degree.-- Except as provided under section 1102.1, a person who has been convicted of murder of the second degree, of second degree murder of an unborn child or of second degree murder of a law enforcement officer shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment.

(c) Attempt, solicitation and conspiracy.--Notwithstanding section 1103(1) (relating to sentence of imprisonment for felony), a person who has been convicted of attempt, solicitation or conspiracy to commit murder, murder of an unborn child or murder of a law enforcement officer where serious bodily injury results may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which shall be fixed by the court at not more than 40 years. Where serious bodily injury does not result, the person may be sentenced to a term of imprisonment which shall be fixed by the court at not more than 20 years.

(d) Third degree.--Notwithstanding section 1103, a person who has been convicted of murder of the third degree or of third degree murder of an unborn child shall be sentenced to a term which shall be fixed by the court at not more than 40 years.


(a) First degree murder.--A person who has been convicted after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the first degree, first degree murder of an unborn child or murder of a law enforcement officer of the first degree and who was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense shall be sentenced as follows:

   (1) A person who at the time of the commission of the offense was 15 years of age or older shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole, or a term of imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be at least 35 years to life.

   (2) A person who at the time of the commission of the offense was under 15 years of age shall be sentenced to a term of life imprisonment without parole, or a term of imprisonment, the minimum of which shall be at least 25 years to life.

(b) Notice.--Reasonable notice to the defendant of the Commonwealth's intention to seek a sentence of life imprisonment without parole under subsection (a) shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing.

(c) Second degree murder.--A person who has been convicted after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the second degree, second degree murder of an unborn child or murder of a law enforcement officer of the second degree and who was under the age of 18 at the time of the commission of the offense shall be sentenced as follows:

   (1) A person who at the time of the commission of the offense was 15 years of age or older shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment the minimum of which shall be at least 30 years to life.

   (2) A person who at the time of the commission of the offense was under 15 years of age shall be sentenced to a term of imprisonment the minimum of which shall be at least 20 years to life.

(d) Findings.--In determining whether to impose a sentence of life without parole under subsection (a),
the court shall consider and make findings on the record regarding the following:

(1) The impact of the offense on each victim, including oral and written victim impact statements made or submitted by family members of the victim detailing the physical, psychological and economic effects of the crime on the victim and the victim's family. A victim impact statement may include comment on the sentence of the defendant.

(2) The impact of the offense on the community.

(3) The threat to the safety of the public or any individual posed by the defendant.

(4) The nature and circumstances of the offense committed by the defendant.

(5) The degree of the defendant's culpability.

(6) Guidelines for sentencing and resentencing adopted by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing.

(7) Age-related characteristics of the defendant, including:

   (i) Age.

   (ii) Mental capacity.

   (iii) Maturity.

   (iv) The degree of criminal sophistication exhibited by the defendant.

   (v) The nature and extent of any prior delinquent or criminal history, including the success or failure of any previous attempts by the court to rehabilitate the defendant.

   (vi) Probation or institutional reports.

   (vii) Other relevant factors.

(c) Minimum sentence.--Nothing under this section shall prevent the sentencing court from imposing a minimum sentence greater than that provided in this section. Sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing may not supersede the mandatory minimum sentences provided under this section.

(f) Appeal by Commonwealth.--If a sentencing court refuses to apply this section where applicable, the Commonwealth shall have the right to appellate review of the action of the sentencing court. The appellate court shall vacate the sentence and remand the case to the sentencing court for imposition of a sentence in accordance with this section if it finds that the sentence was imposed in violation of this section.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2501 (2012). CRIMINAL HOMICIDE.

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or
negligently causes the death of another human being.

(b) Classification.--Criminal homicide shall be classified as murder, voluntary manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2502 (2012). MURDER.

(a) Murder of the first degree.--A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the first degree when it is committed by an intentional killing.

(b) Murder of the second degree.--A criminal homicide constitutes murder of the second degree when it is committed while defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.

(c) Murder of the third degree.--All other kinds of murder shall be murder of the third degree. Murder of the third degree is a felony of the first degree.

(d) Definitions.--As used in this section the following words and phrases shall have the meanings given to them in this subsection:

“Fireman.” Includes any employee or member of a municipal fire department or volunteer fire company.

“Hijacking.” Any unlawful or unauthorized seizure or exercise of control, by force or violence or threat of force or violence.

“Intentional killing.” Killing by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.

“Perpetration of a felony.” The act of the defendant in engaging in or being an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing, or attempting to commit robbery, rape, or deviate sexual intercourse by force or threat of force, arson, burglary or kidnapping.

“Principal.” A person who is the actor or perpetrator of the crime.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2503 (2012). VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.

(a) General rule.--A person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by:

(1) the individual killed; or

(2) another whom the actor endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the individual killed.

(b) Unreasonable belief killing justifiable.--A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an individual commits voluntary manslaughter if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the killing under Chapter 5 of this title, but his belief is unreasonable.

(c) Grading.--Voluntary manslaughter is a felony of the first degree.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2504 (2012). INVolUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER.

(a) General rule.--A person is guilty of involuntary manslaughter when as a direct result of the doing of an unlawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, or the doing of a lawful act in a reckless or grossly negligent manner, he causes the death of another person.

(b) Grading.--Involuntary manslaughter is a misdemeanor of the first degree. Where the victim is under 12 years of age and is in the care, custody or control of the person who caused the death, involuntary manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2603 (2012). CRIMINAL HOMICIDE OF UNBORN CHILD.

(a) Offense defined.--An individual commits criminal homicide of an unborn child if the individual intentionally, knowingly, recklessly or negligently causes the death of an unborn child in violation of section 2604 (relating to murder of unborn child) or 2605 (relating to voluntary manslaughter of unborn child).

(b) Classification.--Criminal homicide of an unborn child shall be classified as murder of an unborn child or voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2604 (2012). MURDER OF UNBORN CHILD.

(a) First degree murder of unborn child.--

(1) A criminal homicide of an unborn child constitutes first degree murder of an unborn child when it is committed by an intentional killing.

(2) The penalty for first degree murder of an unborn child shall be imposed in accordance with section 1102(a)(2) (relating to sentence for murder and murder of an unborn child).

(b) Second degree murder of unborn child.--

(1) A criminal homicide of an unborn child constitutes second degree murder of an unborn child when it is committed while the defendant was engaged as a principal or an accomplice in the perpetration of a felony.

(2) The penalty for second degree murder of an unborn child shall be the same as for murder of the second degree.

(c) Third degree murder of unborn child.--

(1) All other kinds of murder of an unborn child shall be third degree murder of an unborn child.

(2) The penalty for third degree murder of an unborn child is the same as the penalty for murder of the third degree.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2605 (2012). VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER OF UNBORN CHILD.

(a) Offense defined.--A person who kills an unborn child without lawful justification commits voluntary

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
233
manslaughter of an unborn child if at the time of the killing he is acting under a sudden and intense passion resulting from serious provocation by:

(1) the mother of the unborn child whom the actor endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the unborn child; or

(2) another whom the actor endeavors to kill, but he negligently or accidentally causes the death of the unborn child.

(b) Unreasonable belief killing justifiable.--A person who intentionally or knowingly kills an unborn child commits voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child if at the time of the killing he believes the circumstances to be such that, if they existed, would justify the killing under Chapter 5 (relating to general principles of justification) but his belief is unreasonable.

(c) Penalty.--The penalty for voluntary manslaughter of an unborn child shall be the same as the penalty for voluntary manslaughter.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3212 (2012). INFANTICIDE.

(a) Status of fetus.--The law of this Commonwealth shall not be construed to imply that any human being born alive in the course of or as a result of an abortion or pregnancy termination, no matter what may be that human being's chance of survival, is not a person under the Constitution and laws of this Commonwealth.

(b) Care required.--All physicians and licensed medical personnel attending a child who is born alive during the course of an abortion or premature delivery, or after being carried to term, shall provide such child that type and degree of care and treatment which, in the good faith judgment of the physician, is commonly and customarily provided to any other person under similar conditions and circumstances. Any individual who intentionally, knowingly or recklessly violates the provisions of this subsection commits a felony of the third degree.

(c) Obligation of physician.--Whenever the physician or any other person is prevented by lack of parental or guardian consent from fulfilling his obligations under subsection (b), he shall nonetheless fulfill said obligations and immediately notify the juvenile court of the facts of the case. The juvenile court shall immediately institute an inquiry and, if it finds that the lack of parental or guardian consent is preventing treatment required under subsection (b), it shall immediately grant injunctive relief to require such treatment.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3732 (2012). HOMICIDE BY VEHICLE.

(a) Offense.--Any person who recklessly or with gross negligence causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any law of this Commonwealth or municipal ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic except section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) is guilty of homicide by vehicle, a felony of the third degree, when the violation is the cause of death.

(b) Sentencing.--

(1) In addition to any other penalty provided by law, a person convicted of a violation of subsection (a) may be sentenced to an additional term not to exceed five years' confinement if at trial the prosecution
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense occurred in an active work zone.

(1.1) In addition to any other penalty provided by law, a person convicted of a violation of subsection (a) as the result of a violation of section 3325 (relating to duty of driver on approach of emergency vehicle) or 3327 (relating to duty of driver in emergency response areas) and who is convicted of violating section 3325 or 3327 may be sentenced to an additional term not to exceed five years’ confinement when the violation resulted in death.

(2) The prosecution must indicate intent to proceed under this section in the indictment or information which commences the prosecution.

(3) The Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 2154 (relating to adoption of guidelines for sentencing), shall provide for a sentencing enhancement for an offense under this section when the violation occurred in an active work zone or was the result of a violation of section 3325 or 3327.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3735 (2012). HOMICIDE BY VEHICLE WHILE DRIVING UNDER INFLUENCE.

(a) Offense defined.--Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person as the result of a violation of section 3802 (relating to driving under influence of alcohol or controlled substance) and who is convicted of violating section 3802 is guilty of a felony of the second degree when the violation is the cause of death and the sentencing court shall order the person to serve a minimum term of imprisonment of not less than three years. A consecutive three-year term of imprisonment shall be imposed for each victim whose death is the result of the violation of section 3802.

(b) Applicability of sentencing guidelines.--The sentencing guidelines promulgated by the Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing shall not supersede the mandatory penalty of this section.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4303 (2012). CONCEALING DEATH OF CHILD.

(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of a misdemeanor of the first degree if he or she endeavors privately, either alone or by the procurement of others, to conceal the death of his or her child, so that it may not come to light, whether it was born dead or alive or whether it was murdered or not.

(b) Procedure.--If the same indictment or information charges any person with the murder of his or her child, as well as with the offense of the concealment of the death, the jury may acquit or convict him or her of both offenses, or find him or her guilty of one and acquit him or her of the other.

18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5502.2 (2012). HOMICIDE BY WATERCRAFT.

Any person who unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in the violation of any provision of this title or regulation promulgated under this title applying to the operation or equipment of boats or watercraft, except section 5502 (relating to operating watercraft under influence of alcohol or controlled substance), commits homicide by watercraft, a misdemeanor of the first degree, when the violation is the cause of death.
18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (2012). SENTENCING PROCEDURE FOR MURDER OF THE FIRST DEGREE.

(a) Procedure in jury trials.--

(1) After a verdict of murder of the first degree is recorded and before the jury is discharged, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing in which the jury shall determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death or life imprisonment.

(2) In the sentencing hearing, evidence concerning the victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family of the victim is admissible. Additionally, evidence may be presented as to any other matter that the court deems relevant and admissible on the question of the sentence to be imposed. Evidence shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances specified in subsections (d) and (e), and information concerning the victim and the impact that the death of the victim has had on the family of the victim. Evidence of aggravating circumstances shall be limited to those circumstances specified in subsection (d).

(3) After the presentation of evidence, the court shall permit counsel to present argument for or against the sentence of death. The court shall then instruct the jury in accordance with subsection (c).

(4) Failure of the jury to unanimously agree upon a sentence shall not impeach or in any way affect the guilty verdict previously recorded.

(b) Procedure in nonjury trials and guilty pleas.--If the defendant has waived a jury trial or pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding shall be conducted before a jury impaneled for that purpose unless waived by the defendant with the consent of the Commonwealth, in which case the trial judge shall hear the evidence and determine the penalty in the same manner as would a jury as provided in subsection (a).

(c) Instructions to jury.--

(1) Before the jury retires to consider the sentencing verdict, the court shall instruct the jury on the following matters:

(i) the aggravating circumstances specified in subsection (d) as to which there is some evidence.

(ii) the mitigating circumstances specified in subsection (e) as to which there is some evidence.

(iii) aggravating circumstances must be proved by the Commonwealth beyond a reasonable doubt; mitigating circumstances must be proved by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence.

(iv) the verdict must be a sentence of death if the jury unanimously finds at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d) and no mitigating circumstance or if the jury unanimously finds one or more aggravating circumstances which outweigh any mitigating circumstances. The verdict must be a sentence of life imprisonment in all other cases.

(v) the court may, in its discretion, discharge the jury if it is of the opinion that further deliberation will not result in a unanimous agreement as to the sentence, in which case the court shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment.
(2) The court shall instruct the jury that if it finds at least one aggravating circumstance and at least one mitigating circumstance, it shall consider, in weighing the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, any evidence presented about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the victim's family. The court shall also instruct the jury on any other matter that may be just and proper under the circumstances.

(d) Aggravating circumstances.--Aggravating circumstances shall be limited to the following:

1. The victim was a firefighter, peace officer, public servant concerned in official detention, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 5121 (relating to escape), judge of any court in the unified judicial system, the Attorney General of Pennsylvania, a deputy attorney general, district attorney, assistant district attorney, member of the General Assembly, Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Auditor General, State Treasurer, State law enforcement official, local law enforcement official, Federal law enforcement official or person employed to assist or assisting any law enforcement official in the performance of his duties, who was killed in the performance of his duties or as a result of his official position.

2. The defendant paid or was paid by another person or had contracted to pay or be paid by another person or had conspired to pay or be paid by another person for the killing of the victim.

3. The victim was being held by the defendant for ransom or reward, or as a shield or hostage.

4. The death of the victim occurred while defendant was engaged in the hijacking of an aircraft.

5. The victim was a prosecution witness to a murder or other felony committed by the defendant and was killed for the purpose of preventing his testimony against the defendant in any grand jury or criminal proceeding involving such offenses.

6. The defendant committed a killing while in the perpetration of a felony.

7. In the commission of the offense the defendant knowingly created a grave risk of death to another person in addition to the victim of the offense.

8. The offense was committed by means of torture.

9. The defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person.

10. The defendant has been convicted of another Federal or State offense, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue, for which a sentence of life imprisonment or death was imposable or the defendant was undergoing a sentence of life imprisonment for any reason at the time of the commission of the offense.

11. The defendant has been convicted of another murder committed in any jurisdiction and committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue.

12. The defendant has been convicted of voluntary manslaughter, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 2503 (relating to voluntary manslaughter), or a substantially equivalent crime in any other jurisdiction, committed either before or at the time of the offense at issue.

13. The defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice in the killing, as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c) (relating to liability for conduct of another; complicity), while in the perpetration of a felony.
under the provisions of the act of April 14, 1972 (P.L. 233, No. 64), known as The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act, and punishable under the provisions of 18 Pa.C.S. § 7508 (relating to drug trafficking sentencing and penalties).

(14) At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been involved, associated or in competition with the defendant in the sale, manufacture, distribution or delivery of any controlled substance or counterfeit controlled substance in violation of The Controlled Substance, Drug, Device and Cosmetic Act or similar law of any other state, the District of Columbia or the United States, and the defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c), and the killing resulted from or was related to that association, involvement or competition to promote the defendant's activities in selling, manufacturing, distributing or delivering controlled substances or counterfeit controlled substances.

(15) At the time of the killing, the victim was or had been a nongovernmental informant or had otherwise provided any investigative, law enforcement or police agency with information concerning criminal activity and the defendant committed the killing or was an accomplice to the killing as defined in 18 Pa.C.S. § 306(c), and the killing was in retaliation for the victim's activities as a nongovernmental informant or in providing information concerning criminal activity to an investigative, law enforcement or police agency.

(16) The victim was a child under 12 years of age.

(17) At the time of the killing, the victim was in her third trimester of pregnancy or the defendant had knowledge of the victim's pregnancy.

(18) At the time of the killing the defendant was subject to a court order restricting in any way the defendant's behavior toward the victim pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. Ch. 61 (relating to protection from abuse) or any other order of a court of common pleas or of the minor judiciary designed in whole or in part to protect the victim from the defendant.

(e) Mitigating circumstances.--Mitigating circumstances shall include the following:

(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal convictions.

(2) The defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance.

(3) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.

(4) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.

(5) The defendant acted under extreme duress, although not such duress as to constitute a defense to prosecution under 18 Pa.C.S. § 309 (relating to duress), or acted under the substantial domination of another person.

(6) The victim was a participant in the defendant's homicidal conduct or consented to the homicidal acts.

(7) The defendant's participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor.
(8) Any other evidence of mitigation concerning the character and record of the defendant and the circumstances of his offense.

(f) Sentencing verdict by the jury.--

(1) After hearing all the evidence and receiving the instructions from the court, the jury shall deliberate and render a sentencing verdict. In rendering the verdict, if the sentence is death, the jury shall set forth in such form as designated by the court the findings upon which the sentence is based.

(2) Based upon these findings, the jury shall set forth in writing whether the sentence is death or life imprisonment.

(g) Recording sentencing verdict.--Whenever the jury shall agree upon a sentencing verdict, it shall be received and recorded by the court. The court shall thereafter impose upon the defendant the sentence fixed by the jury.

(h) Review of death sentence.--

(1) A sentence of death shall be subject to automatic review by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania pursuant to its rules.

(2) In addition to its authority to correct errors at trial, the Supreme Court shall either affirm the sentence of death or vacate the sentence of death and remand for further proceedings as provided in paragraph (4).

(3) The Supreme Court shall affirm the sentence of death unless it determines that:

(i) the sentence of death was the product of passion, prejudice or any other arbitrary factor; or

(ii) the evidence fails to support the finding of at least one aggravating circumstance specified in subsection (d)

(iii) Deleted.

(4) If the Supreme Court determines that the death penalty must be vacated because none of the aggravating circumstances are supported by sufficient evidence, then it shall remand for the imposition of a life imprisonment sentence. If the Supreme Court determines that the death penalty must be vacated for any other reason, it shall remand for a new sentencing hearing pursuant to subsections (a) through (g).

(i) Record of death sentence to Governor.--Where a sentence of death is upheld by the Supreme Court, the prothonotary of the Supreme Court shall transmit to the Governor a full and complete record of the trial, sentencing hearing, imposition of sentence, opinion and order by the Supreme Court within 30 days of one of the following, whichever occurs first:

(1) the expiration of the time period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari or extension thereof where neither has been filed;

(2) the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari; or

(3) the disposition of the appeal by the United States Supreme Court, if that court grants the petition.
for writ of certiorari.

Notice of this transmission shall contemporaneously be provided to the Secretary of Corrections.

RHODE ISLAND


Any physician, nurse, or other licensed medical person who knowingly and intentionally fails to provide reasonable medical care and treatment to an infant born alive in the course of an abortion shall be guilty of a felony and upon conviction shall be fined not exceeding five thousand dollars ($5,000), or imprisoned not exceeding five (5) years, or both. Any physician, nurse, or other licensed medical person who knowingly and intentionally fails to provide reasonable medical care and treatment to an infant born alive in the course of an abortion, and, as a result of that failure, the infant dies, shall be guilty of the crime of manslaughter.


Every woman who shall conceal the birth of any issue of her body, which, if it were born alive, would be born out of wedlock, so that it may not be known whether it was born dead or alive, or shall conceal the death of any infant child born of her body out of wedlock, so that it may not be known whether the child was murdered or not, shall be imprisoned not exceeding ten (10) months or be fined not exceeding three hundred dollars ($300).


The unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought is murder. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing, or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson or any violation of §§ 11-4-2, 11-4-3, or 11-4-4, rape, any degree of sexual assault or child molestation, burglary or breaking and entering, robbery, kidnapping, or committed during the course of the perpetration, or attempted perpetration, of felony manufacture, sale, delivery, or other distribution of a controlled substance otherwise prohibited by the provisions of chapter 28 of title 21, or committed against any law enforcement officer in the performance of his or her duty or committed against an assistant attorney general or special assistant attorney general in the performance of his or her duty, or perpetrated from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him or her who is killed, is murder in the first degree. Any other murder is murder in the second degree. The degree of murder may be charged in the indictment or information, and the jury may find the degree of murder, whether the murder is charged in the indictment or information or not, or may find the defendant guilty of a lesser offense than that charged in the indictment or information, in accordance with the provisions of § 12-17-14.


Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall be imprisoned for life. Every person guilty of murder in the first degree: (1) committed intentionally while engaged in the commission of another capital offense or other felony for which life imprisonment may be imposed; (2) committed in a manner
creating a great risk of death to more than one person by means of a weapon or device or substance which
would normally be hazardous to the life of more than one person; (3) committed at the direction of
another person in return for money or any other thing of monetary value from that person; (4) committed
in a manner involving torture or an aggravated battery to the victim; (5) committed against any member
of the judiciary, law enforcement officer, corrections employee, assistant attorney general or special
assistant attorney general, or firefighter arising from the lawful performance of his or her official duties;
(6) committed by a person who at the time of the murder was committed to confinement in the adult
correctional institutions or the state reformatory for women upon conviction of a felony; or (7) committed
during the course of the perpetration or attempted perpetration of felony manufacture, sale, delivery or
other distribution of a controlled substance otherwise prohibited by the provisions of chapter 28 of title
21; shall be imprisoned for life and if ordered by the court pursuant to chapter 19.2 of title 12 that person
shall not be eligible for parole from imprisonment. Every person guilty of murder in the second degree
shall be imprisoned for not less than ten (10) years and may be imprisoned for life.

