United States v. Hudspeth, No 05-3316, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 5157, at (8th Cir. Mar. 11, 2008)
The police obtained a warrant to search the Appellant’s place of business for evidence of large quantities of pseudoephedrine cold tablets. Upon searching the Appellant’s work computer, an officer discovered images of child pornography. The Appellant refused the officer’s request to search the Appellant’s home computer for additional images. The officers then went to the Appellant’s house, and asked the Appellant’s wife if they could search the Appellant’s home computer. She declined, and the officer informed her that an officer would remain to secure the computer while a warrant was obtained. The Appellant’s wife eventually consented to the seizure and the police seized the computer. At no time did the police inform the Appellant’s wife that the Appellant had previously denied the police permission to search his computer.
In the en banc rehearing, the Eighth Circuit distinguished the instant case from relevant Supreme Court decisions, and found that it was reasonable for a tenant to consent for a search of the dwelling, even over the express objection of an absent co-tenant. Since the Court found that no case was exactly on point, they analyzed three similar cases in reaching their conclusion. In the initial appellate hearing, U.S. v. Hudspeth, 459 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2006), the Eighth Circuit relied heavily upon dicta from Georgia v. Randolph stating that “there is no common understanding that one co-tenant generally has a right or authority to prevail over the wish of another.” 126 U.S. 1515, 1523 (2006). In Randolph, the husband and wife were present when the police sought consent to search. The wife gave consent, but the husband refused consent to search their house. The Court suppressed the evidence, limiting its ruling to situations where both occupants were present but the occupants disagreed on whether the police could search the premises. In United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974), the Supreme Court held that the police could validly obtain consent to search a residence from the wife of a suspect who was in custody in a nearby police car. In Matlock, the suspect was never asked for his consent, yet, the Court ruled that the government could satisfy its burden of proving consent to a warrantless search by showing "permission to search was obtained from a third party [Graff] who possessed common authority over . . . the premises" to be searched. Matlock, 415 U.S. at 17. Matlock also held that “it is reasonable to recognize that any of the co-inhabitants has the right to permit the inspection,” and that the absent co-inhabitant has “assumed the risk.” 415 U.S. at 171. In Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183 (1990), the Court held that all searches must be “reasonable.” United States v. Hudspeth, No 05-3316, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 5157, (8th Cir. Mar. 11, 2008).
The Eighth Circuit found in the rehearing that neither Randolph nor Matlock controlled the instant case. Unlike in Matlock, the Appellant had expressly denied permission to search his residence. The Eighth Circuit concluded that it was reasonable for one inhabitant to be able to consent for a search when the other inhabitant was not present. Thus the Appellant’s refusal to give consent was superseded by his wife’s consent, and the evidence from the search was admissible.