AGE OF EIGHTEEN (18).

If any person under the age of eighteen (18) who is kidnapped in violation of § 11-26-1 by a person other
than his or her natural or adopted parent dies as a direct result of the kidnapping, then the person
convicted of the offense shall be guilty of murder in the first degree and shall be punished by
imprisonment for life, and the court may, pursuant to chapter 19.2 of title 12, order that that person not be
eligible for parole.

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-2.2 (2012). PENALTY FOR MURDER IN THE FIRST DEGREE.

Every person guilty of murder in the first degree shall serve not less than fifteen (15) years of his or her
sentence before being eligible for parole.


(a) Every person who shall commit manslaughter shall be imprisoned not exceeding thirty (30) years.

(b) Where the provisions of The Domestic Violence Prevention Act, chapter 29 of title 12, are applicable,
the penalties for violation of this section shall also include the penalties as provided in § 12-29-5.

OF BIRTH.

Any woman, who shall be indicted or charged by information for the murder of her infant child born out
of wedlock, may also be charged in the same indictment or information with either or both of the offenses
mentioned in § 11-18-4, and if, upon trial, the jury shall acquit her on the charge of murder and find her
guilty of the other offenses, or either of them, judgment and sentence may be awarded against her
accordingly.


(a) The willful killing of an unborn quick child by any injury to the mother of the child, which would be
murder if it resulted in the death of the mother; the administration to any woman pregnant with a quick child of any medication, drug, or substance or the use of any instrument or device or other means, with intent to destroy the child, unless it is necessary to preserve the life of the mother; in the event of the death of the child; shall be deemed manslaughter.

(b) In any prosecution under this section, it shall not be necessary for the prosecution to prove that any necessity existed.

(c) For the purposes of this section, “quick child” means an unborn child whose heart is beating, who is experiencing electronically-measurable brain waves, who is discernibly moving, and who is so far developed and matured as to be capable of surviving the trauma of birth with the aid of usual medical care and facilities available in this state.


Any person convicted of the sale, delivery or distribution of a controlled substance, the sale of which would constitute a felony under chapter 28 of title 21, to a minor, or of knowingly providing a controlled substance for sale, delivery or distribution to a minor and death has resulted to the minor because of the ingestion orally, by injection, or by inhalation of the controlled substance, shall be imprisoned for life.

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-3-17. (2012). FETAL DEATH REGISTRATION.

(a) A fetal death certificate for each fetal death which occurs in this state after a gestation period of twenty (20) completed weeks or more shall be filed with the state registrar of vital records or as otherwise directed by the state registrar within seven (7) calendar days after the delivery and prior to removal of the fetus from the state, and shall be registered if it has been completed and filed in accordance with this section; provided:

   (1) That if the place of fetal death is unknown, a fetal death certificate shall be filed with the state registrar of vital records or as otherwise directed by the state registrar within seven (7) calendar days after the occurrence; and

   (2) That if a fetal death occurs on a moving conveyance, a fetal death certificate shall be filed with the state registrar of vital records or as otherwise directed by the state registrar.

   (b) All other fetal deaths, irrespective of the number of weeks uterogestation, shall be reported directly to the state department of health within seven (7) calendar days after delivery.

   (c) The funeral director, his or her duly authorized agent, or another person acting as agent, who first assumes custody of a fetus, shall file the fetal death certificate. In the absence of a funeral director or agent, the physician or another person in attendance at or after delivery shall file the certificate of fetal death. He or she shall obtain the personal data from the next of kin or the best qualified person or source available. He or she shall obtain the medical certification of cause of death from the person responsible for the certification.

   (d) The medical certification shall be completed and signed within forty-eight (48) hours after delivery by the physician in attendance at or after delivery except when inquiry is required by chapter 4 of
(e) When a fetal death occurs without medical attendance upon the mother at or after the delivery or when inquiry is required by chapter 4 of this title, the medical examiner shall investigate the cause of fetal death and shall complete and sign the medical certification within forty-eight (48) hours after taking charge of the case.

(f) Each funeral director shall, on or before the tenth (10th) day of the following month, file a report with the state registrar of vital records listing funerals and/or decedents serviced following deaths or fetal deaths within the month. Failure to file these reports or any of the certificates required under § 23-3-16 and this section within the prescribed time limits shall be grounds for disciplinary action, including revocation of license by the state board of examiners in embalming.

R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-27-1. (2012). DRIVING SO AS TO ENDANGER, RESULTING IN DEATH.

(a) When the death of any person ensues as a proximate result of an injury received by the operation of any vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, including violations of § 31-27-22, the person so operating the vehicle shall be guilty of “driving so as to endanger, resulting in death”.

(b) Any person charged with the commission of this offense shall upon conviction be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years and have his or her license to operate a motor vehicle suspended for no more than five (5) years.

SOUTH CAROLINA

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-10 (2012). “MURDER” DEFINED.

“Murder” is the killing of any person with malice aforethought, either express or implied.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (2012). PUNISHMENT FOR MURDER; SEPARATE SENTENCING PROCEEDING WHEN DEATH PENALTY SOUGHT.

(A) A person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to murder must be punished by death, or by a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years to life. If the State seeks the death penalty and a statutory aggravating circumstance is found beyond a reasonable doubt pursuant to subsections (B) and (C), and a recommendation of death is not made, the trial judge must impose a sentence of life imprisonment. For purposes of this section, “life” or “life imprisonment” means until death of the offender without the possibility of parole, and when requested by the State or the defendant, the judge must charge the jury in his instructions that life imprisonment means until the death of the defendant without the possibility of parole. In cases where the defendant is eligible for parole, and when requested by the State or the defendant, the judge must charge the jury in his instructions that life imprisonment means until the death of the defendant without the possibility of parole. In cases where the defendant is eligible for parole, the judge must charge the applicable parole eligibility statute. No person sentenced to life imprisonment pursuant to this section is eligible for parole, community supervision, or any early release program, nor is the person eligible to receive any work credits, education credits, good conduct credits, or any other credits that would reduce the mandatory life imprisonment required by this section. No person sentenced to a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years to life pursuant to this section is eligible for parole or any early release program, nor is the person eligible to receive any work credits, education credits, good conduct credits, or any other credits that would reduce the mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty
years to life required by this section. Under no circumstances may a female who is pregnant be executed so long as she is pregnant or for a period of at least nine months after she is no longer pregnant. When the Governor commutes a sentence of death to life imprisonment under the provisions of Section 14, Article IV of the Constitution of South Carolina, 1895, the commutee is not eligible for parole, community supervision, or any early release program, nor is the person eligible to receive any work credits, good conduct credits, education credits, or any other credits that would reduce the mandatory imprisonment required by this subsection.

(B) When the State seeks the death penalty, upon conviction or adjudication of guilt of a defendant of murder, the court shall conduct a separate sentencing proceeding. In the proceeding, if a statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant must be sentenced to either death or life imprisonment. If no statutory aggravating circumstance is found, the defendant must be sentenced to either life imprisonment or a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years to life. The proceeding must be conducted by the trial judge before the trial jury as soon as practicable after the lapse of twenty-four hours unless waived by the defendant. If trial by jury has been waived by the defendant and the State, or if the defendant pleaded guilty, the sentencing proceeding must be conducted before the judge. In the sentencing proceeding, the jury or judge shall hear additional evidence in extenuation, mitigation, or aggravation of the punishment. Only such evidence in aggravation as the State has informed the defendant in writing before the trial is admissible. This section must not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the Constitution of the United States or the State of South Carolina or the applicable laws of either. The State, the defendant, and his counsel are permitted to present arguments for or against the sentence to be imposed. The defendant and his counsel shall have the closing argument regarding the sentence to be imposed.

(C) The judge shall consider, or he shall include in his instructions to the jury for it to consider, mitigating circumstances otherwise authorized or allowed by law and the following statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence:

(a) Statutory aggravating circumstances:

   (1) The murder was committed while in the commission of the following crimes or acts:

      (a) criminal sexual conduct in any degree;

      (b) kidnapping;

      (c) trafficking in persons;

      (d) burglary in any degree;

      (e) robbery while armed with a deadly weapon;

      (f) larceny with use of a deadly weapon;

      (g) killing by poison;

      (h) drug trafficking as defined in Section 44-53-370(e), 44-53-375(B), 44-53-440, or 44-53-445;

      (i) physical torture;
(j) dismemberment of a person; or

(k) arson in the first degree as defined in Section 16-11-110(A).

(2) The murder was committed by a person with a prior conviction for murder.

(3) The offender by his act of murder knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which normally would be hazardous to the lives of more than one person.

(4) The offender committed the murder for himself or another for the purpose of receiving money or a thing of monetary value.

(5) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, solicitor, former solicitor, or other officer of the court during or because of the exercise of his official duty.

(6) The offender caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person.

(7) The murder of a federal, state, or local law enforcement officer or former federal, state, or local law enforcement officer, peace officer or former peace officer, corrections officer or former corrections officer, including a county or municipal corrections officer or a former county or municipal corrections officer, a county or municipal detention facility employee or former county or municipal detention facility employee, or fireman or former fireman during or because of the performance of his official duties.

(8) The murder of a family member of an official listed in subitems (5) and (7) above with the intent to impede or retaliate against the official. “Family member” means a spouse, parent, brother, sister, child, or person to whom the official stands in the place of a parent or a person living in the official's household and related to him by blood or marriage.

(9) Two or more persons were murdered by the defendant by one act or pursuant to one scheme or course of conduct.

(10) The murder of a child eleven years of age or under.

(11) The murder of a witness or potential witness committed at any time during the criminal process for the purpose of impeding or deterring prosecution of any crime.

(12) The murder was committed by a person deemed a sexually violent predator pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 48, Title 44, or a person deemed a sexually violent predator who is released pursuant to Section 44-48-120.

(b) Mitigating circumstances:

(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal conviction involving the use of violence against another person.

(2) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance.
(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act.

(4) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by another person and his participation was relatively minor.

(5) The defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person.

(6) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired.

(7) The age or mentality of the defendant at the time of the crime.

(8) The defendant was provoked by the victim into committing the murder.

(9) The defendant was below the age of eighteen at the time of the crime.

(10) The defendant had mental retardation at the time of the crime. “Mental retardation” means significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning existing concurrently with deficits in adaptive behavior and manifested during the developmental period.

The statutory instructions as to statutory aggravating and mitigating circumstances must be given in charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberation. The jury, if its verdict is a recommendation of death, shall designate in writing, and signed by all members of the jury, the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it found beyond a reasonable doubt. The jury, if it does not recommend death, after finding a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, shall designate in writing, and signed by all members of the jury, the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances it found beyond a reasonable doubt. In nonjury cases the judge shall make the designation of the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances. Unless at least one of the statutory aggravating circumstances enumerated in this section is found, the death penalty must not be imposed.

Where a statutory aggravating circumstance is found and a recommendation of death is made, the trial judge shall sentence the defendant to death. The trial judge, before imposing the death penalty, shall find as an affirmative fact that the death penalty was warranted under the evidence of the case and was not a result of prejudice, passion, or any other arbitrary factor. Where a statutory aggravating circumstance is found and a sentence of death is not recommended by the jury, the trial judge shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as provided in subsection (A). Before dismissing the jury, the trial judge shall question the jury as to whether or not it found a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. If the jury does not unanimously find any statutory aggravating circumstances or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, it shall not make a sentencing recommendation. Where a statutory aggravating circumstance is not found, the trial judge shall sentence the defendant to either life imprisonment or a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment for thirty years. No person sentenced to life imprisonment or a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment under this section is eligible for parole or to receive any work credits, good conduct credits, education credits, or any other credits that would reduce the sentence required by this section. If the jury has found a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall designate this finding, in writing, signed by all the members of the jury. The jury shall not recommend the death penalty if the vote for such penalty is not unanimous as provided. If members of the jury after a reasonable deliberation cannot agree on a recommendation as to whether or not the death sentence should be imposed on a defendant found guilty of murder, the trial judge shall dismiss such jury and shall sentence the defendant to life imprisonment as provided in subsection (A).
(D) Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 14-7-1020, in cases involving capital punishment a person called as a juror must be examined by the attorney for the defense.

(E) In a criminal action in which a defendant is charged with a crime which may be punishable by death, a person may not be disqualified, excused, or excluded from service as a juror by reason of his beliefs or attitudes against capital punishment unless such beliefs or attitudes would render him unable to return a verdict according to law.


A person who, with intent to kill, attempts to kill another person with malice aforethought, either expressed or implied, commits the offense of attempted murder. A person who violates this section is guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, must be imprisoned for not more than thirty years. A sentence imposed pursuant to this section may not be suspended nor may probation be granted.


A person convicted of manslaughter, or the unlawful killing of another without malice, express or implied, must be imprisoned not more than thirty years or less than two years.


With regard to the crime of involuntary manslaughter, criminal negligence is defined as the reckless disregard of the safety of others. A person charged with the crime of involuntary manslaughter may be convicted only upon a showing of criminal negligence as defined in this section. A person convicted of involuntary manslaughter must be imprisoned not more than five years.


(A) A person is guilty of homicide by child abuse if the person:

(1) causes the death of a child under the age of eleven while committing child abuse or neglect, and the death occurs under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life; or

(2) knowingly aids and abets another person to commit child abuse or neglect, and the child abuse or neglect results in the death of a child under the age of eleven.

(B) For purposes of this section, the following definitions apply:

(1) “child abuse or neglect” means an act or omission by any person which causes harm to the child's physical health or welfare;

(2) “harm” to a child's health or welfare occurs when a person:

(a) inflicts or allows to be inflicted upon the child physical injury, including injuries sustained as a result of excessive corporal punishment;
(b) fails to supply the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or health care, and the failure to do so causes a physical injury or condition resulting in death; or

(c) abandons the child resulting in the child's death.

(C) Homicide by child abuse is a felony and a person who is convicted of or pleads guilty to homicide by child abuse:

(1) under subsection (A)(1) may be imprisoned for life but not less than a term of twenty years; or

(2) under subsection (A)(2) must be imprisoned for a term not exceeding twenty years nor less than ten years.

(D) In sentencing a person under this section, the judge must consider any aggravating circumstances including, but not limited to, a defendant's past pattern of child abuse or neglect of a child under the age of eleven, and any mitigating circumstances; however, a child's crying does not constitute provocation so as to be considered a mitigating circumstance.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-1083 (2012). DEATH OR INJURY OF CHILD IN UTERO DUE TO COMMISSION OF VIOLENT CRIME.

(A) (1) A person who commits a violent crime, as defined in Section 16-1-60, that causes the death of, or bodily injury to, a child who is in utero at the time that the violent crime was committed, is guilty of a separate offense under this section.

(2)(a) Except as otherwise provided in this subsection, the punishment for a separate offense, as provided for in subsection (A)(1), is the same as the punishment provided for that criminal offense had the death or bodily injury occurred to the unborn child's mother.

(b) Prosecution of an offense under this section does not require proof that:

(i) the person committing the violent offense had knowledge or should have had knowledge that the victim of the underlying offense was pregnant; or

(ii) the defendant intended to cause the death of, or bodily injury to, the unborn child.

(c) If the person engaging in the violent offense intentionally killed or attempted to kill the unborn child, that person must, instead of being punished under subsection (A)(2)(a), be punished for murder or attempted murder.

(d) Notwithstanding any provision of this section or any other provision of law, the death penalty must not be imposed for an offense prosecuted under this section.

(B) Nothing in this section may be construed to permit the prosecution under this section:

(1) of a person for conduct relating to an abortion for which the consent of the pregnant woman, or a person authorized by law to act on her behalf, has been obtained or for which such consent is implied by law;
(2) of a person for any medical treatment of the pregnant woman or her unborn child; or

(3) of a woman with respect to her unborn child.

(C) As used in this section, the term “unborn child” means a child in utero, and the term “child in utero” or “child who is in utero” means a member of the species homo sapiens, at any state of development, who is carried in the womb.

(D) Nothing in this section shall be construed to broaden or restrict any other rights currently existing for the child who is in utero.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-80 (2012). PERFORMING OR SOLICITING UNLAWFUL ABORTION; TESTIMONY OF WOMAN MAY BE COMPELLED.

(a) Any person, except as permitted by this chapter, who provides, supplies, prescribes or administers any drug, medicine, prescription or substance to any woman or uses or employs any device, instrument or other means upon any woman, with the intent to produce an abortion shall be deemed guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not less than two nor more than five years or fined not more than five thousand dollars, or both. Provided, that the provisions of this item shall not apply to any woman upon whom an abortion has been attempted or performed.

(b) Except as otherwise permitted by this chapter, any woman who solicits of any person or otherwise procures any drug, medicine, prescription or substance and administers it to herself or who submits to any operation or procedure or who uses or employs any device or instrument or other means with intent to produce an abortion, unless it is necessary to preserve her life, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of not more than two years or fined not more than one thousand dollars, or both.

(c) Any woman upon whom an abortion has been performed or attempted in violation of the provisions of this chapter may be compelled to testify in any criminal prosecution initiated pursuant to subsection (a) of this section; provided, however, that such testimony shall not be admissible in any civil or criminal action against such woman and she shall be forever immune from any prosecution for having solicited or otherwise procured the performance of the abortion or the attempted performance of the abortion upon her.

S.C. CODE ANN. § 50-21-115 (2012). RECKLESS HOMICIDE BY OPERATION OF BOAT; PENALTY; PERSON CONVICTED OF CERTAIN OFFENSES PROHIBITED FROM OPERATING BOAT.

When the death of a person ensues within three years as a proximate result of injury received by the operation of a boat in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person operating the boat is guilty of reckless homicide. A person convicted of reckless homicide or a person who enters a plea of guilty of reckless homicide and receives sentence thereon must be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned for not more than ten years, or both. A person convicted of reckless homicide, involuntary manslaughter, manslaughter, or murder in the operation of a boat must be prohibited by the court having jurisdiction of these violations from operating any boat within this State for a period of not more than five years.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 56-5-2910 (2012). RECKLESS VEHICULAR HOMICIDE; PENALTIES; REVOCATION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE; REINSTATEMENT OF LICENSE; CONDITIONS; CONSEQUENCES FOR SUBSEQUENT VIOLATIONS.

(A) When the death of a person ensues within three years as a proximate result of injury received by the driving of a vehicle in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person operating the vehicle is guilty of reckless vehicular homicide. A person who is convicted of, pleads guilty to, or pleads nolo contendere to reckless vehicular homicide is guilty of a felony, and must be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. The Department of Motor Vehicles shall revoke for five years the driver's license of a person convicted of reckless vehicular homicide.

(B) After one year from the date of revocation, the person may petition the circuit court in the county of the person's residence for reinstatement of the person's driver's license. The person shall serve a copy of the petition upon the solicitor of the county. The solicitor shall notify the representative of the victim of the reckless vehicular homicide of the person's intent to seek reinstatement of the person's driver's license. The solicitor or his designee within thirty days may respond to the petition and demand a hearing on the merits of the petition. If the solicitor or his designee does not demand a hearing, the circuit court shall consider any affidavit submitted by the petitioner and the solicitor or his designee when determining whether the conditions required for driving privilege reinstatement have been met by the petitioner. The court may order the reinstatement of the person's driver's license upon the following conditions:

1. intoxicating alcohol, beer, wine, drugs, or narcotics were not involved in the vehicular accident which resulted in the reckless homicide conviction or plea;

2. the petitioner has served the term of imprisonment or paid the fine, assessment, and restitution in full, or both; and

3. the person's overall driving record, attitude, habits, character, and driving ability would make it safe to reinstate the privilege of operating a motor vehicle.

The circuit court may order the reinstatement of the driver's license before the completion of the full five-year revocation period, or the judge may order the granting of a route restricted license for the remainder of the five-year period to allow the person to drive to and from employment or school, or the judge may place other restrictions on the driver's license reinstatement. The order of the judge must be transmitted to the Department of Motor Vehicles within ten days.

(C) If the person's privilege to operate a motor vehicle is reinstated, a subsequent violation of the motor vehicle laws for any moving violation requires the automatic cancellation of the person's driver's license and imposition of the full period of revocation for the reckless vehicular homicide violation.

SOUTH DAKOTA

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-1 (2012). HOMICIDE DEFINED.

Homicide is the killing of one human being, including an unborn child, by another. Homicide is either:

National Center for Prosecution of Child Abuse
National District Attorneys Association
250
(1) Murder;
(2) Manslaughter;
(3) Excusable homicide;
(4) Justifiable homicide; or
(5) Vehicular homicide.

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-16-1.1 (2012). FETAL HOMICIDE—FELONY—APPLICATION.

Homicide is fetal homicide if the person knew, or reasonably should have known, that a woman bearing an unborn child was pregnant and caused the death of the unborn child without lawful justification and if the person:

(1) Intended to cause the death of or do serious bodily injury to the pregnant woman or the unborn child; or

(2) Knew that the acts taken would cause death or serious bodily injury to the pregnant woman or her unborn child; or

(3) If perpetrated without any design to effect death by a person engaged in the commission of any felony.

Fetal homicide is a Class B felony.

This section does not apply to acts which cause the death of an unborn child if those acts were committed during any abortion, lawful or unlawful, to which the pregnant woman consented.


Homicide is murder in the first degree:

(1) If perpetrated without authority of law and with a premeditated design to effect the death of the person killed or of any other human being, including an unborn child; or

(2) If committed by a person engaged in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, or unlawful throwing, placing, or discharging of a destructive device or explosive.

Homicide is also murder in the first degree if committed by a person who perpetrated, or who attempted to perpetrate, any arson, rape, robbery, burglary, kidnapping or unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or explosive and who subsequently effects the death of any victim of such crime to prevent detection or prosecution of the crime.
S.D. Codified Laws § 22-16-7 (2012). Homicide as murder in the second degree.

Homicide is murder in the second degree if perpetrated by any act imminently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved mind, without regard for human life, although without any premeditated design to effect the death of any particular person, including an unborn child.


Murder in the first degree is a Class A felony. Murder in the second degree is a Class B felony.


Homicide is manslaughter in the first degree if perpetrated:

(1) Without any design to effect death, including an unborn child, while engaged in the commission of any felony other than as provided in § 22-16-4(2);

(2) Without any design to effect death, including an unborn child, and in a heat of passion, but in a cruel and unusual manner;

(3) Without any design to effect death, including an unborn child, but by means of a dangerous weapon;

(4) Unnecessarily, either while resisting an attempt by the person killed to commit a crime or after such attempt has failed.

Manslaughter in the first degree is a Class C felony.


Any reckless killing of one human being, including an unborn child, by the act or procurement of another which, under the provisions of this chapter, is neither murder nor manslaughter in the first degree, nor excusable nor justifiable homicide, is manslaughter in the second degree. Manslaughter in the second degree is a Class 4 felony.


Any person who, while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or substances in a manner and to a degree prohibited by § 32-23-1, without design to effect death, operates or drives a vehicle of any kind in a negligent manner and thereby causes the death of another person, including an unborn child, is guilty of vehicular homicide. Vehicular homicide is a Class 3 felony. In addition to any other penalty prescribed by law, the court shall order that the driver's license of any person convicted of vehicular homicide be revoked for a period of not less than ten years from the date sentence is imposed or ten years from the date of initial release from imprisonment, whichever is later. In the event the person is returned to imprisonment prior to the completion of the period of driver's license revocation, time spent imprisoned does not count toward fulfilling the period of revocation.
Pursuant to §§ 23A-27A-2 to 23A-27A-6, inclusive, in all cases for which the death penalty may be authorized, the judge shall consider, or shall include in instructions to the jury for it to consider, any mitigating circumstances and any of the following aggravating circumstances which may be supported by the evidence:

(1) The offense was committed by a person with a prior record of conviction for a Class A or Class B felony, or the offense of murder was committed by a person who has a felony conviction for a crime of violence as defined in subdivision 22-1-2(9);

(2) The defendant by the defendant's act knowingly created a great risk of death to more than one person in a public place by means of a weapon or device which would normally be hazardous to the lives of more than one person;

(3) The defendant committed the offense for the benefit of the defendant or another, for the purpose of receiving money or any other thing of monetary value;

(4) The defendant committed the offense on a judicial officer, former judicial officer, prosecutor, or former prosecutor while such prosecutor, former prosecutor, judicial officer, or former judicial officer was engaged in the performance of such person's official duties or where a major part of the motivation for the offense came from the official actions of such judicial officer, former judicial officer, prosecutor, or former prosecutor;

(5) The defendant caused or directed another to commit murder or committed murder as an agent or employee of another person;

(6) The offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim. Any murder is wantonly vile, horrible, and inhuman if the victim is less than thirteen years of age;

(7) The offense was committed against a law enforcement officer, employee of a corrections institution, or firefighter while engaged in the performance of such person's official duties;

(8) The offense was committed by a person in, or who has escaped from, the lawful custody of a law enforcement officer or place of lawful confinement;

(9) The offense was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or custody in a place of lawful confinement, of the defendant or another; or

(10) The offense was committed in the course of manufacturing, distributing, or dispensing substances listed in Schedules I and II in violation of § 22-42-2.
TENNESSEE


Criminal homicide is the unlawful killing of another person, which may be first degree murder, second degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide or vehicular homicide.


(a) First degree murder is:

(1) A premeditated and intentional killing of another;

(2) A killing of another committed in the perpetration of or attempt to perpetrate any first degree murder, act of terrorism, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child or aircraft piracy; or

(3) A killing of another committed as the result of the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb.

(b) No culpable mental state is required for conviction under subdivision (a)(2) or (a)(3), except the intent to commit the enumerated offenses or acts in those subdivisions.

(c) A person convicted of first degree murder shall be punished by:

(1) Death;

(2) Imprisonment for life without possibility of parole; or

(3) Imprisonment for life.

(d) As used in subdivision (a)(1), “premeditation” is an act done after the exercise of reflection and judgment. “Premeditation” means that the intent to kill must have been formed prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill pre-exist in the mind of the accused for any definite period of time. The mental state of the accused at the time the accused allegedly decided to kill must be carefully considered in order to determine whether the accused was sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204 (2012). FIRST DEGREE MURDERL SENTENCING; FACTORS

(a) Upon a trial for first degree murder, should the jury find the defendant guilty of first degree murder, it shall not fix punishment as part of the verdict, but the jury shall fix the punishment in a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether the defendant shall be sentenced to death, to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole, or to imprisonment for life. The separate sentencing hearing shall be conducted as soon as practicable before the same jury that determined guilt, subject to the provisions of subsection (k) relating to certain retrials on punishment.

(b) In the sentencing proceeding, the attorney for the state shall be allowed to make an opening statement to the jury and then the attorney for the defendant shall also be allowed such statement; provided, that the
waiver of opening statement by one party shall not preclude the opening statement by the other party.

(c) In the sentencing proceeding, evidence may be presented as to any matter that the court deems relevant to the punishment, and may include, but not be limited to, the nature and circumstances of the crime; the defendant's character, background history, and physical condition; any evidence tending to establish or rebut the aggravating circumstances enumerated in subsection (i); and any evidence tending to establish or rebut any mitigating factors. Any such evidence that the court deems to have probative value on the issue of punishment may be received, regardless of its admissibility under the rules of evidence; provided, that the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements so admitted. However, this subsection (c) shall not be construed to authorize the introduction of any evidence secured in violation of the constitution of the United States or the constitution of Tennessee. In all cases where the state relies upon the aggravating factor that the defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person, either party shall be permitted to introduce evidence concerning the facts and circumstances of the prior conviction. Such evidence shall not be construed to pose a danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury and shall not be subject to exclusion on the ground that the probative value of the evidence is outweighed by prejudice to either party. Such evidence shall be used by the jury in determining the weight to be accorded the aggravating factor. The court shall permit a member or members, or a representative or representatives of the victim's family to testify at the sentencing hearing about the victim and about the impact of the murder on the family of the victim and other relevant persons. The evidence may be considered by the jury in determining which sentence to impose. The court shall permit members or representatives of the victim's family to attend the trial, and those persons shall not be excluded because the person or persons shall testify during the sentencing proceeding as to the impact of the offense.

(d) In the sentencing proceeding, the state shall be allowed to make a closing argument to the jury; and then the attorney for the defendant shall also be allowed such argument, with the state having the right of closing.

(e)(1) After closing arguments in the sentencing hearing, the trial judge shall include instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any of the statutory aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection (i), which may be raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both. The trial judge shall also include instructions for the jury to weigh and consider any mitigating circumstances raised by the evidence at either the guilt or sentencing hearing, or both, which shall include, but not be limited to, those circumstances set forth in subsection (j). These instructions and the manner of arriving at a sentence shall be given in the oral charge and in writing to the jury for its deliberations. However, a reviewing court shall not set aside a sentence of death or of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole on the ground that the trial court did not specifically instruct the jury as to a requested mitigating factor that is not enumerated in subsection (j).

(2) The trial judge shall provide the jury three (3) separate verdict forms, as specified by subdivisions (f)(1), (f)(2), and (g)(2)(B). The jury shall be instructed that a defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life shall not be eligible for parole consideration until the defendant has served at least twenty-five (25) full calendar years of the sentence. The jury shall also be instructed that a defendant who receives a sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole shall never be eligible for release on parole.

(f)(1) If the jury unanimously determines that no statutory aggravating circumstance has been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, the sentence shall be imprisonment for life. The jury shall then return its verdict to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows:
PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE

(2) If the jury unanimously determines that a statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt, but that such circumstance or circumstances have not been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstance or circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt, the jury shall, in its considered discretion, sentence the defendant either to imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or to imprisonment for life. The trial judge shall instruct the jury that, in choosing between the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life, the jury shall weigh and consider the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and any mitigating circumstance or circumstances. In its verdict, the jury shall specify the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt and shall return its verdict to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows:

PUNISHMENT OF IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE WITHOUT POSSIBILITY OF PAROLE OR IMPRISONMENT FOR LIFE

(g)(1) The sentence shall be death, if the jury unanimously determines that:

   (A) At least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance or several statutory aggravating circumstances have been proven by the state beyond a reasonable doubt; and

   (B) Such circumstance or circumstances have been proven by the state to outweigh any mitigating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt.

(2)(A) If the death penalty is the sentence of the jury, the jury shall:

   (i) Reduce to writing the statutory aggravating circumstance or statutory aggravating circumstances so found; and

   (ii) Signify that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the statutory aggravating circumstance or circumstances outweigh any mitigating circumstances.

   (B) These findings and verdict shall be returned to the judge upon a form provided by the court, which may appear substantially as follows:

PUNISHMENT OF DEATH

(h) If the jury cannot ultimately agree on punishment, the trial judge shall inquire of the foreperson of the jury whether the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death. If the jury is divided over imposing a sentence of death, the judge shall instruct the jury that in further deliberations, the jury shall only consider the sentences of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole and imprisonment for life. If, after further deliberations, the jury still cannot agree as to sentence, the trial judge shall dismiss the jury and the judge shall impose a sentence of imprisonment for life. The judge shall not instruct the jury, nor shall the attorneys be permitted to comment at any time to the jury, on the effect of the jury's failure to agree on a punishment.

(i) No death penalty or sentence of imprisonment for life without possibility of parole shall be imposed, except upon a unanimous finding that the state has proven beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of one
(1) or more of the statutory aggravating circumstances, which are limited to the following:

(1) The murder was committed against a person less than twelve (12) years of age and the defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older;

(2) The defendant was previously convicted of one (1) or more felonies, other than the present charge, whose statutory elements involve the use of violence to the person;

(3) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons, other than the victim murdered, during the act of murder;

(4) The defendant committed the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration, or employed another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration;

(5) The murder was especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel, in that it involved torture or serious physical abuse beyond that necessary to produce death;

(6) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding, interfering with, or preventing a lawful arrest or prosecution of the defendant or another;

(7) The murder was knowingly committed, solicited, directed, or aided by the defendant, while the defendant had a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, or was fleeing after having a substantial role in committing or attempting to commit, any first degree murder, arson, rape, robbery, burglary, theft, kidnapping, aggravated child abuse, aggravated child neglect, rape of a child, aggravated rape of a child, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;

(8) The murder was committed by the defendant while the defendant was in lawful custody or in a place of lawful confinement or during the defendant’s escape from lawful custody or from a place of lawful confinement;

(9) The murder was committed against any law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic or firefighter, who was engaged in the performance of official duties, and the defendant knew or reasonably should have known that the victim was a law enforcement officer, corrections official, corrections employee, probation and parole officer, emergency medical or rescue worker, emergency medical technician, paramedic or firefighter engaged in the performance of official duties;

(10) The murder was committed against any present or former judge, district attorney general or state attorney general, assistant district attorney general or assistant state attorney general, due to or because of the exercise of the victim’s official duty or status and the defendant knew that the victim occupied such office;

(11) The murder was committed against a national, state, or local popularly elected official, due to or because of the official’s lawful duties or status, and the defendant knew that the victim was such an official;

(12) The defendant committed “mass murder,” which is defined as the murder of three (3) or more persons, whether committed during a single criminal episode or at different times within a forty-eight-
month period;

(13) The defendant knowingly mutilated the body of the victim after death;

(14) The victim of the murder was seventy (70) years of age or older; or the victim of the murder was particularly vulnerable due to a significant disability, whether mental or physical, and at the time of the murder the defendant knew or reasonably should have known of such disability;

(15) The murder was committed in the course of an act of terrorism;

(16) The murder was committed against a pregnant woman, and the defendant intentionally killed the victim, knowing that she was pregnant; or

(17) The murder was committed at random and the reasons for the killing are not obvious or easily understood.

(j) In arriving at the punishment, the jury shall consider, pursuant to the provisions of this section, any mitigating circumstances, which shall include, but are not limited to, the following:

(1) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;

(2) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;

(3) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act;

(4) The murder was committed under circumstances that the defendant reasonably believed to provide a moral justification for the defendant's conduct;

(5) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by another person and the defendant's participation was relatively minor;

(6) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person;

(7) The youth or advanced age of the defendant at the time of the crime;

(8) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of the defendant's conduct or to conform the defendant's conduct to the requirements of the law was substantially impaired as a result of mental disease or defect or intoxication, which was insufficient to establish a defense to the crime but which substantially affected the defendant's judgment; and

(9) Any other mitigating factor that is raised by the evidence produced by either the prosecution or defense, at either the guilt or sentencing hearing.

(k) Upon motion for a new trial, after a conviction of first degree murder, if the court finds error in the trial determining guilt, a new trial on both guilt and sentencing shall be held; but if the court finds error alone in the trial determining punishment, a new trial on the issue of punishment alone shall be held by a new jury empanelled for that purpose. If the trial court, or any other court with jurisdiction to do so, orders that a defendant convicted of first degree murder, whether the sentence is death, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or imprisonment for life, be granted a new trial, either as to guilt or
punishment, or both, the new trial shall include the possible punishments of death, imprisonment for life without possibility of parole or imprisonment for life.


(a) Second degree murder is:

(1) A knowing killing of another; or

(2) A killing of another that results from the unlawful distribution of any Schedule I or Schedule II drug, when the drug is the proximate cause of the death of the user.

(b) In a prosecution for a violation of this section, if the defendant knowingly engages in multiple incidents of domestic abuse, assault or the infliction of bodily injury against a single victim, the trier of fact may infer that the defendant was aware that the cumulative effect of the conduct was reasonably certain to result in the death of the victim, regardless of whether any single incident would have resulted in the death.

(c) Second degree murder is a Class A felony.


(a) Voluntary manslaughter is the intentional or knowing killing of another in a state of passion produced by adequate provocation sufficient to lead a reasonable person to act in an irrational manner.

(b) Voluntary manslaughter is a Class C felony.


(a) Criminally negligent conduct that results in death constitutes criminally negligent homicide.

(b) Criminally negligent homicide is a Class E felony.


(a) Vehicular homicide is the reckless killing of another by the operation of an automobile, airplane, motorboat or other motor vehicle, as the proximate result of:

(1) Conduct creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury to a person;

(2) The driver's intoxication, as set forth in § 55-10-401. For the purposes of this section, “intoxication” includes alcohol intoxication as defined by § 55-10-408, drug intoxication, or both;

(3) As the proximate result of conduct constituting the offense of drag racing as prohibited by title 55, chapter 10, part 5; or

(4) The driver's conduct in a posted construction zone where the person killed was an employee of the department of transportation or a highway construction worker.
(b)(1) Vehicular homicide under subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(3) is a Class C felony.

(2) Vehicular homicide under subdivision (a)(2) is a Class B felony.

(3) Vehicular homicide under subdivision (a)(4) is a Class D felony.

c) The court shall prohibit a defendant convicted of vehicular homicide from driving a vehicle in this state for a period of time not less than three (3) years nor more than ten (10) years.

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-214 (2012). VICTIMS; EMBRYO OR FETUS; CONSTRUCTION OF LAW.

(a) For the purposes of this part, “another” and “another person” include a human embryo or fetus at any stage of gestation in utero, when any such term refers to the victim of any act made criminal by this part.


(c) Nothing in subsection (a) shall apply to any act or omission by a pregnant woman with respect to an embryo or fetus with which she is pregnant, or to any lawful medical or surgical procedure to which a pregnant woman consents, performed by a health care professional who is licensed to perform such procedure.


(a) Reckless homicide is a reckless killing of another.

(b) Reckless homicide is a Class D felony.


(a) Aggravated vehicular homicide is vehicular homicide, as defined in § 39-13-213(a)(2), where:

(1) The defendant has two (2) or more prior convictions for:

   (A) Driving under the influence of an intoxicant;

   (B) Vehicular assault; or

   (C) Any combination of such offenses;

(2) The defendant has one (1) or more prior convictions for the offense of vehicular homicide; or

(3) There was, at the time of the offense, twenty-hundredths of one percent (.20%), or more, by weight of alcohol in the defendant's blood and the defendant has one (1) prior conviction for:

   (A) Driving under the influence of an intoxicant; or

   (B) Vehicular assault.
(b)(1) As used in this section, unless the context otherwise requires, “prior conviction” means an offense for which the defendant was convicted prior to the commission of the instant vehicular homicide and includes convictions occurring prior to July 1, 1996.

(2) “Prior conviction” includes convictions under the laws of any other state, government, or country that, if committed in this state, would have constituted one (1) of the three (3) offenses enumerated in subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2). In the event that a conviction from a jurisdiction other than Tennessee is not specifically named the same as one (1) of the three (3) offenses enumerated in subdivision (a)(1) or (a)(2), the elements of the offense in the other jurisdiction shall be used by the Tennessee court to determine if the offense constitutes one (1) of the prior convictions required by subsection (a).

(c) If the defendant is charged with aggravated vehicular homicide, the indictment, in a separate count, shall specify, charge and give notice of the required prior conviction or convictions. If the defendant is convicted of vehicular homicide under § 39-13-213(a)(2), the jury shall then separately consider whether the defendant has the requisite number and types of prior offenses or level of blood alcohol concentration necessary to constitute the offense of aggravated vehicular homicide. If the jury convicts the defendant of aggravated vehicular homicide, the court shall pronounce judgment and sentence the defendant from within the felony classification set out in subsection (d).

(d) Aggravated vehicular homicide is a Class A felony.


(a) For the purpose of this section:

(1) “Abortion” means the administration to any woman pregnant with child, whether the child be quick or not, of any medicine, drug, or substance whatever, or the use or employment of any instrument, or other means whatever, with the intent to destroy the child, thereby destroying the child before the child's birth; and

(2) “Attempt to procure a miscarriage” means the administration of any substance with the intention to procure the miscarriage of a woman or the use or employment of any instrument or other means with such intent.

(b)(1) Every person who performs an abortion commits the crime of criminal abortion, unless such abortion is performed in compliance with the requirements of subsection (c). Criminal abortion is a Class C felony.

(2) Every person who attempts to procure a miscarriage commits the crime of attempt to procure criminal miscarriage, unless the attempt to procure a miscarriage is performed in compliance with the requirements of subsection (c). Attempt to procure a criminal miscarriage is a Class E felony.

(3) Every person who compels, coerces, or exercises duress in any form with regard to any other person in order to obtain or procure an abortion on any female commits a misdemeanor. A violation of this section is a Class A misdemeanor.

(c) No person is guilty of a criminal abortion or an attempt to procure criminal miscarriage when an abortion or an attempt to procure a miscarriage is performed under the following circumstances:
(1) During the first three (3) months of pregnancy, if the abortion or attempt to procure a miscarriage is performed with the pregnant woman's consent and pursuant to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman's attending physician who is licensed or certified under title 63, chapter 6 or 9;

(2) After three (3) months, but before viability of the fetus, if the abortion or attempt to procure a miscarriage is performed with the pregnant woman's consent and in a hospital as defined in § 68-11-201, licensed by the state department of health, or a hospital operated by the state of Tennessee or a branch of the federal government, by the pregnant woman's attending physician, who is licensed or certified under title 63, chapter 6 or 9, pursuant to the attending physician's medical judgment; or

(3) During viability of the fetus, if the abortion or attempt to procure a miscarriage is performed with the pregnant woman's consent and by the pregnant woman's attending physician, who is licensed or certified under title 63, chapter 6 or 9; and, if all the circumstances and provisions required for a lawful abortion or lawful attempt to procure a miscarriage during the period set out in subdivision (c)(2) are adhered to; and if, prior to the abortion or attempt to procure a miscarriage the physician has certified in writing to the hospital in which the abortion or attempt to procure a miscarriage is to be performed, that in the physician's best medical judgment, after proper examination, review of history, and such consultation as may be required by either the rules and regulations of the board for licensing health care facilities promulgated pursuant to § 68-11-209, or the administration of the hospital involved, or both, the abortion or attempt to procure a miscarriage is necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother, and shall have filed a copy of the certificate with the district attorney general of the judicial district in which the abortion or attempt to procure a miscarriage is to be performed.

(d) No abortion shall be performed on any pregnant woman unless the woman first produces evidence satisfactory to the physician performing the abortion that she is a bona fide resident of Tennessee. Evidence to support the claim of residence shall be noted in the records kept by the physician and, if the abortion is performed in a hospital, in the records kept by the hospital. A violation of this subsection (d) is punished as provided by subdivision (b)(1).

**TEXAS**

**TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.01 (2011). TYPES OF CRIMINAL HOMICIDE.**

(a) A person commits criminal homicide if he intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence causes the death of an individual.

(b) Criminal homicide is murder, capital murder, manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide.

**TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (2011). MURDER.**

(a) In this section:

(1) “Adequate cause” means cause that would commonly produce a degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection.

(2) “Sudden passion” means passion directly caused by and arising out of provocation by the
individual killed or another acting with the person killed which passion arises at the time of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation.

(b) A person commits an offense if he:

(1) intentionally or knowingly causes the death of an individual;

(2) intends to cause serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual; or

(3) commits or attempts to commit a felony, other than manslaughter, and in the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempt, or in immediate flight from the commission or attempt, he commits or attempts to commit an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of an individual.

c) Except as provided by Subsection (d), an offense under this section is a felony of the first degree.

d) At the punishment stage of a trial, the defendant may raise the issue as to whether he caused the death under the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. If the defendant proves the issue in the affirmative by a preponderance of the evidence, the offense is a felony of the second degree.

**TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03 (2011). CAPITAL MURDER.**

(a) A person commits an offense if the person commits murder as defined under Section 19.02(b)(1) and:

(1) the person murders a peace officer or fireman who is acting in the lawful discharge of an official duty and who the person knows is a peace officer or fireman;

(2) the person intentionally commits the murder in the course of committing or attempting to commit kidnapping, burglary, robbery, aggravated sexual assault, arson, obstruction or retaliation, or terroristic threat under Section 22.07(a)(1), (3), (4), (5), or (6);

(3) the person commits the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration or employs another to commit the murder for remuneration or the promise of remuneration;

(4) the person commits the murder while escaping or attempting to escape from a penal institution;

(5) the person, while incarcerated in a penal institution, murders another:

(A) who is employed in the operation of the penal institution; or

(B) with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in a combination or in the profits of a combination;

(6) the person:

(A) while incarcerated for an offense under this section or Section 19.02, murders another; or

(B) while serving a sentence of life imprisonment or a term of 99 years for an offense under Section 20.04, 22.021, or 29.03, murders another;
(7) the person murders more than one person:

(A) during the same criminal transaction; or

(B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are committed pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct;

(8) the person murders an individual under 10 years of age; or

(9) the person murders another person in retaliation for or on account of the service or status of the other person as a judge or justice of the supreme court, the court of criminal appeals, a court of appeals, a district court, a criminal district court, a constitutional county court, a statutory county court, a justice court, or a municipal court.

(b) An offense under this section is a capital felony.

c) If the jury or, when authorized by law, the judge does not find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of an offense under this section, he may be convicted of murder or of any other lesser included offense.


(a) A person commits an offense if he recklessly causes the death of an individual.

(b) An offense under this section is a felony of the second degree.

**TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.05 (2011). CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.**

(a) A person commits an offense if he causes the death of an individual by criminal negligence.

(b) An offense under this section is a state jail felony.

**TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.06 (2011). APPLICABILITY TO CERTAIN CONDUCT.**

This chapter does not apply to the death of an unborn child if the conduct charged is:

(1) conduct committed by the mother of the unborn child;

(2) a lawful medical procedure performed by a physician or other licensed health care provider with the requisite consent, if the death of the unborn child was the intended result of the procedure;

(3) a lawful medical procedure performed by a physician or other licensed health care provider with the requisite consent as part of an assisted reproduction as defined by Section 160.102, Family Code; or

(4) the dispensation of a drug in accordance with law or administration of a drug prescribed in accordance with law.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.08 (2011). INTOXICATION MANSLAUGHTER.

(a) A person commits an offense if the person:

(1) operates a motor vehicle in a public place, operates an aircraft, a watercraft, or an amusement ride, or assembles a mobile amusement ride; and

(2) is intoxicated and by reason of that intoxication causes the death of another by accident or mistake.

(b) Except as provided by Section 49.09, an offense under this section is a felony of the second degree.

UTAH

UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-1-301 (2012). OFFENSES FOR WHICH PROSECUTION MAY BE COMMENCED AT ANY TIME.

(1) As used in this section:

(a) “Aggravating offense” means any offense incident to which a homicide was committed as described in Subsection 76-5-202(1)(d) or (e) or Subsection 76-5-202(2).

(b) “Predicate offense” means an offense described in Section 76-5-203(1) if a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 was killed in the course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of the offense.

(2) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this code, prosecution for the following offenses may be commenced at any time:

(a) capital felony;

(b) aggravated murder;

(c) murder;

(d) manslaughter;

(e) child abuse homicide;

(f) aggravated kidnapping;

(g) child kidnapping;

(h) rape;

(i) rape of a child;
(j) object rape;

(k) object rape of a child;

(l) forcible sodomy;

(m) sodomy on a child;

(n) sexual abuse of a child;

(o) aggravated sexual abuse of a child;

(p) aggravated sexual assault; or

(q) any predicate offense to a murder or aggravating offense to an aggravated murder.


(1) As used in this section:

(a) “In the presence of a child” means:

   (i) in the physical presence of a child younger than 14 years of age; and

   (ii) having knowledge that the child is present and may see or hear the commission of a violent criminal offense.

(b) “Violent criminal offense” means any criminal offense involving violence or physical harm or threat of violence or physical harm, or any attempt to commit a criminal offense involving violence or physical harm that is not a domestic violence offense as defined in Section 77-36-1.

(2) A person commits a violent criminal offense in the presence of a child if the person:

   (a) commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide, as defined in Section 76-5-201, against a third party in the presence of a child;

   (b) intentionally causes or attempts to cause serious bodily injury to a third party or uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in Section 76-1-601, or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury, against a third party in the presence of a child; or

   (c) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b), commits a violent criminal offense in the presence of a child.

(3) A person who violates Subsection (2) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.


(1)(a) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been found guilty of a capital felony, there shall be further proceedings before the court or jury on the issue of sentence.
(b) In the case of a plea of guilty to a capital felony, the sentencing proceedings shall be conducted before a jury or, upon request of the defendant and with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, by the court which accepted the plea.

(c)(i) When a defendant has been found guilty of a capital felony, the proceedings shall be conducted before the court or jury which found the defendant guilty, provided the defendant may waive hearing before the jury with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, in which event the hearing shall be before the court.

(ii) If circumstances make it impossible or impractical to reconvene the same jury for the sentencing proceedings, the court may dismiss that jury and convene a new jury for the proceedings.

(d) If a retrial of the sentencing proceedings is necessary as a consequence of a remand from an appellate court, the sentencing authority shall be determined as provided in Subsection (6).

(2)(a) In capital sentencing proceedings, evidence may be presented on:

(i) the nature and circumstances of the crime;

(ii) the defendant's character, background, history, and mental and physical condition;

(iii) the victim and the impact of the crime on the victim's family and community without comparison to other persons or victims; and

(iv) any other facts in aggravation or mitigation of the penalty that the court considers relevant to the sentence.

(b) Any evidence the court considers to have probative force may be received regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence. The state's attorney and the defendant shall be permitted to present argument for or against the sentence of death.

(3) Aggravating circumstances include those outlined in Section 76-5-202.

(4) Mitigating circumstances include:

(a) the defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;

(b) the homicide was committed while the defendant was under the influence of mental or emotional disturbance;

(c) the defendant acted under duress or under the domination of another person;

(d) at the time of the homicide, the capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law was impaired as a result of a mental condition, intoxication, or influence of drugs, except that “mental condition” under this Subsection (4)(d) does not mean an abnormality manifested primarily by repeated criminal conduct;

(e) the youth of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(f) the defendant was an accomplice in the homicide committed by another person and the defendant's participation was relatively minor; and

(g) any other fact in mitigation of the penalty.

(5)(a) The court or jury, as the case may be, shall retire to consider the penalty. Except as provided in Subsection 76-3-207.5(2), in all proceedings before a jury, under this section, it shall be instructed as to the punishment to be imposed upon a unanimous decision for death and that the penalty of either an indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be for life or life in prison without parole, shall be imposed if a unanimous decision for death is not found.

(b) The death penalty shall only be imposed if, after considering the totality of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the jury is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that total aggravation outweighs total mitigation, and is further persuaded, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the imposition of the death penalty is justified and appropriate in the circumstances. If the jury reports unanimous agreement to impose the sentence of death, the court shall discharge the jury and shall impose the sentence of death.

(c) If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous decision imposing the sentence of death, the jury shall then determine whether the penalty of life in prison without parole shall be imposed, except as provided in Subsection 76-3-207.5(2). The penalty of life in prison without parole shall only be imposed if the jury determines that the sentence of life in prison without parole is appropriate. If the jury reports agreement by 10 jurors or more to impose the sentence of life in prison without parole, the court shall discharge the jury and shall impose the sentence of life in prison without parole. If 10 jurors or more do not agree upon a sentence of life in prison without parole, the court shall discharge the jury and impose an indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be for life.

(d) If the defendant waives hearing before the jury as to sentencing, with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, the court shall determine the appropriate penalty according to the standards of Subsections (5)(b) and (c).

(e) If the defendant is sentenced to more than one term of life in prison with or without the possibility of parole, or in addition to a sentence of life in prison with or without the possibility of parole the defendant is sentenced for other offenses which result in terms of imprisonment, the judge shall determine whether the terms of imprisonment shall be imposed as concurrent or consecutive sentences in accordance with Section 76-3-401.

(6) Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence is of death, the appellate court, if it finds prejudicial error in the sentencing proceeding only, may set aside the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial court for new sentencing proceedings to the extent necessary to correct the error or errors. An error in the sentencing proceedings may not result in the reversal of the conviction of a capital felony. In cases of remand for new sentencing proceedings, all exhibits and a transcript of all testimony and other evidence properly admitted in the prior trial and sentencing proceedings are admissible in the new sentencing proceedings, and if the sentencing proceeding was before a:

(a) jury, a new jury shall be impaneled for the new sentencing proceeding unless the defendant waives the hearing before the jury with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, in which case the proceeding shall be held according to Subsection (6)(b) or (c), as applicable;

(b) judge, the original trial judge shall conduct the new sentencing proceeding; or
(c) judge, and the original trial judge is unable or unavailable to conduct a new sentencing proceeding, then another judge shall be designated to conduct the new sentencing proceeding, and the new proceeding will be before a jury unless the defendant waives the hearing before the jury with the approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution.

(7) If the penalty of death is held to be unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court or the United States Supreme Court, the court having jurisdiction over a person previously sentenced to death for a capital felony shall cause the person to be brought before the court, and the court shall sentence the person to life in prison without parole.

(8)(a) If the appellate court's final decision regarding any appeal of a sentence of death precludes the imposition of the death penalty due to mental retardation or subaverage general intellectual functioning under Section 77-15a-101, the court having jurisdiction over a defendant previously sentenced to death for a capital felony shall cause the defendant to be brought before the sentencing court, and the court shall sentence the defendant to life in prison without parole.

(b) If the appellate court precludes the imposition of the death penalty under Subsection (8)(a), but the appellate court finds that sentencing the defendant to life in prison without parole is likely to result in a manifest injustice, it may remand the case to the sentencing court for further sentencing proceedings to determine if the defendant should serve a sentence of life in prison without parole or an indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be for life.

**Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-207.7 (2012). First Degree Felony Aggravated Murder—Noncapital Felony—Penalties—Sentence by Court.**

(1) A person who has pled guilty to or been convicted of first degree felony aggravated murder under Section 76-5-202 shall be sentenced by the court.

(2) The sentence under this section shall be life in prison without parole or an indeterminate prison term of not less than 25 years and which may be for life.


(1)(a) Except as provided in Subsections (3) and (4), a person commits criminal homicide if the person intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, with criminal negligence, or acting with a mental state otherwise specified in the statute defining the offense, causes the death of another human being, including an unborn child at any stage of its development.

(b) There shall be no cause of action for criminal homicide for the death of an unborn child caused by an abortion, as defined in Section 76-7-301.

(2) Criminal homicide is aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter, child abuse homicide, homicide by assault, negligent homicide, or automobile homicide.

(3) A person is not guilty of criminal homicide of an unborn child if the sole reason for the death of the unborn child is that the person:

(a) refused to consent to:
(i) medical treatment; or

(ii) a cesarean section; or

(b) failed to follow medical advice.

(4) A woman is not guilty of criminal homicide of her own unborn child if the death of her unborn child:

(a) is caused by a criminally negligent act or reckless act of the woman; and

(b) is not caused by an intentional or knowing act of the woman.


(1) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another under any of the following circumstances:

(a) the homicide was committed by a person who is confined in a jail or other correctional institution;

(b) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which two or more persons were killed, or during which the actor attempted to kill one or more persons in addition to the victim who was killed;

(c) the actor knowingly created a great risk of death to a person other than the victim and the actor;

(d) the homicide was committed incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which the actor committed or attempted to commit aggravated robbery, robbery, rape, rape of a child, object rape, object rape of a child, forcible sodomy, sodomy upon a child, forcible sexual abuse, sexual abuse of a child, aggravated sexual abuse of a child, child abuse as defined in Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), or aggravated sexual assault, aggravated arson, arson, aggravated burglary, burglary, aggravated kidnapping, or kidnapping, or child kidnapping;

(e) the homicide was committed incident to one act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which the actor committed the crime of abuse or desecration of a dead human body as defined in Subsection 76-9-704(2)(e);

(f) the homicide was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing an arrest of the defendant or another by a peace officer acting under color of legal authority or for the purpose of effecting the defendant's or another's escape from lawful custody;

(g) the homicide was committed for pecuniary gain;

(h) the defendant committed, or engaged or employed another person to commit the homicide pursuant to an agreement or contract for remuneration or the promise of remuneration for commission of the homicide;

(i) the actor previously committed or was convicted of:
(i) aggravated murder under this section;

(ii) attempted aggravated murder under this section;

(iii) murder, Section 76-5-203;

(iv) attempted murder, Section 76-5-203; or

(v) an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in this state would be a violation of a crime listed in this Subsection (1)(i);

(j) the actor was previously convicted of:

   (i) aggravated assault, Subsection 76-5-103(2);

   (ii) mayhem, Section 76-5-105;

   (iii) kidnapping, Section 76-5-301;

   (iv) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1;

   (v) aggravated kidnapping, Section 76-5-302;

   (vi) rape, Section 76-5-402;

   (vii) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1;

   (viii) object rape, Section 76-5-402.2;

   (ix) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3;

   (x) forcible sodomy, Section 76-5-403;

   (xi) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1;

   (xii) aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Section 76-5-404.1;

   (xiii) aggravated sexual assault, Section 76-5-405;

   (xiv) aggravated arson, Section 76-6-103;

   (xv) aggravated burglary, Section 76-6-203;

   (xvi) aggravated robbery, Section 76-6-302;

   (xvii) felony discharge of a firearm, Section 76-10-508.1; or

   (xviii) an offense committed in another jurisdiction which if committed in this state would be a violation of a crime listed in this Subsection (1)(j);
(k) the homicide was committed for the purpose of:

(i) preventing a witness from testifying;

(ii) preventing a person from providing evidence or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation;

(iii) retaliating against a person for testifying, providing evidence, or participating in any legal proceedings or official investigation; or

(iv) disrupting or hindering any lawful governmental function or enforcement of laws;

(l) the victim is or has been a local, state, or federal public official, or a candidate for public office, and the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that official position, act, capacity, or candidacy;

(m) the victim is or has been a peace officer, law enforcement officer, executive officer, prosecuting officer, jailer, prison official, firefighter, judge or other court official, juror, probation officer, or parole officer, and the victim is either on duty or the homicide is based on, is caused by, or is related to that official position, and the actor knew, or reasonably should have known, that the victim holds or has held that official position;

(n) the homicide was committed:

(i) by means of a destructive device, bomb, explosive, incendiary device, or similar device which was planted, hidden, or concealed in any place, area, dwelling, building, or structure, or was mailed or delivered; or

(ii) by means of any weapon of mass destruction as defined in Section 76-10-401;

(o) the homicide was committed during the act of unlawfully assuming control of any aircraft, train, or other public conveyance by use of threats or force with intent to obtain any valuable consideration for the release of the public conveyance or any passenger, crew member, or any other person aboard, or to direct the route or movement of the public conveyance or otherwise exert control over the public conveyance;

(p) the homicide was committed by means of the administration of a poison or of any lethal substance or of any substance administered in a lethal amount, dosage, or quantity;

(q) the victim was a person held or otherwise detained as a shield, hostage, or for ransom;

(r) the homicide was committed in an especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or exceptionally depraved manner, any of which must be demonstrated by physical torture, serious physical abuse, or serious bodily injury of the victim before death;

(s) the actor dismembers, mutilates, or disfigures the victim's body, whether before or after death, in a manner demonstrating the actor's depravity of mind; or

(t) the victim, at the time of the death of the victim:

(i) was younger than 14 years of age; and
(ii) was not an unborn child.

(2) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder if the actor, with reckless indifference to human life, causes the death of another incident to an act, scheme, course of conduct, or criminal episode during which the actor is a major participant in the commission or attempted commission of:

(a) child abuse, Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a);

(b) child kidnapping, Section 76-5-301.1;

(c) rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.1;

(d) object rape of a child, Section 76-5-402.3;

(e) sodomy on a child, Section 76-5-403.1; or

(f) sexual abuse or aggravated sexual abuse of a child, Section 76-5-404.1.

(3)(a) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has been filed, aggravated murder is a capital felony.

(b) If a notice of intent to seek the death penalty has not been filed, aggravated murder is a noncapital first degree felony punishable as provided in Section 76-3-207.7.

(c)(i) Within 60 days after arraignment of the defendant, the prosecutor may file notice of intent to seek the death penalty. The notice shall be served on the defendant or defense counsel and filed with the court.

(ii) Notice of intent to seek the death penalty may be served and filed more than 60 days after the arraignment upon written stipulation of the parties or upon a finding by the court of good cause.

(d) Without the consent of the prosecutor, the court may not accept a plea of guilty to noncapital first degree felony aggravated murder during the period in which the prosecutor may file a notice of intent to seek the death penalty under Subsection (3)(c)(i).

(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of aggravated murder or attempted aggravated murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for the conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.

(b) The reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a) shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.

(c) This affirmative defense reduces charges only as follows:

(i) aggravated murder to murder; and

(ii) attempted aggravated murder to attempted murder.

(5)(a) Any aggravating circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2) that constitutes a separate offense does not merge with the crime of aggravated murder.
(b) A person who is convicted of aggravated murder, based on an aggravating circumstance described in Subsection (1) or (2) that constitutes a separate offense, may also be convicted of, and punished for, the separate offense.

**Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (2012). Murder.**

(1) As used in this section, “predicate offense” means:

(a) a clandestine drug lab violation under Section 58-37d-4 or 58-37d-5;

(b) child abuse, under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(a), when the victim is younger than 18 years of age;

(c) kidnapping under Section 76-5-301;

(d) child kidnapping under Section 76-5-301.1;

(e) aggravated kidnapping under Section 76-5-302;

(f) rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.1;

(g) object rape of a child under Section 76-5-402.3;

(h) sodomy upon a child under Section 76-5-403.1;

(i) forcible sexual abuse under Section 76-5-404;

(j) sexual abuse of a child or aggravated sexual abuse of a child under Section 76-5-404.1;

(k) rape under Section 76-5-402;

(l) object rape under Section 76-5-402.2;

(m) forcible sodomy under Section 76-5-403;

(n) aggravated sexual assault under Section 76-5-405;

(o) arson under Section 76-6-102;

(p) aggravated arson under Section 76-6-103;

(q) burglary under Section 76-6-202;

(r) aggravated burglary under Section 76-6-203;

(s) robbery under Section 76-6-301;

(t) aggravated robbery under Section 76-6-302;
(u) escape or aggravated escape under Section 76-8-309; or

(v) a felony violation of Section 76-10-508 or 76-10-508.1 regarding discharge of a firearm or dangerous weapon.

(2) Criminal homicide constitutes murder if:

(a) the actor intentionally or knowingly causes the death of another;

(b) intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, the actor commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes the death of another;

(c) acting under circumstances evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, the actor knowingly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another and thereby causes the death of another;

(d)(i) the actor is engaged in the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense, or is a party to the predicate offense;

(ii) a person other than a party as defined in Section 76-2-202 is killed in the course of the commission, attempted commission, or immediate flight from the commission or attempted commission of any predicate offense; and

(iii) the actor acted with the intent required as an element of the predicate offense;

(e) the actor recklessly causes the death of a peace officer or military service member in uniform while in the commission or attempted commission of:

(i) an assault against a peace officer under Section 76-5-102.4;

(ii) interference with a peace officer while making a lawful arrest under Section 76-8-305 if the actor uses force against a peace officer; or

(iii) an assault against a military service member in uniform under Section 76-5-102.4;

(f) commits a homicide which would be aggravated murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-202(4); or

(g) the actor commits aggravated murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 76-5-205.5.

(3)(a) Murder is a first degree felony.

(b) A person who is convicted of murder shall be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less than 15 years and which may be for life.

(4)(a) It is an affirmative defense to a charge of murder or attempted murder that the defendant caused the death of another or attempted to cause the death of another under a reasonable belief that the circumstances provided a legal justification or excuse for the conduct although the conduct was not legally justifiable or excusable under the existing circumstances.
(b) The reasonable belief of the actor under Subsection (4)(a) shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person under the then existing circumstances.

(c) This affirmative defense reduces charges only from:

   (i) murder to manslaughter; and

   (ii) attempted murder to attempted manslaughter.

(5)(a) Any predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense does not merge with the crime of murder.

   (b) A person who is convicted of murder, based on a predicate offense described in Subsection (1) that constitutes a separate offense, may also be convicted of, and punished for, the separate offense.


In any prosecution for criminal homicide, evidence that the actor caused the death of a person other than the intended victim shall not constitute a defense for any purpose to criminal homicide.


(1) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter if the actor:

   (a) recklessly causes the death of another;

   (b) commits a homicide which would be murder, but the offense is reduced pursuant to Subsection 76-5-203(4); or

   (c) commits murder, but special mitigation is established under Section 76-5-205.5.

(2) Manslaughter is a felony of the second degree.

(3)(a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other section, a person who is convicted of violating this section shall have the person's driver license revoked under Section 53-3-220 if the death of another person results from driving a motor vehicle.

   (b) The court shall forward the report of the conviction resulting from driving a motor vehicle to the Driver License Division in accordance with Section 53-3-218.


(1) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide if the actor, acting with criminal negligence, causes the death of another.

(2) Negligent homicide is a class A misdemeanor.

(3)(a) In addition to the penalty provided under this section or any other section, a person who is convicted of violating this section shall have the person's driver license revoked under Section 53-3-220 if
the death of another person results from driving a motor vehicle.

(b) The court shall forward the report of the conviction to the Driver License Division in accordance with Section 53-3-218.

**Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (2012). Automobile Homicide.**

1. As used in this section:

   (a) “Drug” or “drugs” means:

      (i) a controlled substance as defined in Section 58-37-2;

      (ii) a drug as defined in Section 58-17b-102; or

      (iii) any substance that, when knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly taken into the human body, can impair the ability of a person to safely operate a motor vehicle.

   (b) “Motor vehicle” means any self-propelled vehicle and includes any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft.

2. (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the person operates a motor vehicle in a negligent manner causing the death of another and:

   (i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 grams or greater at the time of the test;

   (ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or

   (iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 grams or greater at the time of operation.

   (b) A conviction for a violation of this Subsection (2) is a second degree felony if it is subsequent to a conviction as defined in Subsection 41-6a-501(2).

   (c) As used in this Subsection (2), “negligent” means simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.

3. (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the person operates a motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner causing the death of another and:

   (i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a subsequent chemical test shows that the person has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 grams or greater at the time of the test;

   (ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree that renders the person incapable of safely operating a vehicle; or

   (iii) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of.08 grams or greater at the time of operation.

   (b) As used in this Subsection (3), “criminally negligent” means criminal negligence as defined by
Subsection 76-2-103(4).

(4) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section 41-6a-515 and the provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as provided by Section 41-6a-516 apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol content under this section.

(5) Calculations of blood or breath alcohol concentration under this section shall be made in accordance with Subsection 41-6a-502(1).

(6) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense.

(7) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content is admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.

(8) A person is guilty of a separate offense for each victim suffering bodily injury or serious bodily injury as a result of the person's violation of Section 41-6a-502 or death as a result of the person's violation of this section whether or not the injuries arise from the same episode of driving.

**Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207.5 (2012). Automobile Homicide Involving Using a Handheld Wireless Communication Device While Driving.**

(1) As used in this section:

   (a) “Criminally negligent” means criminal negligence as defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4).

   (b) “Handheld wireless communication device” has the same meaning as defined in Section 41-6a-1716.

   (c) “Motor vehicle” means any self-propelled vehicle and includes any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine, watercraft, or aircraft.

   (d) “Negligent” means simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.

(2) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if the person operates a moving motor vehicle in a negligent manner:

   (a) while using a handheld wireless communication device in violation of Section 41-6a-1716; and

   (b) causing the death of another person.

(3) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if the person operates a moving motor vehicle in a criminally negligent manner:

   (a) while using a handheld wireless communication device in violation of Section 41-6a-1716; and

   (b) causing the death of another person.

(1) Criminal homicide constitutes child abuse homicide if, under circumstances not amounting to aggravated murder, as described in Section 76-5-202, the actor causes the death of a person under 18 years of age and the death results from child abuse, as defined in Subsection 76-5-109(1):

(a) if the child abuse is done recklessly under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(b);

(b) if the child abuse is done with criminal negligence under Subsection 76-5-109(2)(c); or

(c) if, under circumstances not amounting to the type of child abuse homicide described in Subsection (1)(a), the child abuse is done intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence, under Subsection 76-5-109(3)(a), (b), or (c).

(2) Child abuse homicide as described in Subsection (1)(a) is a first degree felony.

(3) Child abuse homicide as described in Subsections (1)(b) and (c) is a second degree felony.

**Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-209 (2012). Homicide by Assault—Penalty.**

(1) A person commits homicide by assault if, under circumstances not amounting to aggravated murder, murder, or manslaughter, a person causes the death of another while intentionally or knowingly attempting, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another.

(2) Homicide by assault is a third degree felony.


(1) As used in this section:

(a) “Cohabitant” has the same meaning as defined in Section 78B-7-102.

(b) “Domestic violence” has the same meaning as in Section 77-36-1.

(c) “In the presence of a child” means:

(i) in the physical presence of a child; or

(ii) having knowledge that a child is present and may see or hear an act of domestic violence.

(2) A person commits domestic violence in the presence of a child if the person:

(a) commits or attempts to commit criminal homicide, as defined in Section 76-5-201, against a cohabitant in the presence of a child; or
(b) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to a cohabitant or uses a dangerous weapon, as defined in
Section 76-1-601, or other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury against a
cohabitant, in the presence of a child; or

(c) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection (2)(a) or (b), commits an act of
domestic violence in the presence of a child.

(3)(a) A person who violates Subsection (2)(a) or (b) is guilty of a third degree felony.

(b) A person who violates Subsection (2)(c) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

(4) A charge under this section is separate and distinct from, and is in addition to, a charge of
domestic violence where the victim is the cohabitant. Either or both charges may be filed by the prosecutor.

(5) A person who commits a violation of this section when more than one child is present is guilty of one
offense of domestic violence in the presence of a child regarding each child present when the violation
occurred.

**Utah Code Ann. § 76-7-314.5 (2012). Killing an Unborn Child.**

(1) A person is guilty of killing an unborn child if the person causes the death of an unborn child by
performing an abortion of the unborn child in violation of the provisions of Subsection 76-7-302(3).

(2) A woman is not criminally liable for:

(a) seeking to obtain, or obtaining, an abortion that is permitted by this part; or

(b) a physician's failure to comply with Subsection 76-7-302(3)(b)(ii) or Section 76-7-305.

**Vermont**


A person who wilfully and maliciously burns the building of another, or wilfully and maliciously sets fire
to a building owned in whole or in part by himself, by means of which the life of a person is lost, shall be
guilty of murder in the first degree.


A person who is indicted for the murder of an infant child, or of a woman pregnant or supposed by such
person to be pregnant, may be charged in the same indictment with the offenses under section 101 of this
title, and may be found guilty of any charge in the indictment sustained by the proof, and judgment and
sentence shall be awarded accordingly.

Murder committed by means of poison, or by lying in wait, or by wilful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or committed in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate arson, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, robbery or burglary, shall be murder in the first degree. All other kinds of murder shall be murder in the second degree.


(a) (1) The punishment for murder in the first degree shall be imprisonment for:

   (A) a minimum term of not less than 35 years and a maximum term of life; or
   
   (B) life without the possibility of parole.

(2) The punishment for murder in the second degree shall be imprisonment for:

   (A) a minimum term of not less than 20 years and a maximum term of life; or
   
   (B) life without the possibility of parole.

(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, this subsection shall apply only if the murder was committed on or after the effective date of this act.

(b) The punishment for murder in the first degree shall be imprisonment for life and for a minimum term of 35 years unless a jury finds that there are aggravating or mitigating factors which justify a different minimum term. If the jury finds that the aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors, the court may set a minimum term longer than 35 years, up to and including life without parole. If the jury finds that the mitigating factors outweigh any aggravating factors, the court may set a minimum term at less than 35 years but not less than 15 years.

(c) The punishment for murder in the second degree shall be imprisonment for life and for a minimum term of 20 years unless a jury finds that there are aggravating or mitigating factors which justify a different minimum term. If the jury finds that the aggravating factors outweigh any mitigating factors, the court may set a minimum term longer than 20 years, up to and including life without parole. If the jury finds that the mitigating factors outweigh any aggravating factors, the court may set a minimum term at less than 20 years but not less than 10 years.

(d) (1)(A) Before the court sentences a defendant for first or second degree murder, a jury shall consider the aggravating and mitigating factors set forth in subsections (e) and (f) of this section. The court shall allow the parties to present evidence and argument concerning the aggravating and mitigating factors and may empanel a new jury to consider them or conduct the hearing before the same jury that considered the guilt of the defendant.

   (B) The parties shall file notice of intent to present evidence regarding specific aggravating and mitigating factors about which the parties have knowledge not less than 60 days before the hearing. A party may not present evidence on the presence of that aggravating or mitigating factor unless notice has been provided as required by this subdivision.
(C) The jury shall make findings concerning aggravating and mitigating factors and determine whether the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors or the mitigating factors outweigh the aggravating factors. The findings shall be based on the evidence on the criminal charges presented to the jury at the sentencing hearing and at the trial.

(D) The burden shall be on the state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the presence of aggravating factors or the absence of mitigating factors and to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating factors outweigh the mitigating factors.

(2) After the jury renders a verdict on the aggravating and mitigating factors, the court shall allow the parties to present arguments concerning sentencing recommendations. The court shall make written findings of fact summarizing the offense and the defendant's participation in it. The findings shall be based on the evidence taken at trial, the evidence presented on aggravating and mitigating factors at the sentencing hearing, and information from the presentence report. The court shall impose a sentence consistent with subsection (b) or (c) of this subsection and with the jury's findings concerning aggravating and mitigating factors.

(e) Aggravating factors shall include the following:

(1) The murder was committed while the defendant was in custody under sentence of imprisonment.

(2) The defendant was previously convicted of a felony involving the use of violence to a person.

(3) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit, or in immediate flight after committing a felony.

(4) The victim of the murder was particularly weak, vulnerable, or helpless.

(5) The murder was particularly severe, brutal, or cruel.

(6) The murder involved multiple victims.

(7) The murder was random, predatory, or arbitrary in nature.

(8) Any other factor that the state offers in support of a greater minimum sentence.

(f) Mitigating factors shall include the following:

(1) The defendant had no significant history of prior criminal activity before sentencing.

(2) The defendant was suffering from a mental or physical disability or condition that significantly reduced his or her culpability for the murder.

(3) The defendant was an accomplice in the murder committed by another person and his or her participation was relatively minor.

(4) The defendant, because of youth or old age, lacked substantial judgment in committing the
murder.

(5) The defendant acted under duress, coercion, threat, or compulsion insufficient to constitute a defense but which significantly affected his or her conduct.

(6) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to it.

(7) Any other factor that the defendant offers in support of a lesser minimum sentence.

(g) Subsections (b)-(f) of this section shall apply only if the murder was committed before the effective date of this act, and:

(1) the defendant was not sentenced before the effective date of this act; or

(2) the defendant's sentence was stricken and remanded for resentencing pursuant to the Vermont supreme court's decision in State v. Provost, 2005 VT 134 (2005).


A person who commits manslaughter shall be fined not more than $3,000.00, or imprisoned for not less than one year nor more than 15 years, or both.


If a person kills or wounds another under any of the circumstances enumerated below, he or she shall be guiltless:

(1) In the just and necessary defense of his or her own life or the life of his or her husband, wife, parent, child, brother, sister, master, mistress, servant, guardian or ward; or

(2) In the suppression of a person attempting to commit murder, sexual assault, aggravated sexual assault, burglary or robbery, with force or violence; or

(3) In the case of a civil officer; or a military officer or private soldier when lawfully called out to suppress riot or rebellion, or to prevent or suppress invasion, or to assist in serving legal process, in suppressing opposition against him or her in the just and necessary discharge of his or her duty.


A person who mingles poison with food, drink, or medicine with intent to injure another person or who, with a like intent, willfully poisons a spring, well, or reservoir of water shall be imprisoned not more than 20 years.


(a) A person is guilty of aggravated murder if he or she commits a first or second degree murder, as defined in section 2301 of this title, and at the time of his or her actions, one or more of the following circumstances was in fact present:
(1) The murder was committed while the defendant was in custody under sentence for murder or aggravated murder.

(2) The defendant had, prior to commencement of the trial for aggravated murder, been convicted of another aggravated murder or murder in any jurisdiction in the United States and territories.

(3) At the time of the murder, the defendant also committed another murder.

(4) At the time of the murder, the defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to another person or persons.

(5) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing lawful arrest by a law enforcement officer of any person, or effecting an escape by any person from lawful custody of a law enforcement officer.

(6) The murder was committed by a person hired for such purpose in return for anything of value. Both the person hired and the person hiring him or her are guilty of aggravated murder.

(7) The victim of the murder was known by the person to be a person employed in any capacity in or about a correctional facility or a law enforcement officer, and was performing his or her official duties.

(8) The murder was committed in perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate sexual assault or aggravated sexual assault.

(b) In a prosecution for aggravated murder, the state shall allege and prove beyond a reasonable doubt one or more of the circumstances enumerated in subsection (a) of this section.

(c) The punishment for aggravated murder shall be imprisonment for life and for no lesser term. The court shall not place on probation or suspend or defer the sentence of any person convicted of aggravated murder. A person sentenced under this section shall not be eligible for parole during the term of imprisonment imposed herein and shall not be eligible for work-release or noncustodial furlough except when serious medical services make custodial furlough inappropriate.

VIRGINIA

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-30 (2012). MURDER AND MANSLAUGHTER DECLARED FELONIES

ANY PERSON WHO COMMITS CAPITAL MURDER, MURDER OF THE FIRST DEGREE, MURDER OF THE SECOND DEGREE, VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, OR INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER, SHALL BE GUILTY OF A FELONY.

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-31 (2012). CAPITAL MURDER DEFINED; PUNISHMENT.

The following offenses shall constitute capital murder, punishable as a Class 1 felony:
1. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of abduction, as defined in § 18.2-48, when such abduction was committed with the intent to extort money or a pecuniary benefit or with the intent to defile the victim of such abduction;

2. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person by another for hire;

3. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person by a prisoner confined in a state or local correctional facility as defined in § 53.1-1, or while in the custody of an employee thereof;

4. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of robbery or attempted robbery;

5. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of, or subsequent to, rape or attempted rape, forcible sodomy or attempted forcible sodomy or object sexual penetration;

6. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a law-enforcement officer as defined in § 9.1-101, a fire marshal appointed pursuant to § 27-30 or a deputy or an assistant fire marshal appointed pursuant to § 27-36, when such fire marshal or deputy or assistant fire marshal has police powers as set forth in §§ 27-34.2 and 27-34.2:1, an auxiliary police officer appointed or provided for pursuant to §§ 15.2-1731 and 15.2-1733, an auxiliary deputy sheriff appointed pursuant to § 15.2-1603, or any law-enforcement officer of another state or the United States having the power to arrest for a felony under the laws of such state or the United States, when such killing is for the purpose of interfering with the performance of his official duties;

7. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person as a part of the same act or transaction;

8. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of more than one person within a three-year period;

9. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person in the commission of or attempted commission of a violation of § 18.2-248, involving a Schedule I or II controlled substance, when such killing is for the purpose of furthering the commission or attempted commission of such violation;

10. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person by another pursuant to the direction or order of one who is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise as defined in subsection I of § 18.2-248;

11. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a pregnant woman by one who knows that the woman is pregnant and has the intent to cause the involuntary termination of the woman's pregnancy without a live birth;

12. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a person under the age of fourteen by a person age twenty-one or older;

13. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any person by another in the commission of or attempted commission of an act of terrorism as defined in § 18.2-46.4;

14. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of a justice of the Supreme Court, a judge of the Court of Appeals, a judge of a circuit court or district court, a retired judge sitting by designation or under temporary recall, or a substitute judge appointed under § 16.1-69.9:1 when the killing is for the purpose of
interfering with his official duties as a judge; and

15. The willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any witness in a criminal case after a subpoena has been issued for such witness by the court, the clerk, or an attorney, when the killing is for the purpose of interfering with the person's duties in such case.

If any one or more subsections, sentences, or parts of this section shall be judged unconstitutional or invalid, such adjudication shall not affect, impair, or invalidate the remaining provisions thereof but shall be confined in its operation to the specific provisions so held unconstitutional or invalid.

**VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 (2012). FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE MURDER DEFINED; PUNISHMENT.**

Murder, other than capital murder, by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starvation, or by any willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt to commit, arson, rape, forcible sodomy, inanimate or animate object sexual penetration, robbery, burglary or abduction, except as provided in § 18.2-31, is murder of the first degree, punishable as a Class 2 felony. All murder other than capital murder and murder in the first degree is murder of the second degree and is punishable by confinement in a state correctional facility for not less than five nor more than forty years.

**VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.1 (2012). MURDER OF A PREGNANT WOMAN; PENALTY.**

The willful and deliberate killing of a pregnant woman without premeditation by one who knows that the woman is pregnant and has the intent to cause the involuntary termination of the woman's pregnancy without a live birth shall be punished by a term of imprisonment of not less than ten years nor more than forty years.

**VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.2 (2012). KILLING A FETUS; PENALTY.**

A. Any person who unlawfully, willfully, deliberately, maliciously and with premeditation kills the fetus of another is guilty of a Class 2 felony.

B. Any person who unlawfully, willfully, deliberately and maliciously kills the fetus of another is guilty of a felony punishable by confinement in a state correctional facility for not less than five nor more than 40 years.

**VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32.3 (2012). HUMAN INFANT; INDEPENDENT AND SEPARATE EXISTENCE.**

For the purposes of this article, the fact that the umbilical cord has not been cut or that the placenta remains attached shall not be considered in determining whether a human infant has achieved an independent and separate existence.

**VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-33 (2012). FELONY HOMICIDE DEFINED; PUNISHMENT.**

The killing of one accidentally, contrary to the intention of the parties, while in the prosecution of some felonious act other than those specified in §§ 18.2-31 and 18.2-32, is murder of the second degree and is punishable by confinement in a state correctional facility for not less than five years nor more than forty years.
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36.1 (2012). CERTAIN CONDUCT PUNISHABLE AS INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER

A. Any person who, as a result of driving under the influence in violation of clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of § 18.2-266 or any local ordinance substantially similar thereto unintentionally causes the death of another person, shall be guilty of involuntary manslaughter.

B. If, in addition, the conduct of the defendant was so gross, wanton and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life, he shall be guilty of aggravated involuntary manslaughter, a felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than one nor more than 20 years, one year of which shall be a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.

C. The provisions of this section shall not preclude prosecution under any other homicide statute. This section shall not preclude any other revocation or suspension required by law. The driver's license of any person convicted under this section shall be revoked pursuant to subsection B of § 46.2-391.

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-36.2 (2012). INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER; OPERATING A WATERCRAFT WHILE UNDER THE INFLUENCE; PENALTIES.

A. Any person who, as a result of operating a watercraft or motorboat in violation of clause (ii), (iii), or (iv) of subsection B of § 29.1-738 or a similar local ordinance, unintentionally causes the death of another person, is guilty of involuntary manslaughter.

B. If, in addition, the conduct of the defendant was so gross, wanton, and culpable as to show a reckless disregard for human life, he shall be guilty of aggravated involuntary manslaughter, a felony punishable by a term of imprisonment of not less than one nor more than 20 years, one year of which shall be a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.

C. The provisions of this section shall not preclude prosecution under any other homicide statute. The court shall order any person convicted under this section not to operate a watercraft or motorboat that is underway upon the waters of the Commonwealth. After five years have passed from the date of the conviction, the convicted person may petition the court that entered the conviction for the right to operate a watercraft or motorboat upon the waters of the Commonwealth. Upon consideration of such petition, the court may restore the right to operate a watercraft or motorboat subject to such terms and conditions as the court deems appropriate, including the successful completion of a water safety alcohol rehabilitation program described in § 29.1-738.5.


If any person be stricken or poisoned in this Commonwealth, and die by reason thereof out of this Commonwealth, the offender shall be as guilty, and shall be prosecuted and punished, as if the death had occurred in the county or corporation in which the stroke or poison was given or administered.

VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71 (2012). PRODUCING ABORTION OR MISCARRIAGE, ETC.; PENALTY.

Except as provided in other sections of this article, if any person administer to, or cause to be taken by a woman, any drug or other thing, or use means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce
abortion or miscarriage, and thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or miscarriage, he shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.

**VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1 (2012). PARTIAL BIRTH INFANTICIDE; PENALTY.**

A. Any person who knowingly performs partial birth infanticide and thereby kills a human infant is guilty of a Class 4 felony.

B. For the purposes of this section, “partial birth infanticide” means any deliberate act that (i) is intended to kill a human infant who has been born alive, but who has not been completely extracted or expelled from its mother, and that (ii) does kill such infant, regardless of whether death occurs before or after extraction or expulsion from its mother has been completed.

The term “partial birth infanticide” shall not under any circumstances be construed to include any of the following procedures: (i) the suction curettage abortion procedure, (ii) the suction aspiration abortion procedure, (iii) the dilation and evacuation abortion procedure involving dismemberment of the fetus prior to removal from the body of the mother, or (iv) completing delivery of a living human infant and severing the umbilical cord of any infant who has been completely delivered.

C. For the purposes of this section, “human infant who has been born alive” means a product of human conception that has been completely or substantially expelled or extracted from its mother, regardless of the duration of pregnancy, which after such expulsion or extraction breathes or shows any other evidence of life such as beating of the heart, pulsation of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles, whether or not the umbilical cord has been cut or the placenta is attached.

D. For purposes of this section, “substantially expelled or extracted from its mother” means, in the case of a headfirst presentation, the infant's entire head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the infant's trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother.

E. This section shall not prohibit the use by a physician of any procedure that, in reasonable medical judgment, is necessary to prevent the death of the mother, so long as the physician takes every medically reasonable step, consistent with such procedure, to preserve the life and health of the infant. A procedure shall not be deemed necessary to prevent the death of the mother if completing the delivery of the living infant would prevent the death of the mother.

F. The mother may not be prosecuted for any criminal offense based on the performance of any act or procedure by a physician in violation of this section.

**VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-285.1 (2012). DEATH OF INFANTS UNDER EIGHTEEN MONTHS OF AGE; AUTOPSIES REQUIRED; DEFINITION OF SUDDEN INFANT DEATH SYNDROME.**

An autopsy shall be performed in the case of any infant death which is suspected to be attributable to Sudden Infant Death Syndrome (SIDS).

For the purposes of this section, “Sudden Infant Death Syndrome” (SIDS), a diagnosis of exclusion, means the sudden and unexpected death of an infant less than eighteen months of age whose death remains unexplained after a thorough postmortem examination which includes an autopsy.
VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-264 (2012). REPORTS OF FETAL DEATHS; MEDICAL CERTIFICATION; INVESTIGATION BY MEDICAL EXAMINER; CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION CONCERNING ABORTIONS.

A. A fetal death report for each fetal death which occurs in this Commonwealth shall be filed, on a form furnished by the State Registrar, with the registrar of the district in which the delivery occurred or the abortion was performed within three days after such delivery or abortion and shall be registered with such registrar if it has been completed and filed in accordance with this section; provided that:

1. If the place of fetal death is unknown, a fetal death report shall be filed in the registration district in which a dead fetus was found within three days after discovery of such fetus; and

2. If a fetal death occurs in a moving conveyance, a fetal death report shall be filed in the registration district in which the fetus was first removed from such conveyance.

B. The funeral director or person who first assumes custody of a dead fetus or, in the absence of a funeral director or such person, the hospital representative who first assumes custody of a fetus shall file the fetal death report; in the absence of such a person, the physician or other person in attendance at or after the delivery or abortion shall file the report of fetal death. The person completing the forms shall obtain the personal data from the next of kin or the best qualified person or source available, and he shall obtain the medical certification of cause of death from the person responsible for preparing the same as provided in this section. In the case of induced abortion, such forms shall not identify the patient by name.

C. The medical certification portion of the fetal death report shall be completed and signed within twenty-four hours after delivery or abortion by the physician in attendance at or after delivery or abortion except when inquiry or investigation by a medical examiner is required.

D. When a fetal death occurs without medical attendance upon the mother at or after the delivery or abortion or when inquiry or investigation by a medical examiner is required, the medical examiner shall investigate the cause of fetal death and shall complete and sign the medical certification portion of the fetal death report within twenty-four hours after being notified of a fetal death.

E. The reports required pursuant to this section are statistical reports to be used only for medical and health purposes and shall not be incorporated into the permanent official records of the system of vital records. A schedule for the disposition of these reports may be provided by regulation.

F. The physician or facility attending an individual who has delivered a dead fetus shall maintain a copy of the fetal death report for one year and, upon written request by the individual and payment of an appropriate fee, shall furnish the individual a copy of such report.

WASHINGTON

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.02.050 (2012). CONCEALING BIRTH.

Every person who shall endeavor to conceal the birth of a child by any disposition of its dead body, whether the child died before or after its birth, shall be guilty of a gross misdemeanor.
Homicide is excusable when committed by accident or misfortune in doing any lawful act by lawful means, without criminal negligence, or without any unlawful intent.

Homicide is the killing of a human being by the act, procurement, or omission of another, death occurring at any time, and is either (1) murder, (2) homicide by abuse, (3) manslaughter, (4) excusable homicide, or (5) justifiable homicide.

(1) A person is guilty of murder in the first degree when:

(a) With a premeditated intent to cause the death of another person, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person; or

(b) Under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, he or she engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to any person, and thereby causes the death of a person; or

(c) He or she commits or attempts to commit the crime of either (1) robbery in the first or second degree, (2) rape in the first or second degree, (3) burglary in the first degree, (4) arson in the first or second degree, or (5) kidnapping in the first or second degree, and in the course of or in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants: Except that in any prosecution under this subdivision (1)(c) in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, it is a defense that the defendant:

(i) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and

(ii) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article, or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury; and

(iii) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and

(iv) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.

(2) Murder in the first degree is a class A felony.

Notwithstanding RCW 9A.32.030(2), any person convicted of the crime of murder in the first degree shall be sentenced to life imprisonment.
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.050 (2012). MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.

(1) A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:

(a) With intent to cause the death of another person but without premeditation, he or she causes the death of such person or of a third person; or

(b) He or she commits or attempts to commit any felony, including assault, other than those enumerated in RCW 9A.32.030(1)(c), and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or in immediate flight therefrom, he or she, or another participant, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants; except that in any prosecution under this subdivision (1)(b) in which the defendant was not the only participant in the underlying crime, if established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence, it is a defense that the defendant:

(i) Did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command, importune, cause, or aid the commission thereof; and

(ii) Was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article, or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury; and

(iii) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and

(iv) Had no reasonable grounds to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.

(2) Murder in the second degree is a class A felony.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.055 (2012). HOMICIDE BY ABUSE

(1) A person is guilty of homicide by abuse if, under circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life, the person causes the death of a child or person under sixteen years of age, a developmentally disabled person, or a dependent adult, and the person has previously engaged in a pattern or practice of assault or torture of said child, person under sixteen years of age, developmentally disabled person, or dependent person.

(2) As used in this section, “dependent adult” means a person who, because of physical or mental disability, or because of extreme advanced age, is dependent upon another person to provide the basic necessities of life.

(3) Homicide by abuse is a class A felony.

WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.060 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER IN THE FIRST DEGREE

(1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when:

(a) He or she recklessly causes the death of another person; or

(b) He or she intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflicting any injury upon the
mother of such child.

(2) Manslaughter in the first degree is a class A felony.

**WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.070 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER IN THE SECOND DEGREE.**

(1) A person is guilty of manslaughter in the second degree when, with criminal negligence, he or she causes the death of another person.

(2) Manslaughter in the second degree is a class B felony.

**WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 46.61.520 (2012). VEHICULAR HOMICIDE—PENALTY.**

(1) When the death of any person ensues within three years as a proximate result of injury proximately caused by the driving of any vehicle by any person, the driver is guilty of vehicular homicide if the driver was operating a motor vehicle:

   (a) While under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, as defined by RCW 46.61.502; or

   (b) In a reckless manner; or

   (c) With disregard for the safety of others.

(2) Vehicular homicide is a class A felony punishable under chapter 9A.20 RCW, except that, for a conviction under subsection (1)(a) of this section, an additional two years shall be added to the sentence for each prior offense as defined in RCW 46.61.5055.

**WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.50.415 (2012). CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES HOMICIDE—PENALTY.**

(1) A person who unlawfully delivers a controlled substance in violation of RCW 69.50.401(2) (a), (b), or (c) which controlled substance is subsequently used by the person to whom it was delivered, resulting in the death of the user, is guilty of controlled substances homicide.

(2) Controlled substances homicide is a class B felony punishable according to chapter 9A.20 RCW.

**WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 70.58.160 (2012). CERTIFICATE OF DEATH OR FETAL DEATH REQUIRED.**

A certificate of every death or fetal death shall be filed with the local registrar of the district in which the death or fetal death occurred within three business days after the occurrence is known, or if the place of death or fetal death is not known, then with the local registrar of the district in which the human remains are found within one business day thereafter. In every instance a certificate shall be filed prior to the interment or other disposition of the human remains. However, a certificate of fetal death shall not be required if the period of gestation is less than twenty weeks.
WEST VIRGINIA

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17C-5-1 (2012). NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE; PENALTIES

(a) When the death of any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received by the driving of any vehicle anywhere in this state in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person so operating such vehicle shall be guilty of negligent homicide.

(b) Any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than one year or by fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.

(c) The commissioner shall revoke the license or permit to drive and any nonresident operating privilege of any person convicted of negligent homicide.

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-7-18A (2012). NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE; PENALTIES.

(a) When the death of any person ensues within one year as a proximate result of injury received by operating any motorboat, jet ski or other motorized vessel anywhere in this state in reckless disregard of the safety of others, the person so operating the motorboat, jet ski or other motorized vessel is guilty of negligent homicide.

(b) Any person convicted of negligent homicide shall be punished by imprisonment in the county or regional jail for not more than one year or by fine of not less than one hundred dollars nor more than one thousand dollars, or by both fine and imprisonment.

(c) The director shall suspend the privilege to operate a motorboat or other motorized vessel in this state for a period of five years from the date of conviction.

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-1 (2012). FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE MURDER DEFINED; ALLEGATION IN INDICTMENT FOR HOMICIDE.

Murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any willful, deliberate and premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt to commit, arson, kidnapping, sexual assault, robbery, burglary, breaking and entering, escape from lawful custody, or a felony offense of manufacturing or delivering a controlled substance as defined in article four, chapter sixty-a of this code, is murder of the first degree. All other murder is murder of the second degree.

In an indictment for murder and manslaughter, it shall not be necessary to set forth the manner in which, or the means by which, the death of the deceased was caused, but it shall be sufficient in every such indictment to charge that the defendant did feloniously, willfully, maliciously, deliberately and unlawfully slay, kill and murder the deceased.


Murder of the first degree shall be punished by confinement in the penitentiary for life.

Murder of the second degree shall be punished by a definite term of imprisonment in the penitentiary which is not less than ten nor more than forty years. A person imprisoned pursuant to the provisions of this section is not eligible for parole prior to having served a minimum of ten years of his or her sentence or the minimum period required by the provisions of section thirteen, article twelve, chapter sixty-two, whichever is greater.


Voluntary manslaughter shall be punished by a definite term of imprisonment in the penitentiary which is not less than three nor more than fifteen years. A person imprisoned pursuant to the provisions of this section is not eligible for parole prior to having served a minimum of three years of his or her sentence or the minimum period required by the provisions of section thirteen, article twelve, chapter sixty-two, whichever is greater.


Involuntary manslaughter is a misdemeanor, and any person convicted thereof shall be confined in jail not to exceed one year, or fined not to exceed one thousand dollars, or both, in the discretion of the court.


(a) Any person who, by any means, knowingly and willfully conceals, attempts to conceal or who otherwise aids and abets any person to conceal a deceased human body where death occurred as a result of criminal activity is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be confined in a correctional facility for not less than one year nor more than five years and fined not less than one thousand dollars, nor more than five thousand dollars.

(b) It shall be a complete defense in a prosecution pursuant to subsection (a) of this section that the defendant affirmatively brought to the attention of law enforcement within forty-eight hours of concealing the body and prior to being contacted regarding the death by law enforcement the existence and location of the concealed deceased human body.

(c) The provisions of subsection (a) of this section do not apply to practitioners regulated by the provisions of article six, chapter thirty of this code or their agents while acting in their lawful professional capacities.

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-2-6 (2012). HOMICIDE PUNISHABLE WITHIN STATE IF INJURY OCCURS WITHIN AND DEATH WITHOUT, OR VICE VERSA.

If any person be stricken, wounded or poisoned in, and die by reason thereof out of, this State, the offender shall be as guilty, and be prosecuted and punished, as if the death had occurred in the county in which the stroke, wound or poison was given or administered. And if any person be stricken, wounded or poisoned out of this State, and die by reason thereof within this State, the offender shall be as guilty, and may be prosecuted and punished, as if the mortal stroke or wound had been given, or poison administered, in the county in which the person so stricken, wounded or poisoned may so die.

Any person who shall administer to, or cause to be taken by, a woman, any drug or other thing, or use any means, with intent to destroy her unborn child, or to produce abortion or miscarriage, and shall thereby destroy such child, or produce such abortion or miscarriage, shall be guilty of a felony, and, upon conviction, shall be confined in the penitentiary not less than three nor more than ten years; and if such woman die by reason of such abortion performed upon her, such person shall be guilty of murder. No person, by reason of any act mentioned in this section, shall be punishable where such act is done in good faith, with the intention of saving the life of such woman or child.

W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-8D-2 (2012). Murder of a child by a parent, guardian or custodian or other person by refusal or failure to supply necessities, or by delivery, administration or ingestion of a controlled substance; penalties.

(a) If any parent, guardian or custodian shall maliciously and intentionally cause the death of a child under his or her care, custody or control by his or her failure or refusal to supply such child with necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care, then such parent, guardian or custodian shall be guilty of murder in the first degree.

(b) If any parent, guardian or custodian shall cause the death of a child under his or her care, custody or control by knowingly allowing any other person to maliciously and intentionally fail or refuse to supply such child with necessary food, clothing, shelter or medical care, then such other person and such parent, guardian or custodian shall each be guilty of murder in the first degree.

(c) The penalty for offenses defined by this section shall be that which is prescribed for murder in the first degree under the provisions of section two, article two of this chapter.

(d) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any parent, guardian or custodian who fails or refuses, or allows another person to fail or refuse, to supply a child under the care, custody or control of such parent, guardian or custodian with necessary medical care, when such medical care conflicts with the tenets and practices of a recognized religious denomination or order of which such parent, guardian or custodian is an adherent or member.


(a) If any parent, guardian or custodian shall maliciously and intentionally inflict upon a child under his or her care, custody or control substantial physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition by other than accidental means, thereby causing the death of such child, then such parent, guardian or custodian shall be guilty of a felony.

(b) If any parent, guardian or custodian shall knowingly allow any other person to maliciously and intentionally inflict upon a child under the care, custody or control of such parent, guardian or custodian substantial physical pain, illness or any impairment of physical condition by other than accidental means, which thereby causes the death of such child, then such other person and such parent, guardian or custodian shall each be guilty of a felony.

(c) Any person convicted of a felony described in subsection (a) or (b) of this section shall be punished by a definite term of imprisonment in the penitentiary which is not less than ten nor more than forty years. A
person imprisoned pursuant to the provisions of this section is not eligible for parole prior to having served a minimum of ten years of his or her sentence or the minimum period required by the provisions of section thirteen, article twelve, chapter sixty-two of this code, whichever is greater.

(d) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any parent, guardian or custodian or other person who, without malice, fails or refuses, or allows another person to, without malice, fail or refuse, to supply a child under the care, custody or control of such parent, guardian or custodian with necessary medical care, when such medical care conflicts with the tenets and practices of a recognized religious denomination or order of which such parent, guardian or custodian is an adherent or member. The provisions of this section shall not apply to any health care provider who fails or refuses, or allows another person to fail or refuse, to supply a child with necessary medical care when such medical care conflicts with the tenets and practices of a recognized religious denomination or order of which the parent, guardian or custodian of the child is an adherent or member, or where such failure or refusal is pursuant to a properly executed do not resuscitate form.

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8D-4A (2012). CHILD NEGLECT RESULTING IN DEATH; CRIMINAL PENALTIES.

(a) If any parent, guardian or custodian shall neglect a child under his or her care, custody or control and by such neglect cause the death of said child, then such parent, guardian or custodian shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not less than one thousand dollars nor more than five thousand dollars or committed to the custody of the division of corrections for not less than three nor more than fifteen years, or both such fine and imprisonment.

(b) No child who in lieu of medical treatment was under treatment solely by spiritual means through prayer in accordance with a recognized method of religious healing with a reasonable proven record of success shall, for that reason alone, be considered to have been neglected within the provisions of this section. A method of religious healing shall be presumed to be a recognized method of religious healing if fees and expenses incurred in connection with such treatment are permitted to be deducted from taxable income as “medical expenses” pursuant to regulations or rules promulgated by the United States internal revenue service.

(c) A child whose parent, guardian or legal custodian has inhibited or interfered with the provision of medical treatment in accordance with a court order may be considered to have been neglected for the purposes of this section.

WISCONSIN


(1) In this section and ss. 939.24(1), 939.25(1), 940.01(1)(b), 940.02(1m), 940.05(2g) and (2h), 940.06(2), 940.08(2), 940.09(1)(c) to (e) and (1g)(c), (cm), and (d), 940.10(2), 940.195, 940.23(1)(b) and (2)(b), 940.24(2) and 940.25(1)(c) to (e), “unborn child” means any individual of the human species from fertilization until birth that is gestating inside a woman.

(2)(a) In this subsection, “induced abortion” means the use of any instrument, medicine, drug or other substance or device in a medical procedure with the intent to terminate the pregnancy of a woman and
with an intent other than to increase the probability of a live birth, to preserve the life or health of the infant after live birth or to remove a dead fetus.

(b) Sections 940.01(1)(b), 940.02(1m), 940.05(2g) and (2h), 940.06(2), 940.08(2), 940.09(1)(c) to (e) and (1g)(c), (cm), and (d), 940.10(2), 940.195, 940.23(1)(b) and (2)(b), 940.24(2) and 940.25(1)(c) to (e) do not apply to any of the following:

1. An act committed during an induced abortion. This subdivision does not limit the applicability of ss. 940.04, 940.13, 940.15 and 940.16 to an induced abortion.

2. An act that is committed in accordance with the usual and customary standards of medical practice during diagnostic testing or therapeutic treatment performed by, or under the supervision of, a physician licensed under ch. 448.

2h. An act by any health care provider, as defined in s. 155.01 (7), that is in accordance with a pregnant woman's power of attorney for health care instrument under ch. 155 or in accordance with a decision of a health care agent who is acting under a pregnant woman's power of attorney for health care instrument under ch. 155.

3. An act by a woman who is pregnant with an unborn child that results in the death of or great bodily harm, substantial bodily harm or bodily harm to that unborn child.

4. The prescription, dispensation or administration by any person lawfully authorized to do so and the use by a woman of any medicine, drug or device that is used as a method of birth control or is intended to prevent pregnancy.

(3) When the existence of an exception under sub. (2) has been placed in issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts constituting the exception do not exist in order to sustain a finding of guilt under s. 940.04(1)(b), 940.02(1m), 940.05(2g), 940.06(2), 940.08(2), 940.09(1)(c) to (e) or (1g)(c), (cm), or (d), 940.10(2), 940.195, 940.23(1)(b) or (2)(b), 940.24(2) or 940.25(1)(c) to (e).


(1) Offenses. (a) Except as provided in sub. (2), whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class A felony.

(b) Except as provided in sub. (2), whoever causes the death of an unborn child with intent to kill that unborn child, kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or kill another is guilty of a Class A felony.

(2) Mitigating circumstances. The following are affirmative defenses to prosecution under this section which mitigate the offense to 2nd-degree intentional homicide under s. 940.05:

(a) Adequate provocation. Death was caused under the influence of adequate provocation as defined in s. 939.44.

(b) Unnecessary defensive force. Death was caused because the actor believed he or she or another was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm and that the force used was necessary to defend the
endangered person, if either belief was unreasonable.

(c) Prevention of felony. Death was caused because the actor believed that the force used was necessary in the exercise of the privilege to prevent or terminate the commission of a felony, if that belief was unreasonable.

(d) Coercion; necessity. Death was caused in the exercise of a privilege under s. 939.45(1).

(3) Burden of proof. When the existence of an affirmative defense under sub. (2) has been placed in issue by the trial evidence, the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts constituting the defense did not exist in order to sustain a finding of guilt under sub. (1).

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.02 (2011). FIRST-DEGREE RECKLESS HOMICIDE.

(1) Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human being under circumstances which show utter disregard for human life is guilty of a Class B felony.

(1m) Whoever recklessly causes the death of an unborn child under circumstances that show utter disregard for the life of that unborn child, the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or another is guilty of a Class B felony.

(2) Whoever causes the death of another human being under any of the following circumstances is guilty of a Class C felony:

   (a) By manufacture, distribution or delivery, in violation of s. 961.41, of a controlled substance included in schedule I or II under ch. 961, of a controlled substance analog of a controlled substance included in schedule I or II under ch. 961 or of ketamine or flunitrazepam if another human being uses the controlled substance or controlled substance analog and dies as a result of that use. This paragraph applies:

       1. Whether the human being dies as a result of using the controlled substance or controlled substance analog by itself or with any compound, mixture, diluent or other substance mixed or combined with the controlled substance or controlled substance analog.

       2. Whether or not the controlled substance or controlled substance analog is mixed or combined with any compound, mixture, diluent or other substance after the violation of s. 961.41 occurs.

       3. To any distribution or delivery described in this paragraph, regardless of whether the distribution or delivery is made directly to the human being who dies. If possession of the controlled substance included in schedule I or II under ch. 961, of the controlled substance analog of the controlled substance included in schedule I or II under ch. 961 or of the ketamine or flunitrazepam is transferred more than once prior to the death as described in this paragraph, each person who distributes or delivers the controlled substance or controlled substance analog in violation of s. 961.41 is guilty under this paragraph.

   (b) By administering or assisting in administering a controlled substance included in schedule I or II under ch. 961, a controlled substance analog of a controlled substance included in schedule I or II of ch. 961 or ketamine or flunitrazepam, without lawful authority to do so, to another human being and that human being dies as a result of the use of the substance. This paragraph applies whether the human being
dies as a result of using the controlled substance or controlled substance analog by itself or with any compound, mixture, diluent or other substance mixed or combined with the controlled substance or controlled substance analog.


Whoever causes the death of another human being while committing or attempting to commit a crime specified in s. 940.19, 940.195, 940.20, 940.201, 940.203, 940.225(1) or (2)(a), 940.30, 940.31, 943.02, 943.10(2), 943.23(1g), or 943.32(2) may be imprisoned for not more than 15 years in excess of the maximum term of imprisonment provided by law for that crime or attempt.


(1) Any person, other than the mother, who intentionally destroys the life of an unborn child is guilty of a Class H felony.

(2) Any person, other than the mother, who does either of the following is guilty of a Class E felony:

   (a) Intentionally destroys the life of an unborn quick child; or

   (b) Causes the death of the mother by an act done with intent to destroy the life of an unborn child. It is unnecessary to prove that the fetus was alive when the act so causing the mother's death was committed.

(3) Any pregnant woman who intentionally destroys the life of her unborn child or who consents to such destruction by another may be fined not more than 200 or imprisoned not more than 6 months or both.

(4) Any pregnant woman who intentionally destroys the life of her unborn quick child or who consents to such destruction by another is guilty of a Class I felony.

(5) This section does not apply to a therapeutic abortion which:

   (a) Is performed by a physician; and

   (b) Is necessary, or is advised by 2 other physicians as necessary, to save the life of the mother; and

   (c) Unless an emergency prevents, is performed in a licensed maternity hospital.

(6) In this section “unborn child” means a human being from the time of conception until it is born alive.


(1) Whoever causes the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another is guilty of a Class B felony if:

   (a) In prosecutions under s. 940.01, the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01(2) did not exist as required by s. 940.01(3); or

   (b) The state concedes that it is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01(2) did not exist. By charging under this section, the state so
concedes.

(2) In prosecutions under sub. (1), it is sufficient to allege and prove that the defendant caused the death of another human being with intent to kill that person or another.

(2g) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child with intent to kill that unborn child, kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or kill another is guilty of a Class B felony if:

(a) In prosecutions under s. 940.01, the state fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01 (2) did not exist as required by s. 940.01 (3); or

(b) The state concedes that it is unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01 (2) did not exist. By charging under this section, the state so concedes.

(2h) In prosecutions under sub. (2g), it is sufficient to allege and prove that the defendant caused the death of an unborn child with intent to kill that unborn child, kill the woman who is pregnant with that unborn child or kill another.

(3) The mitigating circumstances specified in s. 940.01(2) are not defenses to prosecution for this offense.

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.06 (2011). SECOND-DEGREE RECKLESS HOMICIDE.

(1) Whoever recklessly causes the death of another human being is guilty of a Class D felony.

(2) Whoever recklessly causes the death of an unborn child is guilty of a Class D felony.

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.07 (2011). HOMICIDE RESULTING FROM NEGLIGENT CONTROL OF VICIOUS ANIMAL.

Whoever knowing the vicious propensities of any animal intentionally allows it to go at large or keeps it without ordinary care, if such animal, while so at large or not confined, kills any human being who has taken all the precautions which the circumstances may permit to avoid such animal, is guilty of a Class G felony.

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.08 (2011). HOMICIDE BY NEGLIGENT HANDLING OF DANGEROUS WEAPON, EXPLOSIVES OR FIRE.

(1) Except as provided in sub. (3), whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class G felony.

(2) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child by the negligent operation or handling of a dangerous weapon, explosives or fire is guilty of a Class G felony.

(3) Subsection (1) does not apply to a health care provider acting within the scope of his or her practice or employment.

WIS. STAT. ANN. § 940.09 (2011). HOMICIDE BY INTOXICATED USE OF VEHICLE OR FIREARM.
(1) Any person who does any of the following may be penalized as provided in sub. (1c):

(a) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.

(am) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.

(b) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in s. 340.01(46m).

(bm) Causes the death of another by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.08.

(c) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant.

(cm) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.

(d) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a vehicle while the person has a prohibited alcohol concentration, as defined in s. 340.01 (46m).

(e) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation of a commercial motor vehicle while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.04 or more but less than 0.08.

(1c)

(a) Except as provided in par. (b), a person who violates sub. (1) is guilty of a Class D felony.

(b) A person who violates sub. (1) is guilty of a Class C felony if the person has one or more prior convictions, suspensions, or revocations, as counted under s. 343.307(2).

(1d) A person who violates sub. (1) is subject to the requirements and procedures for installation of an ignition interlock device under s. 343. 301.

(1g) Any person who does any of the following is guilty of a Class D felony:

(a) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while under the influence of an intoxicant.

(am) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.

(b) Causes the death of another by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.

(c) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while under the influence of an intoxicant.
(cm) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while the person has a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood.

(d) Causes the death of an unborn child by the operation or handling of a firearm or airgun while the person has an alcohol concentration of 0.08 or more.

(1m)

(a) A person may be charged with and a prosecutor may proceed upon an information based upon a violation of any combination of sub. (1)(a), (am), or (b); any combination of sub. (1)(a), (am), or (bm); any combination of sub. (1)(c), (cm), or (d); any combination of sub. (1)(c), (cm), or (e); any combination of sub. (1g)(a), (am), or (b) or; any combination of sub. (1g)(c), (cm), or (d) for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence.

(b) If a person is charged in an information with any of the combinations of crimes referred to in par. (a), the crimes shall be joined under s. 971.12. If the person is found guilty of more than one of the crimes so charged for acts arising out of the same incident or occurrence, there shall be a single conviction for purposes of sentencing and for purposes of counting convictions under s. 23.33(13)(b)2. and 3., under s. 30.80(6)(a)2. and 3., under s. 343.307(1) or under s. 350.11(3)(a)2. and 3. Subsection (1)(a), (am), (b), (bm), (c), (cm), (d), and (e) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require, and sub. (1g)(a), (am), (b), (c), (cm), and (d) each require proof of a fact for conviction which the others do not require.

(2)

(a) In any action under this section, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that the death would have occurred even if he or she had been exercising due care and he or she had not been under the influence of an intoxicant, did not have a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his or her blood, or did not have an alcohol concentration described under sub. (1)(b), (bm), (d) or (e) or (1g)(b) or (d).

(b) In any action under sub. (1)(am) or (cm) or (1g)(am) or (cm) that is based on the defendant allegedly having a detectable amount of methamphetamine or gamma-hydroxybutyric acid or delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol in his or her blood, the defendant has a defense if he or she proves by a preponderance of the evidence that at the time of the incident or occurrence he or she had a valid prescription for methamphetamine or one of its metabolic precursors or gamma-hydroxybutyric acid or delta-9-tetrahydrocannabinol.

(3) An officer who makes an arrest for a violation of this section shall make a report as required under s. 23.33(4t), 30.686, 346.635 or 350.106.


(1) Whoever causes the death of another human being by the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class G felony.

(2) Whoever causes the death of an unborn child by the negligent operation or handling of a vehicle is guilty of a Class G felony.

No fine or imprisonment may be imposed or enforced against and no prosecution may be brought against a woman who obtains an abortion or otherwise violates any provision of any abortion statute with respect to her unborn child or fetus, and s. 939.05, 939.30 or 939.31 does not apply to a woman who obtains an abortion or otherwise violates any provision of any abortion statute with respect to her unborn child or fetus.


(1) In this section, “viability” means that stage of fetal development when, in the medical judgment of the attending physician based on the particular facts of the case before him or her, there is a reasonable likelihood of sustained survival of the fetus outside the womb, with or without artificial support.

(2) Whoever intentionally performs an abortion after the fetus or unborn child reaches viability, as determined by reasonable medical judgment of the woman's attending physician, is guilty of a Class I felony.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the abortion is necessary to preserve the life or health of the woman, as determined by reasonable medical judgment of the woman's attending physician.

(4) Any abortion performed under sub. (3) after viability of the fetus or unborn child, as determined by reasonable medical judgment of the woman's attending physician, shall be performed in a hospital on an inpatient basis.

(5) Whoever intentionally performs an abortion and who is not a physician is guilty of a Class I felony.

(6) Any physician who intentionally performs an abortion under sub. (3) shall use that method of abortion which, of those he or she knows to be available, is in his or her medical judgment most likely to preserve the life and health of the fetus or unborn child. Nothing in this subsection requires a physician performing an abortion to employ a method of abortion which, in his or her medical judgment based on the particular facts of the case before him or her, would increase the risk to the woman. Any physician violating this subsection is guilty of a Class I felony.

(7) Subsections (2) to (6) and s. 939.05, 939.30 or 939.31 do not apply to a woman who obtains an abortion that is in violation of this section or otherwise violates this section with respect to her unborn child or fetus.


(1) In this section:

(a) “Child” means a human being from the time of fertilization until it is completely delivered from a pregnant woman.

(b) “Partial-birth abortion” means an abortion in which a person partially vaginally delivers a living child, causes the death of the partially delivered child with the intent to kill the child, and then completes the delivery of the child.
(2) Except as provided in sub. (3), whoever intentionally performs a partial-birth abortion is guilty of a Class A felony.

(3) Subsection (2) does not apply if the partial-birth abortion is necessary to save the life of a woman whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical disorder, physical illness or physical injury caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself, and if no other medical procedure would suffice for that purpose.


Any person who conceals the corpse of any issue of a woman’s body with intent to prevent a determination of whether it was born dead or alive is guilty of a Class I felony.

**Wyoming**


(a) Whoever purposely and with premeditated malice, or in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any sexual assault, sexual abuse of a minor, arson, robbery, burglary, escape, resisting arrest, kidnapping or abuse of a child under the age of sixteen (16) years, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the first degree.

(b) A person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death, life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment according to law, except that no person shall be subject to the penalty of death for any murder committed before the defendant attained the age of eighteen (18) years.

(c) A person convicted of murder in the first degree in a case in which the state seeks the death penalty shall be sentenced in accordance with the provisions of W.S. 6-2-102. In all other cases, including any case in which the state has determined not to seek the death penalty at any stage of the proceeding, the judge shall determine the sentence of life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment taking into consideration any negotiated plea agreement and any evidence relevant to a determination of sentence which the court deems to have probative value.


(a) Upon conviction of a person for murder in the first degree in a case in which the state seeks the death penalty, the judge shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine whether the defendant should be sentenced to death, life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment. The hearing shall be conducted before the judge alone if:

(i) The defendant was convicted by a judge sitting without a jury;
(ii) The defendant has pled guilty; or

(iii) The defendant waives a jury with respect to the sentence.

(b) In all other cases the sentencing hearing shall be conducted before the jury which determined the defendant's guilt or, if the judge for good cause shown discharges that jury, with a new jury impaneled for that purpose. The jury shall be instructed that if the jury does not unanimously determine that the defendant should be sentenced to death, then the defendant shall be sentenced to life imprisonment without parole or life imprisonment.

(c) The judge or jury shall hear evidence as to any matter that the court deems relevant to a determination of the sentence, and shall include matters relating to any of the aggravating or mitigating circumstances enumerated in subsections (h) and (j) of this section. Any evidence which the court deems to have probative value may be received regardless of its admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence, provided the defendant is accorded a fair opportunity to rebut any hearsay statements, and provided further that only such evidence in aggravation as the state has made known to the defendant or his counsel prior to his trial shall be admissible.

(d) Upon conclusion of the evidence and arguments the judge shall give the jury appropriate instructions, including instructions as to any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, as defined in subsections (h) and (j) of this section, or proceed as provided by paragraph (iii) of this subsection:

   (i) After hearing all the evidence, the jury shall deliberate and render a sentence based upon the following:

   (A) Whether one (1) or more aggravating circumstances exist beyond a reasonable doubt as set forth in subsection (h) of this section;

   (B) Whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, mitigating circumstances exist as set forth in subsection (j) of this section; and

   (C) The mere number of aggravating or mitigating circumstances found shall have no independent significance.

   (ii) The jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating circumstances unanimously found to exist, and each individual juror may also consider any mitigating circumstances found by that juror to exist. If the jury reports unanimous agreement to impose the sentence of death, the court shall discharge the jury and shall impose the sentence of death. If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict imposing the sentence of death within a reasonable time, the court shall instruct the jury to determine by a unanimous vote whether the penalty of life imprisonment without parole shall be imposed. If the jury is unable to reach a unanimous verdict imposing the penalty of life imprisonment without parole within a reasonable time, the court shall discharge the jury and impose the sentence of life imprisonment;

   (iii) In nonjury cases, the judge shall determine if any aggravating or mitigating circumstances exist and impose sentence within the limits prescribed by law, based upon the considerations enumerated in subparagraphs (A), (B) and (C) of paragraph (i) of this subsection.

(e) The death penalty shall not be imposed unless at least one (1) of the aggravating circumstances set forth in subsection (h) of this section is found. In nonjury cases the judge shall make such designation. The jury, if its verdict is a sentence of death, shall designate in writing signed by the foreman of the jury:
(i) The aggravating circumstance or circumstances which it unanimously found beyond a reasonable doubt;

(ii) The mitigating circumstance or circumstances which it unanimously found by a preponderance of the evidence; and

(iii) The mitigating circumstance or circumstances which any individual juror found by a preponderance of the evidence.

(f) Repealed by Laws 2001, ch. 96, § 3.

(g) If the trial court is reversed on appeal because of error only in the presentence hearing, the new trial which may be ordered shall apply only to the issue of punishment.

(h) Aggravating circumstances are limited to the following:

(i) The murder was committed by a person:

   (A) Confined in a jail or correctional facility;

   (B) On parole or on probation for a felony;

   (C) After escaping detention or incarceration; or

   (D) Released on bail pending appeal of his conviction.

(ii) The defendant was previously convicted of another murder in the first degree or a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person;

(iii) The defendant knowingly created a great risk of death to two (2) or more persons;

(iv) The murder was committed while the defendant was engaged, or was an accomplice, in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any aircraft piracy or the unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of a destructive device or bomb;

(v) The murder was committed for the purpose of avoiding or preventing a lawful arrest or effecting an escape from custody;

(vi) The murder was committed for compensation, the collection of insurance benefits or other similar pecuniary gain;

(vii) The murder was especially atrocious or cruel, being unnecessarily torturous to the victim;

(viii) The murder of a judicial officer, former judicial officer, district attorney, former district attorney, defending attorney, peace officer, juror or witness, during or because of the exercise of his official duty or because of the victim's former or present official status;

(ix) The defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was less than seventeen (17) years of age or older than sixty-five (65) years of age;
(x) The defendant knew or reasonably should have known the victim was especially vulnerable due to significant mental or physical disability;

(xi) The defendant poses a substantial and continuing threat of future dangerousness or is likely to commit continued acts of criminal violence;

(xii) The defendant killed another human being purposely and with premeditated malice and while engaged in, or as an accomplice in the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing or attempting to commit, any robbery, sexual assault, arson, burglary, kidnapping or abuse of a child under the age of sixteen (16) years.

(j) Mitigating circumstances shall include the following:

(i) The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal activity;

(ii) The murder was committed while the defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance;

(iii) The victim was a participant in the defendant's conduct or consented to the act;

(iv) The defendant was an accomplice in a murder committed by another person and his participation in the homicidal act was relatively minor;

(v) The defendant acted under extreme duress or under the substantial domination of another person;

(vi) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law was substantially impaired;

(vii) The age of the defendant at the time of the crime;

(viii) Any other fact or circumstance of the defendant's character or prior record or matter surrounding his offense which serves to mitigate his culpability.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-104 (2012). MURDER IN THE SECOND DEGREE; PENALTY.

Except as provided in W.S. 6-2-109, whoever purposely and maliciously, but without premeditation, kills any human being is guilty of murder in the second degree, and shall be imprisoned in the penitentiary for any term not less than twenty (20) years, or during life.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-105 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER; PENALTY

(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills any human being without malice, expressed or implied, either:

(i) Voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion; or

(ii) Involuntarily, but recklessly except under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-106(b).
(b) Except as provided in W.S. 6-2-109, manslaughter is a felony punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-106 (2012). HOMICIDE BY VEHICLE; AGGRAVATED HOMICIDE BY VEHICLE; PENALTIES.

(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a person is guilty of homicide by vehicle and shall be fined not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00) or imprisoned in the county jail for not more than one (1) year, or both, if he operates or drives a vehicle in a criminally negligent manner, and his conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another person. Evidence of a violation of any state law or ordinance applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic, except for evidence of a violation of W.S. 10-6-103, 31-5-233 and 41-13-206, is admissible in any prosecution under this subsection.

(b) A person is guilty of aggravated homicide by vehicle and shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years, if:

   (i) While operating or driving a vehicle in violation of W.S. 10-6-103, 31-5-233 or 41-13-206, he causes the death of another person and the violation is the proximate cause of the death; or

   (ii) He operates or drives a vehicle in a reckless manner, and his conduct is the proximate cause of the death of another person.

(c) The department of transportation shall revoke the license or permit to drive and the nonresident operating privilege of any person convicted of aggravated homicide by vehicle or of homicide by vehicle.

(d) Any person convicted of aggravated homicide by vehicle for causing the death of another person while operating or driving a vehicle in violation of W.S. 31-5-233 shall not be issued an ignition interlock restricted license under W.S. 31-5-233 or 31-7-401 through 31-7-404.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-107 (2012). CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE

(a) Except under circumstances constituting a violation of W.S. 6-2-106, a person is guilty of criminally negligent homicide if he causes the death of another person by conduct amounting to criminal negligence.

(b) Criminally negligent homicide is a misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment for not more than one (1) year, a fine of not more than two thousand dollars ($2,000.00), or both.

WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-108 (2012). DRUG INDUCED HOMICIDE; PENALTY

(a) A person is guilty of drug induced homicide if:

   (i) He is an adult or is at least four (4) years older than the victim; and

   (ii) He violates W.S. 35-7-1031(a)(i) or (ii) or (b)(i) or (ii) by unlawfully delivering a controlled substance to a minor and that minor dies as a result of the injection, inhalation, ingestion or administration by any other means of any amount of that controlled substance.

(b) Except as provided in W.S. 6-2-109, drug induced homicide is a felony punishable by imprisonment
in the penitentiary for not more than twenty (20) years.


(a) Upon sentencing of a defendant who is convicted of an offense pursuant to W.S. 6-2-104, 6-2-105 or 6-2-108, if the jury has found that the victim was pregnant at the time of the commission of the offense and that the defendant knew that the victim was pregnant at the time of the commission of the offense, the court shall impose a sentence as follows:

(i) For a conviction of W.S. 6-2-104, imprisonment in the penitentiary for any term not less than forty (40) years, or during life; or

(ii) For a conviction of W.S. 6-2-105 or 6-2-108, imprisonment in the penitentiary for any term not less than ten (10) years and not more than thirty (30) years.


(a) The local child protective agency shall:

(i) Prepare a plan for child protective services under guidelines prepared by the state agency, and provide services under the plan to prevent further child abuse or neglect. The plan shall be reviewed annually by both agencies;

(ii) Receive, assess, investigate or arrange for investigation and coordinate investigation or assessment of all reports of known or suspected child abuse or neglect;

(iii) Within twenty-four (24) hours after notification of a suspected case of child abuse or neglect, initiate an investigation or assessment and verification of every report. The representative of the child protective agency shall, at the initial time of contact with the individual subject to a child abuse and neglect investigation or assessment, advise the individual of the specific complaints or allegations made against the individual. A thorough investigation or assessment and report of child abuse or neglect shall be made in the manner and time prescribed by the state agency pursuant to rules and regulations adopted in accordance with the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act. If the child protective agency is denied reasonable access to a child by a parent or other persons and the agency deems that the best interest of the child so requires, it shall seek an appropriate court order by ex parte proceedings or other appropriate proceedings to see the child. The child protective agency shall assign a report:

(A) For investigation when allegations contained in the report indicate:

(I) That criminal charges could be filed, the child appears to be in imminent danger and it is likely the child will need to be removed from the home; or

(II) A child fatality, major injury or sexual abuse has occurred.

(B) For assessment when the report does not meet the criteria of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph.

(iv) If the investigation or assessment discloses that abuse or neglect is present, initiate services with
the family of the abused or neglected child to assist in resolving problems that lead to or caused the child abuse or neglect;

(v) If the child protective agency is able through investigation to substantiate a case of abuse or neglect, it shall notify the person suspected of causing the abuse or neglect by first class mail to his last known address of his right to request a hearing on the agency’s determination for a final determination before the office of administrative hearings pursuant to the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act;

(vi) Make reasonable efforts to contact the noncustodial parent of the child and inform the parent of substantiated abuse or neglect in high risk or moderate risk cases as determined pursuant to rules and regulations of the state agency and inform the parent of any proposed action to be taken;

(vii) Cooperate, coordinate and assist with the prosecution and law enforcement agencies;

(viii) When the best interest of the child requires court action, contact the county and prosecuting attorney to initiate legal proceedings and assist the county and prosecuting attorney during the proceedings. If the county attorney elects not to bring court action the local child protective agency may petition the court for appointment of a guardian ad litem who shall act in the best interest of the child and who may petition the court to direct the county attorney to show cause why an action should not be commenced under W.S. 14-3-401 through 14-3-439; and

(ix) Refer a child receiving department services who is under the age of six (6) years to the department of health, division of developmental disabilities preschool program for educational and developmental screening and assessment.

(b) The local child protective agency may appeal an adverse determination of the office of administrative hearings.

FEDERAL LEGISLATION/ U.S.
TERRITORIES

FEDERAL LEGISLATION

(a) Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought. Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying in wait, or any other kind of willful, deliberate, malicious, and premeditated killing; or committed in the perpetration of, or attempt to perpetrate, any arson, escape, murder, kidnaping, treason, espionage, sabotage, aggravated sexual abuse or sexual abuse, child abuse, burglary, or robbery; or perpetrated as part of a pattern or practice of assault or torture against a child or children; or perpetrated
from a premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human being other than him who is killed, is murder in the first degree. Any other murder is murder in the second degree.

(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, Whoever is guilty of murder in the first degree shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for life; Whoever is guilty of murder in the second degree, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.

(c) For purposes of this section--

(1) the term "assault" has the same meaning as given that term in section 113 [18 USCS § 113];

(2) the term "child" means a person who has not attained the age of 18 years and is—

(A) under the perpetrator's care or control; or

(B) at least six years younger than the perpetrator;

(3) the term "child abuse" means intentionally or knowingly causing death or serious bodily injury to a child;

(4) the term "pattern or practice of assault or torture" means assault or torture engaged in on at least two occasions;

(5) the term "serious bodily injury" has the meaning set forth in section 1365 [18 USCS § 1365]; and

(6) the term "torture" means conduct, whether or not committed under the color of law, that otherwise satisfies the definition set forth in section 2340(1) [18 USCS § 2340(1)].


(a) Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. It is of two kinds: Voluntary--Upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. Involuntary--In the commission of an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, or in the commission in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection, of a lawful act which might produce death.

(b) Within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, Whoever is guilty of voluntary manslaughter, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both; Whoever is guilty of involuntary manslaughter, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 8 years, or both.

18 U.S.C.S. § 1113 (2013). ATTEMPT TO COMMIT MURDER OR MANSLAUGHTER.

Except as provided in section 113 of this title [18 USCS § 113], whoever, within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, attempts to commit murder or manslaughter, shall, for an attempt to commit murder be imprisoned not more than twenty years or fined under this title, or both, and for an attempt to commit manslaughter be imprisoned not more than seven years or fined under this title, or both.

(a) Any physician who, in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 2 years, or both. This subsection does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself. This subsection takes effect 1 day after the enactment [enacted Nov. 5, 2003].

(b) As used in this section--

(1) the term "partial-birth abortion" means an abortion in which the person performing the abortion--

(A) deliberately and intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the partially delivered living fetus; and

(B) performs the overt act, other than completion of delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus; and

(2) the term "physician" means a doctor of medicine or osteopathy legally authorized to practice medicine and surgery by the State in which the doctor performs such activity, or any other individual legally authorized by the State to perform abortions: Provided, however, That any individual who is not a physician or not otherwise legally authorized by the State to perform abortions, but who nevertheless directly performs a partial-birth abortion, shall be subject to the provisions of this section.

(c)

(1) The father, if married to the mother at the time she receives a partial-birth abortion procedure, and if the mother has not attained the age of 18 years at the time of the abortion, the maternal grandparents of the fetus, may in a civil action obtain appropriate relief, unless the pregnancy resulted from the plaintiff's criminal conduct or the plaintiff consented to the abortion.

(2) Such relief shall include—

(A) money damages for all injuries, psychological and physical, occasioned by the violation of this section; and

(B) statutory damages equal to three times the cost of the partial-birth abortion.

(d)

(1) A defendant accused of an offense under this section may seek a hearing before the State Medical Board on whether the physician's conduct was necessary to save the life of the mother whose life was endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.
(2) The findings on that issue are admissible on that issue at the trial of the defendant. Upon a motion of the defendant, the court shall delay the beginning of the trial for not more than 30 days to permit such a hearing to take place.

(e) A woman upon whom a partial-birth abortion is performed may not be prosecuted under this section, for a conspiracy to violate this section, or for an offense under section 2, 3, or 4 of this title based on a violation of this section.


(a) Any Indian who commits against the person or property of another Indian or other person any of the following offenses, namely, murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, maiming, a felony under chapter 109A [18 USCS §§ 2241 et seq], incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury (as defined in section 1365 of this title [18 USCS § 1365]), an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of 16 years, felony child abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, robbery, and a felony under section 661 of this title [18 USCS § 661] within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same law and penalties as all other persons committing any of the above offenses, within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.

(b) Any offense referred to in subsection (a) of this section that is not defined and punished by Federal law in force within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States shall be defined and punished in accordance with the laws of the State in which such offense was committed as are in force at the time of such offense.

AMERICAN SAMOA


(a) The birth of every child shall be reported promptly to the pulenuu of the village where the child was born, together with such further particulars as the pulenuu may request. Within 30 days from the date of birth, the child shall be footprinted on a birth certificate provided by the Department of Health. The report of birth shall be made by the father or mother, or in the event of the death, absence or inability of the father or mother, by the owner of the house or place where the child was born.

(b) The death of every person shall be reported promptly to the pulenuu of the village where the death occurred, together with such further particulars as the pulenuu may request. The report of death shall be made by the occupant of the house or place where the death occurred, or by the relatives of the deceased.

(c) The pulenuu shall report all births and deaths, with such particulars as may be required, within 10 days following the birth or death, to the department of medical services. These reports shall be forwarded promptly to the Registrar of Vital Statistics, together with such comment as is pertinent.

(d) Births and deaths occurring at the LBJ Medical Center need not be reported to the pulenuu, but shall be reported by the Director of Health. Each child born at the center shall be footprinted on a birth certificate provided by the department.

Whoever unlawfully and unintentionally causes the death of another person while engaged in a violation of any law applying to the operation or use of a vehicle or to the regulation of traffic shall be guilty of homicide when such violation is the proximate cause of the death. Any person convicted of homicide by vehicle shall be fined not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both.

AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §22.0708 (2011). CAUSING DEATH OR BODILY INJURY WHILE DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE - PENALTY.

Any person operating or driving a motor vehicle, boat or ship of any kind while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, and who, by reason of such condition, does any act or neglects any duty imposed by law, which act or neglect of duty causes the death of or bodily injury to any person, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 5 years, or a fine not more than $5,000, or both.

AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §22.0502 (2011). ACCIDENT INVOLVING DEATH OR PERSONAL INJURIES.

(a) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible, but shall then forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of 22.0504. Every such stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than is necessary

(b) Any person failing to stop or to comply with these requirements under such circumstances is guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and upon conviction shall be sentenced accordingly.

(c) The Commissioner shall revoke the license or permit to drive of any resident or any nonresident’s operating privilege, of any person so convicted, for the period prescribed under 22.0213.

AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §46.3501 (2011). DEFINITIONS.

The following definitions are applicable in this chapter unless the context otherwise requires:

(a) “Criminal homicide” means conduct which causes the death of a person under circumstances constituting murder in the 1st or 2nd degree, manslaughter, or criminally negligent homicide.

(b) “Person”, when referring to the victim of a homicide, means a human being who had been born and was alive at the time of the homicidal act.

AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §46.3502 (2011). MURDER IN THE 1ST DEGREE.

(a) A person commits the crime of murder in the 1st degree if:

(1) intending or knowing that his conduct will cause death or serious bodily injury, he causes the death of another person with deliberation; or

(2) acting either alone or with 1 or more other persons, he commits or attempts to commit any class A felony and in the course of and in furtherance of the offense or immediate flight from it, he or another person who is a party to the offense recklessly causes the death of a person other than 1 of the parties to
the commission of the offense:

(3) it is an affirmative defense to a charge of violation subparagraph (a)(2) that the defendant:

(A) was not the only participant in the underlying crime:

(B) did not commit the homicidal act or in any way solicit, request, command importune, cause, or aid the commission of it:

(C) was not armed with a deadly weapon, or any instrument, article, or substance readily capable of causing death or serious physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places by law-abiding persons;

(D) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant was armed with such a weapon, instrument, article, or substance; and

(E) had no reasonable ground to believe that any other participant intended to engage in conduct likely to result in death or serious physical injury.

(b) For the purposes of this section, “deliberation” means that the defendant acts with either the intention or the knowledge that he will kill another human being or cause him serious bodily injury, when the intention or knowledge precedes the killing by an appreciable length of time to permit reflection; an act is not done with deliberation if it is the instant effort of impulse.

(c) The penalties for murder in the 1st degree are provided for in 46.3510 through 46.3516.

**AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §46.3503 (2011). MURDER IN THE 2ND DEGREE.**

(a) A person commits the crime of murder in the 2nd degree if:

(1) he intentionally causes the death of another person;

(2) knowing that his conduct will cause death or serious physical injury, he causes the death of another person; or

(3) under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to human life, he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death and thereby causes the death of another person.

(b) Murder in the 2nd degree is a class A felony.

**AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §46.3504 (2011). MANSLAUGHTER**

(a) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:

(1) it is committed recklessly; or

(2) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental
or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse; the reasonableness of the explanation or excuse is determined from the viewpoint of a person in the actor’s situation tinder the circumstances as he believes them to be:

(3) at the time of the killing, he believes the circumstances to be that, if they existed, would justify the killing under 46.3301 et seq., but his belief is unreasonable.

(b) Manslaughter is a class C felony.

**AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §46.3505 (2011). CRIMINALLY NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.**

(a) A person commits the crime of criminally negligent homicide if, with criminal negligence, he causes the death of another person.

(b) Criminally negligent homicide is a class D felony.

**AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §46.3902 (2011). UNLAWFUL ABORTION.**

(a) A person commits the crime of unlawful abortion if he uses any instrument or device or prescribes or administers any medicine, drug, or other substance which is likely to produce an abortion of a pregnant woman, with purpose to produce an abortion unless the abortion is authorized under 46.3903.

(b) The defendant has the burden of injecting the issue of authorized abortion.

(c) Unlawful abortion is a class D felony.

**AM. SAMOA CODE ANN. §47.0401 (2011). CRIME INVOLVING DOMESTIC OR FAMILY VIOLENCE DEFINED.**

(a) A “crime involving domestic or family violence” occurs when a family or household member, as defined in section 47.0102(1), commits one or more of the following crimes against another family or household member:

(1) arson;

(2) assault and harassment;

(3) burglary, robbery, tampering;

(4) property damage;

(5) homicide offenses (murder and manslaughter, negligent homicide);

(6) kidnapping, felonious restraint, false imprisonment;

(7) sex offenses (rape, sexual assault, deviate sexual assault, sexual abuse, child molesting);
(8) stealing and related offenses;

(9) weapon law violations (unlawful use of weapons, possessing a defaced firearm, unlawfully transferring a weapon, unlawful possession of firearms and firearm ammunition);

(10) offenses against public order (disturbing public peace, disbursing private peace);

(11) family offenses (bigamy, incest, abandonment of child; criminal nonsupport, endangering the welfare of a child, abuse of a child);

(12) property damage and trespass; and

(13) any other crimes which the Attorney General deems relevant and necessary.

(b) The above criminal laws encompassing (a)(1)-(13) shall be enforced without regard to whether the persons involved are or were married, cohabiting, or involved in a relationship.

GUAM

GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 9, § 16.20 (2012). CRIMINAL HOMICIDE DEFINED.

(a) A person is guilty of criminal homicide if he causes the death of another human being:

   (1) intentionally and with premeditation; or

   (2) intentionally; or

   (3) knowingly; or

   (4) recklessly; or

   (5) by criminal negligence.

(b) Criminal homicide is aggravated murder, murder, manslaughter or negligent homicide.

GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 9, § 16.30 (2012). AGGRAVATED MURDER DEFINED.

(a) Criminal homicide constitutes aggravated murder when:

   (1) it is committed intentionally with premeditation; or

   (2) it is committed during the commission or attempt to commit any felony defined in Chapters 22, 25, 31, 34, 37, 40 or 58 of this Title; or
(3) death is directly caused by the illegal use of a Schedule I Controlled Substance, as defined by Chapter 67 of this Title, to a minor child under the age of eighteen (18) years old (Any person who knowingly or willingly transfers or sells any Schedule I Controlled Substance, as defined by Chapter 67 of this Title, to a minor child under the age of eighteen (18) years old in violation of the provisions of Chapter 67 of this Title, and such controlled substances directly causes the death of such minor child, is guilty of aggravated murder. This Section shall not apply to health care professionals and pharmacists in the legitimate practice of the healing arts.); or

(4) it is committed upon the orders of another person. Such person giving the order is also guilty of aggravated murder.

(b) Aggravated murder is a felony of the first degree, but a person convicted of aggravated murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment notwithstanding any other provision of law; provided, further, that any person convicted of aggravated murder shall not be eligible for parole, work release, educational programs outside the confines of prison nor shall his sentence be suspended.

GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 9, § 16.40 (2012). MURDER DEFINED.

(a) Criminal homicide constitutes murder when:

(1) it is committed intentionally or knowingly; or

(2) it is committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life; or

(3) death is directly caused by the illegal use of a Schedule I Controlled Substance, defined by Chapter 67 of this Title, to any person. Any person who knowingly or willingly transfers or sells any Schedule I Controlled Substance to a person over the age of eighteen (18) years old in violation of the provisions of Chapter 67 of this Title, and such controlled substance directly causes the death of such person, is guilty of murder. This Section shall not apply to health care professionals and pharmacists in the legitimate practice of the healing arts.

(b) Murder is a felony of the first degree, but a person convicted of murder shall be sentenced to life imprisonment notwithstanding any other provision of law; provided, however, that any person convicted of murder shall be eligible for parole after serving fifteen (15) years as provided in § 80.72 of this Title and no part of said sentence shall be suspended; provided, further, that any person convicted of murder shall also not be eligible for work release or educational programs outside the confines of prison.

GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 9, § 16.50 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER DEFINED AND CLASSIFIED.

(a) Criminal homicide constitutes manslaughter when:

(1) it is committed recklessly; or

(2) a homicide which would otherwise be murder is committed under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance for which there is reasonable explanation or excuse (The reasonableness of such explanation or excuse shall be determined from the viewpoint of a reasonable person in the defendant's
situation under the circumstances as he believes them to be. The defendant must prove the reasonableness of such explanation or excuse by a preponderance of the evidence.); or

(3) death is indirectly or proximately caused, such as an accident, by the illegal use of a Schedule I Controlled Substance, as defined by Chapter 67 of this Title, to a person under the influence of such controlled substance. Any person who knowingly or willingly transfers or sells any Schedule I Controlled Substance to a person over the age of eighteen (18) years old in violation of the provisions of Chapter 67 of this Title, and such controlled substance indirectly or proximately causes the death of such person, is guilty of manslaughter. This Section shall not apply to health care professionals and pharmacists in the legitimate practice of the healing arts.

(b) Manslaughter is a felony of the first degree.

GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 9, § 16.60 (2012). NEGLIGENCE HOMICIDE DEFINED AND CLASSIFIED.

(a) Criminal homicide constitutes negligent homicide when it is committed by criminal negligence.

(b) Negligent homicide is a felony of the third degree.

GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 10, § 69210 (2012). MOTORBOAT OR VESSEL HOMICIDE; CLASSIFIED.

(a) A person is guilty of motorboat or vessel homicide if, while, he or she does any act forbidden by law in the operation of any motorboat or vessel or if he or she negligently operates a motorboat or vessel, which act or negligence proximately causes death to any person other than himself or herself. As allowed in § 4.45 of Title 9, Guam Code Annotated, in proving that the person did any act forbidden by law, it shall not be necessary to prove that the person possessed a culpable mental state. Motorboat or vessel homicide is a felony of the second degree and shall be punishable by imprisonment in the custody of DOC and GPD for up to eight (8) years.

(b) A person is guilty of motorboat or vessel homicide while intoxicated if, while operating a motorboat or vessel in violation of § 69201 of this Chapter, he or she does any act forbidden by law in the operation of such motorboat or vessel or if he or she negligently operates a motorboat or vessel, which act or negligence proximately causes death to any person other than himself or herself. As allowed in § 4.45 of Title 9, Guam Code Annotated, in proving that the person did any act forbidden by law, it shall not be necessary to prove that the person possessed a culpable mental state. Motorboat or vessel homicide while intoxicated is a felony of the second degree and shall be punishable by imprisonment in the custody of DOC or GPD for not less than a mandatory five (5) years, and up to fifteen (15) years. The court may order that any person punished under this Subsection be prohibited from operating any motorboat or vessel on any waters of this Territory for a period of not more than ten (10) years.


10 GCA § 91A102

A person shall not knowingly perform or attempt to perform a partial-birth abortion. Any physician who knowingly performs a partial-birth abortion and thereby kills a human fetus shall be fined under this Title or imprisoned not more than ten (10) years, or both. This Subsection takes effect one (1) day after the enactment. This Subsection does not apply to a partial-birth abortion that is necessary to save the life of a mother whose life is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.

GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 10, § 91A105 (2012). PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTIONS PUNISHMENT.

Any person performing a partial-birth abortion shall be guilty of a third degree felony.

GUAM CODE ANN. TIT. 16, § 18111 (2012). VEHICULAR HOMICIDE; CLASSIFIED.

(a) A person is guilty of vehicular homicide if, while driving a vehicle, he or she does any act forbidden by law in the driving of the vehicle or if he or she negligently drives a vehicle, which act or negligence proximately causes death to any person other than himself or herself. As allowed in § 4.45 of Title 9, Guam Code Annotated, in proving that the person did any act forbidden by law, it shall not be necessary to prove that the person possessed a culpable mental state. Vehicular homicide is a felony of the second degree and shall be punishable by imprisonment in the custody of DOC and GPD for up to eight (8) years.

(b) A person is guilty of vehicular homicide while intoxicated if, while driving a vehicle in violation of § 18102 of this Chapter, he or she does any act forbidden by law in the operating or driving of the vehicle or if he or she negligently operates or drives a vehicle, which act or negligence proximately causes death to any person other than himself or herself. As allowed in § 4.45 of Title 9, Guam Code Annotated, in proving that the person did any act forbidden by law, it shall not be necessary to prove that the person possessed a culpable mental state. Vehicular homicide while intoxicated is a felony of the second degree and shall be punishable by imprisonment in the custody of DOC or GPD for not less than a mandatory five (5) years, and up to fifteen (15) years.

PUERTO RICO

P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 1051 (2010). ABORTION PROHIBITED.

It is hereby prohibited, except in the case of a therapeutic prescription by a physician duly authorized to practice medicine in Puerto Rico, for the purpose of preserving health or life, to prescribe, advise, or induce abortion, or to practice abortion on a pregnant woman.

P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 1052 (2010). ABORTION PROHIBITED – PENALTIES.

Every person who, in violation of the provisions of § 1051 of this title, may furnish, supply, prescribe, or administer to a pregnant woman, by oral, rectal, or vaginal injections, any drug, substance, or medicinal,
therapeutic, or opotheretic agent, or who uses any surgical instrument or mechanical agent with the intention or purpose of causing abortion, or practicing an abortion, shall be guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be punished by imprisonment in the penitentiary for five (5) to ten (10) years, on the first conviction, and [for] ten (10) years in cases of recidivism.

P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4655 (2010). STATE OF NECESSITY.

Any person who, in order to protect his/her own or another's right from an imminent danger, not provoked by him/her and otherwise inevitable, infringes a duty or causes damage to another's legally protected interest, shall not be liable, provided that the damage caused is lesser than the damage sought to be prevented and does not cause the death or the serious and permanent injury to the physical integrity of a person.

This cause for justification shall not benefit a person who, by reason of his/her office, occupation or activity, is bound to confront the risk and the consequences thereof.

P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4733 (2010). MURDER.

Murder is to kill another human being with intent.

P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4734 (2010). DEGREES OF MURDER.

First degree murder is constituted by:

(a) Any murder committed by means of poison, stalking or torture, or with premeditation.

(b) Any murder committed as a natural consequence of the attempt or consummation of aggravated arson, sexual assault, robbery, aggravated burglary, kidnapping, child abduction, serious damage or destruction, poisoning of bodies of water for public use, mayhem, escape, and intentional abuse or abandonment of a minor.

(c) The murder of a law enforcement officer, school police, municipal guard or police officer, marshal, prosecutor, solicitor for minors' affairs, special family solicitors for child abuse, judge or custody officer in the performance of his duty, committed while carrying out, attempting or concealing a felony.

Any other intentional killing of a human being constitutes second degree murder.

P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4735 (2010). PENALTIES FOR MURDER.

Any person convicted of murder in the first degree shall be penalized as established for a first degree felony.

Any person convicted of murder in the second degree shall be penalized as established for a severe second degree felony.
P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4736 (2010). MANSLAUGHTER.

Notwithstanding the provisions of § 4735 of this title, when the murder occurs in circumstances of sudden heat of passion or rage, the convict shall receive the penalty established for a third degree felony.

P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4737 (2010). NEGLIGENT HOMICIDE.

Any person who causes the death of another through negligence shall incur a misdemeanor, but shall receive the penalty established for a fourth degree felony.

When the death is caused while driving a motor vehicle with wanton disregard for the safety of others, or while aiming and shooting a firearm at an undefined target, the offender shall incur a third degree felony.

When the death is caused while driving a motor vehicle under the influence of controlled substances or alcoholic beverages, as provided and defined in §§ 5001 et seq. of Title 9, known as the 'Puerto Rico Vehicle and Traffic Act', the offender shall incur a second degree felony.

P.R. LAWS ANN. TIT. 33, § 4740 (2010). COMMITTED OR CONSENTED BY THE WOMAN.

A woman who seeks from any other person with the purpose of provoking an abortion any medicine, drug or substance and takes it, or who undergoes any operation or any other surgical procedure or means, except in the case that it were necessary to save her health or life, shall incur a fourth degree felony.

VIRGIN ISLANDS

V.I. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, § 922 (2012). FIRST AND SECOND DEGREE MURDER DEFINED.

(a) All murder which--

(1) is perpetrated by means of poison, lying in wait, torture, detonation of a bomb or by any other kind of willful, deliberate and premeditated killing;

(2) is committed in the perpetration or attempt to perpetrate arson, burglary, kidnapping, rape, robbery or mayhem, assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, assault in the third degree and larceny; or

(3) is committed against (A) an official, law enforcement officer, or other officer or employee of the Government of the Virgin Islands while working with law enforcement officials in furtherance of a criminal investigation (i) while the victim is engaged in the performance of official duties; (ii) because of the performance of the victim's official duties; or (iii) because of the victim's status as a public servant; or (B) any person assisting a criminal investigation, while that assistance is being rendered and because it is first degree murder;

is murder in the first degree. (b) All other kinds of murder are murder in the second degree.
V.I. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, § 923 (2012). PUNISHMENT FOR MURDER

(a) Whoever commits murder in the first degree shall be imprisoned for the remainder of his natural life without parole.

(b) Whoever commits murder in the second degree shall be imprisoned for not less than five (5) years, provided, that if such second degree murder was perpetrated upon a law enforcement officer while such officer was engaged in the performance of his official duties, the perpetrator shall be imprisoned for not less than ten (10) years.

V.I. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, § 924 (2012). MANSLAUGHTER DEFINED AND CLASSIFIED
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice aforethought. It is of two kinds--

(1) voluntary; upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion; or

(2) involuntary; in the commission of an unlawful act, not amounting to a felony; or in the culpable omission of some legal duty; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspection.

V.I. CODE ANN. TIT. 14, § 925 (2012). PUNISHMENT FOR MANSLAUGHTER

(a) Whoever commits voluntary manslaughter shall be imprisoned for not more than ten (10) years, provided, that if such voluntary manslaughter is perpetrated upon a law enforcement officer while such officer is engaged in the performance of his official duties, the perpetrator shall be imprisoned for not less than five (5) years nor more than fifteen (15) years.

(b) Whoever commits involuntary manslaughter shall be imprisoned not more than 5 years.